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Abstract 
This thesis aims to analyse the phenomenon of cryptocurrencies, specifically the legal 
understanding of cryptocurrencies, to assess whether they may be used to launder 
money, and if so, how this risk should be addressed in the United Kingdom. 
Cryptocurrencies have had a tumultuous existence since the publication of original 
white paper proposing the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, by Satoshi Nakamoto in 
October 2008. Bitcoin in particular has had dramatic fluctuations in its value, and it has 
been at the centre of high-profile scandals such as the collapse of the Mt Gox 
exchange in February 2014 and been utilised as the preferred payment method for 
ransomware demands, such as the ‘WannaCry’ cyber-attack on the NHS in May 2017. 
While awareness of cryptocurrencies is growing, the understanding, use and 
regulation of them remains limited in the United Kingdom. Cryptocurrencies allow 
transactions, of any size, to be completed within minutes, and without the need for 
financial institutions to facilitate, or any centralised government interference. The 
cryptocurrency model relies on a publicly distributed ledger that is maintained by all 
the computers in the system to keep it up to date and free from fraud and replaces 
individuals’ names with public codes, making cryptocurrencies pseudonymous. The 
limited awareness of cryptocurrencies, and the degree of anonymity afforded to users, 
could be viewed as an ideal opportunity for money launderers who are seeking to hide 
and disguise their proceeds of crime via a decentralised cryptocurrency system. 
 
This thesis concludes that the United Kingdom has not kept pace with international 
best practice in anti-money laundering regulation with regards to cryptocurrencies, but 
also that the current international standards do not fully regulate cryptocurrencies from 
 v 
an anti-money laundering perspective. The gap between the United Kingdom and the 
leading regulation in the United States of America and Australia will be closed by the 
implementation of the 5th Anti-Money Directive. However, this thesis proposes that a 
tailored approach to cryptocurrencies is needed as the application of existing anti-
money laundering measures is not compatible with cryptocurrencies and fails to 
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Money Laundering through Cryptocurrencies: Analysing the responses of the United 
States and Australia and providing recommendations for the UK to address the money 
laundering risks posed by cryptocurrencies.  
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Cryptocurrencies have had a tumultuous existence since the publication of the original 
white paper proposing the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, by Satoshi Nakamoto in 
October 2008.1 Bitcoin in particular has had dramatic fluctuations in its value,2 and it 
has been at the centre of high-profile scandals such as the collapse of the Mt Gox 
exchange in February 2014,3 and been utilised as the preferred payment method for 
ransomware demands, such as in the ‘WannaCry’ cyber-attack on the NHS in May 
2017.4 While awareness of cryptocurrencies is growing, the understanding, use and 
regulation of them remains limited in the UK, as identified by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) in March 2019 when it published research into UK consumers’ use of 
                                                     
1 The published name of the author(s) is widely accepted to be a pseudonym and their real identity 
remains unknown: Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015. 
2 Huge spikes in the value of Bitcoin can be seen through a 10-year chart of its value against the US$: 
XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to USD’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=USD&view=10Y> accessed 07 October 2019. 
3 BBC News, ‘MtGox bitcoin exchange files for bankruptcy’ (28 February 2014) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25233230> accessed 07 October 2019. 
4 BBC News, ‘NHS cyber-attack: GPs and hospitals hit by ransomware’ (13 May 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-39899646> accessed 097 October 2019. 
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cryptocurrencies.5 The headline findings were that cryptocurrencies were being 
bought based on limited information, with purchasers often being influenced by a 
rejection of mainstream media, a fear of missing out on trends, and seeking to ‘get rich 
quick’.6 It follows that if consumers are poorly informed, then they are more likely to 
make poor financial choices. An indication of this can be seen in the numbers of 
individuals being used as money mules is increasing both in younger people7 and 
older people,8 which raises concerns that cryptocurrencies could be utilised in a similar 
fashion.  
 
Cryptocurrencies allow transactions, of any size, to be completed within minutes, 
without the need for financial institutions to facilitate, or any centralised government 
interference.9 The cryptocurrency model relies on a publicly distributed ledger that is 
maintained by all the computers in the system, to keep it up to date and free from 
fraud.10 The ledger, known as a blockchain replaces individuals’ names with public 
codes.11 The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies is described as 
pseudonymous,12 as although the users’ names are not known, other details are 
published on the blockchain;13 such as their Bitcoin address, the time of the 
                                                     
5 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘How and why consumers buy cryptoassets: A report for the FCA’ (07 
March 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/how-and-why-consumers-buy-
cryptoassets.pdf> accessed 23 September 2019. 
6 ibid p.47. 
7 BBC News, ‘Rise in teenage money mules prompts warnings’ (16 September 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49717288> accessed 23 September 2019. 
8 BBC News, ‘'Money mules': Rising numbers are in middle age’ (18 June 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48671542> accessed 23 September 2019. 
9 As demonstrated by the Bitcoin white paper: Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2015. 
10 ibid p.8. 
11 ibid. 
12 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> 
accessed 16 December 2015 at p.6. 
13 The public ledger of Bitcoin. See chapter three at 3.3.2 for explanation of what the blockchain. 
 3 
transaction, and the amount. The limited awareness of cryptocurrencies, and the 
degree of anonymity afforded to users, could be viewed as an ideal opportunity for 
anybody seeking to hide and disguise their proceeds of crime. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this research is to analyse the phenomenon of cryptocurrencies, 
specifically the legal understanding of cryptocurrencies. Additionally the research will 
assess whether cryptocurrencies may be used to launder money, and if so, how this 
risk should be addressed. The recommendations of this research are in relation to the 
United Kingdom (UK), based on an analysis of cryptocurrencies, the development of 
existing anti-money laundering (AML) regulation, and the responses of the United 
States of America (US) and Australia. 
 
1.2. Research Question 
How can the UK learn from international guidance and the approaches of the United 
States and Australia to address the money laundering risks posed by 
cryptocurrencies? 
 
1.3. Research Objectives  
This thesis will critique the approach of the UK to the money laundering threat posed 
by cryptocurrencies. In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to 
identify and distinguish the different types of virtual currencies, so as to determine 
which virtual currencies require regulation, and the most appropriate use of regulation. 
It will be established that cryptocurrencies are a class of virtual currencies which 
 4 
require specific attention. The concept of money will be explored, specifically whether 
cryptocurrencies are money. The reason being is if cryptocurrencies are considered 
to be classified as money then AML legislation should already be applied. This 
research will examine the development of the AML legislation from its beginnings as 
part of the United Nations (UN) ‘War on Drugs’, through to the modern-day 
entanglement with terrorism financing.14 The aim of this historical analysis will be to 
better predict developments and to demonstrate the evolution of AML regulation in 
response to the continuing evolution of money laundering. This research includes case 
studies of the US and Australia, analysing their reactions to the development of 
cryptocurrencies. These case studies are used to contrast with the position of the UK 
and inform the recommendations of this thesis. The US is a world leader in AML 
regulation,15 often being the first to adopt new measures,16 and first criminalised 
money laundering in 1986,17 the same year as the UK.18 Australia has also been at 
the forefront of tackling money laundering, enacting criminal offences the 1987,19 and 
has recently taken the step of regulating cryptocurrencies.20 
 
                                                     
14 See chapter four at 4.5 for a detailed chronology of AML development, with reference to: Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict, Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act 2001 and the development of the term ‘reverse money laundering’: S. D. Cassella, 
‘Reverse money laundering (2003) 7(1) Journal of Money Laundering 92 at pp.92-93. 
15 N. Ryder, Money laundering – an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-money 
laundering policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge, London, 2012) at 1.3. 
16 Examples include the Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91–508, Money Laundering Control Act Pub. L. 
99-570 and Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act 1992 §1571. See chapter four timeline of anti-
money laundering developments for more detail. 
17 Money Laundering Control Act Pub. L. 99-570. 
18 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
19 Proceeds of Crime Act 1987. 
20 AUSTRAC, ‘New Australian laws to regulate cryptocurrency providers’ 
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/media/media-releases/new-australian-laws-regulate-cryptocurrency-
providers> accessed 23 July 2018. 
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Where possible this thesis will not address the crime of terrorist financing, which has 
become entangled with money laundering since the turn of the century. This is justified 
by the distinct nature of the two practices, and therefore each requiring a distinct 
regulatory approach. This position is supported by Alexander21 and Roberge22 who 
both distinguish money laundering and terrorist financing based on the aims of the two 
crimes, money laundering is concerned with the origins of the money, compared to 
terrorist financing which is concerned with its destination. Cryptocurrencies 
undoubtedly have terrorist financing applications, and while there may be some 
common ground with money laundering, terrorist financing cannot be adequately 
covered within this thesis in conjunction with money laundering. 
 
This thesis critiques the current approach toward cryptocurrencies in the UK, with 
reference to international guidance and the measures adopted in the US and Australia, 
to recommend appropriate reforms. This analysis comes at a time when the UK 
government has publicly stated it will regulate cryptocurrencies, so as to comply with 
the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive,23 but detail on this regulation is lacking.24 
 
                                                     
21 R. Alexander, Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the EU: Law and Regulation (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007) at p.173. 
22 Ian Roberge, ‘Misguided Policies in the War on Terror? The Case for Disentangling Terrorist 
Financing from Money Laundering’ (2007) 27(3) Political Studies Associations 196. 
23 Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] 
OJ L 156/43. 
24 Discussed in chapter five at 5.7 and outlined in: HM Treasury, ‘Cryptoassets Taskforce: final report’ 
(29 October 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7
52070/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_web.pdf> accessed 20 September 2019. 
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1.4. Central Argument 
This thesis argues that a tailored approach is needed towards the regulation, and 
monitoring of cryptocurrencies, and simply transposing existing regulations onto 
cryptocurrencies will not be effective. Justifications for this include concerns that 
transactions within the networks of cryptocurrencies do not go through regulated 
entities, and that existing AML tools are not compatible with cryptocurrencies, such as 
freezing transactions to allow time for investigations by regulators. Current 
international best practice issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and 
legislation enacted by the European Union (EU), ignores the wealth of data available 
through the distributed ledgers of cryptocurrencies. It is recommended that the UK 
utilises the data available through the blockchain to monitor money laundering and aid 
investigations. A plethora of software tools exist which can visualise the blockchain 
and analyse the data available,25 allowing supervision to widen from just the 
intersections between fiat currency and cryptocurrency to all transactions. The wealth 
of transaction data available in a digital format, paired with the traditional AML 
measures applied to cryptocurrency service providers, will begin to address the 
currently unregulated realm of cryptocurrencies. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of the current level of AML regulation of cryptocurrency 
service providers, it is recommended that the UK follows international 
recommendations pertaining to applying AML to cryptocurrency service providers. The 
                                                     
25 Tools such as Maltego: Maltego, ‘Visualising the Bitcoin Blockchain in Maltego’ (12 April 2016) 
<http://maltego.blogspot.com/2016/04/visualization-bitcoin-blockchain-in.html> accessed 07 October 
2019 and a variety of tools offered here: Examples can be found at Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Bitcoin 
Developer APIs’ <https://www.blockchain.com/api> accessed 26 September 2019. 
 7 
UK should follow the guidance of the FATF26 as the leading global AML organisation, 
and implement the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive enacted by the EU.27 The 
reason for this is that the UK is currently lagging behind in developing AML regulation 
of cryptocurrencies and it should utilise the examples set by the US and Australia so 
as to close the gap. The 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive adds “virtual currency 
exchange platforms as well as custodian wallet providers to the list of obliged entities 
within the scope of the Directive;”28 which mirrors the guidance of the FATF with 
regards to bringing points of intersection between virtual currencies and the traditional 
financial system under the scope of EU AML regulations. The UK implemented the 5th 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive in January 2020,29 and exceeded the requirements 
of the Directive by applying AML measures to transactions involving exchanges 
between cryptocurrencies as well as exchanges between cryptocurrencies and fiat 
currencies.  
 
This thesis argues that consistent terminology should be used to refer to 
cryptocurrencies to provide clarity to regulators and market users. Currently a number 
of different terms are being used by international and supranational organisations, 
such as the FATF and the EU, and nationally by the UK, the US, and Australia. This 
                                                     
26 The Financial Action Task Force is the leading international organisation tackling money 
laundering, as identified in chapter four, their latest guidance can be found here: Financial Action 
Taskforce, ‘FATF Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF-Report-G20-FM-CBG-July-2018.pdf> accessed 23 July 
2018. 
27 Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] 
OJ L 156/43. 
28 EUROPA, ‘Revision of the Fourth Anti-Money-Laundering Directive’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607260/EPRS_BRI%282017%29607260
_EN.pdf> accessed 10 September 2019. 
29 The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/1511. 
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thesis recommends the term cryptocurrencies as this term specifically refers to 
exclusively digital virtual currencies, which operate based on a decentralised network 
using a distributed ledger. The term ‘virtual assets’, used by the FATF, is too broad as 
the term could also include virtual currencies which are centralised, and can be 
regulated through regulation of that central authority. Cryptocurrencies are a specific 
subset of virtual currencies, which due to their decentralised nature require unique 
AML measures. The EU use the term ‘virtual currencies’ and Australia used the term 
‘digital currency’,30 both of which suffer from the same shortcomings as the FATF term, 
as they do not sufficiently define cryptocurrencies. The agencies of the US also 
predominantly use the term ‘virtual currencies’,31 but the terminology used by the 
various authorities in the US is not consistent. It is still too early to determine whether 
cryptocurrencies are going to replace fiat money, or even compete with it, but the 
current levels of cryptocurrency usage require a clear response from the UK 
government and authorities. 
 
1.5. Identifying Cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies are a category of virtual currency. The term virtual currencies used 
alone refers to any currencies which exist solely in electronic form, having no official 
physical form. A virtual currency is defined by the FATF as;  
 
                                                     
30 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
31 As demonstrated throughout the GAO report on in 2014: United States Government Accountability 
Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. The term is also used by 
FinCEN: FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving 
Convertible Virtual Currencies’ (9 May 2019) <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. The CFTC 
refer to Bitcoin directly, but also use the term: CFTC, ‘Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies’ 
https://www.cftc.gov/Bitcoin/index.htm> accessed 04 September 2019. 
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“a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as 
(1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of 
value, but does not have legal tender status … It is not issued nor guaranteed 
by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above functions only by agreement within the 
community of users of the virtual currency.”32 
 
The focus of the FATF definition is on the functions of money and how virtual 
currencies meet the requirements based on user acceptability. This contrasts to the  
European Central Bank (ECB) viewed virtual currencies as ‘schemes’,33 and in 2012 
defined them as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually 
controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific 
virtual community.”34 The ECB updated their position in 2015, and stated that “the 
word ‘unregulated’ should be deleted from the definition used in 2012,”35 as it 
recognised some jurisdictions had regulated virtual currencies.36 The definition was 
therefore updated to “digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, 
credit institution or e-money institution, which, in some circumstances, can be used as 
an alternative to money.”37 The ECB do not recognised virtual currencies as money, 
but accept that they can be used as an alternative to money. 
 
                                                     
32 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th October 2019 at page 4. 
33 ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> accessed 02 June 
2019. 
34 ibid at p13. 
35 ibid at p25. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid.  
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Both the FATF and the EU place emphasis on the transferability of virtual currencies 
for fiat currencies, but the FATF also considers the administration of the virtual 
currency as part of its classifications, distinguishing between centralised and 
decentralised systems. Figure 1 below demonstrates how the FATF categorises virtual 
currencies. 
 
Figure 1. FATF Categories of Virtual Currency38 
 Centralised Decentralised 
Convertible Linden Dollars (used in Second 
Life) are an example of a 
convertible virtual world 
currency; users may exchange 
their currency for US Dollars. The 
currency is centralised, Linden 
Labs (the developer of Second 
Life) act as administrators.  
Examples of decentralised 
currencies include Bitcoin and 
Dogecoin. These are convertible for 





World of Warcraft (WoW) gold is 
non-convertible virtual world 
currency; users may not convert 
this into a fiat currency. WoW 




                                                     
38 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th October 2019 at p.8. 
39 ibid. 
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As can be seen in Figure 1, the FATF consider the structure and convertibility of the 
virtual currency in order to categorise them. Structures are either centralised or 
decentralised, and a virtual currency can be either convertible or non-convertible. A 
virtual currency is centralised when it is controlled by a single administrating authority; 
examples of these are the currencies of virtual worlds. The degree of control exercised 
may vary according to the practices of the administrator and whether the currency is 
convertible or not. A decentralised currency has no central authority; instead it 
functions using algorithms and programming code to manage the production of the 
currency. The focus of this research is upon convertible decentralised virtual 
currencies, known as cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies are particularly novel due to 
their decentralised nature, which is also what makes them so challenging for 
regulators, there is no administrator who can be subject to regulation. The operation 
of cryptocurrencies is best explained through the leading example of Bitcoin. 
 
1.5.1. Bitcoin 
Bitcoin warrants particular attention due to its value,40 and because it is the forerunner 
to the growth of cryptocurrencies.41 Bitcoin is a virtual currency but is also referred to 
as a cryptocurrency, a currency which uses cryptography to disguise or protect the 
users of the currency. Cryptocurrencies utilise cryptography techniques to conceal the 
identity of the sender and receiver of a message or transfer, Southall and Taylor42 
trace the technique used by Bitcoin, and many other currencies, back to proposals 
                                                     
40 BBC News, ‘Bitcoin Currency Hits New Record High’ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
42135963> accessed 19 March 2019. 
41 Though widely considered the first cryptocurrency, the original paper proposing Bitcoin references a 
number of papers including previous proposals for web-based money such as: W. Dai, ‘b-money’ 
(1998) <http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt> accessed 13 October 2019. 
42 E. Southall and M. Taylor, ‘Bitcoins’ [2013] 19(6) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 
177. 
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made by Chaum in the early 1980’s. Chaum proposed sending private messages with 
a serial key system;43 messages were sent using a public key, but only the sender and 
recipient could access the message using a private key. Chaum subsequently 
suggested the technique could be used to facilitate anonymous payments.44 
 
Bitcoin is not the first digital currency; previous digital currencies have been created 
but failed to persist. Examples of this include ‘Beenz’ which launched in 1999 and 
promised to create “a generation of e-millionaires”45 but closed in 2001,46 just weeks 
after rival currency ‘Flooz’47 also shut down. As is discussed later in chapter three;48 
numerous factors determine whether something is accepted as money, and as their 
demise demonstrates, early digital currencies failed to be accepted as money by a 
large enough community.  
 
Bitcoin was created by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009.49 The true identity of Bitcoin’s 
creator(s) is unknown as Satoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym. It is not known if Satoshi 
Nakamoto is one person or a group of people as throughout the self-published paper 
proposing Bitcoins, the term ‘we’ is used to refer to the author, suggesting it may be 
more than one person. Bitcoins can be distinguished from early digital currencies, and 
subsequent digital currencies can be seen to have copied the characteristics of 
                                                     
43 D. Chaum, ‘Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms’ [1981] 24(2) 
Communications of the ACM 84. 
44 D. Chaum, ‘Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments’ in D. Chaum. R.L. Rivest and A.T. 
Sherman (ed), ‘Advances in Cryptology’ (Session III, Springer US, 1982) pp199-203. 
45 BBC News, ‘Business: The Company File: Beenz means business’ (16 March 1999) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/297133.stm> accessed 12 June 2019. 
46 Commerce Times, ‘Beenz.com Closes Internet Currency Business’ 
<http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/12892.html> accessed 12 June 2015. 
47 CNet, ‘E-currency Site Flooz Goes Offline’ <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-271385.html> 
accessed 12 June 2019. 
48 See 3.4 and 3.5. 
49 Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ < http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 October 2019. 
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Bitcoin. Bitcoin operates using the process summarised below as it appeared in the 
original paper by Satoshi Nakamoto:50 
 
1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 
2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.  
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block. 
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes. 
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already 
spent. 
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next 
block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous 
hash.51 
 
Stage three introduces the concept of proof-of-work, this part of the process is known 
as mining. The mining process involves a user’s computer, known as a node, providing 
an answer which matches the solution the system is requesting in order to produce a 
‘block’, known as a ‘proof-of-work’, Blocks are sets of data which are permanent record 
in the Bitcoin network, they are a leger of Bitcoin transactions,52 and known as the 
blockchain.53 By finding the proof-of-work and completing the block the user then 
acquires some newly created Bitcoins, currently 6.25 Bitcoins.54 Each block can only 
                                                     
50 ibid.  
51 ibid at p.3. 
52 ibid at p.8. 
53 Bitcoin, ‘How it Works’ <https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works> accessed 13 October 2019. 
54 B. Bambrough, ‘A Bitcoin Halvening Is Two Years Away - Here's What'll Happen To The Bitcoin 
Price’ (Forbes, 29 May 2018) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/05/29/a-bitcoin-
halvening-is-two-years-away-heres-whatll-happen-to-the-bitcoin-price/#4bffecd05286> accessed 19 
March 2019. 
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be produced once, the Bitcoin reward goes to the miner who first produces the block, 
and duplicates are not accepted. The alternative way to obtain Bitcoins is via 
cryptocurrency exchanges.55  
 
Users send messages to each other in order to send and receive Bitcoins; this process 
uses a cryptography technique similar to that proposed by Chaum. When a user sends 
another user some Bitcoins two keys are used. The first is the public key which tells 
the network of the transaction between the two keys, the second is a private key which 
is a signature from the sender which prevents the amounts being transferred from 
being altered by anyone else in the network.56 This is shown below in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Bitcoin Transactions57 
 
 
                                                     
55 Rates can be viewed here: Bitcoin Charts, ‘Markets’ <http://bitcoincharts.com/markets/> accessed 
18 June 2015. 
56 Bitcoin.org, ‘How Does Bitcoin Work?’ <http://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works> accessed 19 January 
2014. 
57 Taken from: Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015. 
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The use of keys rather than names allows all transactions to be public and verifiable, 
to ensure no Bitcoins are spent twice, but still ensure the anonymity of those making 
the transactions. This anonymity will be lost if the user’s key were to become public, 
and then all transactions may be traced. The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies 
is addressed by the United States Government Accountability Office in their 2014 
report, which described such currencies as pseudonymous.58 The term 
pseudonymous is used as, although the users name is not known, other details are 
published on the blockchain, such as their Bitcoin address, the time of the transaction, 
and the amount. Transactions of Bitcoins are authenticated by users of the network. 
Authentication ensures the sender has sufficient funds and that there are no duplicated 
uses of Bitcoin. This authentication occurs when the proof-of-work is found; at this 
point the computer which solved the proof-of work verifies all of the transactions which 
took places since the last proof-of-work was produced.59 In order to control the number 
of Bitcoins being produced the difficulty of the proof-of-work problems is adjusted 
based on the average time between blocks.60 The variability in difficulty is to 
compensate for increasing computing power. The Bitcoin system aims for a block to 
be produced every 10 minutes.61  
 
Bitcoin’s model of coin production, transaction security and transaction logging has 
been adopted by numerous subsequent currencies, such as Ethereum,62 Dogecoin63 
                                                     
58 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> 
accessed 16 December 2015 at p.6. 
59 Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015 at p.3. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 Ethereum, ‘Learn about Ethereum’ <https://www.ethereum.org/learn/> accessed 13 October 2019. 
63 Dogecoin, ‘Dogecoin’ <https://dogecoin.com/> accessed 13 October 2019. 
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and LiteCoin.64 The various currencies compete amongst each other by claiming to 
offer faster transaction speeds or increased security.65 A key feature of 
cryptocurrencies is the use of a blockchain, also known as distributed ledger.66 A 
crytpocurrency’s blockchain is usually publicly available.67 The accessibility of 
cryptocurrency blockchains can be further aided through the use of Application 
Programme Interfaces68 (APIs) which allow for the creation of applications to analyse 
the transaction data published in the blockchain. The identity protection afforded by 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin can also be challenged as Meiklejohn et al “were able 
to identify 1.9 million public keys with some real-world service or identity,”69 however, 
“in many cases the identity was not a real name, but rather (for example) a username 
on a forum.”70 More recently, Juhász et al identified 22363 users’ 1797 associated IP 
addresses.71 While difficulties will remain with determining which users require 
identification and investigation, Juhász et al argue their “method is cheap in terms of 
resources,”72 and their “algorithms are relatively easy to implement and can be 
combined with other Bitcoin-transaction related information.”73 The research of 
                                                     
64 LiteCoin, ‘LiteCoin’ <https://litecoin.org/> accessed 13 October 2019. 
65 The Guardian, ‘Nine Bitcoin alternatives for future currency investments’ 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/28/bitcoin-alternatives-future-currency-
investments> accessed 17 June 2015. 
66 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA publishes Feedback Statement on Distributed Ledger 
Technology’ (15 December 2017) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-publishes-
feedback-statement-distributed-ledger-technology> accessed 13 October 2019. 
67 As demonstrated by: Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Bitcoin’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer> 
accessed 13 October 2019, Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Ethereum’ 
<https://www.blockchain.com/explorer?currency=ETH> accessed 13 October 2019, and Blockchain, 
‘Block Explorer: Bitcoin Cash’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer?currency=BCH> accessed 13 
October 2019. 
68 H. Henderson, ‘application programming interface (API)’ in Harry Henderson (ed) Encyclopedia of 
Computer Science and Technology (3rd ed, Facts On File, 2017) <https://search-credoreference-
com.ezproxy.uwe.ac.uk/content/entry/fofcomputer/application_programming_interface_api/0>  
69 Sarah Meiklejohn, et al, “A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No 
Names,” (2013) 38(6) ;Login: 10 at p.14. 
70 ibid. 
71 P. L. Juhász, J. Stéger, D. Kondor and G. Vattay, ‘A Bayesian approach to identify Bitcoin users’ 
(2018) 13(12) PLoS ONE 1 at p.13. 
72 ibid at p.18. 
73 ibid. 
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Meiklejohn et al and Juhász et al demonstrate that the anonymity of cryptocurrencies 
may be eroded by the aforementioned techniques, but more research is needed. 
 
Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, are exchanged globally and are referred to in 
similar terms as money, such as the term ‘currency’ within cryptocurrency, the term 
‘cash’ in Bitcoin Cash, and the symbol used in Bitcoin’s logo being akin to a monetary 
symbol. Due to the connotations towards money, and cryptocurrencies representing 
such a novel and undefined phenomenon, money is analysed in chapter 3, to 
determine whether cryptocurrencies are indeed money, or have the potential to 
become money. 
 
1.6. UK Withdrawal from the EU 
This research has taken place during a time of political upheaval, most notably for the 
UK due to the ongoing exit from the European Union (EU). As this research is 
concerned with the AML regulation of cryptocurrencies it will not focus on the political 
wrangling related to the UK leaving the EU for a number of reasons. Firstly, it has not 
yet happened, and as with many things relating to leaving the EU, there is little to no 
direction given. Secondly, as will be seen in chapter four, in relation to money 
laundering, the behaviour of the UK since 1970 indicates that very little is likely to 
change as the UK has been an early adopter of international best practice. Thirdly, 
and finally, as the UK is a member of the FATF, and, as is also seen in chapter four, 
the EU and the FATF prescribe very similar approaches to money laundering. The UK 
will continue to be compliant with EU AML legislation, by virtue of meeting the FATF 
standards, whether it is a member of the EU or not. As identified in chapter five, the 
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UK implemented the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive in January 2020,74 
showing that it will continue to keep pace with international best practice. The 
recommendations from this research suggest that no jurisdiction or international 
organisation has sufficiently addressed the risks posed by cryptocurrencies, and that 
the UK should take initiatives of its own to utilise the potential of blockchains to assist 
investigations. This further justifies the omission of a debate over the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU, as it will distract from the aims of this research.  
 
1.7. Chapter Structure 
Following on from this introduction, chapter two will consist of a literature review and 
a justification of the methodology and methods used in this research. Chapter three 
will provide contextualisation by introducing and defining key terms for the purpose of 
this thesis; this will provide clarity. The chapter also considers the concept of money 
from a socio-political perspective and determines whether cryptocurrencies are 
money. The objective of this comparison is to improve the understanding of 
cryptocurrencies, this is aided by questioning the concept of money, as money is a 
concept which most in society readily accept and relate to without ever considering 
why.75 As cryptocurrencies are frequently compared to money in the media,76 and 
cryptocurrency transactions can be used in lieu of money, this comparison is pertinent 
and valuable. The contextualisation chapter will distinguish the different types of virtual 
                                                     
74 The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/1511. 
75 Bank of England, ‘What is Money?’ (19 February 2019) 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/what-is-money> accessed 07 October 2019. 
76 BBC News, ‘Bitcoin explained: How do crypto-currencies work?’ (12 February 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/technology-43026143/bitcoin-explained-how-do-crypto-currencies-
work> accessed 20 July 2018. 
 19 
currencies and identify cryptocurrencies as the specific virtual currencies which pose 
the highest risk, and thus the focus of this thesis and its recommendations. 
 
Chapter four focusses on the phenomenon of money laundering, the term is defined, 
the process will be explained, and examples of the impacts of money laundering will 
be briefly explored. The chapter provides a timeline of the international, regional and 
domestic AML developments, beginning in the 1960s with the initial attempts of the 
UN. The timeline identifies themes, which will provide an insight into the likely 
trajectory of future AML developments, such as the rise of the FATF to the lead 
international organisation, taking over from the UN, and the increased influence of EU 
legislation as its Anti-Money Laundering Directives have become more prescriptive. 
The UK, the US and Australia are all members of the UN, and are fully compliant with 
UN AML conventions, as well as all being members of the FATF, and each achieving 
high levels of compliance in their recent mutual evaluation reports,77 and the UK is, at 
the time of writing, a member of the EU. The ongoing departure of the UK from the EU 
is not a central theme of this thesis, along with many other issues, the status of EU 
AML is not known, so little will be achieved through speculation, and, as chapter four 
demonstrates, there are a number of indicators which suggest the UK will continue to 
keep pace with EU AML developments. Firstly, the UK has been an early adopter of 
                                                     
77 FATF, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, December 2018) <fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 
2019, Financial Action Task Force, ‘Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combatting the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf> accessed 03 September 2019, 
and Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures - 
Australia, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 
23 July 2019. 
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international AML best practices and there is no evidence to suggest this will change. 
Secondly, the position of the FATF and the EU are notably similar, so by being 
compliant with FATF Recommendations the UK will be comparably compliant with EU 
regulation, and vice versa. Thirdly, a key motivator for the UK to adhere to two points 
above is the status of London as an important global financial centre,78 in order to 
retain this position after the UK leaves the EU, amongst other factors, the UK will have 
to maintain its AML compliance, or face loss of reputation. Chapter four will provide an 
analysis of the prevailing international approach to the money laundering risks posed 
by cryptocurrencies, this is particularly helpful in predicting and recommending an 
approach for the UK, as the UK is a member of a number of international organisations. 
Given that cryptocurrencies are non-physical, they are inherently an international 
concern, therefore the approach of the international community will provide valuable 
assistance to the UK as it determines its approach.  
 
Chapter five concentrates on the UK and considers how the UK can adapt its approach 
to cryptocurrencies and the money laundering risks posed. The relevant money 
laundering offences will be considered, as well as the preventative measures, in order 
to determine the applicability of the current AML laws to cryptocurrencies. The relevant 
authorities are identified, and their stances on cryptocurrencies are analysed. The UK 
case study will allow its approach to cryptocurrencies to be contrasted to that of the 
US and Australia and assesses the UK’s compliance with the current FATF guidance 
for regulating cryptocurrency service providers. 
                                                     
78 J. Treanor, The Guardian, ‘London still world's top financial centre despite Brexit, says survey’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/11/london-financial-centre-brexit-frankfurt-dublin-
new-york-donald-trump> accessed 20 July 2018. 
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Chapters six and seven will be on the US and Australia respectively, detailing their 
approach to money laundering and how each jurisdiction is addressing the money 
laundering risks posed by cryptocurrencies. In each case study the relevant money 
laundering legislation will be considered in two categories; firstly, the criminal offences 
of money laundering will be analysed, in order to determine whether the offences can 
be committed using cryptocurrencies. Secondly, the relevant AML will be analysed, 
this is the legislation which is designed to detect and prevent money laundering 
occurring, requiring the compliance of institutions in affected industries. The purpose 
of analysing the criminal offences and the preventative measures is to identify which 
elements of each jurisdiction’s approach to the money laundering risks of 
cryptocurrencies needs to be addressed. As well as analysing the law, the case 
studies will also consider the roles of each jurisdiction’s relevant authorities, and their 
approach to cryptocurrencies, legislation is imperative, but it is ineffective if it is not 
being enforced by the relevant bodies. Lastly, each jurisdiction is judged against the 
FATF guidance to assess their levels of compliance with regards to cryptocurrencies 
and recommendations are made for the UK. The US and Australia have implemented 
similar regulation of cryptocurrency service providers but achieved it through 
contrasting mechanisms. The US, through the actions of the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), has taken a regulator led approach to expanding 
AML regulation to cryptocurrency service providers, whereas Australia, through its 
Parliament as a legislature, has taken a legislator led approach.  
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Chapter eight provides an overall conclusion, emphasising the central argument of this 
thesis; the UK should adopt a tailored approach to cryptocurrencies rather than apply 
existing measures. Simply applying anti-money laundering legislation to the fringes of 
the system is ineffective in gathering financial intelligence. A tailored approach to 
cryptocurrencies will better utilise the data available from blockchains and potentially 
aid money laundering investigations. It is argued that utilising the wealth of transaction 
data available in a digital format, paired with the traditional AML measures applied to 
cryptocurrency service providers, will begin to address the currently unregulated realm 
of cryptocurrencies. Having identified the approaches of the US and Australia in 
chapters six and seven, it is recommended that the UK takes a legislator led approach 
to widening the regulatory perimeter to cryptocurrency service providers, this is 
because the FCA has failed to initiate a regulator led expansion of AML regulation. 
This thesis also recommends further research is required, specifically in collaboration 
with those who are able to best analyse the blockchain to realise its huge potential as 
an investigative tool. 
 
1.8. Research Themes  
A number of issues must be addressed in order to answer the research question. 
Cryptocurrencies must be placed in context, it must be determined whether they are 
money, or have the potential to be money as currently cryptocurrencies lack a clear 
legal status. This research stops short of concluding that cryptocurrencies have the 
same standing as money, this will be fully explored in chapter three, but it will be 
argued that cryptocurrencies are capable of becoming money if their value stabilises 
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and their usage increases. This argument is made based on cryptocurrencies being 
placed within a hierarchy of money. 
 
A further important consideration is the prevailing approach to money laundering, the 
risk-based approach. Cryptocurrencies and their use must be judged against the risk-
based approach to money laundering, a key determining factor being the higher the 
usage, both in volume and value, the greater the risk. Other considerations which will 
determine the level or risk, and as such proportionate response, are the ease of use, 
the speed at which the money laundering process can be completed, and the amounts 
of money which may realistically be laundered through cryptocurrencies. While 
cryptocurrencies pose money laundering risks, and successful prosecutions 
demonstrate their use for money laundering purposes, there is no evidence that the 
majority of transactions are illicit. If particularly onerous requirements are placed on 
cryptocurrency service providers, it may cause such businesses to try and avoid the 
regulation and push the industry underground. This would leave users in a potentially 
vulnerable position and make pursuing money laundering more difficult. 
 
While cryptocurrencies are a very modern phenomenon, the past is still a valuable 
resource in predicting the future, what has gone before provides hindsight to previous 
developments, and a valuable learning opportunity. Cryptocurrencies are new, but 
money laundering is most definitely not, as chapter four will demonstrate, therefore 
this thesis will use the development of anti-money laundering legislation over the past 




This thesis will use a case study approach, to take the issue of money laundering risks 
posed by cryptocurrencies, and analyse the reaction within the US and Australia to 
advise the approach in the UK. The focus of the recommendations relates on the UK, 
but given the inherently international nature of cryptocurrencies, and of money 
laundering, the recommendations will have wider applicability. The recommendations 
for the UK are to implement the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive so as to meet 
current international standards, but to also address the regulatory gaps that remain. 
The UK should seek to harness the wealth of intelligence within distributed ledgers 
and utilise developments in AI and machine learning to help automate the monitoring 
process. Coupling the data gathered from distributed ledgers with AML regulation of 





Chapter 2. Literature Review and Methodology 
2.1. Literature Review 
This literature review considers existing knowledge of money laundering, identifying 
trends in existing anti-money laundering (AML) regulation, and in the development of 
AML regulation internationally and domestically in the United Kingdom (UK), the 
United States of America (US), and Australia. The existing legislation is identified, as 
well as the relevant domestic and international authorities, it is observed that the UK 
has fallen behind the US and Australia in AML regulation, as it has yet to address the 
threats posed by cryptocurrencies. International guidance and initial attempts to 
regulate cryptocurrencies are observed to be a commendable first step to addressing 
the money laundering threat, but as the majority of cryptocurrency transactions remain 
outside of AML regulation, a clear regulatory gap exists.  
 
2.2. Themes 
The principal purpose of this research is to analyse the money laundering risks posed 
by cryptocurrencies, but a number of issues must be explored in order to answer the 
research question. Cryptocurrencies must be examined, definitions must be analysed, 
specifically against the concept of money, considering whether cryptocurrencies are a 
form of money. The phenomenon of money laundering needs to be explained and it 
must be determined whether cryptocurrencies may be used in this process, and 
whether the current criminal offences are applicable. As well as the criminal offences, 
the applicability of the preventative measures will be analysed. Ultimately this thesis 
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will consider how cryptocurrencies should be regulated in order to address the money 
laundering risks posed.  
 
2.2.1. Defining Cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies must be defined, which requires them to be identified as a specific 
class of virtual currencies and differentiated from fiat currencies and e-money. Fiat 
currencies are government backed currencies, and designated legal tender. E-money 
is “a digital representation of a fiat currency,”1 which is used to transfer fiat currency 
electronically; it is not a separate currency, merely the mechanism by which legal 
tender is transferred. Virtual Currency is defined by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) as;  
“a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as 
(1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of 
value, but does not have legal tender status … It is not issued nor guaranteed 
by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above functions only by agreement within the 
community of users of the virtual currency.”2 
 
                                                     
1 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions And Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th November 2014. 
2 ibid 4. 
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This definition could apply to both virtual world currencies, including Second Life 
Linden Dollars,3 and stand-alone cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin;4 but distinctions 
between these currencies must be made. Virtual currencies may be either convertible 
or non-convertible, and centralised or decentralised.5 A virtual currency is convertible 
if it may be exchanged for a fiat currency; if this is not possible, the currency is non-
convertible; these distinctions will be explored in chapter three. In addition to the 
convertibility of a virtual currency, chapter three will also define virtual worlds and 
distinguish these from virtual currencies, once these distinctions are made, the focus 
of the thesis will be on convertible decentralised currencies, known as 
cryptocurrencies.6 This focus is justified as cryptocurrencies pose the greatest money 
laundering threat, as identified by the FATF.7 Cryptocurrencies are problematic 
because there is no central authority managing the cryptocurrency, or providing a 
redress system, so no institution exists which can apply AML measures such as 
suspicious activity reports (SARs) or customer due diligence. Confusion exists as to 
the accepted terminology to use when referring to cryptocurrencies, with a number of 
different terms being used by both international and supranational organisations, such 
as the FATF and the EU, and nationally by the UK, the US, and Australia. The term 
                                                     
3 Full explanation of Linden Dollars can be found at: Linden Labs, ‘LindeX™ Exchange’ 
<https://secondlife.com/my/lindex/#> accessed 28 August 2018. (login may be required) Tromans 
explores the issue of Second Life: Richard Tromans, ‘The World is not Enough: Law for a Virtual 
Universe’ (2007) 70 Euro Law 21.  
4 Bitcoin is defined and explained in chapter three at 3.3.2, more can be found on the ongoing debate 
of the definition and regulation in Richard Alexander, ‘How to Regulate Bitcoin – the Debate 
Continues’ (2018) 39(3) Comp Law 65, Robbert Jacobs, ‘European Union: Virtual Currencies – 
Warning’ (2018) 33(3) JIBLR 29 and Benjamin Geva, ‘Disintermediating Electronic Payments: Digital 
Cash and Virtual Currencies’ (2016) 31(12) JIBLR 661. 
5 cf Financial Action Task Force (n1) p4. 
6 The term cryptocurrency will be used to refer to convertible decentralised virtual currencies. Being 
cryptography based allows these virtual currencies to be decentralised. The currencies can be seen 
to resemble system hypothesised by Chaum in Chaum, D, ‘Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return 
Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms’ [1981] 24(2) Communications of the ACM 84. 
7 cf Financial Action Task Force (n1) p.9 
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‘virtual assets’, used by the FATF, is too broad as the term could also include virtual 
currencies which are centralised, and can be regulated through regulation of that 
central authority. Cryptocurrencies are a specific subset of virtual currencies, which 
due to their decentralised nature require unique AML measures. The EU uses the term 
‘virtual currencies’8 and Australia uses the term ‘digital currency’,9 both of which suffer 
from the same shortcomings as the FATF term, as they do not sufficiently define 
cryptocurrencies. The agencies of the US also predominantly use the term ‘virtual 
currencies’,10 but the terminology used by the various authorities in the US is not 
consistent. 
 
Prominent academics writing on virtual worlds include Castronova, who defines virtual 
worlds and traces their development,11 and Lastowka,12 Hunter,13 Kerr14 and Brenner15 
who all consider the application of criminal law within virtual environments. Notably, 
Brenner attempts to categorise crimes based on the harm caused by the offence; hard 
harms and soft harms.16 Hard harms are seen as traditional offences, physical harm 
                                                     
8 As used in the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive: Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 
2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] OJ L 156/43. 
9 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
10 As demonstrated throughout the GAO report in 2014: United States Government Accountability 
Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. The term is also used by 
FinCEN: FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving 
Convertible Virtual Currencies’ (9 May 2019) <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. The CFTC 
refer to Bitcoin directly, but also use the term: CFTC, ‘Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies’ 
https://www.cftc.gov/Bitcoin/index.htm> accessed 04 September 2019. 
11 E. Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First Hand Account of Market and Society of the Cyberian Frontier, 
[2001] SSRN CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618. 
12 G. Lastowka, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (Yale University Press, 2010) 
13 G. Lastowka and D. Hunter, ‘Virtual Crimes’ (2004) 49 NYL Sch Rev 294. 
14 O. S. Kerr, ‘Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds’ [2008] Chi Legal F 415. 
15 S. Brenner, ‘Fantasy Crime’ (2008) 11(1) V and J Ent & Tech L 1. 
16 ibid at p.4. 
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against another human, be that murder, rape, other bodily harm or theft and damage 
to property. Soft harms are non-physical wrongs the law has addressed, offences 
against harming ‘morality’, ‘affectivity’ or causing ‘systemic’ harm.17 Brenner argues 
that offences against morality include the possession and abuse of substances or 
breaching gambling legislation; these crimes don’t directly harm another individual but 
are against the “moral sense of the community.”18 ‘Affectivity’ harms are non-physical 
harms to individuals, be that to their reputation through the former offence of libel19 or 
to their security through harassment or stalking.20 ‘Systemic’ harms are harms to the 
system and can be described as regulatory offences such as failure to pay tax or fulfil 
legal obligations.21 This thesis is distinguished from the research of these academics 
as the focus is placed on standalone cryptocurrencies, and not the virtual worlds which 
the currencies may originate from. If the crime of money laundering were to be placed 
within Brenner’s categories, it would either sit within ‘morality’ harms of ‘systemic’ 
harms, but it would not sit within the virtual worlds Brenner researches.  
 
Interaction with the physical world is another theme which has arisen from the 
literature review with regard to things which exist within computer systems. The magic 
circle concept could be applied; first proposed by Huizinga in 1938,22 it recommends 
an exclusion zone inside which the rules of the game are to be followed. This protects 
the game from real world influences,23 as well as the players; for example, a tackle on 
                                                     
17 ibid at p.8. 
18 Lawrence Freidman, Crime and Punishment in American History (Basic Books 1934) as cited by 
Brenner (n15) at p.4. 
19 cf Brenner (n15) at p.10. 
20 cf Brenner (n15) at p.12. 
21 cf Brenner (n15) at p.17. 
22 J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Story of the Play-Element in Culture (Beacon Press, 1938). 
23 Y. S. Tseng, ‘Governing Virtual Worlds: Interration 2.0’ (2011) 35 J Law & Policy 547. 
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a football pitch could easily constitute an assault otherwise. The magic circle can only 
go so far, potential criminal offences outside of the rules of a sport will still be 
investigated by authorities, as demonstrated by the racial abuse case in 2012 
concerning the footballer John Terry.24 Based on the magic circle principle it follows 
that only where the authorities are failing, the rules are inadequate, or the act is of 
particular severity will the law step in. The magic circle argument may be used to 
further justify this research; cryptocurrencies may only become a regulatory issue 
when they interact and affect the traditional financial system. Money laundering would 
be a clear example of how cryptocurrencies will have effects in the real world; this 
approach further justifies the focus of the research on convertible currencies as the 
interactivity of non-convertible currencies is limited. 
 
Contribution to knowledge  
This thesis argues for consistency in the terminology used to refer to cryptocurrencies 
to avoid the current confusion caused by a plethora of terms being used. The UK uses 
the term ‘cryptoassets’,25 which is yet another variation on the terms used by the FATF, 
the EU, the US, and Australia, and potentially adding to the confusion. The term 
‘assets’ appears deliberate as the FCA does not accept cryptocurrencies as currency 
or money.26 The term ‘cryptocurrencies’ is the best term to use, as this specifically 
refers to decentralised convertible virtual currencies, which is the class of virtual 
currencies which pose a money laundering risk, as accepted by all of the organisations 
                                                     
24 R v Terry (Westminster Magistrates, 13 July 2012). 
25 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets – Consultation Paper’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf> accessed 19 March 2019 at 2.3. 
26 ibid at 2.7. 
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and jurisdictions considered in this thesis. Cryptocurrencies have breached the magic 
circle concept, as they intersect with the traditional financial system. 
 
2.2.2. Defining Money 
An important element of this research is to consider the development of money and 
whether cryptocurrencies can satisfy the definitions of money. Money needs to be 
defined, which involves exploring the legal definition of money, as well as the concept 
of money in general, encompassing both theories of money and its functions. Money 
is a social tool and understanding its role in society is often taken for granted. 
Definitions of a currency centre on the concept of a certain type of money being the 
legal tender of a country, and controlled by the central bank of that country, this is 
consistent with chartalist theories of money.27 The largest exception to this is the Euro 
which a currency shared by 19 countries across Europe, and controlled by the 
European Central Bank, the central bank of the European Union. The Euro can still be 
incorporated into chartalist theories. If cryptocurrencies can be defined as money, then 
the relevant AML provisions would apply to cryptocurrency service providers. As such 
it will be considered whether cryptocurrencies satisfy descriptions of money and 
whether the functions of money are performed. Chapter three will consider two 
metallist theories of money and three chartalist theories of money. The metallist 
theories considered by this thesis are the orthodox theory, explained through the 
                                                     
27 A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, (The Cannon Edition, 
New York, The Modern Library, 1937). 
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works of Menger,28 North,29 and Jones,30 and the Marxist theory proffered by Karl 
Marx.31 As will be explored in Chapter three, the focus of metallist theories of money 
is on the physical item which is used as money, so it is difficult to argue 
cryptocurrencies satisfy the definition as they do not exist physically. The three 
chartalist theories analysed by this thesis are the state theory of toney, supported by 
Knapp,32 Hurst,33 Smith34 and Minsky,35 credit theory, proffered by Innes36 and 
Keynes,37 and social construction theory, which is argued by Zelizer.38 The theories of 
money considered can be placed in to the two categories, of metallist or chartalist, 
because they share certain characteristics. Metallist theories view money as having 
intrinsic value, the item used as money is valuable even when not being used as 
money. Chartalist theories consider money to be valuable as tokens of credit, the thing 
used as money may not have any value in itself, but it gains value through being 
usable. Money is then the mechanism by which debts are accepted and repaid. 
Differences in the types of theories also exist when determining who creates money, 
and where the power relationships exist. The metallist theories view money as a 
creation of society and merchants; the state has a minor role, instead it is to support 
the system through contract and property law.39 Chartalist theories give the state a 
                                                     
28 K. Menger, ‘On Origins of Money’ (1892) 2(6) Economic Journal 293. 
29 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
30 R. A. Jones, ‘The Origin and Development of Media of Exchange’ (1976) 84 (4, Part 1) August 
Journal of Political Economy 757. 
31 K. Marx, Capital: Vol 1 (London, Penguin, 1976). 
32 G. F. Knapp, The State Theory of Money (Macmillan, 1924). 
33 J. W. Hurst, A Legal History of Money in the United States 1774-1970 (University of Nebraska 
Press, 1973). 
34 cf Smith (n27). 
35 H. P. Minsky Stabilising An Unstable Economy (Yale University Press, 1986). 
36 A. M. Innes, ‘What is Money’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 377. 
37 J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money (Harancourt Brace, 1930). 
38 V. A. Zelizer, ‘The Social Meaning of Money: “Special Monies”’ (1989) 95(2) 342. 
39 cf North (n29). 
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greater role, particularly in the state theory of Money, in which the only reason money 
has value is because the state is willing to accept it.40 This research will compare these 
theories of money, determining whether cryptocurrencies fit with the theories. No 
single theory of money is universally accepted, Bell instead constructs a hierarchy of 
money, which identifies classes of money and considers which theories may fit within 
each class.41 While the hierarchy is formulated around chartalist theories of money, 
Bell also assesses metallist theories,42 but finds them to be a poor fit for modern forms 
of money. Accepting that no existing theories of money are infallible, this research will 
seek to build on the concept of Bell and place the cryptocurrencies within her hierarchy 
of money.  
 
As well as the theoretical concept of money, this thesis will consider the functions of 
money, and whether cryptocurrencies satisfy these functions. In identifying the 
functions of money Hudson begins with Aristotle’s three principles of money; a means 
of exchange, a measure of value and a store of value.43 Bell also traces metallist 
theories back to the functions of money identified by Aristotle,44 of which the medium 
of exchange function is the considered the most important, as this replaced barter, 
though Bell questions whether barter economies ever existed.45 The three core 
functions of money have clearly existed for an exceedingly long time, this research will 
                                                     
40 cf Knapp (n32). 
41 S. Bell, ‘The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money’ (2001) 25 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 149 at p.149. 
42 ibid at p.149. 
43 A. Hudson, The Law of Finance (Sweet and Maxwell, 2013) at p.40. 
44 cf Bell (n41) at p.151. 
45 ibid. 
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consider whether cryptocurrencies can perform these functions adequately enough to 
subsequently claim cryptocurrencies are in fact money. 
 
The concept of money is an important theme in establishing the need to regulate 
cryptocurrencies, if cryptocurrencies perform the functions of money in society, then 
the magic circle principle will be categorically breached; if cryptocurrencies can be 
money then they will have significant interaction with the physical world and cannot be 
left to be solely regulated by it participants. This research will identify whether AML 
measures should already apply to cryptocurrencies, establishing cryptocurrencies as 
money would simplify this contention as money laundering offences, and AML 
regulation, would be as applicable to cryptocurrencies as they are to Great British 
Pounds. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
Chapter three assesses money from a novel perspective and places cryptocurrencies 
on the hierarchy of money proposed by Bell and identifies that although 
cryptocurrencies have similar characteristics to money, they cannot be placed as high 
on the hierarchy as State money. Cryptocurrencies do not fit within existing theories 
of money as their characteristics straddle both metallist and chartalist theories, notably 
the absence of state control complying with metallist theories, and its assigned value 
complying with chartalist theories. Cryptocurrencies are not used as money, rather 
they are used for investment purposes, but their capacity to effect international 
transactions of considerable worth means they require AML regulation irrespective of 
their status as money or not.  
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2.2.3. Money Laundering 
As defined by Lilly money laundering is “the process whereby the identity of dirty 
money that is the proceeds of crime and the real ownership of these assets is 
transformed so that the proceeds appear to originate from a legitimate source.”46 
Existing AML legislation applies to financial institutions, and other businesses which 
are exposed to potential money laundering avenues, this is very broad. The analysis 
of money laundering in chapter four demonstrates, the nature of money laundering is 
also very broad, utilising any means by which value can be transferred and used to 
conceal its origin, thus justifying the broad scope of AML regulation. The three-stage 
process of money laundering, outlined by Gilmore,47 also used by Ryder,48 is used to 
explain the elements of money laundering common to most cases; placement, layering 
and integration. These stages can be completed in a variety of ways; Ping considers 
a wide variety of money laundering techniques,49 evidencing how they have been 
utilised by criminals with case studies. The variety of methods adopted demonstrates 
the ingenuity of money launderers and suggests that new technology will quickly be 
adopted if money laundering can be achieved. This research does not seek to develop 
theories in relation to the money laundering process, however, the process must be 
outlined in order for the vulnerabilities of cryptocurrencies to be considered in light of 
traditional money laundering techniques.  
                                                     
46 P. Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering (London, 
Kogan Page, 2006) at p6. 
47 W.C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures (Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Press, 1995). 
48 N. Ryder, ‘The Financial Services Authority and Money Laundering: A Game of Cat and Mouse’ 
(2008) 67(3) Cambridge LJ 635. 
49 Ping He, ‘A Typological Study on Money Laundering’ (2010) 13(1) JMLC 15. 
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This research is concerned with the potential for cryptocurrencies to be used for 
money laundering purposes, as such the research needs to be placed within the 
existing money laundering literature, which is substantial. This research is not 
intending to provide a critique of the concept, or the impact of the approaches to 
combat money laundering in general. This subject has considerable literature already 
dedicated to it, notably from authors such as Ryder who looks it its cyclical nature,50 
Lilly who provides a clear simple definition of money laundering based on its aims,51 
and Robinson traces the origins of the term.52 As well as academic writing on money 
laundering, there are also professional guides to complying with AML measures, such 
guides can be found for each of the case study jurisdictions in Simpson, Smith and 
Srivastava’s International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice.53 This thesis 
is concerned with whether the measures apply to cryptocurrencies, an area in which 
there is limited guidance for professionals. The research is also distinguished from 
work which focussed on the impacts of money laundering, while these impacts are 
used as part of the justification for researching money laundering, this thesis does not 
seek to repeat the work of academics such as McDowell and Novis,54 and Unger.55 
Money laundering is plainly defined by Buchanan: 
                                                     
50 N. Ryder Money laundering – an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-money 
laundering policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge, London, 2012). 
51 cf Lilley (n46). 
52 J. Robinson, The Laundrymen (London, Pocket Books, 1995). 
53 M. Simpson, N. Smith and A. Srivastava (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering Law and 
Practice (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2010). 
54 J. McDowell and G Novis, ‘The Consequences Of Money Laundering And Financial Crime’ (2001) 
6(2) Economic Perspectives 6. 
55 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007). 
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“Simply stated, money laundering is the processing of criminal profits through 
the financial system to obscure their illegal origins and make them appear 
legitimate. It is not just enough to hide the proceeds of illegal activities. Equally 
important in the laundering process is to render the proceeds re-usable for other 
purposes. Although on the surface money laundering may be simple to define, 
it is extremely difficult to investigate and prosecute.”56  
The purpose of defining money laundering in this research is to be able to consider 
whether money laundering may be committed using cryptocurrencies. It will not be 
possible to say definitively that money laundering is taking place, this is an issue for 
the prosecuting authorities, but this research can assess the potential for 
cryptocurrencies to be used to launder the proceeds of crime and examples of this can 
be seen through relevant convictions in the UK and US. This research can be justified 
in part by the work of Irwin et al.,57 who found that the “main advantage of the virtual 
world scenario is the level of anonymity afforded to entities when obtaining financial 
instruments and placing and moving funds around virtual environments and financial 
service providers.”58 The research of Irwin et al. focussed on virtual worlds rather than 
just cryptocurrencies, but many of their conclusions could be applied to 
cryptocurrencies, as will be explored in chapter four. It is not possible to accurately 
estimate the amount of money laundering which takes places domestically or 
internationally. Robinson places money laundering as the third biggest industry in the 
world,59 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that the amount of money 
                                                     
56 B. Buchanan, ‘Money laundering – a global obstacle’ (2004), 18(1) Research in International 
Business and Finance 115 at p.117. 
57 A. S. M. Irwin, J. Slay, R.C. Kim-Kwang, L. Lui, ‘Money laundering and terrorism financing in virtual 
environments: a feasibility study’ (2014) 17(1) JMLC 50. 
58 ibid at p.70. 
59 cf Robinson (n52). 
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laundered could be valued at 2-5% of global GDP.60 The secretive nature of money 
laundering means reliable records are unavailable and varying estimates are 
produced; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated 2.7% of 
global GDP,61 equating to US$1.6 trillion, was being laundered in 2009,62 which is the 
figure used by the FATF, but Unger found wide ranging estimates; 63 $45 and $280 
billion by Reuter and Greenfield,64 to $2.85 billion by Walker and Unger.65 The case 
study jurisdictions each attempt to estimate money laundering domestically, the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) estimates “AUD200 
billion is laundered in the Asia-Pacific region.”66 In the UK the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) estimated in 2013 that “£10billion of illicit funds”67 passes through the 
UK financial system, but this has since been revised upwards, in 2017 the National 
Crime Agency (NCA) believed a previous estimation of £39 billion to £90 billion to be 
a “significant underestimate”.68 The NCA was unable to provide a new estimate, but 
stated that there have been a number of money laundering operations it has identified, 
                                                     
60 International Monetary Fund, ‘Money Laundering: the Importance of International 
Countermeasures’ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm> accessed 15 June 
2015. 
61 Gross Domestic Product: "an aggregate measure of production equal to the sum of the gross 
values added of all resident, institutional units engaged in production (plus any taxes, and minus any 
subsidies, on products not included in the value of their outputs).” Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, ‘Gross Domestic Product’ 
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1163> accessed 15 June 2015. 
62 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Illicit Money: How Much is Out There?’ 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-out-there.html> 
accessed 15 June 2015. 
63 B. Unger, ‘Can Money Laundering Decrease?’ (2013) 41(5) Public Finance Review 658 at p.663. 
64 P. Reuter and V.A. Greenfield, ‘Measuring Global Drug Markets: How Good Are the Numbers and 
Why Should We Care about Them?’ (2001) 2(159) World Economics 73. 
65 J. Walker and B. Unger, ‘Estimating Money Laundering: The Walker Gravity Model’ (2009) 5(821) 
Review of Law and Economics 53. 
66 AUSTRAC, ‘Introduction to Money Laundering’ 
<https://michaelsmithnews.typepad.com/files/money-laundering.pdf> accessed 5 September 2019. 
67 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report 2012/13’ 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/anti-money-laundering-report.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015. 
68 National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2017’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/807-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-
and-organised-crime-2017/file> accessed 05 September 2018. 
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each handling over £100 million. In the US, the Treasury believes “about $300 billion 
is generated annually in illicit proceeds.”69 This research will not seek to estimate the 
amounts of money being laundered as such research will most likely produce yet 
another number, which will further confuse the issue as each of these estimations is 
likely to be inaccurate because each calculation has been produced using a different 
methodology. Furthermore estimations are usually based on different definitions of key 
terms; Unger and Busuioc identify that differing definitions of money laundering, the 
proceeds of different predicate offences being included, and the different statistical 
methods, lead to “controversy between the purists, people who want to measure and 
model precisely, and the innovators – those who try to measure the immeasurable, 
even if they run the risk of being criticised.”70 Despite the difficulties in establishing an 
accurate estimation of money laundering, the attempts are important in raising 
awareness of money laundering and justifying the allocation of resources to tackling 
it. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis identifies cryptocurrencies as a new mechanism for laundering money, in 
light of the characteristics of cryptocurrencies and the clear evidence cryptocurrencies 
are used for money laundering, as demonstrated by prosecutions. Chapters five, six, 
and seven demonstrate that the money laundering offences of each of the three case 
                                                     
69 United States Treasury, ‘National Money Laundering Risk Assessment’ 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%
2006-12-2015.pdf> accessed 5 September 2019. 
70 cf Unger (n55) at p.32. 
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studies can be committed using cryptocurrencies, and that the existing preventative 
measures are not compatible with cryptocurrencies. 
 
2.2.4. Cryptocurrency Money Laundering  
Convictions in the UK and US demonstrate that money laundering is taking place using 
cryptocurrencies. As with conventional money laundering techniques, accurate 
statistics are not available, but in 2018, Europol estimated that “3-4% of the £100bn in 
illicit proceeds in Europe are laundered through cryptocurrencies.”71 Cryptocurrencies 
have been central to a number of high profile crimes, such as the collapse of the Mt 
Gox exchange in February 2014,72 and been utilised at the preferred payment method 
for ransomware demands, such as in the ‘WannaCry’ cyber-attack on the NHS in May 
2017.73 Bitcoin was the currency of choice for the infamous illicit online market place 
Silk Road,74 and its founder Ross Ulbricht is serving a life sentence in the US.75 The 
number of cases in the UK remains low, but it is clear that cryptocurrencies are being 
utilised to launder the proceeds of crime. Laundered cryptocurrency has also been 
confiscated from convicted criminals, but successful confiscation has largely been 
reliant on circumstantial luck; a police force was able to freeze the cryptocurrency 
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74 J. Lane, ‘Bitcoin, Silk Road and the Need for a New Approach to Virtual Currency Regulation’ 
(2013-2014) 8 Charleston Law Review 511 at 513. 
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assets of an individual having caught them with their “fingers on the keyboard”,76 such 
as in the case of West, and in the case of Teresko police gained access to the 
defendants Bitcoin wallet through finding access details on paper during a search of 
his address.77 A likely method of seizing illicit cryptocurrency, which was also used 
against West, is to use a court order requiring the convicted individual to give up the 
cryptocurrency or face further jail time.78 Once the cryptocurrency is confiscated there 
are currently two options for authorities wishing to convert the currency; they can either 
use a cryptocurrency exchange or sell the cryptocurrency at public auction, Hall 
observes that the US approach is use public actions, whereas Dutch authorities use 
exchanges.79  
 
Irwin et al. found the anonymity of cryptocurrencies as appealing to money 
launderers,80 Stokes considers the “emergence of new and alternative payment 
technologies and products pose a genuine money laundering risk”81 and that more 
research is required into cryptocurrencies.82 Houben argues that “national level is 
probably not the best level to adequately address”83 the risks of cryptocurrencies, and 
that “European level is more appropriate, preferably in the execution of a global 
approach, as crypto activity is also not limited by the European border.”84 The issue of 
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cryptocurrencies and money laundering has not been ignored by academia, but this 
research considers international and national efforts to bring cryptocurrencies within 
the regulatory perimeter, and observes gaps within that regulation.  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis argues that the existing money laundering offences are sufficient to cover 
the use of cryptocurrencies to launder money. The UK money laundering offences do 
not need reform for the purpose of applying to cryptocurrencies, the drafting of the 
offences is wide enough to obtain convictions, as demonstrated by the prosecutions 
of Teresko,85 White,86 and West.87 Where the UK law is unclear is in relation to 
converting seized cryptocurrency, in the Teresko case an exchange was used,88 but 
in 2019 a UK police force used the public auction method for the first time.89 It is 
recommended that the UK processes cryptocurrency seizures faster in order to realise 
the value of the confiscated goods at the correct value, however it is currently unclear 
which method of conversion is preferred. 
 
                                                     
85 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘More than £1.2million of Bitcoin seized from drug dealer’ (19 July 
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2.2.5. Anti-Money Laundering Legislation 
As will be seen in chapter four, attempts to combat money laundering date back to the 
1960s, with the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961.90 The 
development of anti-money laundering regulation will be viewed in a timeline in chapter 
four to demonstrate the evolution of such regulation and attempt to predict future 
developments. As well as international efforts at combatting money laundering, 
domestic legislation from each of the case study jurisdictions will demonstrate the 
development of AML measures. Each of the case study jurisdictions have been 
attempting to combat money laundering for decades The US and the UK both made 
money laundering a criminal offence in 1986; with the Money Laundering Control Act 
1986,91 and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 198692 respectively. Australia 
implemented its first money laundering offences in 1987; through the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1987.93 This research will track the development of international and 
domestic money laundering legislation, in light of this the applicability of these 
provisions to cryptocurrencies can be assessed, and the likelihood of legislative action 
in relation to cryptocurrencies may be considered. In order to achieve this, it is best to 
take each area in turn, starting with the international approach, and then considering 
each of the case studies, as each of the case study jurisdictions. This thesis highlights 
a changing of the guard in the setting of international best practice, with the FATF and 
the EU taking over from the UN. 
  
                                                     
90 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (adopted 30 March 1961, entered into force 13 December 
1964) 520 UNTS 151 (Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs). 
91 Money Laundering Control Act Pub. L. 99-570. 
92 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
93 Proceeds of Crime Act 1987. 
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International Anti-Money Laundering Regulation 
Money laundering is recognised as an international issue, and cryptocurrencies 
intangible nature means national borders do not apply, thus it is necessary to analyse 
the international legal approach to money laundering. The principal literature in 
international law is produced by the United Nations (UN) and the principal AML laws 
of the UN can be found in the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances94 (Vienna Convention 1988), and the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime95 (Palermo Convention 2000). The Vienna 
Convention 1988 remains focussed on drug related crime, as Ryder opines, the 
“Vienna Convention was limited to the laundering of the proceeds of crime from the 
manufacturing and sale of narcotics.”96 The Palermo Convention 2001 marked an 
important change in the UN approach, extending money laundering offences to include 
the proceeds of “serious crimes.”97 Zagaris cites a key aim of the Palermo Convention 
2000 was to strengthen the “power of governments to combat serious crimes by 
providing a basis for stronger common action against money laundering through 
synchronized national laws.”98 In 2003, the UN adopted the UN Convention on 
Corruption.99 Carr praises the comprehensiveness of the Convention,100 arguing it is 
“very difficult to fault”,101 but notes that the biggest weakness with the Convention, 
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which is true of most UN measures, is that international legislation alone is not the 
solution. Carr does not criticise the convention itself but the will of countries to utilise 
it, in “countries where politicians turn a blind eye to corruption to ensure or maintain 
their status, there is unlikely to be legislative interference” on corrupt practices. The 
adoption of an all crimes approach to money laundering offences is a step forward 
from the UN, and the Palermo Convention was a key step in the decoupling of money 
laundering from drug trafficking. While the UK is a signatory to UN Convention relating 
to money laundering, it goes further than its obligations, as it is also compliant with EU 
and FATF measures, which are more prescriptive than UN Conventions are able to 
be. 
 
The EU also attempts to harmonise approaches to money laundering, the most recent 
legislation is the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive,102 which must be adopted by EU 
Member States by 10 January 2020, replacing the 4th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive.103 It is observed in chapter four that the EU has reacted to the issue of money 
laundering later than the UN, but the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive moves the 
EU ahead of the UN in advancing AML measures. The 5th Anti-Money Laundering 
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Directive applies AML legislation to cryptocurrency exchanges,104 which will bring 
some cryptocurrency transactions under AML regulation. 
 
At the time of this research, UK is still a member of the EU, and this research considers 
the influence of EU legislation on the legislation of the UK. This thesis will not focus 
on the UK’s exit from the EU, this is for a number of reasons, firstly it has not yet 
happened, and as with many things relating to leaving the EU, there is little to no 
direction given by the UK government. Secondly, as will be seen in chapter four, in 
relation to money laundering, the behaviour of the UK since 1970 indicates that very 
little is likely to change as the UK has been an early adopter of international best 
practice. Thirdly, and finally, as the UK is a member of the FATF, and it is seen in 
chapter four that the EU and the FATF prescribe very similar approaches to money 
laundering, the UK will continue to be compliant with EU AML legislation, whether it is 
a member of the EU or not.  
 
In addition to the legal instruments, the guidance of the FATF is influential on the AML 
approaches of the three case study jurisdictions as they are all members of FATF. 
Alexander observes that despite the most recent set of 40 Recommendations105 being 
“non-binding in a legal sense, some of the 40 Recommendations have become 
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mandatory.”106 The FATF provide the most widely used guidance on cryptocurrencies 
and the money laundering threats they may pose,107 the advice of the FATF is utilised 
by the UN in its approach to cryptocurrencies.108 The guidance of the FATF will be 
considered, and how the influence of the FATF Recommendations may be utilised in 
developing a consistent approach to preventing money laundering through 
cryptocurrencies. 
 
Domestic Anti-Money Laundering Legislation  
The domestic legislation of each of the case study jurisdictions form the primary 
sources of law, the legislation is considered in two ways, firstly can the relevant money 
laundering offences be committed using cryptocurrencies, and secondly, do the AML 
provisions apply to cryptocurrency transactions; either transactions within 
cryptocurrency networks, or transactions which interact with fiat currencies, involving 
the purchasing and selling of cryptocurrencies. 
 
UK 
Money laundering has been a criminal offence in the UK since the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986109 was passed, and chapter four tracks the development of 
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legislation up to the present day. The evolution of legislation in the UK will be seen to 
exceed the UN conventions and, as with the ‘failure to disclose’ offence of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986,110 the UK has been world leading. The UK decoupled 
money laundering from drug offences with the Criminal Justice Act 1993,111 amending 
the Criminal Justice Act 1988,112 and widening money laundering offences to the 
proceeds of all crimes, not just drugs.113 In chapter four, this thesis argues that 
separating money laundering and drug offences is a positive step; cleaning the 
proceeds of illegal drug sales is money laundering, but not all illicit money comes from 
illegal drug sales. By the same argument, this thesis argues that while the UK has 
been world leading in combatting money laundering, it has also been at the forefront 
of taking money laundering legislation backwards. By confusing money laundering and 
terrorist financing through the Terrorism Act 2000,114 which introduced the concept of 
laundering terrorist property, the UK has recoupled money laundering to a distinctly 
different offence. Alexander distinguishes from the common concept of money 
laundering from terrorist funding, in terrorist financing “the focus is not on the where 
the property has come from but where it is destined: its ultimate purpose,”115 which 
differs from money laundering which “concerns property which is derived from crime 
and efforts to combat it therefore focus on its origin.”116 Coupling money laundering 
and terrorism financing is confusing as the processes are different; the processes 
operate in opposite directions as Alexander describes, and so use different 
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techniques, and while there may be some common ground, the two issues require 
separate approaches.  
 
The current money laundering offences of the UK are found within the Part 7 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act.117 The three main offences are concealing,118 
arrangements,119 and acquisition, use and possession.120 It is also an offence to fail to 
disclose knowledge of money laundering,121 or tip off a person suspected of money 
laundering.122 The preventative measures are found in the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2017.123 The applicability of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017 will be considered in relation to cryptocurrencies. 
The most recent piece of legislation, the Criminal Finances Act 2017124 is 
acknowledged, but does not add any provisions relevant to cryptocurrencies. 
 
US 
The US was the first country to criminalise money laundering, with the Money 
Laundering Control Act 1986.125 The US AML legislation is split into two categories by 
Tomas and Roppolo;126 firstly, criminal law, and secondly, the implementation of 
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regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act127 (BSA 1970). The BSA 1970 is still the 
principal AML legislation of the US, but it has had numerous amendments, as can be 
seen in chapter four. The Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act 1992128 amended the 
BSA 1970 by introducing suspicious activity reporting requirements for financial 
institutions,129 these were extended by the Money Laundering Suppression Act 1994.130 
More changes to the BSA 1970 came through the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict, Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
2001131 (PATRIOT Act 2001), which extended reporting requirements to cover terrorist 
financing. The PATRIOT Act 2001 also gave money laundering legislation extra-
territorial effect.132 The amended version of the BSA 1970 remains the principal source 
of US AML law and is considered in detail in chapter six. As with the UK legislation, 
21st century developments have intertwined money laundering with terrorist financing. 
The incorporation of counter terrorist financing legislation has led to the term ‘reverse 
money laundering’, defined by Cassella as the “process of conducting financial 
transactions with clean money for the purpose of concealing or disguising the future 
use of that money to commit a criminal act.”133 The Cassella concept of reverse money 
laundering is rejected by this thesis, as it could apply to any organised crime, it is not 
specific to terrorist financing. Furthermore, as established in relation to the UK, the 
confusion of money laundering and terrorist financing is unhelpful as the processes 
and behaviours, are very different. This research is focussed on the potential money 
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laundering risks posed by cryptocurrencies. The analysis of the US legislation will 
focus on money laundering offences within Title 18 of the United State Code §§1956-
1957;134 introduced by the Money Laundering Control Act 1986,135 and on the present 
version of the BSA 1970, incorporating the most recent amendments by the PATRIOT 
Act 2001. Cryptocurrencies will be considered in relation to the relevant legislation, 
analysing the applicability of the law, and where relevant suggesting reform. 
 
Australia 
Australia implemented its first money laundering offences through the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1987.136 The development of AML legislation in Australia has followed a 
similar pattern to the US and the UK, particularly the most recent money laundering 
legislation, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006.137 
The 2006 Act, like the US and the UK, entwines money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The primary source of money laundering offences in Australia is the Criminal 
Code Act 1995,138 which codifies all federal offences. Subdivision 400.3-9139 will be the 
most relevant division of the Criminal Code for this thesis as this is where the money 
laundering offences are contained, of which there are 19. This is a much larger number 
of offences than the UK and the US; this is because money laundering offences are 
arranged very differently in Australia. The US and UK have a small number of offences, 
and sentencing provisions allow for the appropriate sentence to be imposed, whereas 
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in Australia the same three offences are repeated 6 times to prescribe the sentencing 
guidelines depending on the value of money or property involved. 
 
The preventative measures of Australia are contained in the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter Terrorist Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act 2006),140 of which the key 
measures are Threshold Transaction Reports (TTRs),141 Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs),142 and due diligence requirements.143 Chapter seven demonstrates that 
Australia follows the same broad split in approaching money laundering as the US and 
the UK; criminalising money laundering, as required by the UN treaties and the FATF, 
and requiring financial institutions to adhere to preventative measures. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis identifies themes in the development of AML legislation since its inception 
in the 1960s. Money laundering is tracked from its origins as secondary crime linked 
to the drugs trade, through to it being accepted as a standalone offence, and then the 
reverse step of conflating terrorist financing with money laundering. It is observed in 
this thesis that the role of the UN has receded, giving way to the FATF and the EU in 
developing current international best practice, and that the FATF and EU have become 
increasingly prescriptive through their Recommendations and legislation respectively. 
With regard to national AML regulation, the UK, the US, and Australia have been early 
adopters of AML regulation, they have been quick to implement UN conventions and 
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subsequently the Recommendations of the FATF, the UK has also implemented EU 
AML directives. With regard to cryptocurrency regulation, Australia and the US are 
ahead of the UK, demonstrating that the regulation of cryptocurrency service providers 
is possible, and that adapting an AML approach to include cryptocurrency service 
providers can be achieved in a timely fashion. Both jurisdictions have widened their 
AML regulation and require cryptocurrency service providers to adhere to customer 
due diligence and reporting requirements, this shows that cryptocurrency service 
providers can be regulated in the same way as traditional financial institutions. Though 
the end result has been the same in both jurisdictions, the development of their AML 
regulation has been instigated differently; in the US, FinCEN has taken the lead in a 
regulatory led widening of the regulatory perimeter, compared to Australia where 
Parliament has delivered a legislator led widening of the regulatory perimeter. The UK 
will follow a legislator led approach by virtue of implementing the 5th Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive. This thesis identifies that while international guidance and 
domestic measures are a positive step, they fail to recognise the wealth of data 
available through public ledgers, which needs to be addressed through utilising 
technology. Bitcoin’s blockchain can be viewed freely online,144 and there are 
numerous blockchain API tools available to enable analysis of the blockchain.145 At 
present, it is not clear if the financial intelligence available through the blockchain is 
being analysed for AML purpose, but it is a valuable resource that needs to be utilised. 
Currently a money laundering investigation will only begin when suspicion is aroused, 
but by automating analysis of the blockchain, money laundering investigations could 
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get a head start and patterns of transactions could be identified. Blockchain analysis 
should be the responsibility of the FIU as financial intelligence will be produced. 
 
2.3. Placing the thesis 
The relationship between cryptocurrencies and money laundering is an under-
researched area. Some attempts have been made to consider the implications of 
money laundering and virtual currencies, such as that of Irwin et al.,146 but this research 
specifically seeks to consider whether the current laws apply to cryptocurrencies and 
whether any proposed reforms will address the gap in the law, or whether a new 
approach is required. This thesis analyses money laundering in isolation of terrorist 
financing, this is justified based on the differences between money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Principally, as Alexander observes, the focus of the activity in 
terrorist financing is “where it is destined: its ultimate purpose,”147 whereas money 
laundering is the opposite, it “concerns property which is derived from crime and efforts 
to combat it therefore focus on its origin.”148 Cassella also notes this difference, terrorist 
financing is the “process of conducting financial transactions with clean money for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the future use of that money to commit a criminal 
act,”149 therefore, while there may be overlaps in the appeal of cryptocurrencies for 
terrorist financing, this will require separate research.  
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2.3.1. Regulatory Gaps 
This thesis exposes the weaknesses of AML legislation targeted at cryptocurrencies. 
It demonstrates that the money laundering offences of each of the three case studies 
can be committed using cryptocurrencies, but also that the existing preventative 
measures are not compatible with cryptocurrencies. The prevailing approach from the 
FATF is to recommend that cryptocurrencies should be regulated under existing AML 
measures, with the emphasis being placed in the intersections between 
cryptocurrencies and the traditional financial system.150 This approach leaves a clear 
gap in the regulation of cryptocurrencies; the speed and ease of transactions within 
cryptocurrency networks means that the transactions with the traditional financial 
system will be too far along the money laundering process to appear suspicious. This 
research demonstrates this gap in regulation in each of the case study jurisdictions 
and in the international guidance. 
 
This research has taken place at a time of political uncertainty in all three jurisdictions, 
as each jurisdiction has held divisive general elections. In July 2016, Australia retained 
the same leading coalition, but with a bare majority of 1 seat,151 and the same slim 
majority was retained in the 2019 election.152 The US election of November 2016 
resulted in a change of government and a new President,153 and the UK elections of 
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Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 07 October 2019. 
151 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Federal Election 2016’ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/federal-
election-2016/results/> accessed 27 September 2019. 
152 The Guardian, ‘Australian election 2019: live results’ (18 May 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2019/may/18/live-results-for-the-2019-
australian-election-track-the-votes> accessed 09 October 2019. 
153 BBC News, ‘US Election 2016’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/us2016/results> accessed 27 
September 2019. 
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2015154 and 2017155 which have seen the UK move from coalition, to a small 
Conservative majority government and, at the time of writing, a fragile Conservative 
minority government seeking another general election.156 Government change 
hampers the passing of legislation, the legislating house of the country is dissolved 
while campaigning takes place, and a period of time after the election can be spent 
formulating a government.157 Elections further hamper the passing of AML legislation 
as elections are rarely fought on this issue; money laundering does not have 
immediately identifiable consequences as will be seen in chapter four, Unger notes 
that there are no direct victims of money laundering, instead “there are always 
secondary victims such as family, friends, acquaintances, and society at large.”158 
While recent elections have shown that politicians are not aware exactly what the 
electorate want, it is clearly a lot easier to campaign on more tangible issues, as such 
manifestos are silent on money laundering and cryptocurrencies, and instead much 
more focussed on taxes, security and the economy. As a result of elections, the 
legislature will be focussed on proposals which stem from the manifestos and election 
campaigns, which is likely to push back any proposed AML legislation. This thesis 
analyses the law of the three jurisdictions and considers the reform that can take place 
once settled governments are in place. 
 
                                                     
154 BBC News, ‘Election 2015’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results> accessed 27 
September 2019. 
155 BBC News, ‘Election 2017’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results> accessed 27 
September 2019. 
156 BBC News, ‘Brexit: Boris Johnson's second attempt to trigger election fails’ (10 September 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49630094> accessed 09 October 2019. 
157 As demonstrated in 2017 in the UK: BBC News, ‘Theresa May and the DUP deal: What you need 
to know’ (26 June 2017) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40245514> accessed 09 
October 2019. 
158 B. Unger & D. v.d. Linde, Research Handbook On Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2013) at p.20. 
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There is limited academic comment regarding the money laundering risks of 
cryptocurrencies; those who have considered the money laundering threat have found 
the threat to be minimal due to the volatility of the most prominent cryptocurrency, 
Bitcoin, and the relatively low value of Linden Dollars, the currency of Second Life. 
Irwin et al. viewed the anonymity of cryptocurrencies as appealing to money 
launderers,159 but focussed on virtual worlds rather than just cryptocurrencies. Stokes 
considers the “emergence of new and alternative payment technologies and products 
pose a genuine money laundering risk”160 and that more research is required into 
cryptocurrencies.161 Houben argues that “national level is probably not the best level 
to adequately address”162 the risks of cryptocurrencies, and that “European level is 
more appropriate, preferably in the execution of a global approach, as crypto activity 
is also not limited by the European border.”163 This thesis will contribute to knowledge 
in understanding cryptocurrencies and analyse whether cryptocurrencies can be 
defined as money, as this is unclear. The most important contribution from this thesis 
will be in analysing and contrasting the global and domestic reactions to 
cryptocurrencies and proposing reform in the UK, but that will also be applicable 
internationally.  
 
2.3.2. Relevant Authorities and Organisations  
In identifying the relevant authorities and organisations to this thesis, the research can 
be split into two broad areas; domestic and international. In each of the case study 
jurisdictions, this thesis will focus on the actions of the governments, legislators and 
                                                     
159 cf Irwin et al. (n57) 
160 cf Stokes (n81) at 231. 
161 cf Stokes (n81) at 232. 
162 cf Houben (n83) at 268. 
163 cf Houben (n83) at 268. 
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regulators of each of the case study jurisdictions. The focus of this thesis is on the 
application of AML regulation, as such the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in each 
jurisdiction will be identified and its response to cryptocurrencies will be analysed. The 
UK FIU is the National Crime Agency, in the US it is the Financial Crime Enforcement 
Network, and in Australia it is the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. 
In the UK the responsibility for regulation rests with Financial Conduct Authority, rather 
than the FIU as it does in the US and Australia, therefore the Financial Conduct 
Authority’s response to cryptocurrencies will also be analysed.  
 
As chapter four demonstrates, money laundering attracts the attention of prominent 
international organisations, most notably the UN, the FATF, and the EU. 
Cryptocurrencies and money laundering are both international issues and therefore 
the response of the international community must be considered; the constraints of 
this research mean that the priority will be placed on the major international 
organisations and their influences on the case study jurisdictions.  
 
2.4. Literature Review Summary 
This thesis seeks to build on the academic debate regarding cryptocurrencies, in 
situating the research within the existing literature it must be made clear from the 
outset that the focus will be placed on the money laundering risks of cryptocurrencies; 
where relevant the research will be distinguished from terrorist financing risks. The 
aims of the research are to assess the applicability of both money laundering offences 
and AML provisions to cryptocurrencies; the relevant laws of three case study 
jurisdictions will be analysed, and the influence of international organisations will be 
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considered. The primary sources will be the legislation of the case study jurisdictions, 
and the relevant international organisations will be considered based on their links to 
the three jurisdictions; all are members of the UN and the FATF, and, at the time of 
this research, the UK is still implementing EU legislation.  
 
2.5. Methodology 
This thesis adopts a socio-legal methodology, this methodology does not exist in 
isolation; it includes traditional doctrinal research but recognises the need to consider 
wider sources than legal text. 
 
Doctrinal research has been defined as providing “a systematic exposition of the rules 
governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, 
explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments.”164 Mann 
describes it as a “synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines 
and values. It explains, makes coherent or justifies a segment of the law as part of a 
larger system of law.”165 Van Hoecke has described the doctrinal approach as a 
hermeneutic discipline166 comparing it to a study of literature, the principal difference 
being that doctrinal research involves “interpreting texts and arguing about a choice 
among diverging interpretations.”167 The principle strength of the doctrinal 
methodology is the focus on primary materials; the essence of the approach is to 
                                                     
164 D. Pearce, E. Campbell and D. Harding (‘Pearce Committee’), Australian Law Schools: A 
Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1987) p.7. 
165 T. Mann (ed), Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press 2010) at p.97. 
166 M. van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) What Kind of Discipline?’ in M. van Hoecke, 
Methodologies of Legal Research (Bloomsbury, 2011) p.4. 
167 ibid. 
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assess the law, through statutes and case law. This focus on legal texts also points 
towards to be biggest criticism of doctrinal research; it is limited to specific legal 
questions which may only be answered by analysing legal text, this restricts legal 
research as it does not allow for the social, political or economic impact of the law to 
be considered. While this method of legal research will be invaluable in this research, 
it is also limited, as stated, the definition of the doctrinal approach highlights the most 
prevalent criticism against it, it is merely descriptive, it is argued that socio-legal 
research has achieved more valuable knowledge because of its considerations for 
how and why the law exists as it does and how it can be reformed.168 
 
Adopting a socio-legal methodology addresses the principal weakness of doctrinal 
research. To discount socio-legal research would risk producing a very narrow thesis, 
as it would involve ignoring issues identified by other methods of research used within 
this research, and as such valuable considerations would be missed; the value of the 
research would be reduced if it was solely doctrinal. 
 
Defining the parameters of socio-legal research has proven difficult as it encompasses 
a broad spectrum. The most effective way of establishing these parameters is to 
distinguish socio-legal research from the traditional doctrinal approach to legal 
research. Whereas doctrinal research limits a researcher to legal text, the socio-legal 
methodology allows a researcher to “cast their net wider than law reports, statutes and 
Hansard, and academic commentaries upon doctrinal sources. Instead it requires 
                                                     
168 R. Cotterrell, Law’s Community (OUP 1995). 
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researchers to gather ‘data wherever appropriate to the problem, by using whatever 
methods are most likely to generate such data.”169 This may be applied to the research 
at hand; it is accepted from the outset that there will be limited primary legal resources 
directly pertaining to cryptocurrencies due to cryptocurrencies being a relatively new 
phenomenon, and were a purely doctrinal approach adopted the available sources 
would be unlikely to be sufficient for a thesis. By utilising sources from other 
disciplines, the wealth of research in this area may be analysed and the potential legal 
impacts may be considered. 
 
2.5.1. Methods employed for the research.  
Under the socio-legal methodology, this thesis will employ a case study approach in 
order to draw comparisons between the three selected jurisdictions. As has been 
demonstrated already, the socio-legal methodology is a very broad one; therefore, it 
is important to consider the specific methods that will be adopted under the umbrella 
of the socio-legal research. Case studies are used as a method in this research, but 
case studies will also require methods within them, and do no stand alone as a 
research method.  
 
Case studies 
Three case study jurisdictions have been selected; Australia, the UK and the US. The 
selection of jurisdictions has been limited to three as it would not be viable to attempt 
to compare too many jurisdictions. The United States has been selected as it is a world 
                                                     
169 A. Bradshaw, Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal Research 
Methods’ in P Thomas (ed) Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot, Ashgate-Dartmouth, 1997) p.99. 
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leader in adopting AML measures; it was the first country to criminalise money 
laundering,170 it has an influential role in directing the international agenda with the 
biggest economy171 and housing the UN headquarters in New York,172 and it is a 
founding member of the Financial Action Task Force.173 Australia has been selected 
as it is also an early adopter of AML initiatives; Australia criminalised money 
laundering within a year of the US doing so,174 it is also a founding member of the 
FATF,175 and one of the first countries to develop legislation which specifically 
addresses cryptocurrencies.176 This research is conducted in the UK, and the UK has 
historically been an early adopter of AML measures, criminalising money laundering 
in the same year as the US in 1986,177 and it is a founder member of the FATF.178 
Despite the previous proactivity of the UK, this research identifies the UK as lagging 
behind in its reaction to the development of cryptocurrencies.179 The UK case study 
will analyse the UK and seek to recommend reform based on the conclusions of the 
US and Australia case studies. The three jurisdictions have been selected in part due 
to their similarities; as identified, all three jurisdictions are founding members of the 
                                                     
170 In 1986 through the Money Laundering Control Act Pub. L. 99-570. 
171 Based on Gross Domestic Product: World Bank ‘GDP (current US$)’ (2018) 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true&view=chart> 
accessed 29 April 2020. 
172 United Nations, ‘Secretariat’ <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/secretariat/index.html> 
accessed 29 April 2020. 
173 Financial Action Task Force, ‘History of the FATF’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> 
accessed 29 April 2020. 
174 Proceeds of Crime Act 1987. 
175 Australian Government: Department of Home Affairs, ‘Crime Prevention – Financial Action Task 
Force’ (17 March 2020) <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/criminal-
justice/crime-prevention/financial-action-task-force> accessed 29 April 2020. 
176 The terms “registered digital currency exchange provider” and “registrable digital currency 
exchange service” were added to the list of regulated activities within the Anti‑Money Laundering and 
Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5.  
177 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986.  
178 178 Financial Action Task Force, ‘History of the FATF’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 29 April 2020. 
179 Until the implementation of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive in January 2020, the UK had 
not enacted any reforms to address cryptocurrencies. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(Amendment) Regulations 2019. 
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FATF, they are all considered developed countries, and they can all be seen to be 
early adopters of AML measures.180 There are also differences between each of the 
jurisdictions, the US and Australia are federal countries whereas the UK is not, the 
analysis of the US and Australia will focus on national legislation, it is not possible to 
cover state or territory legislation within this thesis.  
 
The UK’s historical membership in the EU provides the opportunity to assess EU law, 
which may be described as supranational law, completing tripartite assessment of 
money laundering law; national, international and supranational. As developed 
countries, and members of the FATF the three jurisdictions may be expected to 
present strong AML controls, but in analysing cryptocurrencies, the research will 
explore the effect of such controls on vehicles that the jurisdictions have little influence 
over. 
 
The socio-legal methodology will be applied to the case studies; therefore, the case 
studies, consistent with the methodology of the thesis, will involve doctrinal analysis, 
but also consider non-legal sources. In order to define and understand the position of 
the law currently in force it will be necessary to undertake a comprehensive 
assessment of the primary sources of law in the UK the US and Australia; these 
sources will be case law and legislation. This element of the case study research will 
be doctrinal, also referred to as ‘black-letter’ approach.181 As stated already, the 
doctrinal approach seeks to identify and explain the law using all its forms. Based on 
                                                     
180 See chapter four at 4.7. 
181 J. Mason and M. Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of 
Legal Research (Pearson 2007) at p. 44 
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this definition the aim of the analysis is to determine the applicability of current money 
laundering legislation to cryptocurrencies in each jurisdiction. In determining the 
applicability of the law, the legislation will be interpreted based on the relevant legal 
definitions of the terms used; and it will be seen whether the offences can be 
committed using cryptocurrencies.  
 
The case studies will involve criminal and civil law, as well as European legislation in 
the case of the UK. Although the applicability of the law will be doctrinal, the overall 
analysis of the law will also be socio-legal as the influences from international 
legislation will also be considered; each of the jurisdictions is party to a number of 
international agreements and organisations, for example all three jurisdictions are 
members of the FATF, and so each jurisdictions legislation may be analysed in light 
of the Recommendations issued by the FATF. 
 
The three case studies will be separate but, as much as possible, be comparable in 
order to achieve a like for like analysis. A strict comparison could not be undertaken 
due to the differences in the legal systems in each jurisdiction. The parameters of the 
cases studies must be made clear; the research will be centred on the national 
legislation of each of the jurisdictions; it will not be possible to fully analyse the 
legislation of all US states or Australian federal territories. Similarly, in relation to 
enforcement authorities, national agencies will be the predominant subjects of 
analysis. Each jurisdiction implements its AML legislation using numerous regulatory 
authorities. In this research regulatory authorities will be divided into three categories; 
primary, secondary, and, where relevant, tertiary authorities. Primary authorities are 
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government departments; as Ryder identifies, this category will include authorities with 
policymaking powers.182 Secondary authorities are regulatory bodies; these may be 
financial intelligence units or law enforcement agencies. Tertiary authorities are 
industry bodies which represent professions that are affected by regulation, or 
organisations representing cryptocurrencies.183 The cryptocurrency industry is not one 
that is well represented by tertiary authorities, as such these will not be considered in 
detail. The research is primarily concerned with the legislation, and overall approach 
of the jurisdictions to AML; by categorising the authorities, a clearer comparison of 
approaches may be achieved. By using the case study method, the findings from each 
jurisdiction can then be compared. 
 
The comparison between the three case studies will be de lege lata / de lege lata, 
comparing the laws that in place at the time of research. In light of this comparison, 
some de lege ferenda / de lege lata inferences may be made; the practice of one 
jurisdiction may be advised for the other.184 Comparing the law of different jurisdictions 
is invaluable in considering reform; it is highly unlikely for a legal issue to be entirely 
unique to one jurisdiction. Additionally, the nature of the internet means much of the 
western world, if not the entire world, faces similar challenges in regulating a non-
physical jurisdiction, upon which traditional physical borders do not apply. 
 
                                                     
182 cf Ryder (n50) at p.25. 
183 ibid. 
184 J. Karha, ‘How to Make Comparable Things: Legal Engineering at the Service of Comparative Law’ 
in M.Van Hoecke, Epistemology and methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing 2004). 
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Prior to analysing domestic legislation, a history of international developments will be 
provided; in undertaking the research in this order the primary domestic legislation 
may be viewed in light of the international legal sources, which will assist with 
interpretation, and in applying the law to cryptocurrencies. 
 
Documentary Analysis 
The method of analysis is informal documentary analysis. Informal in that no coding is 
used to analyse the documents. The subject of the analysis will be a variety of 
documents, consistent with the socio-legal methodology. Analysis is a very broad 
term; defined by the Oxford Dictionary as a “[d]etailed examination of the elements or 
structure of something.”185 To better define analysis for the purpose of this research; 
the various documents will be read, and the text pertinent to money laundering and 
cryptocurrencies will be examined. This examination will explain the legal approach to 
cryptocurrencies and money laundering, drawing links between the texts, as well as 
identifying differences. The purpose of this examination is to identify the current legal 
status, and treatment, of cryptocurrencies, and to predict the impending developments 
to that legal status and treatment. 
 
Primary Sources 
Various sources are used in this research. The primary sources of law are legislation 
and case law from each of the case study jurisdictions; all three of the case study 
                                                     
185 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Analysis’ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/analysis> 
accessed 10th September 2019. 
 67 
jurisdictions practice common law. As well as the primary sources of law, this thesis 
will also analyse international treaties, conventions, agreements and organisations. 
 
Legislation 
The national legislation of each case study jurisdiction will be the principal source of 
law. These will be sourced from state run websites and law databases. As stated in 
relation to the parameters of the case studies, this research does not focus on US 
state law or the law of Australia’s federal territories; the limitation on resources mean 
only national legislation is used.  
 
Case Law  
The three case study jurisdictions selected are common law jurisdictions, as such, 
relevant case law will be used to demonstrate the application of the law, however, it is 
accepted from the outset that the phenomenon of cryptocurrencies is such a recent 
development, very few relevant cases have been heard. 
 
Sources of International Law 
In addition to the law of the case study jurisdictions; international sources of law are 
used in this thesis. The principal sources of international law relevant to this thesis are 
treaties and conventions of the United Nations and the European Union. Soft law is 
also considered, such as the Recommendations of the FATF as this is a leading 
organisation in developing international standards in AML legislation and regulation.  
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Secondary sources  
Journal articles and commentaries will make up the secondary legal sources; these 
will provide clarification from commenters and their interpretations of the development 
of the law, as well as highlight the current issues in the area. The use of these sources 
can remain within the general doctrinal method; using primary and secondary sources 
the legal rules can be analysed and provide “a descriptive commentary on points of 
law.”186 However, in this research the use of secondary sources will embrace the socio-
legal approach, as the secondary sources will not be limited to describing the law, but 
also seeking to critique its effectiveness. Furthermore, the secondary sources will not 
be limited to legal journals; relevant non-legal sources will be used, as the subject 
matter of this thesis naturally overlaps with economics, politics and sociology.  
 
The sources used in this thesis are predominantly qualitative data, as the focus of this 
research is on the status and treatment of cryptocurrencies, which will not be found in 
quantitative data. Where relevant some statistics will be included; but this will be 
restricted to limited circumstances, such as justifying the research, the value of 
cryptocurrencies, and estimations as to the extent of money laundering in each of the 
jurisdictions, and globally. This element of the research will provide insight into the 
size and value of the industry that is being researched, which will provide justification 
for considering potential legal involvement. Castronova argues the size of the user 
base and the economies of virtual worlds justify a legal assessment of virtual worlds,187 
demonstrating the social importance of virtual worlds and as such the potential need 
for an assessment of the law’s role. This research focuses on cryptocurrencies, which 
                                                     
186 cf Mason and Mason (n181) at p.64 
187 cf Castronova (n11) at p.39. 
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form a broader phenomenon than virtual worlds as some virtual currencies can interact 
with the real-world economy. Law is reactionary and if such a great volume of people 
are participating in a behaviour, producing such a high value of economic worth, it is 
right for the law to address the problems that may exist and the potential problems 
that may develop. Analysing the impact of the law on cryptocurrencies will also provide 
insight into the way the law is administered and its effectiveness.  
 
As well the economic considerations, societal considerations must be explored. Media 
coverage of cryptocurrencies in recent years will have influenced public opinion. It will 
be important to consider the portrayal of virtual worlds and virtual currency issues 
raised here. Contemporary methods of communication and sources of information are 
particularly important in such a fast-evolving area. Traditional sources of comment 
such as monographs and journals cannot be produced as fast or as efficiently as online 
news articles, direct publications to the internet, or publications through social 
networks. The research will utilise respectable online sources of information, such as 
reputable news sites and press releases from government authorities. However, 
where possible the research seeks to build on the seminal work of researchers in this 
area via monographs and journal papers. 
 
2.5.2. Limitations to the research 
Additional empirical socio legal work could and perhaps should be undertaken in this 
area, such as interviews with users of cryptocurrencies and regulatory authorities. It 
was not possible to use empirical methods due to difficulties in contacting relevant 
individuals, these individuals consenting to being interviewed, the available financial 
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resources to this research, and the ethical issues around such sources. If research 
were to be undertaken within virtual communities it will be difficult to ascertain or verify 
the identity of the individuals contacted, as such it would also be difficult to be sure of 
the age of the interviewees. This research is limited to a socio-political exploration of 
the concept of money, as it is a law PhD, and not an economics study. Similarly, it is 
not possible for this research to have produced the analytical tools recommended, but 
these are recommended for further research. 
 
2.6. Chapter Summary 
This literature review identifies that money laundering is an extensively researched 
area, but that the emergence of cryptocurrencies has not been fully addressed within 
academic literature. Trends in AML regulation have been observed, such as rise of the 
FATF and EU to take the place of the UN in leading global AML efforts, and the 
separation of money laundering from drug offences only for it to be combined with 
terrorist financing. This thesis focuses solely on money laundering, as it is 
distinguishable from the financing of terrorism. The existing legislation has been 
identified and it is clear that the UK is compliant with AML regulation of the traditional 
financial system, but it has fallen behind the US and Australia as it has yet to address 
the threats posed by cryptocurrencies. Current international guidance is observed to 
be a commendable first step to addressing the money laundering threat of 
cryptocurrencies, but this thesis argues that the guidance is ineffective as the majority 
of cryptocurrency transactions remain outside of AML regulation.  
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Before the relevant laws can be considered, the concept of cryptocurrencies and 
money laundering must be fully understood, therefore the next chapter explores the 
phenomenon of cryptocurrencies, defining and differentiating them from fiat currency. 
The chapter also analyses the concept of money and assesses whether 
cryptocurrencies are indeed money. 
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Chapter 3. Contextualisation  
3.1. Chapter Outline 
In this chapter, the subject matter of the thesis will be introduced and explained. The 
key terms which require explanation are; virtual worlds, virtual currencies, and 
cryptocurrencies. Once these have been defined, the concept of money will also be 
analysed, cryptocurrencies will be assessed against theories of money, and the 
functions of money. These discussions are necessary in order to consider the link 
between money laundering and cryptocurrencies; while it may not be possible to prove 
the extent to which cryptocurrencies are used to launder money, it will be shown that 
cryptocurrencies have the potential to be utilised in the money laundering process as 
demonstrated by convictions in the UK and US. The Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) consider cryptocurrencies worthy of attention for this reason.1 
 
Cryptocurrencies, and their characteristics, will be identified and assessed as to 
whether they can be defined as money, or as a type of money. This is necessary in 
order to establish that cryptocurrencies are a potential avenue to launder money. 
Cryptocurrencies have been prominent in the media in recent times, partly fuelled by 
the surges in price. The most well-known cryptocurrency is Bitcoin, partly due to its 
changeable value, its highest value being $19,447 in December 2017.2 This chapter 
will identify Bitcoin as a cryptocurrency, which is a distinct type of virtual currency.  
 
                                                     
1 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27 October 2019. 
2 XE, ‘USD per 1 XBT’ <https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=USD&view=2Y> 
accessed 19 March 2019. 
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In determining whether cryptocurrencies are money, theories of money must be 
analysed, five theories will be considered; orthodox, Marxist, state theory, social 
construction theory, and credit theory. Theories of money may be categorised into two 
broad groups; metallist and chartalist.3 Metallist theories consider efficiency and 
market forces as the principle drivers in the formation of money, rather than the state.4 
Chartalists place the state in a much more prominent role in the creation of money,5 
creating money as tokens which have little value in themselves but have value as 
means of payment.6 Orthodox and Marxist theories of money are categorised as 
metallist theories of money; as the intrinsic value of the thing being traded as money 
is paramount.7 These theories may be contrasted with state theory and credit theory, 
which may be considered as chartalist theories of money. Cryptocurrencies will be 
assessed against the theories of money to determine their status in relation to money. 
Cryptocurrencies are not consistent with existing theories of money, but they are not 
wholly incompatible. It will be concluded that although cryptocurrencies are not 
currently able to perform the functions of money, it is possible for this to change with 
higher levels of acceptance. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) do not accept 
cryptocurrencies as currency or money,8 and categorise cryptocurrencies as 
‘cryptoassets’,9 which is a broad term. The position of the FCA and the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) response to cryptocurrencies will be analysed in chapter five. 
                                                     
3 Both terms are defined later in this chapter, for further discussion see: S. Bell, ‘The Role of the State 
and the Hierarchy of Money’ (2001) 25 Cambridge Journal of Economics 149. 
4 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
5 A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, (The Cannon Edition, 
New York, The Modern Library, 1937). 
6 ibid. 
7 K. Menger, ‘On Origins of Money’ (1892) 2(6) Economic Journal 293. 
8 ibid at 2.7. 
9 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets – Consultation Paper’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf> accessed 19 March 2019 at 2.3. 
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The analysis in this chapter will focus on cryptocurrencies, the broader term virtual 
currencies will be considered, and alternative categories of virtual currency will be 
identified. However, as identified by the FATF,10 cryptocurrencies will be identified as 
the focus of this thesis as they are considered to pose the highest money laundering 
risk.  
 
Prior to the analysis of cryptocurrencies against the theories of money, the key 
concepts of this thesis must be introduced and defined. Cryptocurrencies must be 
distinguished from the wider term virtual currencies, as virtual currencies exist both 
within virtual world, and on the internet in general, therefore these terms need defining 
and contextualising.  
 
3.2. Virtual worlds 
Castronova identifies three defining features of virtual worlds: ‘interactivity’, 
‘physicality’ and ‘persistence’.11 Users must be able to access the world remotely, it 
must be a simulation of a first-person physical environment, and finally it should 
continue to run whether anyone is using it or not.12 Interactivity and persistence are 
the most important of these features. Persistence is particularly important as it 
distinguishes virtual worlds from computer games and simulations; the virtual world is 
always functioning, even when the user logs off, and it can be affected by an infinite 
                                                     
10 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> 
accessed 19 March 2019 at p.32. 
11 E. Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First Hand Account of Market and Society of the Cyberian 
Frontier, [2001] SSRN CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618. 
12 ibid. 
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number of users. Bell also defines virtual worlds by their attributes, echoing the 
‘persistence’ requirement of the Castronova definition, but adding that the interaction 
should be ‘synchronous’,13 as such the communication and interactivity should be in 
real time and not turn based.14 The need for a virtual world to be synchronous is a 
demonstration of the development virtual worlds from early text based virtual worlds 
and role-playing games. The requirement of real time interaction incorporates 
Castronova’s ‘physicality’ requirement. Bell also requires the program to be ‘avatar-
based’15 in that users explore the world with their avatar; this can also be seen as an 
extrapolation of Castronova’s ‘physicality’ criterion. 
 
Virtual worlds may also be known as Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing 
Games (MMORPG) and their development may be traced to the development of role-
playing games (RPGs). Role playing and simulation has been around for millennia, 
Lastowka dates simulation back as far as Ancient Greece.16 The movement of RPGs 
to internet environments was not surprising and Brenner see the basis of many early 
RPGs stemming from the game Dungeons and Dragons.17 These early games were 
known as Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs), these were largely text based and developed 
during the 1970s.18 Also developing were non-game environments described as Multi 
Objected Oriented (MOO)19 such as LambdaMOO.20 Text based networks soon 
developed to become first-person graphical environments as computer graphics 
                                                     




16 G. Lastowka, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (Yale University Press, 2010) at p.31. 
17 S. Brenner, ‘Fantasy Crime’ (2008) 11(1) Vand J Ent & Tech L 1 at p.20. 
18 ibid. 
19 B. J. Gilbert, ‘Getting to Conscionable: Negotiating Virtual Worlds’ End User License Agreements 
without Getting Externally Regulated’ (2009) 4(4) JICLT 238. 
20 ibid. 
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improved, along with the ability of the internet to deal with increased traffic, especially 
with the increased access to broadband internet.21  
 
The broadest categories of virtual worlds are ‘game worlds’ and ‘open worlds’.22 Game 
worlds provide users with objectives, they are competitive, and the user’s aims include 
improving their characters ‘level’ and collecting items they can equip their character 
with. This is achieved though completing tasks often known as quests, many game 
worlds include a fighting element; users may fight each other and can take items from 
a defeated opponent. An example of a game world is World of Warcraft (WoW),23 
which is described as the biggest online game in the world,24 peaking at over 10 million 
subscribers in December 2014.25 
 
Open worlds are not objective orientated, they are merely simulations; be that of the 
real world or a fantasy world. Second Life is a prominent open world; users create an 
‘avatar’ which they may customise and use to explore the virtual world. Users are free 
to do whatever they choose, hence the term open world, they may purchase land, 
                                                     
21 R. Kennedy, ‘Law in Virtual Worlds’ (2009) 12(10) Journal of Internet Law 3. 
22 E. Castronova, ‘The Right to Play’ (2004) 49 NYL Sch L Rev 185. 
23 Blizzard, ‘World of Warcraft: Game Guide’ <http://eu.battle.net/wow/en/game/> accessed 11 June 
2015. 
24 IGN, ‘IGN Presents the History of World of Warcraft’ <http://uk.ign.com/articles/2009/08/18/ign-
presents-the-history-of-warcraft> accessed 11 June 2015. 
25 Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2014/11/19/world-of-warcraft-tops-10-million-
subscribers-following-warlords-of-draenor-expansion/> accessed 11 June 2018. This has since 
dropped but accurate figures are not available as Blizzard, the game’s developer, stopped releasing 
figures in 2015: E. Makuck, Gamespot <https://www.gamespot.com/articles/blizzard-will-no-longer-
report-world-of-warcraft-s/1100-6431943/> accessed 29 March 2019. 
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create in world objects and trade amongst each other. Second Life26 is an example of 
an open world which has over 1 million regular users.27 
 
Virtual worlds may require payments from users in a number of ways, users may have 
to pay to access subscription or pay for additional content in ‘freemium’ worlds; a 
‘freemium’ virtual world is one which may be played for free, but users may choose to 
pay a fee to access premium features.28 Free-to-play virtual words are platforms that 
do not charge a subscription fee for user access, these worlds do not involve any 
financial transactions. Subscription based games are games which require the user to 
pay to access the virtual world, usually a monthly fee, such as WoW.29 In ‘freemium’ 
virtual worlds, the platform is free to access but the user may pay to access premium 
content or accelerate their avatar’s development. Second Life may be viewed as an 
example of a freemium virtual world; users may access Second Life for free, but they 
can pay to acquire a premium membership which gives the user land in Second Life, 
a stipend of in world currency (Linden Dollars) and access to premium items in world.30 
Alternatively, Second Life users may retain a free account but purchase Linden Dollars 
to acquire items in the Second Life marketplace.31 
 
Trade is a common feature of most virtual worlds, predominantly via in-world currency. 
Users create or acquire objects, they often gain surpluses of common items and may 
                                                     
26 Linden Labs, ‘What is Second Life’ <http://secondlife.com/whatis/> accessed 11 June 2015. 
27 Business Insider, ‘Second Life Has Devolved into a Post-Apocalyptic Virtual World, And The 
Weirdest Thing Is How Many People Still Use It’ <http://www.businessinsider.com/second-life-today-
2014-7?op=1&IR=T> accessed 11 June 2015. 
28 BBC News, ‘Video Games Embrace China’s Freemium Model to Beat Piracy’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20899165> accessed 17 June 2015.  
29 Blizzard, ‘Games and Subscriptions’ <http://eu.battle.net/wow/en/shop/> accessed 11 June 2015. 
30 Linden Labs, ‘Become a Second Life Premium Member’ 
<https://secondlife.com/my/account/membership.php> accessed 11 June 2015. 
31 Linden Labs, ‘Second Life Market Place’ <https://marketplace.secondlife.com/?lang=en-US> 
accessed 11 June 2015. 
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lack rare ones. This, much like the development of real-world currency, requires a 
commodity with a standardised value which may be used as a medium of exchange; 
virtual world currencies are the medium of exchange in virtual worlds. Each virtual 
world will usually have its own virtual world currency, such as Linden Dollars in Second 
Life.  
 
Virtual currencies of specific virtual worlds are issued and controlled by the 
developers, and they are not classified as cryptocurrencies. This thesis focuses on the 
risks posed by cryptocurrencies. It is important to identify and distinguish virtual world 
currencies from cryptocurrencies, as any recommended reforms will not be targeted 
towards virtual worlds.  
 
3.3. Virtual Currencies 
The term virtual currencies used alone refers to any currencies which exist solely in 
electronic form, having no official physical form. A virtual currency is defined by FATF 
as;  
“a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as 
(1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of 
value, but does not have legal tender status … It is not issued nor guaranteed 
by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above functions only by agreement within the 
community of users of the virtual currency.”32 
 
                                                     
32 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th October 2019 at page 4. 
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The European Central Bank (ECB) views virtual currencies as ‘schemes’,33 and in 
2012 defined them as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and 
usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a 
specific virtual community.”34 The position of the ECB was updated in relation to virtual 
currencies in 2015, the ECB stated that “the word ‘unregulated’ should be deleted from 
the definition used in 2012,”35 as it recognised some jurisdictions had regulated virtual 
currencies.36 The definition was therefore updated to a “digital representation of value, 
not issued by a central bank, credit institution or e-money institution, which, in some 
circumstances, can be used as an alternative to money.”37 The ECB do not recognised 
virtual currencies as money, but accept that they can be used as an alternative to 
money. 
 
These definitions are deliberately generalised to apply to all virtual currencies, but 
there are important differences between types of virtual currencies. The ECB identify 
closed, unidirectional, and bidirectional virtual currencies; these are defined based on 
the way in which real economy money,38 or fiat money may be exchanged for virtual 
currency.  
 
In a closed virtual currency, no fiat money enters the system; the ECB state that there 
is “almost no link to the real economy”39 and that these may also be known as “in-
                                                     
33 ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> accessed 02 June 
2019. 
34 ibid at p13. 
35 ibid at p25. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid.  
38 ibid at p13. 
39 ibid. 
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game only”40 currencies. Users acquire this type of virtual currency via the virtual world 
they participate in; they may not use fiat money to purchase in-game currency. 
Unidirectional virtual currencies are currencies which may be purchased using fiat 
currency, but cannot be exchanged back; once converted the virtual currency must be 
spent within the relevant world or infrastructure. An example of this was Facebook 
Credits;41 they could be purchased using fiat currency, but may only be spent on virtual 
goods offered by Facebook and associated applications.42 The final category is 
bidirectional virtual currencies; these currencies allow the user to buy and sell the 
currency; Linden Dollars are the example provided by the ECB.43 These types of 
currencies are “similar to any other convertible currency with regard to its 
interoperability with the real world.”44 
 
It can be seen that, the ECB classify virtual currencies based on the movement of fiat 
money into and out of the virtual currency’s economy. The FATF also consider the 
transferability of the virtual currency into fiat currency, but also classify based on the 
organisational structure of the virtual currency. Figure 1 below demonstrates how the 
FATF categorises virtual currencies. 
  
                                                     
40 ibid. 
41 Facebook, ‘Where is my Facebook Credits?’ <https://www.facebook.com/notes/molpoints/where-is-
my-facebook-credits/439455502732806> accessed 02 October 2019. 
42 ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> accessed 02 June 




Figure 1. FATF Categories of Virtual Currency45 
 Centralised Decentralised 
Convertible Linden Dollars (used in Second 
Life) are an example of a 
convertible virtual world currency; 
users may exchange their 
currency for US Dollars. The 
currency is centralised, Linden 
Labs (the developer of Second 
Life) act as administrators.  
 
Examples of decentralised 
currencies include Bitcoin and 
Dogecoin. These are convertible 
for fiat currency but not controlled 




World of Warcraft (WoW) gold is 
non-convertible virtual world 
currency; users may not convert 
this into a fiat currency. WoW gold 




A virtual currency is convertible if it may be transferred into a fiat currency; if this is not 
possible, the currency is non-convertible. This may also be referred to as ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ currencies; a non-convertible currency operates a ‘closed’ system, none of the 
currency may be transferred into fiat currency. The convertibility of a currency is not 
                                                     
45 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th October 2019 at p.8. 
46 ibid. 
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fixed; it is observed that a virtual currency may become convertible, even via third 
party facilities, beyond the control of the currency’s administrator.47 In comparison to 
the ECB categories, both closed and unidirectional currencies would be viewed as 
non-convertible by the FATF classification. The values of these currencies are not 
fixed, they are dictated by market forces, which differentiates digital currencies from 
digital payment facilities, which have fixed exchange rates,48 such as PayPal49 or the 
now obsolete Liberty Reserve.50 
 
As can be seen by Figure 1, the FATF also consider the structure of the virtual 
currency in order to categorise them. Structures are either centralised or 
decentralised. A virtual currency is centralised when it is controlled by a single 
administrating authority; examples of these are the currencies of virtual worlds. The 
degree of control exercised may vary according to the practices of the administrator 
and whether the currency is convertible or not. A decentralised currency has no central 
authority; these may be based on an algorithm or code which dictates the production 
of the currency.  
 
In view of the aims of this research, it appears logical to adopt the FATF distinctions 
over that of the ECB; with regards to money laundering it is important to be able to 
convert the virtual currency back into fiat money in order to fully benefit from the 
criminal proceeds. As such virtual currencies fall into one of three categories; 
convertible centralised, non-convertible centralised, and convertible decentralised. No 
                                                     
47 ibid at p.5 
48 For a detailed explanation of payment facilities see: C. Chambers Jones and H. Hillman, Financial 
Crime and Gambling in a Virtual World: A new Frontier in Cybercrime (Edward Elgar, 2014 at p139.  
49 PayPal, ‘About PayPal’ <https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/about> accessed 17 June 2018. 
50 BBC News, ‘Liberty Reserve digital money service forced offline’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22680297> accessed 17 September 2019. 
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examples of non-convertible decentralised currencies have been identified by the 
FATF or the ECB. One further distinction which may be made relates to the usability 
of the virtual currency. A virtual currency is known as a virtual world currency when it 
is only accepted in a particular virtual world; this type of virtual currency is controlled 
by the developers of the virtual world and as such will be centralised. As demonstrated 
by the WoW gold and Linden Dollar comparison, virtual world currencies may be 




Bitcoin warrants particular attention due to its value,51 and because it is the forerunner 
to the growth cryptocurrencies.52 Bitcoin is a virtual currency but is also be referred to 
as a cryptocurrency, a currency which uses cryptography to disguise or protect the 
users of the currency. Cryptocurrencies utilise cryptography techniques to conceal the 
identity of the sender and receiver of a message or transfer. Southall and Taylor53 
trace the technique used by Bitcoin, and many other cryptocurrencies, back to 
proposals made by Chaum in the early 1980’s, who proposed sending private 
messages with a serial key system;54 messages were sent using a public key, but only 
the sender and recipient could access the message using a private key. Chaum 
                                                     
51 BBC News, ‘Bitcoin Currency Hits New Record High’ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
42135963> accessed 19 March 2019. 
52 Though widely considered the first cryptocurrency, the original paper proposing Bitcoin references a 
number of papers including previous proposals for web-based money such as: W. Dai, ‘b-money’ 
(1998) <http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt> accessed 13 October 2019. 
53 E. Southall and M. Taylor, ‘Bitcoins’ [2013] 19(6) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 
177. 
54 D. Chaum, ‘Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms’ [1981] 24(2) 
Communications of the ACM 84. 
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subsequently suggested the technique could be used to facilitate anonymous 
payments.55 
 
Bitcoin is not the first digital currency; previous digital currencies existed but failed to 
persist. Examples of this include ‘Beenz’ which launched in 1999 and promised to 
create “a generation of e-millionaires”56 but closed in 2001,57 just weeks after rival 
currency ‘Flooz’58 also shut down. As is discussed later is this chapter,59 numerous 
factors determine whether something is accepted as money, and as the demise of 
Beenz and Flooz demonstrates, early digital currencies failed to be accepted as 
money by a large enough community.  
 
Bitcoin was created by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009,60 the true identity of Bitcoin’s 
creator(s) is unknown as Satoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym. It is not known if Satoshi 
Nakamoto is one person or a group of people as throughout the self-published paper 
proposing Bitcoins, the term ‘we’ is used to refer to the author, suggesting it may be 
more than one person. Bitcoins can be distinguished from early digital currencies, and 
subsequent digital currencies can be seen to have copied the characteristics of 
Bitcoin. Bitcoin operates using the process summarised below as it appeared in the 
original paper by Satoshi Nakamoto:61 
 
                                                     
55 D. Chaum, ‘Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments’ in D. Chaum. R.L. Rivest and A.T. 
Sherman (ed), ‘Advances in Cryptology’ (Session III, Springer US, 1982) pp199-203. 
56 BBC News, ‘Business: The Company File: Beenz means business’ 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/297133.stm> accessed 12 June 2019. 
57 Commerce Times, ‘Beenz.com Closes Internet Currency Business’ 
<http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/12892.html> accessed 12 June 2015. 
58 CNet, ‘E-currency Site Flooz Goes Offline’ <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-271385.html> 
accessed 12 June 2019. 
59 See 3.4 and 3.5. 
60 Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ < http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 October 2019. 
61 ibid.  
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1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 
2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.  
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block. 
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes. 
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already 
spent. 
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next 
block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous 
hash.62 
 
Stage three introduces the concept of proof-of-work, this part of the process is known 
as mining, this involves a user’s computer, known as a node, providing an answer 
which matches the solution the system is requesting in order to produce a ‘block’ with 
a ‘proof-of-work’ attached. Blocks are sets of data which are permanently recorded in 
the Bitcoin network, they are a record of Bitcoin transactions,63 and known as the 
blockchain,64 By finding the proof-of-work and completing the block the user then 
acquires some new Bitcoins, currently 6.25 Bitcoins.65 Each block can only be 
produced once, and the Bitcoin reward goes to the miner who first produces the block, 
duplicates are not accepted. The alternative way to obtain Bitcoins is to purchase it 
via exchanges.66  
 
                                                     
62 ibid at p.3. 
63 ibid at p.8. 
64 Bitcoin, ‘How it Works’ <https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works> accessed 13 October 2019. 
65 B. Bambrough, ‘A Bitcoin Halvening Is Two Years Away - Here's What'll Happen To The Bitcoin 
Price’ (Forbes, 29 May 2018) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/05/29/a-bitcoin-
halvening-is-two-years-away-heres-whatll-happen-to-the-bitcoin-price/#4bffecd05286> accessed 19 
March 2019. 
66 Rates can be viewed here: Bitcoin Charts, ‘Markets’ <http://bitcoincharts.com/markets/> accessed 
18 June 2015. 
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Users send messages to each other in order to send and receive Bitcoins; this process 
uses a cryptography technique similar to that proposed by Chaum. Each user has a 
Bitcoin wallet with a unique address, when one user sends another user some Bitcoins 
two keys are used. The first is the public key which tells the network of the transaction 
between the two keys, the second is a private key which is a signature from the sender 
which prevents the amounts being transferred from being altered by anyone else in 
the network.67 This is shown below in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Bitcoin Transactions68 
 
 
The use of keys rather than names allows all transactions to be public and verifiable, 
to ensure no Bitcoins are spent twice, but still ensure the anonymity of those making 
the transactions. This anonymity will be lost if the user’s key were to become public, 
                                                     
67 Bitcoin.org, ‘How Does Bitcoin Work?’ <http://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works> accessed 19 January 
2014. 
68 Taken from: Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015. 
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and then all transactions may be traced. The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies 
is addressed by the United States Government Accountability Office in their 2014 
report, which described such currencies as pseudonymous,69 as the although the 
users name is not known, other details are published on the blockchain, such as their 
Bitcoin address, the time of the transaction, and the amount. Transactions of Bitcoins 
are confirmed by users of the network; confirmation ensures the sender has sufficient 
funds and that there are no double spends of Bitcoin. This confirmation occurs when 
the proof-of-work is found; at this point, the computer which solved the proof-of work 
verifies all of the transactions which took places since the last proof-of-work was 
produced.70 In order to limit the number of Bitcoins being produced the difficulty proof-
of-work problems increases to reduce the rate at which miners can complete blocks 
and obtain new Bitcoins.71 
 
Bitcoin’s model of coin production, transaction security, and transaction logging has 
been adopted by numerous subsequent cryptocurrencies, such as Ethereum,72 
Dogecoin73 and LiteCoin.74 The various currencies compete amongst each other by 
claiming to offer faster transaction speeds or increased security.75 A key feature of 
cryptocurrencies is the use of a blockchain, also known as distributed ledger,76 which 
                                                     
69 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> 
accessed 16 December 2015 at p.6. 
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71 ibid. 
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is publicly available.77 The accessibility of cryptocurrency blockchains can be further 
aided through the use of Application Programme Interfaces78 (APIs) which allow for 
the creation of applications to analyse the transaction data published in the blockchain. 
The identity protection afforded by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin can also be 
challenged as Meiklejohn et al79 “were able to identify 1.9 million public keys with some 
real-world service or identity,”80 however, “in many cases the identity was not a real 
name, but rather (for example) a username on a forum.”81 More recently, Juhász et al 
identified 22,363 users 1,797 associated IP addresses.82 While difficulties will remain 
with determining which users require identification and investigation, Juhász et al 
argue their “method is cheap in terms of resources,”83 and their “algorithms are 
relatively easy to implement and can be combined with other Bitcoin-transaction 
related information.”84 The research of Meiklejohn et al and Juhász et al demonstrate 
that the anonymity of cryptocurrencies may be eroded by the aforementioned 
techniques, but more research is needed. 
 
Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, are exchanged globally and are referred to in 
similar terms as money; such as the term ‘currency’ within cryptocurrency, the term 
‘cash’ in Bitcoin Cash, and the symbol used in Bitcoin’s logo being akin to a monetary 
                                                     
77 As demonstrated by: Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Bitcoin’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer> 
accessed 13 October 2019, Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Ethereum’ 
<https://www.blockchain.com/explorer?currency=ETH> accessed 13 October 2019, and Blockchain, 
‘Block Explorer: Bitcoin Cash’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer?currency=BCH> accessed 13 
October 2019. 
78 H. Henderson, ‘application programming interface (API)’ in Harry Henderson (ed) Encyclopaedia of 
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79 Sarah Meiklejohn, et al, “A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No 
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80 ibid at p.14. 
81 ibid. 
82 P. L. Juhász, J. Stéger, D. Kondor and G. Vattay, ‘A Bayesian approach to identify Bitcoin users’ 
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83 ibid at p.18. 
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symbol. Due to the connotations towards money, and cryptocurrencies representing 
such a novel and undefined phenomenon, an analysis of money is required, to 
determine whether cryptocurrencies are indeed money, or have the potential to 
become money. 
 
3.4. Definition of Money 
Definitions of a currency centre on the concept of a certain type of money being the 
legal tender of a country and controlled by the central bank of that country. The largest 
exception to this is the Euro which is the currency of a large number of countries across 
Europe and controlled by the ECB, the central bank of the European Union. A medium 
of exchange may still be viewed as money, despite not enjoying the status of legal 
tender in a particular jurisdiction. Fox states that the “status of an asset as money is a 
social fact rather than a matter of legal fiat.”85 As such, “an asset may circulate as a 
generally accepted medium of exchange, without also enjoying the status of legal 
tender in that state.”86 Fox gives the example of the US dollar which is accepted as 
payment in numerous countries where it is not legal tender. It would therefore seem 
sensible to establish whether cryptocurrencies are in fact money; as such the question 
must be asked, what is money?  
 
3.4.1. Theories of Money 
Debates over the origins on money have existed for millennia;87 subsequently a 
number of theories have been developed. Five theories will be discussed here; 
                                                     
85 D. Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP, 2008) at p17. 
86 ibid. 
87 Aristotle considered the nature of money in: Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Ch.9 (384-322 BC). 
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orthodox, Marxist, state theory, social construction theory, and credit theory. Orthodox 
and Marxist theories of money are metallist theories of money; this school of thought 
places intrinsic value on the thing being traded as money.88 Metallist theories consider 
efficiency and market forces as the principle drivers in the formation of money, rather 
than the state.89 These theories may be contrasted with state theory and credit theory, 
which are chartalist theories of money. Chartalists place the state in a much more 
prominent role in the creation of money,90 the state creates money as tokens which 
have little value in themselves but have value as means of payment.91 The social 
construction theory will also be considered, this does not necessarily conform to either 
category of theory, as it focuses on the differing situations money is used in order to 
determine what is meant by money. A hierarchy of money will then be analysed; this 
will demonstrate that money is not fixed, and numerous things may be money to 
varying extents. Cryptocurrencies will be placed on the hierarchy. It is argued that by 
being able to satisfy some functions of money, cryptocurrency are illustrated as 
capable of being utilised as a money laundering tool.  
 
3.4.2. Metallist and Chartalist Theories 
As it has already been stated, theories of money may be divided into two categories, 
metallist and chartalist, and individual theories of money will be considered within their 
category, beginning with metallist theories. Marxist and orthodox theories of money 
are metallist theories, as both of these theories view money as having intrinsic value, 
which means that the item used as money is valuable even when not being used as 
money. The Marxist theory considers money to be a measure of value for labour; gold 
                                                     
88 cf Menger (n7). 
89 cf North (n4). 
90 cf Smith (n5). 
91 ibid. 
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is used to measure the labour required to produce the item being purchased. Likewise, 
in the orthodox theory, the commodity used as money is a commodity which is used 
as a measure of the value of other commodities. The metallist theories view money as 
being created by society and merchants; the state has a minor role, supporting the 
system through contract and property law.92 The state theory of money and credit 
theory are chartalist theories of money; these theories place the state in a much more 
prominent role in the creation of money. Chartalist theories also differ from metallist in 
their view over the value of money; chartalist theories consider money to be valuable 
as tokens of credit, the thing used as money may not have any value in itself, it gains 
value through being usable. Money is then the mechanism by which debts is accepted 
and repaid. Metallist theories view the asset used as money as having intrinsic value. 
 
Orthodox Theory of Money 
The orthodox theory suggests that money evolved out of the inefficiencies of barter, 
principally, as identified by Jones, the issue of requiring double wants.93 For example, 
A must find someone, B, with the commodity they require, who in turn requires what 
A is offering in return. As Jones observes, this in inefficient because the chances of 
this occurring are low, and the relevant commodities may be of differing values.94 A 
further issue with barter is that not everyone offers commodities, some people may 
provide services, and difficulties may arise in valuing services against commodities. 
Menger raises these issues, as well as the issue of transporting goods, or commodities 
restricted to specific times of the year.95 Feldman and Jones recognise barter is quid 
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pro quo96 and that money is the item which all market participants keep in supply.97 
Feldman states that all market participants will hold a “positive quantity of one good 
(which we will call ‘money’)”,98 which will be accepted in lieu of wanting to directly swap 
goods, and Jones interprets this as a “good which everyone desires."99 In determining 
the good which will be used as money, Menger notes that precious metals are best 
suited because “their saleableness is far and away superior to that of all other 
commodities.”100 ‘Saleableness is determined by a number of factors; demand, supply, 
divisibility, status, and market speculation.101 Saleableness appears to have the same 
meaning as value; in essence precious metals are used because they are valuable. 
Precious metals are not always the basis of money, Radford observes that in prisoner 
of war (P.O.W) camps cigarettes took the role of money and were traded at standard 
values for inter-prisoner trade.102 The exact commodity which becomes money may 
vary, but it will have value itself; as well as be divisible, durable and portable, traits 
identified by Menger103  
 
The orthodox theory attributes very little to the role of the state; Radford’s assessment 
of P.O.W camps demonstrates the development of an economy without the control of 
the state. Menger argues that money “has not been generated by law,”104 but that it is 
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a “social, and not a state-institution.”105 North takes a similar position and argues that 
the law plays a facilitating role, protecting rights through property and contract law.106 
The orthodox theory of money puts forward the argument that money developed 
independently, as a social tool to facilitate trade. It suggests the commodity used as 
money should have value; and that this commodity by durable, divisible and portable. 
The role of the state is not prominent; it should simply take the role of enforcing the 
effects of money and protecting users.107  
 
Applying the orthodox theory of money to cryptocurrencies, it can be seen that the 
limited role of the state is true in cryptocurrencies. In applying saleableness, as 
identified by Menger,108 cryptocurrencies are divisible, and the process of mining 
provides a steady supply. However, while cryptocurrencies have been in high demand, 
the levels of market speculation have caused huge swings in value,109 and this 
reduces the usability of cryptocurrencies as money. The key characteristic of the 
orthodox theory which cryptocurrencies do comply with is the role of the state being 
minimal. 
 
Marxist Theory of Money 
The Marxist theory is, like the orthodox theory, a metallist theory of money. Karl Marx, 
an eminent philosopher of the 19th Century and his writings are the foundations of 
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modern communism.110 His theory of money is based on the concept of labour; money 
is quantified in terms of units of labour. Commodities have a value in money, which in 
turn places a value on the labour time required to produce that commodity. Money 
itself also has value, the gold used as money must be mined and minted; the price of 
gold acts as the price of labour.111 Marx identifies money as the unit of account; 
everything may be measured in terms of labour, and in turn in terms of money. The 
role of the state and the law is a reduced one, money is a product of society. The 
Marxist theory identifies money as a cover for relations of domination; if money did not 
exist it would simply appear that people were under the control of other people.112  
 
It might be that Marxist concepts of labour best apply to the mining process of 
cryptocurrencies, but nothing of intrinsic value is produced; just code which represents 
Bitcoins. Due to the computing power required to complete the mining process,113 it is 
likely that those mining Bitcoin in particular, are having to use lots of fiat money in 
order to produce cryptocurrency, which is most probably not the ‘labour’ Marx was 
referring to when formulating his theory of money. 
 
Metallist theories appear unworkable in modern monetary systems, particularly as the 
gold standard has been abandoned, so there is no solid commodity which paper notes 
represent; however, metallist theories do suggest that money existed before the state 
which would appear logical as humans formed into groups before forming into 
organised countries. Though metallist theories better explain money prior to the 
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existence of states, the theories still fail to provide a satisfactory account of how the 
concept of money came into existence, chartalist theories may better explain money 
in the modern day. As surmised by Bell, chartalist theories treat money as a token 
rather than as a valuable commodity in itself,114 and place the state at the centre of 
the operation of money,115 which is a contrast to the role attributed by metallist theories 
of money. The state theory of money will demonstrate how chartalist theories consider 
the state’s power to demand payment and the form the payment takes.116 Credit theory 
will also be considered as this chartalist theory of money demonstrates that the role of 
wider society is not immaterial in shaping money and identified by Innes.117 
 
State Theory of Money 
As the name suggests, the state theory of money places the state at the centre of the 
creation of money; prominent proponents of this theory include Knapp118 and Hurst.119 
Knapp argues that money is whatever the state understands as money, and what it 
understands as money is clear from what it will accept in payment of debts.120 This 
money then acquires value in the community because it may be used to settle such 
debts. Smith provides the analogy of a prince who chooses to accept a proportion of 
taxes in paper money; this paper has then been given a certain value.121 An important 
factor in the attribution of value in state theory is usability; the money has value 
because it is useful; it can be used to pay debts to the state. In turn this will encourage 
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the citizens of the state to trade in what the state understands as money; because the 
citizens will seek to collect this money in order to be able to meet their obligations to 
the state, this position was supported by Minsky.122 Under the state theory of money 
value is assigned to money, and the value they are given is upheld by the state’s 
acceptance of them at that value. Despite this the state is not the sole force, Mann 
recognises the influence the public may have on what is used as money, the State 
may be influenced by what the community already accepts as money.123 Knapp claims 
that the state will make it clear what they will accept, regardless of whether it is legal 
tender.124 
 
The role of the state is central to this theory of money; this is a clear contrast to the 
role of the state in the two previous theories. A further contrast is the way in which 
money is valued and the role of precious metals; in state theory the amount of precious 
metal in a coin is not relevant to its indicated value, whereas orthodox and Marxist 
approaches deem money to have value as a commodity. It is not possible to apply 
state theory to Bitcoin; there is no state associated with Bitcoin, and it is not possible 
to settle state debts in Bitcoins in any of the case study jurisdictions.  
 
The decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies makes them antonymous to the state 
theory of money, with the state having little to no control. It is also difficult for 
cryptocurrencies to conform to the chartalist concept of money being a token, as the 
relative value of the token is constantly changing. While it is not impossible for the 
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state to adopt cryptocurrencies as payment for taxes, there is nothing to suggest this 
is likely to happen in the near future. 
 
Credit Theory 
Credit theory places credit and debt relationships at the heart of the creation of money; 
credit and debt are explained by Innes: 
“What A owes to B is A’s debt to B and B’s credit on A. A is B’s debtor and B is 
A’s creditor. The words ‘credit’ and ‘debt’ express a legal relationship between 
two parties, and they express the same legal relationship seen from two 
opposite sides.”125 
 
Debt cannot exist without someone else being in credit, credit is the opposite of debt 
but, as noted by Innes, credit may exist without debt; this is money.126 Keynes makes 
similar arguments to Innes, seeing money as coming into existence on the creation of 
debt.127 Bell interprets this further, viewing money as “representing a promise or IOU 
held as an asset by the creditor.”128 Bell also comments on the claim by Minsky that 
“everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted,”129 Bell sees this as 
slightly inaccurate; Bell accepts that anyone may try to create a money but that it 
cannot be created until acceptance has occurred.130  
 
The concept of credit and debt correlating at all times, with the exception of money 
being credit alone, can be applied quite simply. Only money is its physical form may 
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be solely credit, all other money is in a credit-debt relationship. An example of the 
credit theory in practise is that of a demand deposit with the bank; the money which A 
may have in the bank is credit they have with the bank, at the same time that money 
is a debt owed by the bank to A. If A were to withdraw the money and hold it in a 
physical format, then the credit debt relationship has been neutralised and the money 
held by A is then purely credit.  
 
Cryptocurrencies satisfy the contention of Minsky, they have been created, and users 
seek its acceptance from others. Bell’s requirement of acceptance is difficult to judge, 
cryptocurrencies are not universally accepted, but there is a degree of acceptance, as 
can be demonstrated by Coinmap, which is a website recording where users of Bitcoin 
can spend their cryptocurrency.131 As of March 2019, 14,413 Bitcoin venues are 
recorded on the site, considering French supermarket chain Carrefour has 12,300 
shops worldwide,132 it is not feasible to argue Bitcoin has achieved acceptance to the 
level required to satisfy the credit theory of money. 
 
Social Construction Theory 
The social construction theory is argued by Zelizer;133 and suggests that money may 
be different in different situations. Grounding for this comes from historical references 
to cultures where male and female money were physically different commodities; 
Zelizer gives the example of the south-western Pacific island of Rossel where lower 
value coins are reserved for women.134 On a summary reading of this theory, it would 
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immediately appear outdated; in modern civilisations a single currency is used by all 
members of a community, but this currency may be used in different ways depending 
on the circumstances. Zelizer looks at the spending habits of married women from 
1870-1930 and finds that the use of ‘domestic money’ differs from the use of ‘real 
money’;135 once money enters the household it is subject to different rules, distinct 
from the rules of the market. The exact uses of ‘domestic money’ may differ between 
households but the principle argument of Zelizer that the money of the housewife is 
very different from the salary of the husband; the size of a housewife’s stipend may 
remain the same, even if the salary of the husband increases.136 This concept is now 
outdated, with greater gender equality, but it may still apply in the sense of disposable 
income;137 spending habits have been seen to change when levels of disposable 
income decrease.138 This may show that when the money is seen as being disposable, 
or as spending money, it is spent with greater ease than when the money is needed 
to meet liabilities, such as rent or bills. This supports the essence of the social 
construction theory; that money may be treated differently in different situations, and 
a different form of payment may be used. Money which has already been designated 
for a particular purpose may be spent more liberally than money which is being saved 
for the future.  
 
The social construction theory does not necessarily fit into either type of theory; this is 
because the social construction theory instead looks at the different uses of money 
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instead of its origins. This means that the social construction theory could be applied 
within the other theories as it seeks to explain a different phenomenon. Social 
construction theory may be relevant to cryptocurrencies, the use of cryptocurrencies 
as a payment mechanism is limited by the number of retailers willing to accept it, but 
in terms of settling payments between individuals, cryptocurrencies have potential as 
they can be used easily between two users.  
 
The social construction theory, along with all of the discussed theories, can be 
assessed alongside the hierarchy of money considered by Bell,139 which incorporates 
a number of theories of money to consider how different types of money are ranked 
according to the ease with which they are accepted. 
 
3.4.3. Bell’s Hierarchy of Money 
Bell analyses a hierarchy based on the works of economists, such as Minsky,140 
Foley141 and Wray.142 The hierarchy is formulated around chartalist theories of money; 
but Bell also assesses metallist theories,143 and finds them to be a poor fit for modern 
forms of money. Bell traces metallist theory back to the functions of money identified 
by Aristotle, of which the medium of exchange function is the considered the most 
important, as this replaced barter, though Bell questions whether barter economies 
ever existed.144 The principle issue identified by Bell is that paper money is not metal 
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backed which is contrary to metallist theory. Money has now become fiat money; 
money which will never be used as a commodity, as described by Kiyotaki and 
Wright.145 As such, the metallist position is a difficult one to maintain. The hierarchy 
focuses on debt relationships; the further up the pyramid the more freely that type of 
debt is accepted.  
 
Figure 3. Hierarchy of Money146 
 
 
As Figure 3 demonstrates that the acceptability of debt increases the higher up the 
pyramid the money is. A pyramid is used here as this represents the decreasing 
number of parties which are active, the higher up the hierarchy they sit; only the state 
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is present at the top of the hierarchy, whereas the population as a whole is at the 
bottom. The state is at the top, because all those below will accept state money. This 
is because state money is fiat money; this is money issued by the state, and in turn 
accepted by the state in payment of debts. As argued by the chartalist approach, the 
willingness of the state to accept its own money gives that money value through its 
usability. In accordance with credit theory, state money is the only money in the 
pyramid capable of being purely credit.  
 
Bank money is second in the hierarchy; it is in this position because the acceptance 
of bank debt is near universal. The majority of people in the Western world have a 
bank account,147 usually a demand deposit, and in doing so they accept the debt of 
the bank. State money takes the top place in the hierarchy, but the acceptability of 
bank debt is also near universal. The usability of bank money is also nearly that of 
state money; wherever card payment or cheques are accepted, bank money can be 
used, which is an ever-increasing number of places. 
 
The third level of the hierarchy is labelled as firm or company money, this level of the 
hierarchy represents the debt of companies. In this level of the hierarchy the debt is 
significantly less usable than the top two levels; in order to spend, or redeem, credit 
held against a company, the holder would need the company to be able to repay the 
debt or find another buyer. It would be unusual for shares in a company to be used as 
a medium of exchange; at this level of the hierarchy the assets have a much lower 
liquidity than the higher levels.  
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The lowest level of the hierarchy is household or individual money; this is personal 
debt. This level is the least liquid of the hierarchy and of the least value; in order for 
this debt to be accepted, interest is usually charged, and security sought in return. The 
theories of money may be applied to the hierarchy, while the hierarchy is produced 
predominately using chartalist theories,148 metallist theories can be applied, and non-
money assets may also be placed on the hierarchy. The hierarchy is particularly useful 
when it is difficult to identify something as state money; by providing a tiered system, 
commodities, assets, or concepts, which are not yet money, can be considered on the 
scale, against other similar assets. The hierarchy supports the idea that money is not 
a fixed concept and assets which are not money may become money if their usability 
increases, or the state begins to accept said asset as money.  
 
Chartalist theories of credit and debt relationships can clearly be seen, each level has 
a different class of debt, which may be used differently. There is a clear resemblance 
to the state theory of money as the state is at the top due to its ability to declare what 
it will accept as money, and give this value by accepting it in payment of debts. The 
social construction theory may be also be applied to the hierarchy and may also 
demonstrate how money may differ depending on the social situation. All money is 
valued in the currency dictated by the state, but the relative value of the money 
decreases as it progresses down the hierarchy and it is treated in a very different way.  
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3.4.4. Placing Cryptocurrencies on the Hierarchy of Money 
Cryptocurrencies satisfy of some of the functions of money, but not all of them, so they 
may near the middle of Bell’s hierarchy, as approximated in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4. Placing Cryptocurrency on Bell’s Hierarchy of Money149 
 
 
Cryptocurrencies have no state to act as the driver of the money, there are no state 
debts to pay with cryptocurrencies. Therefore, cryptocurrencies cannot be placed as 
high on the pyramid as state money. Cryptocurrencies may be best placed as either 
company money or bank money. The level of usage and acceptance is not high 
enough to meet all of the criteria of bank money; it is not held by most people and 
cannot be said to have near universal acceptance, but it has the capacity to increase 
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in levels of acceptance as more people start to use it. Cryptocurrencies may be viewed 
as having higher liquidity than company money as it may be used as a medium of 
exchange in some circumstances. The liquidity of cryptocurrencies is higher than a 
bond or share, as a cryptocurrency is not linked to a company in the way a share or 
bond is, and can be bought as sold very quickly, without the need to produce share 
certificates and go through the required procedures with Companies House.150 The 
most appropriate place on the pyramid for cryptocurrencies would be a low form of 
bank money or a high form of company money due to its limited acceptance, and its 
current use as an investment tool rather than as money. 
 
3.5. Identifying Money 
While theories of money attempt to explain what money is, they do not provide a clear 
mechanism for identifying money. The aim of this chapter is to consider whether 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoins, are actually money. To determine this a variety of 
approaches may be taken. Using the state theory, it might first be appropriate to 
determine whether or not the state accepts the item as money, this would be the 
clearest indication; if the state says that it is money, or accepts it in payment of debts, 
then it is money. The second approach may then be to apply credit theory; a creditor 
and debtor relationship may be found in many situations, but in order for money to 
have been created, acceptance of the resulting credit must be high. As stated above, 
theories of money may be helpful in explaining money, but identifying it and tracing its 
origins still remains difficult, as such money is often determined by its principle 
functions.  
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3.5.1. Function Based Definition 
Hudson begins with Aristotle’s three principles of money; a means of exchange, a 
measure of value, and a store of value.151 Something is a means of exchange when it 
is used as consideration in a contract; most histories of money trace its roots back to 
being a solution to the shortfalls of bartering. One party may not always have an item, 
or service, that the other party wants in return for an item, or service; or the parties 
may bring items, or services, of different values. Money provides a solution to this; the 
person wishing to acquire an item may give money to the other party in return for that 
item. Money then also completes the second function, a measure of value, or unit of 
account; money is used to value items. Purchasing a cow for £100 demonstrates both 
of these functions; the £100 is used as the medium of exchange and the £100 also 
represents the value of the cow. Finally, value can be stored in money; an individual 
may gather and store their wealth in the form of money; £100 today will still be worth 
£100 in 10 years, the cow may have perished in this time.  
 
3.5.2. Money in the eyes of the law 
Legal definitions of money may differ from socio-economic definitions. The principle 
concern for the law is to identify what money is, and the rights the holder of money 
has; though there will obviously be some cross over, the theories discussed thus far 
seek to understand the development of money and provide an explanation for that 
development. While an understanding of the development of money is important to 
educate legal decisions; the principle concern of the law is to identify and provide 
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guidelines, so as to ensure confidence and certainty for those that seek to rely on it.152 
Arora and Hudson both point to the case of Moss v Hancock153 in which money is 
defined as: 
“That which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final 
discharge of debts and full payment for commodities, being accepted equally 
without reference to the character or credit of the person who offers it and 
without the intention of the person who receives it to consume it or apply it to 
any other use than in turn tender it to others in discharge of debts or payment 
for commodities.”154 
 
It is clear that money is not a fixed concept; Moss v Hancock155 notably seeks to define 
money by its functions. Economists also seek to do this, but identify a few additional 
functions of money. While the law is primarily concerned with the medium of exchange, 
socio-economics recognises this as the main function, but also considers money as a 
store of value, and a unit by which value is determined. The function-based approach 
adopted by the law allows it to be flexible; the law does not prescribe what money is, 
and as such cryptocurrencies may have the potential to become money.  
 
The EU definition of money is focused on the concept of legal tender, which the Euro 
is clearly identified as within the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union156 
(TFEU), in which Article 128(1) stipulates the legal tender status of euro banknotes.157 
                                                     
152 J. van Dunné ‘On a clear day, you can see the continent - the shrouded acceptance of good faith 
as a general rule of contract law on the British Isles’ (2015) 31(1) Const. L.J. 3. 
153 [1899] 2 QB III. 
154 ibid 116. 
155 ibid. 
156 Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On The European Union [2012] OJ C326/25. 
157 Article 128(1), Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On The European Union [2012] OJ C326/25. 
 108 
The European Commission state that “in the absence of an agreement of the means 
of payment, the creditor is obliged to accept a payment made in euro”158 but that 
“contractual parties are free to use other official foreign currencies with legal tender 
status in the state of issuance.”159 Additionally the Commission directly address ‘virtual 
currency schemes’, which includes cryptocurrencies, stipulating that although “these 
are not official currencies and have no legal tender status, parties can agree to use 
them as private money without prejudice to the official currency.”160 By categorising 
cryptocurrencies as private money, the EU makes it clear that cryptocurrencies will not 
be covered by monetary law,161 so individuals use cryptocurrencies at their own risk 
and are not afforded the same protections as when using money. 
 
3.5.3. Is Bitcoin Money? 
As theories of money do not appear to be compatible with Bitcoin, a function-based 
analysis is adopted. The primary function of money, a medium of exchange, is satisfied 
in part; it is possible to purchase goods using Bitcoins, but they are not universally 
accepted. Universal acceptance, at least in a particular community, is a clear 
requirement identified in Moss v Hancock.162 Taking the word ‘community’; it is 
arguable that Bitcoin is accepted by an online community,163 and therefore, for that 
community Bitcoin is a medium of exchange. This argument may be viewed as 
tenuous, it is potentially difficult to determine when a group of people form a 
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community. For Bitcoin to be a form of money in the UK it would need to pass “freely 
from hand to hand throughout the community”,164 this is currently not the case; 
currently only 341 outlets accept Bitcoin in the UK. The counter argument to the issue 
of limited usability at present is that Bitcoin is still a developing concept, and that as it 
grows, acceptance will grow too. Society is not stationary, things change over time, 
and as Fox observes, the “status of an asset as money is a social fact”165 and it is 
possible that Bitcoin may grow into a recognised from of money. 
 
Bitcoin also faces issues when other functions of money are considered; it is difficult 
to argue that Bitcoin serves as a store of value, or a unit of account, due to its 
inconsistent value in relation to fiat currencies. Bitcoin is a store of value in that 1 
Bitcoin will always be worth 1 Bitcoin, but the value of Bitcoin in relation to other 
currencies, such as the US Dollar, will mean that the real value of that Bitcoin may 
vary considerably. It is accepted that all currencies will vary in value, the exchange 
rates are determined by market forces,166 but the size of these value changes are often 
small; the changes in the value of Bitcoin are often much more extreme. This is clear 
when Bitcoin is compared to major fiat currencies. In January 2013, 1 Bitcoin was 
worth US$13.28,167 but by 4th December 2013, Bitcoin reached a then record high 
value of $1230.69 per Bitcoin.168 By 18th December, half of that value had been lost 
and 1 Bitcoin was worth $553.48.169 Despite recovering to $995.83 by 11th January 
                                                     
164 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB III at 116. 
165 cf Fox (n85) p17. 
166 C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘What is the essence of money?’ 2005 29 Cambridge Journal of Economics 817 
at 823. 
167 XE, ‘USD per 1 XBT’ <http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=USD&view=2Y> 




2014,170 Bitcoin steadily lost value over 2014 and the first 5 months of 2015, it was 
worth just $229.24 on 1st June 2015.171 The latter half of 2015 saw Bitcoin regain value, 
finishing the year at $432.40,172 and 2016 saw Bitcoin retain its value until May before 
rising to $763.54 in June, then falling sharply to $503.48 in August. Bitcoin continued 
to increase in value for the rest of 2016, finishing at $963.50. 2017 saw Bitcoin surpass 
its record value of 2013, reaching $1275 on 3rd March, dipped to £929.38 by 24th March 
and then began to rise to new highs, reaching $2381.55 in May, and then steadily 
rising to its record value of $19,783 in December 2017.173 Over 7 years the value of 
Bitcoin varied from $13.28 to $19,783, a difference of $19,769.72 with many abrupt 
changes up and down. In the same period, the GBP experienced a low value of $1.20 
in April 2015174 and a high value of $1.72 in July 2014,175 a difference in value of $0.52. 
Similarly, to GBP, the Euro only varied in value by $0.35.176 The swings in value 
prevents Bitcoin from acting as a store of value; it is not possible to be confident about 
which direction the value will move, or how quickly it will change.  
 
The functions of money do not operate independently; for something to be a 
functioning unit of account it must also be a store of value, or that measure of value 
will be inconsistent. The unit of account function allows for the value of an item to be 
immediately identified; for example, a jumper is worth £10, the pounds are serving as 
a measure of the value of that jumper. In the case of Bitcoin this is not reliable as the 




173 D. Morris, ‘Bitcoin Hits a New Record High, but Stops Short of $20,000’ (Fortune.com, 17 
December 2017) <https://fortune.com/2017/12/17/bitcoin-record-high-short-of-20000/> accessed 29 
July 2020. 
174 XE, ‘USD per 1 GBP’ <http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=GBP&to=USD&view=5Y> 




value of goods in Bitcoins will constantly changes as the value of Bitcoin changes. An 
issue for Bitcoin in being a store of value is its lack of backing; Bitcoin is not valued 
against anything, whereas currencies such as the British Pound are valued against a 
national economy. The value of the pound rises and falls based on the success of the 
UK economy, amongst other things;177 there is no such economy which Bitcoin is 
valued against, it is simply based on trust. While the supporters of Bitcoin will point to 
the inability to control Bitcoin being an assurance for its users,178 the majority of 
individuals do not understand Bitcoin, so their trust would have to be blind; this is not 
common when money is concerned. 
 
As Bitcoin does not satisfy all of the functions of money, it is difficult to conclude that 
it is money in same way as fiat money is money; based on the hierarchy of money it 
would not be possible to have Bitcoin at the top. It may be more appropriate to view 
Bitcoin as company money or bank money; it could be considered a company money 
of relatively high liquidity, or a bank money with comparably low liquidity; with the 
potential to become as usable as other bank money as acceptability increases. This 
analysis has focused on Bitcoin as it is the most prominent cryptocurrency, the 
shortfalls in Bitcoin being money are applicable to all cryptocurrencies. In many cases, 
the limitations preventing Bitcoin being money are even more evident in alternative 
cryptocurrencies, with even lower levels of acceptance and more volatile changes in 
value. 
 
                                                     
177 The value of GBP may rise and fall based on events on the national and international platform, 
changes of government or announcements of budgets may influence the value of GBP as this may 
stimulate certain trading.  
178 Coin Desk, ‘What is Bitcoin’ <http://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-bitcoin/> accessed 23 
June 2015. 
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3.6. Chapter Summary 
Cryptocurrencies require unique attention due to their popularity, and the levels of 
anonymity they provide. This chapter identifies cryptocurrencies as a specific class of 
virtual currencies, their key characteristics being that they are decentralised, as they 
rely on cryptography and blockchain technology, and they are capable of being 
exchanged for fiat currencies. Other forms of virtual currencies, such as those within 
virtual worlds, are not without legal issues, but the value of cryptocurrencies and their 
interaction with the traditional financial system makes them the most attractive form of 
virtual currency for money laundering, as will be demonstrated in chapter four, and 
thus the focus of this thesis.  
 
Theories of money fail to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether 
cryptocurrencies are money, but these theories do demonstrate that money is clearly 
not a static concept; it is subject to change and is developed by states and society. 
Chartalist theories of money appear to best describe modern fiat money, and these 
theories have some application to cryptocurrencies, but it is not a perfect fit, as the 
state’s role is nearly completely removed in cryptocurrencies. The reduced role of the 
state in metallist theories of money is present in cryptocurrencies, but there is no 
intrinsic value to cryptocurrencies, as is required by both orthodox and Marxist theories 
of money. Assessing cryptocurrencies against the functions of money provides a 
useful indication of whether something may be money, but this is not conclusive as 
although cryptocurrencies act as a medium of exchange, the volatility in value means 
cryptocurrencies cannot act as a store of value or a unit of account. Considering that 
money is a social concept and is subject to change, the hierarchy of money proposed 
by Bell is a useful measure of where an asset sits in relation to state money, which is 
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universally accepted credit. An asset’s position on the hierarchy is also not static and 
may be subject to change as its usability increases or decreases. Based on 
cryptocurrencies current usage and acceptance, cryptocurrencies cannot be placed 
as high as state money, nor can it be as high as bank money. Due to being more 
readily accepted than company shares or vouchers, cryptocurrencies sit towards the 
top of ‘company money’, with the potential to move up the hierarchy depending on 
future treatment in society.  
 
Although not accepted as money, the transferability of cryptocurrencies, into fiat 
currencies, means there is potential for money laundering to take place. It would most 
likely take place during the layering stage of the money laundering process; a 
launderer may purchase Bitcoins using US$, and then be able to undertake a number 
of transactions via Bitcoin wallets which will be difficult to trace as only serial keys are 
published in the blockchain. The next chapter analyses the history of money 
laundering and efforts to combat it, by observing the development of this area of law, 








Chapter 4. Money Laundering 
 
“Crime has become increasingly international in scope, and the financial 
aspects of crime have become more complex due to rapid advances in 
technology and the globalization of the financial services industry.”1 
 
4.1. Outline 
In this chapter the crime of money laundering will be defined, the history of the term 
will be considered, as will the concept of money laundering, and what criminals aim to 
achieve from the practice. In defining money laundering, the process by which money 
is laundered will be explained, and various techniques will be outlined. It is clear from 
successful prosecutions in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), that 
money launderers are utilising cryptocurrencies. In order to understand the likely 
trajectory of anti-money laundering (AML) regulation, a short history of AML measures 
will be provided, where themes are identified in the development of AML regulation, 
introducing the key developments, legislation, and international bodies as they 
become relevant. The chapter goes on to analyse the responses of international 
organisations to the money laundering threat posed by cryptocurrencies, specifically 
the UN, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the European Union (EU). It is 
observed that the role of the UN in relation to setting international best practice for 
AML regulation has receded, as the FATF and the EU have taken the lead role in the 
21st century. The FATF and the EU both propose the AML regulation of cryptocurrency 
                                                     
1 J. McDowell and G Novis, ‘The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime’ (2001) 
6(2) Economic Perspectives 6. 
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service providers at the point of intersection with fiat currencies and the traditional 
financial system, which is a first step in addressing the money laundering threat of 




4.2. Concept of Money Laundering 
Money laundering is the process by which the proceeds of crime are made to look 
legitimate; “[m]ost simply, it is the process by which criminals cleanse the fruits of their 
criminal labours.”2 Stokes refers to Lilly’s definition; “the process whereby the identity 
of dirty money that is the proceeds of crime and the real ownership of these assets is 
transformed so that the proceeds appear to originate from a legitimate source.”3 The 
aim of money laundering is to conceal, hide and disguise the origins of the illicit money, 
and to enable the money launderer to enjoy the benefits of it without reproach. Money 
laundering simply refers to concealing the source of money due to its criminal origins. 
As the task is such a broad one, money laundering may take many forms and may 
utilise anything that has value.4 
 
Claimed to be the third biggest industry in the world by Robinson;5 money laundering 
is an international problem, but estimating the extent of the issue has proven 
                                                     
2 R. Stokes, ‘Virtual money laundering: the case of Bitcoin and the Linden dollar’ (2012) 21(3) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 221 at 222.  
3 P. Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering (London, Kogan Page, 
2006). 
4 N. Ryder, ‘The Financial Services Authority and Money Laundering: A Game of Cat and Mouse’ 
(2008) 67(3) Cambridge LJ 635. 
5 J. Robinson, The Laundrymen (London, Pocket Books, 1995). 
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complicated and produced conflicting results. For example, the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated 2.7% of global GDP6 (or US$1.6 trillion) was 
being laundered in 2009,7 which is the figure the FATF use.8 This correlates with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)9 estimate in 1998, which suggested money 
laundering could be valued at 2-5% of global GDP.10 These estimates differ from other 
global estimates collated by Unger,11 who found wide ranging estimates, such as $45 
and $280 billion by Reuter and Greenfield,12 to $2.85 billion by Walker and Unger.13 
As well as global estimations, the individual jurisdictions in the case studies of this 
thesis also attempt to estimate the value of illegal money laundered their respective 
territories. The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
estimates “AUD200 billion is laundered in the Asia-Pacific region”;14 in the UK the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) estimate that “£10billion of illicit funds”15 passes 
through the UK financial system; and in the United States (US) the Treasury believes 
“about $300 billion is generated annually in illicit proceeds.”16 While these estimations 
                                                     
6 Gross Domestic Product: "an aggregate measure of production equal to the sum of the gross values 
added of all resident, institutional units engaged in production (plus any taxes, and minus any 
subsidies, on products not included in the value of their outputs).” Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, ‘Gross Domestic Product’ 
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1163> accessed 15 June 2015. 
7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Illicit Money: How Much is Out There?’ 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-out-there.html> 
accessed 15 June 2015. 
8 Financial Action Task Force, ‘About Us’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whatwedo> 
accessed 09 June 2015. 
9 International Monetary Fund, ‘Money Laundering: The Importance of International Countermeasures’ 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm> accessed 15 June 2015. 
10 ibid.6 
11 B. Unger, ‘Can Money Laundering Decrease?’ (2013) 41(5) Public Finance Review 658 at p.663. 
12 P. Reuter and V.A. Greenfield, ‘Measuring Global Drug Markets: How Good Are the Numbers and 
Why Should We Care about Them?’ (2001) 2(159) World Economics 73. 
13 J. Walker and B. Unger, ‘Estimating Money Laundering: The Walker Gravity Model’ (2009) 5(821) 
Review of Law and Economics 53. 
14 AUSTRAC, ‘Introduction to Money Laundering’ 
<https://michaelsmithnews.typepad.com/files/money-laundering.pdf> accessed 5 September 2019. 
15 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report 2012/13’ 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/anti-money-laundering-report.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015. 
16 United States Treasury, ‘National Money Laundering Risk Assessment’ 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
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may be helpful in justifying a concerted effort to combat money laundering, each of 
these estimations is likely to be inaccurate. This is because each calculation has been 
produced using a different methodology and based on different definitions of the key 
terms. Further to this, the secretive nature of money laundering means reliable records 
are unavailable, and each study dedicated to calculating the extent of money 
laundering will make different assumptions from the data available to them. Unger and 
Busuioc identify that differing definitions of money laundering, the proceeds of different 
predicate offences being included, and the use of different statistical methods, lead to 
“controversy between the purists, people who want to measure and model precisely, 
and the innovators – those who try to measure the immeasurable, even if they run the 
risk of being criticised.”17 Writing as a purist under Unger’s distinction, Thomas 
criticised money laundering measurements, and other measurements from the 
criminal economy,18 as “measurement without theory.”19 Estimations have provided 
larger and larger figures, which Unger puts this partly down to the number of predicate 
offences increasing as AML laws have developed.20 Increasing the number of offences 
counting as a predicate offence for money laundering will naturally lead to a larger 
amount of money in illicit gains being produced, and needing to be laundered. The 
issues in quantifying the extent and impacts of money laundering are not limited to 
monetary terms, other impacts should be considered, money laundering is not a 
victimless crime. Unger notes that while there are no direct victims of money 
                                                     
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%
2006-12-2015.pdf> accessed 5 September 2019. 
17 B Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007) at p.32  
18 There is no agreed term for the criminal economy; it may also be referred to as the ‘black 
economy’, or the ‘hidden economy’. It refers to transactions completed in secret to avoid detection by 
the relevant authorities. 
19 J. Thomas, ‘Quantifying the Black Economy: ‘Measurement Without Theory’ Yet Again?’ (1999) 
109(456) The Economic Journal 381 at p.381. 
20 cf Unger (n11) at p661-662. 
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laundering, “there are always secondary victims such as family, friends, 
acquaintances, and society at large.”21 
 
 
4.3. Impacts of Money Laundering 
McDowell and Novis identify the money laundering has both economic and social 
consequences.22 As the scale of money laundering is impossible to calculate, it is also 
impossible to discern the impacts, as some of the impacts are also naturally difficult to 
measure, and may be impacted by other factors, such as damage caused to the 
reputation of an economy. Reputational damage may lead to the reduced investment 
from legitimate businesses, which do not wish to be associated with such an economy, 
and an increase in those wishing to launder their money in the effected economy, as 
they see such an economy as an appealing place to do so. Both of these potential 
consequences are effects which cannot be measured, are therefore impossible to 
quantify accurately. Further impacts of money laundering include legitimate 
businesses being unable to compete with those funded by illegal money, as the front 
businesses may have substantial illicit funds behind them and allowing them to offer 
goods and services at lower prices than legitimates businesses.23 
 
Money laundering reduces the integrity of the financial services industry; money 
launderers may move their money unexpectedly and this may cause liquidity strains 
for financial institutions. McDowell and Novis highlight that the BCCI and Bearings 
                                                     
21 B. Unger & D. v.d. Linde, Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2013) at p.20 
22 cf McDowell and Novis (n1). 
23 cf McDowell and Novis (n1). 
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Bank scandals in the 1990s “had significant criminal or fraud components”24 as causal 
factors, and such scandals persist to the present day, as the 2012 US senate 
investigation into HSBC demonstrates.25 
 
Privatisation of services may be affected by money laundering;26 should one of the 
companies bidding for government contracts be backed by illicit funds it will hold an 
advantage over the legitimate bidder. Tax revenues will also be reduced by money 
laundering which negatively affects taxpayers.27 Given the estimates of the scale of 
money laundering McDowell and Novis also argue that the control of economic policy 
may also be reduced,28 money laundering may distort markets and increase the threat 
of monetary instability.  
 
The prevalence of money laundering may increase the occurrence of other crimes; it 
provides “fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, illegal arms dealers, corrupt public officials, 
and others to operate and expand their criminal enterprises.”29 Morris-Cotterill noted 
in 1996 that “governments and society are recognising their inability to control drug 
abuse and that the only way to stop or reduce the rate of increase of crime is to try to 
prevent the criminal spending his or her money.”30 An increase in corruption has a 
generally detrimental effect on society; in “extreme cases, it can lead to the virtual 
                                                     
24 cf McDowell and Novis (n1) at p.7. 
25 US Senate, ‘HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing 
Risks’ <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-
system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks> accessed 05 August 2016. 
26 cf Unger and Linde (n21) at p.20 
27 M. M. Gallant, ‘Money Laundering Consequences: Recovering Wealth, Piercing Secrecy, Disrupting 
Tax Havens and Distorting International Law’ (2014) 17(3) JMLC 296. 
28 cf McDowell and Novis (n1). 
29 cf McDowell and Novis (n1). 
30 N. Morris-Cotterill, ‘The International Effect of Money Laundering Laws’ (1996) 4(1) Journal of 
Financial Regulation & Compliance 67 at 68. 
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take-over of legitimate government.”31 The impacts of money laundering are 
“magnified in emerging markets.”32 The prevalence of money laundering may make 
organised crime more appealing and lead to increases in such crime, at present this 
may lead to increased people smuggling, in light of social unrest and the migrant crisis 




A further justification for combatting money laundering, is that the money, or assets, 
may be evidence of the predicate crimes; a key piece of evidence in securing a 
conviction for a crime might be the possession of the proceeds of that crime. As has 
already been stated, money laundering is the process of disguising the origins of illicit 
money, the purpose of this is not only to be able to enjoy the use of the money, it is 
also to distance the criminal from the original offences. If this money can be identified, 
and traced back to the offender then it will not only serve to aid in a money laundering 
conviction, but also aid in obtaining a conviction for the original offence which 
produced the illegal assets. 
 
4.4. Can Cryptocurrencies Be Used to Launder Money? 
Cryptocurrencies are being used to launder money, as demonstrated by examples 
from the UK and the US, such as the conviction of Ross Ulbricht for his role in creating 
                                                     
31 cf McDowell and Novis (n1). 
32 cf McDowell and Novis (n1). 
33 M. Kluczyński, ‘Prevention of Money Laundering in the Fight Against Human Trafficking 
and Smuggling of Migrants’ (2013) 5(2) Internal Security 83.  
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Silk Road.34 Ulbricht is not the only individual to have be convicted for money 
laundering using cryptocurrencies, numerous convictions have been announced 
through US Department of Justice press releases with cases varying from international 
gangs35 to one-man operations.36 The appeal of using cryptocurrencies was assessed 
by Irwin et al,37 who considered the factors a money launderer may consider when 
deciding how to clean their money. The key factors considered were; ease, time, 
amount laundered, cost, risks mitigated, and chances of detection.38 The ideal 
scenario for a money launderer would be for the proceeds of a crime to be quickly and 
easily cleaned, without reducing the value and avoiding detection, this is unrealistic, 
and each method for laundering money will involve a balancing of these factors.39 Irwin 
et al found that each money launderer will have their own preferences in their 
techniques, but that “the more techniques that are used, the more cash can be 
successfully laundered or concealed.”40 Cryptocurrencies provide an additional 
technique to launder the proceeds of crime, which is clearly being utilised by criminals.  
 
In terms of ease, using cryptocurrencies does not require any great expertise, basic 
computer literacy and access to a cryptocurrency exchange being the only hurdles to 
                                                     
34 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2017). 
35 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Washington, ‘Multi-State 
International Drug Trafficking Organization Targeted in 18-Month Investigation’ (Washington, United 
States, 6 December 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/multi-state-international-drug-
trafficking-organization-targeted-18-month-investigation> accessed 04 September 2019. 
36 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Central District of California, ‘“Bitcoin Maven” 
Sentenced to One Year in Federal Prison in Bitcoin Money Laundering Case’ 
<https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/bitcoin-maven-sentenced-one-year-federal-prison-bitcoin-
money-laundering-case> accessed 04 September 2019. 
37 A. S. M. Irwin, R.K.K. Choo, and L. Liu, ‘An analysis of money laundering and terrorism financing 
typologies’ (2012) 15(1) JMLC 85. 
38 ibid at 100. 
39 ibid at 99. 
40 ibid at 105. 
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overcome to make use of cryptocurrencies.41 Once using cryptocurrencies, the level 
of difficulty does not increase, making transfers simply requires knowing the address 
of the intended recipient.42 Cryptocurrencies are also very fast, Bitcoin transactions 
take approximately 10 minutes on average,43 as this is the time between blocks being 
created.44 Blocks are created when the proof-of work is completed, at which point all 
transactions since the previous the block was created are verified.45 While it takes up 
to 10 minutes to verify a transaction, this does not preclude a user from making more 
than one transaction in the same 10-minute time frame. In theory, many transactions 
could take place in a very short period of time, distancing the money from its origin. 
Transactions in cryptocurrencies incur small fees which go to the miner who produced 
the block, and some fees may be incurred when using a cryptocurrency exchange, 
similar to that incurred when exchanging fiat currencies.46 
 
Using cryptocurrencies does come with some risks, while the speed of the transactions 
and the potential lack of dependency on others to assist in operation both reduce the 
risks, the biggest risk in using cryptocurrencies is the volatility in value. If the value of 
a cryptocurrency crashes while the launderer has their funds in that currency, they will 
suffer losses to the value of their assets when they convert the money back into a fiat 
currency.  
                                                     
41 Numerous guides exist online to assist beginners such as : Bitcoin, ‘Getting started with Bitcoin’ 
<https://bitcoin.org/en/getting-started> accessed 14 October 2019 and Cryptorunner, ‘How to Get 
Started with Bitcoin’ <https://cryptorunner.com/get-started-with-bitcoin/> accessed 14 October 2019. 
42 Bitcoin, ‘Getting started with Bitcoin’ <https://bitcoin.org/en/getting-started> accessed 14 October 
2019. 
43 Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015. 
44 The details of the how Bitcoin works, and transaction times is set out in the initial paper: Bitcoin 
Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015. 
45 Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015 at p.8. 
46 Information on potential fees can be found through the exchange or platform used. 
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Accurate estimates of the amount of money laundered through cryptocurrencies are 
not available, but Europol have predicted that 3-4% of the £100bn in illicit proceeds in 
Europe is through cryptocurrencies, and that is “growing quite quickly.”47 By using a 
cryptocurrency, the chances of detection may be reduced as the majority of 
cryptocurrency transactions are not be subject to reporting requirements. The only 
cryptocurrency transactions which are subject to reporting requirements are those that 
go through cryptocurrency exchanges, as stipulated by FinCEN in the US,48 and in 
accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 
200649 in Australia. Currently no reporting requirements are implemented in the UK, 
but this will change in 2021 once amendments to the 2017 Money Laundering 
Regulations, enacted to comply with the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, come 
into force.50 It is unclear exactly how the UK will implement the regulation required by 
the Directive, but the FCA has stated it will go further than the requirements of the 
Directive,51 which is in line with the insights that can be drawn from the way the UK 
                                                     
47 BBC News, ‘Criminals hide 'billions' in crypto-cash – Europol’ (12 February 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43025787> accessed 08 October 2019 and  
Hannah Murphy, ‘Europol meets cryptocurrency exchanges to thwart criminals’ Financial Time 
(London, 19 June 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/9430a3b0-73d4-11e8-b6ad-3823e4384287> 
accessed 14 October 2019. 
48 FinCEN, ‘Guidance - FIN-2013-G001 - Issued: March 18, 2013 - Subject: Application of FinCEN’s 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 06 August 2019 
at p2. 
49 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006. 
50 Regulatory Policy Committee, ‘Transposition of the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive HM 
Treasury’ (London, 16 January 2020) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8
63735/2020-01-16-RPC-HMT-4432_1_-Transposition_of_the_Fifth_Anti-
Money_Laundering_Directive.pdf> accessed 28 July 2020. 
51 T. Chambers, ‘Unstable coins: cryptoassets, financial regulation and preventing financial crime in 
the emerging market for digital assets’ (Financial Conduct Authority, London, 06 March 2020) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/unstable-coins> accessed 10 November 2020. 
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has implemented AML measures that have been developed domestically and 
internationally since the 1960s. 
 
4.5. History of Anti-Money Laundering Law 
Here the development of AML law will be chronicled, dating AML measures back to 
the UN’s attempts to combat the international drugs trade. It is important to understand 
the development of AML laws so as to better understand the current law, and to be 
able to better predict the potential future developments of AML laws. By tracing the 
developments of the fight against money laundering, themes may be observed and 
the motivations for the developments may also be considered by assessing the key 
events from the time. Once the development of AML laws has been assessed, and the 
factors that influenced this development have also been considered, it will be possible 
to discuss whether the risks posed by cryptocurrencies will lead to reforms of AML 
laws. Each decade, from the 1960s onwards, is taken in turn so that the key 
developments in national and international approaches can be seen. 
 
4.5.1. 1960s 
Leading on from the 1939 League of Nations Convention, the UN’s Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs 196152 remained focussed on the production, and trade of drugs. 
Article 37 stipulated that “drugs, substances and equipment”53 should be confiscated, 
but does not explicitly mention money, or money laundering. While the UN was still 
                                                     
52 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (adopted 30 March 1961, entered into force 13 December 
1964) 520 UNTS 151 (Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs). 
53 ibid art.37.  
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focussed on drugs, the US was concerned about money laundering. Doyle dates the 
beginning of US attempts to tackle money laundering to the late 1960’s;54 citing a 
Department of Justice guide to the Bank Secrecy Act55 which identifies strong bank 
secrecy laws of foreign jurisdictions creating “a legal climate that is optimal for the 
laundering of "dirty" money.”56  
 
4.5.2. 1970s 
In 1970 the US enacted the Bank Secrecy Act 1970 (BSA 1970) which Ryder identifies 
as the “central tenant of the US AML policy,”57 as it introduced record keeping 
requirements on financial institutions and introduced obligatory currency transaction 
reports where the transaction value exceeded $10,000.58 As the name suggests the 
BSA 1970 was introduced to tackle the bank secrecy concerns which developed in the 
late 1960’s. The aim of the Act “was to deter and prevent the use of secret foreign 
bank accounts for tax fraud and their use to screen from view a wide variety of 
criminally related financial activities, and to conceal and cleanse criminal wealth.”59 
Also enacted in 1970 was the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
1970 (RICO 1970),60 which aimed to “restrict the growth of criminal enterprises and, 
                                                     
54 T. Doyle, ‘Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactic Needlessly Violate 
International Law’ (2002) 24 Houston Journal of International Law 297. 
55 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91–508 
56 C. W. Blau Et Al., Investigation and Prosecution of Illegal Money Laundering: A Guide to The Bank 
Secrecy Act, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (1983) at p.124. 
57 N. Ryder Money Laundering - An Endless Cycle?: A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
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September 2019 at p.16. 
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secondly, to thwart the reintegration of their proceeds of crime,”61 and was part of the 
Organized Crime and Control Act 1970. The BSA 1970 and the RICO 1970, while 
closely linked to money laundering, were not directly concerned with combatting 
money laundering. The reporting requirements of the BSA 1970 did not apply to money 
laundering as noted by Ryder, and the offence of money laundering62 was not created 
by the BSA 1970 or the RICO 1970. However, the BSA does represent the first 
measures attempting to identify money laundering, even if it was via bank secrecy law; 
this is significant, as by seeking to identify money laundering the US demonstrated a 
will to pursue criminal gains, rather than simply enact offences. Reporting 
requirements may be viewed as the origins of detecting and combatting money 
laundering in the US. Additionally, the RICO 1970 attempted to widen the concept of 
‘proceeds of crime’, this was subsequently limited in the US Supreme Court in United 
States v Santos,63 but demonstrated the willingness of the US to broaden money 
laundering law to crimes not involving drugs, despite not yet coining the term ‘money 
laundering’.  
 
1971 saw the creation of the UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances64 which, 
along with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, was criticised for being 
ineffective as it did not target the benefits of the drugs trade or punish those involved.65 
The weaknesses of the 1961 and 1971 Conventions are laid out by Sproule and St-
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Denis, who state that, despite the UNs “aim of reducing the drug trafficking problem, 
they are inadequate instruments to confront the various aspects of the problem”66 that 
existed. Comparing the UN’s approach to the US, it can be seen that the US created 
offences but also put in place measures by which the offences may be utilised. The 
US recognised that in order to combat money laundering, there needed to be 
prescribed measures for financial institutions to follow in order to detect criminal 
activity; law enforcement agencies are not in a position to detect and pursue money 
laundering without information from financial institutions. In recommending offences, 
the UN was only half addressing the problem, the offences were “inadequate 
instruments to confront the various aspects of the problem”67 because they did not 
provide a framework for detecting and enforcing the offences.  
 
The UN was not the only international body concerned by money laundering, the EU, 
formerly known as the European Economic Community, began addressing the issue 
of money laundering in the 1970’s. The EU began addressing money laundering 
through the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), which created a Select 
Committee to assess the transfer of criminal proceeds between Member States.68 The 
recommendations of the CDPC Select Committee were not published until 1980. 
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4.5.3. 1980s 
The EU Committee of Ministers approved of the recommendations of the CDPC Select 
Committee in 1980, these recommendations included the introduction of identity 
checks when customers open accounts, rent safe deposits, or when large cash and 
inter-bank transactions take place.69 This would have been an innovative move at the 
time; such measures are commonplace in modern day, but the EU did not adopt the 
recommendations.70 Gilmore states that despite the fact that many of the proposed 
measures are “now generally regarded as central aspects of any comprehensive anti-
money laundering programme, the 1980 initiative failed to find a receptive audience”71 
and as such were not implemented at that time. This was a missed opportunity by the 
EU to greatly improve AML approaches. In 1981 Australia made its first attempt to 
address the issue of international drug trafficking through the Stewart Royal 
Commission, which was completed in 1983,72 it was officially called the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking,73 thus it was focussed on the drugs trade 
instead of solely on money laundering.74  
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1986 saw the UK and the US make money laundering a criminal offence; the US was 
first with the Money Laundering Control Act 1986,75 followed by the UK by virtue of the 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 198676 (DTOA 86). The DTOA 86 was enacted in light 
of decision in R v Cuthbertson77 which highlighted the limitations of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971,78 which restricted confiscation to the “physical items used to commit 
the offence”,79 demonstrating that the law needed wider drafting to address the reality 
of organised crime. In light of the Cuthbertson decision, the Hodgson Committee 
recommended a broadening of what should be considered the proceeds of crime, and 
therefore the way in which money laundering was addressed.80 The Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986 can be seen as the birthplace of suspicious activity reports as it 
created the offence of “assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking”81 
which made assisting someone while “knowing or suspecting”82 them to be an 
offender, and failing to report it, a criminal offence. The introduction to suspicious 
activity reports is important as it demonstrates the origins of preventative measures 
requiring the expertise of professionals from industries vulnerable to money 
laundering. Until this point the common approach had been centred on criminalisation, 
this was a solely reactive approach, the crime and the money laundering had to have 
been committed before any action could be taken. Suspicious activity reports were the 
first measures that were preventative, attempting to capture money laundering before 
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is occurred; from this point AML developments may be categorised as further 
criminalisation or preventive measures.  
 
In the same year as the UK and the US enacted targeted legislation towards money 
laundering, the EU still failed to act through legislation. In 1986 European ministers 
did instruct the CDPC to consider the issue “in light inter alia of the work of the United 
Nations,”83 but the work of the CDPC did not lead to any legislation until 1990. Australia 
implemented its first money laundering offences in 1987, passing the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1987,84 and in 1988 the UN also began to address the proceeds of crime 
more directly through the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances,85 commonly referred to as the Vienna Convention 1988. 
Alford notes that the Vienna Convention “evolved from two previous multilateral 
agreements;”86 the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, which as Sproule and St-Denis 
stated, “focused primarily on limiting the supply of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances to […] prevent their diversion into illicit traffic.”87 Alford sees this as a 
weakness of the earlier conventions; as “they were primarily regulatory in nature and 
did not provide for punishment of drug traffickers, these conventions were not effective 
against the drug problem in the 1980s.”88 It is important to note that combatting the 
drugs trade was still the main driver behind money laundering legislation in the 1980s, 
as the Vienna Convention and commentators’ analysis illustrate. Ryder observes that 
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while the Vienna Convention requires signatories to criminalise the laundering of drug 
proceeds,89 confiscate said proceeds,90 facilitate extradition,91 and improve mutual 
legal assistance;92 these obligations are initially limited as the “Vienna Convention was 
limited to the laundering of the proceeds of crime from the manufacturing and sale of 
narcotics.”93  
 
In 1989 the FATF was created, “in response to mounting concern over money 
laundering.”94 The FATF “was established by the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris 
in 1989”95 to address “the threat posed to the banking system and to financial 
institutions.”96 The creation of the FATF is a particularly important one in the history of 
AML initiatives as it demonstrated a shift away from the drugs trade, and towards 
treating money laundering as a standalone issue. 
 
4.5.4. 1990s 
The FATF issued 40 Recommendations, “intended to provide a comprehensive plan 
of action needed to fight against money laundering”97 for its initial 16 members to 
comply with, the first edition of these Recommendations was published in April 1990.98 
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Despite the creation of the FATF as a body to address money laundering as an 
independent issue, the first Recommendation was for members to “fully implement the 
Vienna Convention,”99 which, as has already been made clear, remained focussed on 
the issue of the drugs trade. Also in 1990 the Council of Europe adopted the 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime100 (1990 Council of Europe Convention), which was open for both member 
states and non-member states to sign.101 Gilmore notes that the 1990 Council of 
Europe Convention was not widely adopted when it was first created, but that by 2004 
it had 44 signatories.102 The reasons for the poor uptake are not clear. Gilmore 
observes that the drafters were keen to “protect the advances which had so recently 
been made”103 by the Vienna Convention 1988. The Council of Europe convention 
goes further than the Vienna Convention 1988, notably signatories were required to 
criminalise money laundering generally, rather than specifically in relation to drug 
trafficking.104 Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention was slow, but it was 
another sign that the fight against money laundering was being decoupled from drug 
trafficking and being considered as a financial crime of its own.  
 
In 1991, the First Money Laundering Directive was passed by the EU,105 which created 
numerous obligations for financial institutions, the most important of which included 
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identifying customers, record keeping, refraining from tipping off customers being 
investigated, and a proactive duty to report suspicious transactions to the competent 
national authorities.106 Article 14 stated that Member States were to “determine the 
penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures”107 by financial institutions. 
Mitsilegas and Gilmore considered the Directive inadequate as it was not specific 
enough; the “Directive did not contain any provisions regarding the nature, functions 
and powers of”108 the domestic authorities to oversee the measures. The lack of 
specificity of the Directive led to Member Stares implementing the directive in different 
ways, which hindered cooperation between Member States.109  
 
In the US, the Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act 1992110 amended the BSA 1970, 
notably introducing suspicious activity reporting requirements for financial 
institutions.111 Reporting requirements were extended further by the Money 
Laundering Suppression Act 1994.112 It can be seen that suspicious activity reports 
were a key development of the AML approaches in the 1990s. An important 
development in the UK was the Criminal Justice Act 1993,113 which amended the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988114 to include money laundering offences for all crimes, not 
just drugs.115 The 1993 amendment also criminalised “[a]ssisting another to retain the 
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benefit of criminal conduct”116 which, along with the drug crime related offence within 
the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986,117 represents an important development in the 
crime of money laundering. Since the Criminal Justice Act 1993, money laundering 
has become an offence in itself; an offender would be found guilty of dealing with the 
proceeds of a crime without having committed the original crime. 
 
International cooperation can be seen to be continually developing in the 1990s; by 
1992 the membership of the FATF had increased to 28 members,118 and in 1995 the 
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units formed; an “informal network of FIUs for 
the stimulation of international co-operation.”119 The FATF Recommendations 
required members to create financial intelligence units (FIU), which serve as a 
“national centre for the receipt and analysis of: (a) suspicious transaction reports; and 
(b) other information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and 
financing of terrorism, and for the dissemination of the results of that analysis.”120 An 
FIU should be in a position to co-ordinate a country’s intelligence relating to money 
laundering and aid investigations by law enforcement agencies. The UK’s FIU is the 
National Crime Agency (NCA), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre are the respective FIUs 
of the US and Australia. While the Egmont group and the expansion of the FATF 
demonstrates an international move towards separating money laundering from the 
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drugs trade in the 1990s, the UN was still focussed primarily on drugs, and in 1997 the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was created.121 The UNODC 
was the result of the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention merging. The UNODC mandate is to assist UN 
Member States in combatting drugs and crime, but the inclusion of drugs in the title of 
the organisation, and the Conventions adopted up to this point, indicates the focus 
remained on drugs at the time of its creation.  
 
4.5.5. 2000 to Present  
The turn of the century saw the creation of the Wolfsberg Group, a group of banks 
which collectively develop guidance for banks in developing AML policies,122 this 
demonstrates that money laundering was beginning to warrant attention in the private 
sector as well as from governments. In 2000 the UN extended the criminalisation of 
money laundering with the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime,123 
known commonly as the Palermo Convention 2000. This was an important 
development in the UN’s approach to money laundering as it finally decoupled the 
fights against drugs and money laundering; the Palermo Convention 2000 required 
signatories to extend money laundering offences to include the proceeds of “serious 
crimes,”124 not just drug related crime. Serious crimes were defined as “conduct 
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constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four 
years or a more serious penalty.”125 Zagaris cites a key aim of the Palermo Convention 
2000 as strengthening the “power of governments to combat serious crimes by 
providing a basis for stronger common action against money laundering through 
synchronized national laws.”126 This may be contrasted with the criticisms of the first 
EU Directive on money laundering,127 which produces an inconsistent approach from 
Member States and created uncertainty. The Palermo Convention 2000 provides a 
clear model for governments to follow and its definitions were adopted by the FATF.128 
 
Also in 2000, the UK passed the Terrorism Act 2000,129 which introduced the concept 
of laundering terrorist property. Alexander distinguishes terrorist financing from the 
common concept of money laundering; money laundering “concerns property which is 
derived from crime and efforts to combat it therefore focus on its origin”,130 whereas 
with terrorist financing, “the focus is not on the where the property has come from but 
where it is destined: its ultimate purpose.”131 Roberge also argues for a disentangling 
of the two concepts due to their differing aims and ideology.132 The Terrorism Act 2000 
represents the point at which the UK confused money laundering with a different issue 
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to the drugs trade, and can be seen as a backwards step by a country which could be 
viewed as being ahead of the international approach in the 1990’s by criminalising 
money laundering for all crime. Coupling money laundering and terrorism financing is 
confusing as the processes are different; as can be seen from the Alexander 
distinction above, the processes operate in opposite directions and so use different 
techniques, and while there may be some common ground, the two issues require 
separate approaches. The UK also enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000,133 which gave the newly created Financial Services Authority responsibility for 
reducing financial crime,134 and powers to create rules in relation to preventing money 
laundering.135 In 2002, the UK passed the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002136 (POCA 
2002), which is where the current UK money laundering offences are found, the 
applicability of the offences to cryptocurrencies is analysed in chapter five. 
 
Countering terrorist financing was further integrated into AML approaches in the wake 
of the 11th September attacks, as the US introduced reforms to money laundering 
legislation to address terrorist financing. The Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict, Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001137 
(PATRIOT Act 2001), which, along with paying too much attention being paid to the 
acronym the title produced, amended the BSA 1970 reporting requirements to cover 
terrorist financing. The PATRIOT Act 2001 was also the first time the US legislated 
against money laundering with extra-territorial effect.138 The amended version of the 
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BSA 1970 is the principal current source of US AML law and is considered in detail in 
chapter six. The incorporation of counter terrorist financing legislation has led to the 
term ‘reverse money laundering’, which Cassella defines as the “process of conducting 
financial transactions with clean money for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
future use of that money to commit a criminal act.”139 The development of the US AML 
approach, similarly to the UK, has become confused as it tries to combat terrorist 
financing; as a result the US and the UK may now be criticised for coupling money 
laundering to a relatable offence, much like the UN did with the drugs trade before 
2000. The FATF also reacted to the 11th September attacks by conflating money 
laundering and terrorist financing, initially through Eight Special Recommendations in 
October 2001.140  
 
In 2001, the EU passed the Second Money Laundering Directive,141 which amended 
the First Directive, extending the preventative measures to non-financial institutions.142 
Notably the Second Directive required any potentially new Member States to adopt 
the Money Laundering Directives as a prerequisite of entry.143 The First and Second 
Directives were then merged into the Third Directive in 2005;144 Ryder states that the 
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EU Directives require Member States to adopt a risk-based approach, prioritising 
institutions, individuals or services that are most at risk to money laundering. The risk-
based approach is also recommended by the FATF as of the 2003 iteration of the 
FATF Recommendations.145 The EU has also amended the 1990 Council of Europe 
Convention with the 2005 by the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing 
of Terrorism,146 and took similar action to the UK and the US, combining money 
laundering with counter terrorist financing, the treaty currently has 28 ratifications and 
a further 12 signatories not followed by ratification.147 The FATF also added an 
additional ninth special Recommendation for combatting terrorist financing in 2004.148 
 
2003 saw the UN adopt the UN Convention on Corruption.149 Corruption is a complex 
and broad issue, which overlaps with money laundering. Article 14 of the Convention 
contains measures to prevent money laundering, which are notably similar to the 
Recommendations of the FATF. Article 14 requires Party States to regulate entities 
which pose money laundering risks,150 and to enable the cooperation of the relevant 
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authorities.151 Cash is specifically mentioned as requiring monitoring,152 and the 
convention specifically mentions remittance services as being included in the entities 
which are required to identify the originator of funds, maintain information, and query 
any incomplete data sets.153 It is notable that remittance services are mentioned, as 
US regulator FinCEN specifically identifies cryptocurrency exchanges as money 
transmitters,154 regardless of whether the currency being remitted is fiat or not. Carr 
praises the comprehensiveness of the Convention,155 arguing it is “very difficult to 
fault”,156 but notes that the biggest weakness with the Convention, which is true of 
most UN measures, is that international legislation alone is not the solution. Carr does 
not criticise the convention itself, but the will of countries to utilise it. In “countries where 
politicians turn a blind eye to corruption to ensure or maintain their status, there is 
unlikely to be legislative interference”157 on corrupt practices. The UK is a signatory to 
the Convention, as are the US and Australia.158 In the UK in particular the Convention 
was implemented by the Bribery Act 2010,159 this legislation is not specifically targeted 
towards money laundering, due to the UK addressing this in other pieces of legislation, 
and therefore the Bribery Act 2010 will not be focused on in this thesis. 
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The Money Laundering Regulations 2007160 codified the preventive measures of the 
UK in order to comply with the 3rd Anti-Money Laundering Directive, this has since 
been superseded by the 4th and 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directives.161 The Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007 have subsequently been replaced by the Money 
Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017.162 The UK has amended the 2017 regulations to implement the 5th 
Anti-Money Laundering directive.163 The current legislation of the UK analysed in detail 
in chapter five. Similarly, Australia’s most recent money laundering legislation is the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006,164 which is 
considered in the Australia case study in chapter eight. 
 
4.5.6. Summary of Anti-Money Laundering Regulation  
Money laundering has developed from being a secondary consideration to the War on 
Drugs to a standalone issue of international concern. The 1980s and 1990s saw 
money laundering separated from drug offences, but from the early 2000s it has been 
conflated with countering the financing of terrorism. It is clear from the timeline of AML 
                                                     
160 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 S.I. 2003/3075. 
161 Directive 2015/849/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
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164 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006. 
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development than the UK, the US, and Australia have each been early adopters of 
international best practice, and also gone further than the international minimum 
requirements. Each of the three jurisdictions are considered developed countries165 
and therefore have developed economies which are vulnerable to money laundering. 
Based on the previous behaviour of each of the case study jurisdictions it is likely that 
they will implement international best practice in relation to cryptocurrencies. This has 
already occurred in the United States, which is analysed in chapter six, and in 
Australia, which is analysed in chapter seven. The UK is expected to keep pace with 
international best practice, and it is legally bound to implement EU directives while it 
remains a member of the EU. The EU response to cryptocurrencies is analysed below 
at 4.11, and the UK has legislated to implement the 5th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive. Due to the global importance of AML regulation, the threat posed by 
cryptocurrencies has been addressed by international organisations, the next section 
of this chapter will assess the response of the UN, the FATF and the EU. It will be 
seen that the EU and the FATF continue to pursue their prescriptive approach to 
setting international best practice and providing guidance on regulating 
cryptocurrencies. 
 
4.6. International Response to Money Laundering Threat 
Posed by Cryptocurrencies  
Given the development global of AML standards during the latter half of the 1990s and 
the early 2000s, there are a number of international organisations which provide 
domestic jurisdictions with model legislation and guidance relating to combatting the 
                                                     
165 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Reports: 2018 Statistical Update’ 
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board and complex issue of money laundering. The organisations involved differ 
greatly; in their legal authority, in their size of membership, and in how high AML is in 
their overall objectives. Therefore, the aim on this section is to identify the relevant 
international organisations, ascertain their influence over the case study jurisdictions 
and to analyse their AML measures, with specific reference to their responses to the 
money laundering risks posed by cryptocurrencies. The organisations which will be 
assessed are the United Nations (UN), the FATF, and the EU. The reasons for the 
selection of these organisations are as follows. All of the case study jurisdictions are 
UN members, and the UN has been instrumental in developing AML legislation at an 
international level since the 1960s. The FATF can be seen as the present-day world 
leading AML organisation, set up in 1989, providing comprehensive recommendations 
and also counting all three case study jurisdictions as members. The EU is considered 
in this thesis due to its unique nature, which means its AML measures are applicable 
across the bloc, and has directly impacted on the development of AML in the UK. As 
identified in the money laundering timeline, the EU has been addressing money 
laundering since the 1970s. Building on the history of money laundering and AML 
analysed above, it will be seen in this section that the international position in relation 
to money laundering is still lacking harmony, but the FATF Recommendations form 
the basis of international standards. The importance these international organisations 
to the case study jurisdictions varies according to membership rules, but, as seen 
above, each of the case study jurisdictions are early adopters of international AML 
standards so would likely continue to comply with such measures. It will also be seen 
that the FATF and the EU both seek to regulate cryptocurrencies in some form but 
only at the periphery of the cryptocurrency networks, where they interact with the 
traditional financial system. This is inadequate, and the relevant international 
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organisations should take more of a lead in understanding cryptocurrencies, their 
networks, and how best to adapt the current measures to apply to cryptocurrencies, 
rather than simply transposing existing measures which are incompatible with 
cryptocurrency transactions.  
 
4.7. United Nations 
The UN was formed in 1945,166 it was created in the wake of World War Two, replacing 
the defunct League of Nations.167 Both the League of Nations and its replacement, the 
UN, were created in the aftermath of world wars, and therefore maintaining peace was 
high on the initial agenda.168 The modern-day UN has 193 Member States, including 
the three case study jurisdictions; the UK, the US, and Australia. The UN lists its main 
organs as the General Assembly,169 the Security Council,170 the Economic and Social 
Council,171 the Trusteeship Council,172 the International Court of Justice,173 and the 
Secretariat.174 The UN is a unique international organisation with the power to “take 
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action on the issues confronting humanity,”175 of which money laundering has been 
accepted as global issue, as the International Monetary Funds (IMF) estimations of 2-
5% of global GDP demonstrates.176 
 
In relation to money laundering the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) is the most relevant body; and as argued in the money laundering timeline, 
this is indicative of the UN’s approach to money laundering being part of its measures 
to combat the international drugs trade, rather than independent financial crime. The 
UN’s role with regard to AML is less prominent in the 21st century due to the 
development of the FATF, and the current UN conventions do not address 
cryptocurrencies 
 
4.7.1. Anti-Money Laundering Policy  
As seen through the history of AML, the UN’s AML policy can be traced back to the 
1960’s when the confiscation of the proceeds of drug related crime was included in 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961.177 This did not directly address the 
issue of money laundering, however, it recognised that preventing criminals from 
enjoying the benefits of crime is an important step to reducing the appeal of criminal 
activity. As Stewart identifies,178 the first attempts of the UN to address money 
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laundering focussed on the drugs trade, and this continued for the proceeding 
decades; as Ryder observes, the “Vienna Convention was limited to the laundering of 
the proceeds of crime from the manufacturing and sale of narcotics.”179 The Vienna 
Convention required signatories to criminalise the laundering of drug proceeds,180 
confiscate said proceeds,181 facilitate extradition,182 and improve mutual legal 
assistance;183 but, as identified in the money laundering timeline, the continued link 
with the drugs trade left many crimes outside of the remit of the convention. It was not 
until the Palermo Convention 2000184 that the UN decoupled money laundering from 
drug related offences, and criminalised money laundering of the proceeds of all 
“conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at 
least four years or a more serious penalty.”185 
 
The UN Convention on Corruption was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 
2006.186 The convention addresses money laundering, but it is not the focus of the 
Convention as corruption is a wider and more complex issue which overlaps with many 
financial crimes. Article 14 of the convention contains measures to prevent money 
laundering, which are notably similar to the Recommendations of the FATF. While 
independent of each other, the UN endorses the FATF Recommendations, notably in 
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2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1617 “[s]trongly urges all Member States to 
implement” FATF Recommendations.187 
 
4.7.2. Policy towards cryptocurrencies 
The relevant UN conventions were adopted before the creation and development of 
cryptocurrencies, as such the conventions makes no mention of cryptocurrencies. 
However, the UN, particularly through the UNODC, has recognised cryptocurrencies, 
and makes recommendations to Member States for the detecting and preventing 
money laundering through cryptocurrencies. The UNODC is the principle UN 
organisation in this area as it has responsibility for the UN’s Global Programme against 
Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism,188 with the 
UNODC’s mandate coming from the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.189  
 
The UNODC published guidance on virtual currencies in 2014.190 This document is 
training manual, which covers 4 areas; identifying virtual currencies, the risks posed, 
methods for detecting money laundering through virtual currencies, and methods for 
seizing virtual currencies. The manual echoes the guidance from the FATF, identifying 
                                                     
187 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1617 (2005)’ 
<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1617> accessed 10 June 2019 at para 7. 
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similar challenges that cryptocurrencies pose. Namely that regulations should be 
applied where intersections between the traditional financial system and 
cryptocurrencies occur, “they should be licensed or registered, and subject to effective 
systems of monitoring and ensuring compliance with national AMF/CFT 
requirements.”191 With regard to gaps in the guidance of the FATF, the UNODC notes 
the difficulties in regulating cryptocurrencies as their decentralised nature means there 
is “no financial institution providing a service of money or value transfer, or of money 
or currency changing”192 to apply regulations to.  
 
The UNODC make some basic proposals for tackling cryptocurrency money 
laundering, they suggest international harmonisation, and the adoption on the FATF 
Recommendations.193 The UNODC also propose the creation of “specialised financial 
investigative units [that] can draw on their experience investigating laundering crime 
proceeds using more traditional methods.”194 This is a commendable suggestion, while 
cryptocurrencies are a new phenomenon, the concept of money laundering is not, and 
the end goal for launders remains the same. As stated already, the aim of money 
laundering is not disputed, taking Stokes summation, money laundering is “the 
process whereby the identity of dirty money that is the proceeds of crime and the real 
ownership of these assets is transformed so that the proceeds appear to originate 
from a legitimate source.”195 A logical step proffered by the UNODC is to utilise existing 
                                                     
191 ibid at 5.4 at p.64. 
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expertise on money laundering, and cooperate with those who understand the 
complexities of cryptocurrencies.  
 
4.7.3. Summary of the UN’s Approach to risks of Money Laundering using 
Cryptocurrencies 
The UN has developed AML conventions which have a high level of ratification, all of 
the case study jurisdictions comply with UN AML provisions. The UN does provide 
some guidance on cryptocurrencies and their regulation through the basic manual, but 
this has no legal force and it is not well publicised. Additionally, it does not provide any 
specific measures for cryptocurrencies, the guidance is limited in relation to applying 
or developing AML provisions to address cryptocurrencies. The UN frequently refers 
to the guidance of the FATF rather than developing AML provisions of its own.  
 
4.8. Financial Action Task Force 
The FATF was created in 1989, following the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris that 
year.196 All of the case study jurisdictions of this research are members.197 The FATF 
describes itself as “an inter-governmental body,”198 which is to “set standards and 
promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures”199 
specifically towards money laundering and terrorist financing, but it will consider wider 
                                                     
196 Financial Action Task Force, ‘History of the FATF’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> 
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related threads to the international financial system.200 The role of the FATF is as “a 
“policy-making body” which works to generate the necessary political will to bring 
about”201 change to Member States AML legislation. In this capacity, the FATF issues 
40 Recommendations which it states are the “International Standards on Combating 
Money Laundering.”202 While the FATF was created to address money laundering as 
an independent issue, the first Recommendation was for members to “fully implement 
the Vienna Convention,”203 which remained focussed on the issue of the drugs trade. 
The Recommendations were first published in 1990,204 they have been amended 
regularly, but most notably in 1996, 2001, 2003, and 2012.205 The biggest change to 
the Recommendations came in 2001 when eight ‘special Recommendations’ were 
introduced to combat terrorist financing following the terrorist attacks in September 
2001.206 A ninth special Recommendation was added in 2004,207 and all nine have 
subsequently been incorporated into the most recent set of 40 Recommendations.208 
With the inclusion of terrorist financing provisions, the approach towards money 
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laundering is slightly confused, as identified in the money laundering timeline, money 
laundering was originally integrated into drug offences and took decades to be 
considered an offence in itself, it is a step backwards to merge money laundering and 
terrorist financing together when they should be considered separately.  
 
4.8.1. Anti-Money laundering policy 
The FATF was created in response to mounting concern over money laundering”,209 
and the 40 Recommendations represent the FATF’s money laundering policy, to 
address “the threat posed to the banking system and to financial institutions.”210 The 
40 Recommendations are “intended to provide a comprehensive plan of action needed 
to fight against money laundering”,211 which its 35 members are to comply with.  
 
The FATF promotes a ‘risk-based approach’ to preventing and detecting money 
laundering.212 A risk-based approach means “enhanced CDD measures have to be 
taken”213 in higher risk circumstances. The FATF provides guidance for determining 
such circumstances; customer risk factors include whether “the business relationship 
is conducted in unusual circumstances”,214 if the customers from foreign jurisdictions, 
cash intensive businesses, or businesses which are “excessively complex given the 
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nature of the company’s business.”215 The FATF also consider country or geographic 
risk factors such as countries identified as not having adequate AML systems, 
countries subject to sanctions, or countries identified as having significant levels of 
corruption or other criminal activity.216 Finally, in relation to high risk activity, specific 
services or transactions are deemed to increase the money laundering risk, such as 
private banking, anonymous transactions, non-face-to-face business relationships or 
transactions and payments received from unknown or un-associated third parties.217 
 
The FATF also identifies situations which are of a lower risk and in such circumstances 
the FATF states it is “reasonable for a country to allow its financial institutions to apply 
simplified CDD measures.”218 Situations where a simplified CDD measures can be 
applied typically involve recognised financial institutions, government bodies or 
situations where AML measures will already have been applied; such as financial 
institutions “where they are subject to requirements to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations”.219 Other risk lowering 
circumstances include customers which are publicly listed companies or public 
administrations. While the country a transaction come from may raise the risk, no 
countries are listed as lowering risk of money laundering. The FATF states that 
products and services with low risks include life insurance policies with low premiums, 
pensions “where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages, and the 
scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member’s interest under the 
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scheme”,220 and “[f]inancial products or services that provide appropriately defined and 
limited services to certain types of customers, so as to increase access for financial 
inclusion purposes.”221 
 
Adopting a risk-based approach can be applied in a specific manner as above, but the 
importance of the risk-based approach is in a more general sense; Recommendation 
1 of the 40 Recommendations is that Member States are “[a]ssessing risks & applying 
a risk-based approach.”222 The FATF states that the risk based approach “should be 
an essential foundation to efficient allocation of resources across the anti-money 
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the 
implementation of risk based measures throughout the FATF Recommendations.”223 
Member States are required to perform regular risk assessments, as money 
launderers will utilise whatever methods they can, and will naturally target 
weaknesses.224 The risk-based approach accepts that it is not possible to pursue 
money laundering without being targeted towards circumstances which are most likely 
to be used for money laundering.  
 
Alexander notes that despite the Recommendations of the FATF being “non-binding 
in a legal sense, some of the 40 Recommendations have become mandatory.”225 
Examples of mandatory Recommendations are criminalising money laundering and 
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implementing ‘know your customer’ protocols.226 The FATF strengthens the status of 
the Recommendations through sanctions. Alexander outlines the FATF sanctions 
regime as “a series of graduated steps designed to pressure members to enact the 
necessary reforms to achieve compliance.”227 Sanctions available to any international 
organisation are limited; as such the punitive measures of the FATF start with relatively 
soft pressure with a letter from the President of the FATF, this step was issued to 
Turkey in 1996.228 The non-compliance of Turkey as a member of the FATF prompted 
the FATF to formalise its sanctions regime; if a jurisdiction fails to adequately respond 
to the FATF President’s letter, then Recommendation 19 requires all members to 
“apply enhanced due diligence measures to business relationships and transactions 
with natural and legal persons, and financial institutions, from countries for which this 
is called for by the FATF.”229 The strongest sanction the FATF can impose on a 
member is to expel them from the organisation, which to date has not been taken. 
Recommendation 19 demonstrates that the key power the FATF will utilise is public 
shaming, Alexander notes that the public shame created when the FATF instructed its 
members to scrutinise transactions with Turkey was enough to prompt Turkey to 
comply where the letter from the President had failed.230 The power of the FATF to 
shame jurisdictions is only as effective as the jurisdiction’s desire to be seen positively 
by the international community; public shaming will likely have little effect on 
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jurisdictions such as North Korea where international condemnation does not appear 
to deter the government or force change. 
 
The sanction regime for Non-Member States is similar to that of Member States, while 
there is no official sanctioning power, Recommendation 19 is not limited to Member 
States. The FATF treatment of jurisdictions which are not members and not adhering 
to international money laundering standards has been described by Stessens as 
‘blacklisting’.231 The FATF categorise ‘high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’ as 
either those requiring a ‘call for action’, and ‘other monitored jurisdictions’.232 Those 
that are subject to a ‘call to action’ are North Korea, which faces a “FATF call on its 
members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures,”233 and Iran, which is 
subject to a “FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due 
diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction.”234 The ‘call 
for action’ list serves as the FATF blacklist, intended to shame jurisdictions into 
complying; the approach will also cause economic pressure as globalisation has 
meant countries are increasingly dependent on international trade. The blacklisting 
approach is still reliant on the subject jurisdiction being influenced by public shame, 
which has limited impact on isolated jurisdictions such as North Korea. An important 
element to any sanctions regime is to also act as a deterrence; this can be 
demonstrated by the effect of threatening sanctions on the Seychelles. The FATF 
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criticised a proposed law in the Seychelles in 1996,235 and Alexander notes that the 
threat of sanctions along with the negative media attention was enough to dissuade 
the Seychelles from passing the law.236 
 
Additionally to the blacklist, the FATF also maintains a list of ‘other monitored 
jurisdictions’, which are “jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies for 
which they have developed an action plan with the FATF.”237 The current list consists 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu and Yemen.238 
The purpose of this category of jurisdictions is to aid the jurisdictions to become 
compliant; the FATF states that “[w]hile the situations differ among each jurisdiction, 
each jurisdiction has provided a written high-level political commitment to address the 
identified deficiencies.”239 
 
The FATF identifies its money laundering objective as to “set standards and promote 
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating 
money laundering”.240 As part of this objective the FATF undertakes “peer reviews of 
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each member on an ongoing basis to assess levels of implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations”.241  
 
4.8.2. Policy towards cryptocurrencies 
The FATF has been the most proactive international organisation in attempting to 
address the money laundering threats posed by cryptocurrencies; publishing three 
guidance documents on the issue, and two reports.242 In June 2014, the potential risks 
of cryptocurrencies were considered,243 and in June 2015 a follow up paper was 
published as a guide for Member States in applying the risk-based approach to 
cryptocurrencies.244 In June 2019, the FATF published “Guidance for a Risk-Based 
Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers”,245 in which the 
terminology used was broad, addressing virtual assets as a whole, rather than 
specifically advising on cryptocurrencies. 
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The June 2014 paper, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks’246 provides a definition of virtual currencies which focusses on the three 
functions of money. The FATF define a virtual currency as a “digital representation of 
value”247 which is not legal tender, is “not issued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction,”248 
and only fulfils the functions of money by agreement of the relevant community of 
users.249 As identified in chapter three, in addition to providing a general definition of 
virtual currencies, the FATF also provide a breakdown of virtual currency types, as 
shown in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5. FATF Categories of Virtual Currency250 
 Centralised Decentralised 
Convertible Linden Dollars (used in Second 
Life) are an example of a 
convertible virtual world currency; 
users may exchange their 
currency for US Dollars. The 
currency is centralised, Linden 
Labs (the developer of Second 
Life) act as administrators.  
 
Examples of decentralised 
currencies include Bitcoin and 
Dogecoin. These are convertible 
for fiat currency but not controlled 




World of Warcraft (WoW) gold is 
non-convertible virtual world 
currency; users may not convert 
this into a fiat currency. WoW gold 





As discussed in chapter three, a convertible virtual currency can be transferred into a 
fiat currency; if this is not possible, the currency is non-convertible. The distinction 
between centralised and decentralised currencies is that a centralised currency is 
controlled by a single administrating authority, whereas a decentralised currency has 




no central authority. Fiat currencies are centralised, typically the administrating 
authority is a central bank, but in virtual currencies the central authority might be the 
developer of the virtual world the currency is used in. For decentralised virtual 
currencies, no central bank entity exists, instead these may be based on an algorithm 
or code which dictates the production of the currency. The focus of the FATF is on 
convertible virtual currencies, as is the focus of this thesis, known as 
cryptocurrencies.252 The FATF state that “[c]onvertible virtual currencies that can be 
exchanged for real money or other virtual currencies are potentially vulnerable to 
money laundering”253 and that “[d]ecentralised systems are particularly vulnerable to 
anonymity risks.254 This thesis adopts the term cryptocurrencies, as all known 
decentralised convertible currencies utilise cryptography.255 
 
2015 Guidance on applying the Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies  
In 2015 FATF published a follow up to the 2014 paper, providing guidance on applying 
the risk based approach to virtual currencies,256 the focus of 2015 Guidance is on 
“convertible virtual currency exchangers which are points of intersection that provide 
gateways to the regulated financial system”.257 The guidance is based on how to follow 
the FATF Recommendations, advising on two areas; applying the FATF 
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Recommendations to countries and authorities,258 and guidance on applying FATF 
Recommendations to virtual currency exchanges.259 
 
Guidance to countries and competent authorities begins at Recommendation 1; the 
FATF expect countries to adopt a risk-based approach, and in order to do this 
countries should “identify, assess, and understand the money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks for the country.”260 Higher risk activities will then be subject to the 
strongest AML measures, and in relation to cryptocurrencies the FATF recommend 
the “application of enhanced due diligence measures”261 due to the levels of anonymity 
provided to users. With regard to national cooperation and coordination, the FATF 
recommends education of the relevant authorities to understand the money laundering 
risks of cryptocurrencies and to consider engaging with the cryptocurrency sector.262 
FATF Recommendation 14 requires ‘money or value transfer services’263 to become 
licensed, and subject to the relevant guidance in the FATF Recommendations.264 The 
2015 guidance from FATF states that “requirements of Recommendation 14 apply to 
domestic entities providing convertible VC exchange services between VC and fiat 
currencies.”265 This is a notable step as it shows the FATF are opening up to the 
concept of cryptocurrencies being akin to money. Additionally, Recommendation 15 is 
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clearly applicable as it requires countries to assess risks concerning “the development 
of new products and new business practices, including new delivery mechanisms,”266 
and “the use of new or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing 
products.”267 The guidance reminds countries of Recommendation 39 which requires 
countries to have an appropriate sanction regime,268 and Recommendation 40 which 
promotes international cooperation.269 
 
Section IV of the FATF guidance applies to any “entities that act as nodes where 
convertible VC activities intersect with the regulated fiat currency financial system.”270 
As with the advice to countries in Section III, the first Recommendation is for entities 
to “identify, assess, and take effective action to mitigate”271 their money laundering 
risks, and apply a risk-based approach. The principle advice from the FATF is for 
entities to apply customer due diligence, suspicious activity reporting, and record 
keeping requirements to cryptocurrencies. The guidance advises compliance with 
Recommendation 10272 which states that regulated entities “should be prohibited from 
keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names,”273 and that 
entities “should be required to undertake customer due diligence.”274 The guidance 
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states that record keeping and suspicious activity reporting requirements should apply 
to entities involved in exchanging cryptocurrencies. The guidance here is not detailed; 
it states that “information available on the blockchain provides a beginning foundation 
for record keeping, provided institutions can adequately identify their customers”.275 
As identified in chapter three, the use of public keys rather than more orthodox 
personal details, led to cryptocurrencies being described as pseudonymous, and thus 
are appealing to money launderers.276 Pseudonymous is an important distinction from 
anonymous, as if an individual’s details are matched to a cryptocurrency address then 
transactions can be traced on the blockchain. Some success has been achieved in 
identifying cryptocurrency users, Meiklejohn et al277 “were able to identify 1.9 million 
public keys with some real-world service or identity,”278 although in many cases the 
identity discovered was not genuine.279 More recently Juhász et al identified 22,363 
users 1,797 associated IP addresses.280 While difficulties will remain with determining 
which users require identification and investigation, Juhász et al argue their method is 
economical281 and their “algorithms are relatively easy to implement and can be 
combined with other Bitcoin-transaction related information.”282 The research of 
Meiklejohn et al and Juhász et al demonstrate that the anonymity of cryptocurrencies 
may be eroded by the aforementioned techniques, but more research is needed. 
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2019 Guidance on Applying Risk Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers. 
The 2019 guidance issued by the FATF is more comprehensive than the 2015 
guidance, but it provides broadly similar advice. The FATF have widened their 
terminology to ‘Virtual Assets’ (VAs)283 and they recommend that its members interpret 
terms “such as “property,” “proceeds,” “funds,” “funds or other assets,” and other 
“corresponding value,” as including VAs.”284 This clearly brings cryptocurrencies within 
the remit of what the FATF recommend should be regulated for AML purposes.  
 
The 2019 guidance terms a VA as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally 
traded or transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes.”285 The 
definition specifically discounts digital representations of fiat currencies.286 The FATF 
use the term ‘Virtual Asset Service Provider’ (VASP),287 to describe businesses 
providing services for cryptocurrency users, and the definition of the term is wide. The 
5 activities are: 
I. Exchange between virtual assets and fiat currencies; 
II. Exchange between one or more forms of virtual assets; 
III. Transfer of virtual assets on [behalf of another natural or legal person] 
IV. Safekeeping and/or administration of virtual assets or instruments enabling 
control over virtual assets; 
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V. Participation in and provision of financial services related to an issuer’s offer 
and/or sale of a virtual asset.288 
 
This set of activities will encompass those who provide cryptocurrency services, but it 
will not require individual users to be regulated, which is in keeping with the regulation 
of fiat currencies; the financial institutions are regulated, not the individual users of a 
currency. The FATF approach appears to be to recommend the regulation of the 
entities which can be regulated, accepting that the cryptocurrency networks cannot be 
regulated, due to their decentralised nature. The 2019 guidance shows a departure 
from exclusively regulating at the intersections of cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies, 
which was recommended in 2015. The FATF stress that the new VASP definition 
“includes both virtual-to-virtual and virtual-to-fiat transactions or financial activities or 
operations.”289 The 2019 guidance goes on to state that countries should address 
money laundering risks “both where those activities intersect with the regulated fiat 
currency financial system”290 and also where the activities “consist only of “virtual-to-
virtual” interactions.”291 This is a commendable step as the previous approach was 
leaving potentially suspicious transactions unreported. The guidance makes specific 
reference to maintaining flexibility, attempting to remain “technology neutral”292 and 
aims to encompass future developments in VAs, without specific terms being 
recognised.293 
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The 2019 guidance from the FATF demonstrates a commitment to take 
cryptocurrencies seriously, there is a recognition that “[a]lmost all of the FATF 
Recommendations are directly relevant”294 to addressing the money laundering risks 
posed by cryptocurrencies. In keeping with previous advice from the FATF, the risk-
based approach is central to the FATF guidance.295 In applying the risk-based 
approach the FATF recommends that cryptocurrencies and VASPs be treated as 
higher risk due to the levels of anonymity allowed by cryptocurrency systems.296 
Identifying an activity as high risk means the enhanced due diligence measures are 
required of the regulated entity.297 
 
To assist members in continuing to adhere to the FATF Recommendations, guidance 
is provided on the specific Recommendations which are directly relevant to 
cryptocurrencies. Recommendation 1 concerns countries undertaking a risk 
assessment and applying the risk-based approach,298 which the 2019 guidance states 
should now include VAs and VASPs. The assessment should identify the relevant 
authorities that should regulate VAs and VASPs, and the treatment of these products 
and services should be consistent.299 With regards to Recommendations 3, 4, and 6, 
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which concern creating appropriate offences,300 enacting a confiscation regime,301 and 
asset freezing,302 the 2019 guidance makes it clear that “all funds or value-based 
terms in the Recommendations”303 should be interpreted as including VAs.304 While 
this guidance is clear it is difficult to put into practice, confiscating cryptocurrency is 
extremely difficult given that assets are not stored in financial institutions, and for the 
same reason asset freezing will be impossible without access to an individual’s 
cryptocurrency wallet. 
 
Perhaps the most pertinent of the Recommendations is Recommendation 15 which 
requires institutions to be aware of, and continue to assess the money laundering risks 
posed by new products and new business practices.305 This Recommendation has 
been updated to specifically mention VASPs, which are to be regulated for AML 
purposes,306 which is reiterated in the 2019 guidance.307 Recommendations 26 and 
27 are highlighted in the 2019 guidance, requiring adequate regulatory authorities to 
be identified and given adequate powers to supervise regulated entities.308 
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Recommendation 33 requires countries to gather relevant statistics pertaining to their 
AML systems,309 the 2019 guidance instructs countries to widen their data gathering 
to include regulation of VASPs and VA activities. Such statistics include the practice 
of suspicious activity reporting and reporting transactions over a specified threshold.310 
 
Recommendation 10 requires regulated entities to complete customer due diligence 
(CDD),311 the 2019 guidance expands this to VASPs,312 this is consistent with the 
advice given in 2015.313 The extension of CDD requirements to VASPs is a logical 
step, as it is not possible to apply regulation to the cryptocurrency networks, but by 
applying CDD requirements to exchanges, this theoretically removes the anonymity of 
the users. This is only true for users that use regulated cryptocurrency exchanges, 
and the data captured will be limited if the user uses multiple wallets and only registers 
one with the exchange. The FATF state that the CDD process includes “understanding 
the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, where relevant, and 
obtaining further information in higher risk situations.”314 As already identified with the 
classification of cryptocurrencies as high risk, the CDD required will be enhanced to 
reflect the risk. The regulated entities will be required to obtain the identity of “the 
customer and, where applicable, the customer’s beneficial owner”315 and verify this 
information.316 These requirements may deter some users from using regulated 
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exchanges, due to the data being gathered. VASPs will also be expected to submit 
SARs where relevant, and per Recommendation 20,317 have risk management 
systems in place, adhering to Recommendation 12,318 and share information with 
FIUs, compliant with Recommendation 29.319  
 
The FATF recommends a licensing system to VASPs, the registration is required to 
take place “in the jurisdiction(s) where they are created.”320 Registration should include 
records of who operates the VASP, so if owned by a company then the registration 
should require reference to the relevant register of companies for that jurisdiction.321 
The register should be the responsibility of a designated authority.322 The 2019 
guidance stresses that the “authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory 
measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding, or being the beneficial 
owner of, a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in, a 
VASP.”323 
 
The FATF promote the increasing understanding of cryptocurrencies, the 2019 
guidance recommends that in order to develop a deeper understanding, investment is 
needed in training personnel.324 This Recommendation mirrors that of the UNODC, 
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which also recommends education.325 VASPs operate in a different way to existing 
financial institutions, but many of their functions are also similar.326  
 
The FATF provides guidance on how supervisors and authorities can adjust their 
approach. Examples given by the FATF are that “supervisors should employ both 
offsite and onsite access to all relevant risk and compliance information”,327 vary the 
frequency of visits, both periodical and ad hoc and issues arise,328 and regulate to the 
perceived risks.329 However these Recommendations are still lacking in detailed 
guidance to the supervisors, the guidance from the FATF is too vague. The guidance 
also suggests an intensive response from regulators, which will cost significant 
amounts of money to train staff and empower supervisors. Given that AML regulation 
is already criticised by the British Bankers Association for costing its members £5bn 
per year collectively,330 it is likely that excessive regulation will deter VASPs from being 
compliant and make operating outside of the regulation more appealing.  
 
The 2015 FATF guidance recognises that cryptocurrencies provide compliance 
challenges, and suggests, “Actors in the VC space should seek to develop technology-
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based solutions that will improve compliance”;331 such as application, programming 
interfaces (APIs) to provide identification information.332 This Recommendation of the 
FATF highlighted a key weakness in the 2015 FATF guidance, it only applies to 
situations where cryptocurrencies intersect with fiat currencies, at which point it may 
be difficult to ascertain the origin of the money as the previous transactions will have 
taken place inside the cryptocurrency network, and thus outside of the regulated 
sector. This weakness has been partly addressed in the 2019 guidance, recognising 
that VASPs providing cryptocurrency exchange services will convert between 
cryptocurrencies as well as from fiat to cryptocurrency.  
 
The FATF emphasises the importance of intelligence in combatting money laundering, 
particularly through the requirement for countries creating and coordinating their 
reporting regime via an FIU, and the record keeping requirements placed in regulated 
entities. The recommended approach to cryptocurrencies will only monitor the edges 
of the cryptocurrency networks, key information will not be collected. Despite the 
shortcomings in the FATF guidance, it has been the proactive international body with 
regards to addressing the money laundering risks posed by cryptocurrencies. 
 
4.8.3. Summary of the FATF’s Approach to risks of Money Laundering using 
Cryptocurrencies 
The FATF guidance is not binding on its members; all of the case study jurisdictions 
are members, but they are not compelled to follow the advice. The status of the 
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Recommendations is that they too are advisory as they are soft law, members of the 
FATF are expected to comply with them, but no member of the FATF is fully compliant. 
As observed by Alexander, the FATF has been a powerful driver of reform, giving the 
example of mandatory suspicious transaction reports, which were virtually non-
existent before the FATF came into being, are in place in all but one of the FATF 
member jurisdictions.333 It is observed that the present advice of the FATF is that 
states should apply a risk-based approach to cryptocurrencies, regardless of their 
specific legal treatment of them. This advice has been developed in 2019 to 
recommend the regulation of VASPs, and the remit of the regulation has been 
broadened to some transactions which do not involve fiat currencies, such as from 
one cryptocurrency to another. The weakness of the FATF advice is that it is still using 
its existing Recommendations, and applying them to cryptocurrencies, and the advice 
amounts to designating all VASPs as high risk and applying the highest level of 
regulation possible, which is likely to cause backlash from VASPs. The FATF should 
heed its own guidance and seek a deeper understanding of cryptocurrencies. As 
Recommendation 36 ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and 
the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ states, international harmonisation is 
required, and through the FATF’s position this may be the way this is achieved. 
Another body which may achieve harmonisation, on a European scale, is the EU. 
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4.9. European Union  
The EU is a unique, supranational organisation; “Member States of the European 
Union have agreed, as a result of their membership of the EU, to transfer some of their 
powers to the EU institutions in specified policy areas.”334 The initial aims of the EU 
were to foster economic cooperation335 between six countries: Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.336 The EU now has 28 members;337 
although the UK is in the process of leaving the EU, until the process has been 
organised and completed, “the United Kingdom remains a full member of the EU and 
rights and obligations continue to fully apply in and to the UK.338 As well as its size, 
the nature of the EU has changed considerably since its inception; it has developed 
into a single market and a “unique economic and political union”339 which has the 
power to prescribe legislation to its Member States.  
 
4.9.1. Anti-Money laundering policy 
The EU began combatting money laundering in the 1970s340 through the European 
Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC),341 which created a Select Committee to 
assess the transfer of criminal proceeds between Member States,342 and first 
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published its findings in 1980.343 Prior to legislating through directives, the EU adopted 
the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime344 (1990 Council of Europe Convention), which was open for members and non-
member states to sign.345 The 1990 Council of Europe Convention was not widely 
adopted when it was first created,346 the reasons for the poor uptake are not clear. 
Gilmore states that the drafters were keen to “protect the advances which has so 
recently been made” 347 by the Vienna Convention 1988. The Council of Europe 
convention went further than the Vienna Convention 1988, as signatories were 
required to criminalise money laundering generally, rather than specifically in relation 
to drug trafficking.348 The first EU AML legislation was the 1991 First Money 
Laundering Directive;349 measures included identifying customers, record keeping, 
refraining from tipping off customers being investigated, and a proactive duty to report 
suspicious transactions to the competent national authorities.350 Mitsilegas and 
Gilmore criticised the Directive as it was not specific enough,351 which led to Member 
States implementing the directive in different ways, and hindered cooperation across 
the EU. This demonstrates an issue with directives which is borne out of the flexibility 
they provide, Member States are allowed to devise the best solution for their 
jurisdictions, and those solutions may be too different to achieve harmony. Money 
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laundering is a common problem which may be addressed differently in different 
jurisdictions, it is an example where Craig and de Búrca’s observation is particularly 
true; “Member States have differing legal systems, and there are variations in the 
political, administrative, and social arrangements within the Member States.”352 The 
task for EU legislators is therefore to devise legislation which is flexible enough to 
allow Member States to devise appropriate measures for their jurisdictions, but also 
be prescriptive enough to provide consistency across the EU. The 1st Directive was 
amended by the 2nd Directive in 2001,353 and required any potentially new Member 
States to adopt the Money Laundering Directives as a prerequisite of entry.354 In 2005 
the First and Second Directives were then merged into the Third Directive;355 the EU 
approach to AML mirrors that of the FATF Recommendations, Ryder states that the 
EU Directives require Member States to adopt a risk-based approach; prioritising 
institutions, individuals, or services that are most at risk to money laundering. Also in 
2005, the EU amended the 1990 Council of Europe Convention with the Council of 
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism.356 As observed in the AML timeline,357 
the 2005 Convention coupled money laundering with terrorist financing which 
confuses the issue and undoes the progress made in the 1990’s to recognise money 
                                                     
352 P Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text Cases and Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press, 
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laundering as an issue in itself. The present AML legislation of the EU is contained in 
Directive 2018/843,358 known as the 5th AML Directive, which amends Directive 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing,359 known as the 4th Directive.  
 
4.9.2. The 4th Money Laundering Directive 
As discussed already, directives set a minimum standard for Member States to attain, 
the; directives are goal driven, and the Member States can reach that goal through 
passing their own laws. Fortson notes that, as with the earlier directives, “[m]uch of 
the 4th Directive restates pre-existing measures”;360 this is because each of the money 
laundering directives replaces the previous one. The preamble to the 4th Directive 
highlights the international nature of money laundering, and that the “measures 
adopted by the Union in that field should therefore be compatible with, and at least as 
stringent as, other actions undertaken in international fora"361 in light of this the 
Directive seeks to be aligned with the Recommendations of the FATF.362  
 
                                                     
358 Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the 
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The intended correlation between the EU approach and the FATF is clear from the 
first requirement of the Directive, which is for Member States is to criminalise money 
laundering.363 Article 4 then makes it clear that the risk based approach should be 
adopted in applying the Directive to “activities which are particularly likely to be used 
for the purposes of money laundering.”364 In pursuing the risk based approach, the 
Commission will conduct an assessment of the money laundering risks affecting both 
internal and cross border activities.365 Member States will conduct their own risk 
assessments,366 and regulated institutions should also complete their own 
assessments.367 Chapter 2 of the Directive covers customer due diligence (CDD) 
requirements,368 namely when CDD measures should be applied and what details 
should be gathered. Circumstances where CDD is to be applied include; when 
establishing a new business relationship,369 when transactions values meet certain 
thresholds,370 where money laundering is suspected,371 or the previously obtained 
information is questioned.372 Article 13 outlines what CDD consists of, such as 
obtaining the verified identify of the customer,373 the nature of the business 
relationship,374 and the beneficial owner of the money or goods being transferred.375 
The Directive is clear that the CDD procedures should take place before the respective 
business relationship is established, or transaction takes place.376 The Directive is 
                                                     
363 ibid at Article 1(2). 
364 ibid at Article 4(1). 
365 ibid at Article 6(1). 
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committed to the risk based approach, and Section 2 Chapter 2 makes it clear that in 
low risk circumstances a simplified CDD process can be applied,377 whereas Section 
3 states that in high risk circumstances, enhanced CDD is required.378 There are 
similarities between the 4th Directive and the Recommendations of the FATF in relation 
to CDD; the wording of some of respective sections detailing when CDD is to be 
applied is nearly identical,379 and the threshold of €15,000 is the same.380 The 
information required to be gathered is very similar, the identity of the customer is a 
priority, as well as focussing establishing the beneficial owner of the property and the 
purpose of the business relationship.381 
 
Chapter 4 of the Directive outlines the reporting obligation Member States should 
establish in their jurisdictions. The first stipulation, in Article 32, is that “[e]ach Member 
State shall establish an FIU in order to prevent, detect and effectively combat money 
laundering”.382 A Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is also prescribed by the FATF 
Recommendations,383 and both the EU and the FATF expect FIUs to be to the 
organisation where reports produced to comply AML legislation are sent and analysed. 
The reports which are to be sent to the FIU are produced by regulated institutions, the 
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Directive requires a regulated entity to report if it “knows, suspects or has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that funds, regardless of the amount involved, are the proceeds of 
criminal activity”,384 this form or reporting is known as a suspicious activity report 
(SAR). Article 39 prohibits the disclosure of the SAR to the customer concerned or 
third persons,385 this is to prevent the potential money launderer being tipped off that 
their transaction has been flagged, and taking steps to protect themselves from a 
potential investigation. Article 39 is comparable to FATF Recommendation 21 which 
states that regulated entities should be “prohibited by law from disclosing (“tipping-off”) 
the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being filed 
with the FIU.”386  
 
“Member States shall require the competent authorities to monitor effectively, and to 
take the measures necessary to ensure, compliance with”387 the Directive. As part of 
this each Member State should ensure the relevant authorities have “adequate 
powers”388 to monitor compliance, and to have the required “financial, human and 
technical resources to perform their functions.”389 This is an area of the Directive which 
is quite broad, giving no floors or ceilings as to the resources Member States should 
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make available to the regulators, which could lead to disparities between the standards 
on regulation in Member States. The FATF Recommendations are also not completely 
clear as to what constitutes adequate regulation, but the mutual evaluation programme 
of the FATF can address attainment of the Recommendations in FATF members. 
Another board Article of the Directive is Article 49 which concerns cooperation 
between national authorities, as with providing adequate resources, it is difficult to 
quantify or set standards in cooperation and as such Member States will vary in their 
levels of national cooperation. Article 49 mirrors part of Recommendation 2 of the 
FATF.390  
 
It can be seen that in places the 4th Money Laundering Directive is quite prescriptive 
in what is required of Member States, particularly in relation to customer due diligence 
and suspicious activity reporting, but in other areas there is still the potential for the 
standards in Member States to be very different. It can be seen that the EU’s approach 
to money laundering is very similar to that of the FATF, it follows a risk-based approach 
and places an emphasis on intelligence gathering through CDD and SARs. Both the 
EU and FATF require an FIU to be at the centre of a country’s information gathering 
process, and that compliance with preventative measures is overseen by an 
‘adequately’ resourced authority. The 4th Directive is silent on the issue of 
cryptocurrencies, this is addressed in the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 
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4.9.3. Policy towards cryptocurrencies 
As identified in chapter three, the European Central Bank (ECB) has defined virtual 
currencies in 2012 as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually 
controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific 
virtual community.”391 The ECB subsequently released further analysis in 2015,392 and 
while it stated that its position on virtual currencies remained consistent with the 2012 
report, it has modified its definition of virtual currencies. Virtual currencies are now 
defined as “a digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, credit 
institution or e-money institution, which, in some circumstances, can be used as an 
alternative to money.” The notable differences between the definitions show that 
attitudes towards cryptocurrencies are changing, the word ‘unregulated’ has been 
removed; cryptocurrencies are no longer referred to as ‘digital money’ instead they are 
referred to as a ‘representation of value’ and an ‘alternative to money’; and an 
emphasis is now placed on cryptocurrencies not being issued by a central bank, rather 
than defining who issues and controls the cryptocurrency. The new definition shows 
that institutions within the traditional financial system are attempting to understand 
cryptocurrencies, rather than simply dismiss them. 
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5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
Further evidence that the EU is recognising cryptocurrencies, particularly the money 
laundering risks, is through the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.393 In July 2016, 
only a year after the 4th Directive was enacted, a revision was proposed by the 
Commission, which included “tackling terrorist financing risks linked to virtual 
currencies”.394 By virtue of the EU’s approach to money laundering being entangled 
with terrorist financing, the revision to the Directive in relation to terrorist financing 
would also apply to money laundering. The 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive adds 
“virtual currency exchange platforms as well as custodian wallet providers to the list of 
obliged entities within the scope of the Directive;”395 which mirrors the guidance of the 
FATF with regards to bringing points of intersection between cryptocurrencies and the 
traditional financial system under the scope of EU AML regulations. While this is a 
positive step, it presents the same short comings as identified in the FATF guidance, 
the measures only apply to businesses exchanging cryptocurrency for fiat currency 
and will leave a large proportion of the cryptocurrency network outside of AML 
regulation.  
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4.9.4. Summary EU’s Approach to risks of Money Laundering using 
Cryptocurrencies 
The EU is in a unique position to legislate in its Member States, this gives it the 
opportunity to be a world leader in regulating new phenomenon; if it were to be bold 
and regulate cryptocurrencies it would be likely to set the global trend due to the size 
of the economies within it. Despite this power, the EU is a complex organisation, and 
it has ignored its own advice in the past when given the opportunity to create world 
leading legislation, specifically in the 1980s and 1990s where the EU approved the 
CDPC Select Committee recommendations but ultimately did not adopt the 
recommendations.396 The EU has expanded its AML regime to the same level as the 
guidance of the FATF, which demonstrates an international consistency, but one 
which falls short of addressing the issues posed by cryptocurrencies.  
 
4.10. Summary 
The origins of money laundering can be seen to be as difficult to trace as it is to prevent 
or pursue; the nature of money laundering would suggest it is as old as crime itself, 
but the modern concept can be seen to have its origins in the 1920s.397 The history of 
AML legislation is also not straightforward, it can be seen that governments and 
international organisations have struggled with defining, measuring, isolating, and 
preventing money laundering. The international approach has its origins in the UN’s 
predecessor, the League of Nations, but the UN took until 2000 to decouple money 
laundering from the drugs trade, before which the two criminal activities had been 
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approached together rather than recognised as individual. Conversely, individual 
jurisdictions such as the US, the UK and Australia recognised that money laundering 
was not confined to the drugs trade much earlier than the UN, yet these jurisdictions 
have since confused the area by entwining money laundering and counter terrorist 
financing. Assessing the origins of the modern crime of money laundering and the 
development of the fight against it, it is a quirk that the term originates from the affairs 
of the President of a country that now takes a global lead in its prevention. It is clear 
that money laundering remains impossible to accurately measure, and that the 
globalised nature of the modern world means it has become, more than ever, a global 
problem. Cryptocurrencies fit within a globalised world, without recognising physical 
borders, which suits money launderers and it is this suitability which forms the main 
reasoning for the contention; cryptocurrencies are appealing to money launders and 
their characteristics make them vulnerable to money laundering. 
 
The role of the UN in AML best practice grew over the latter half of the 20th century 
but has subsided since the creation of the FATF and the development of the EU, who 
set the modern agenda in international AML developments; this is clearly observed in 
relation to cryptocurrencies. The UN has been absent in addressing the threats posed 
by cryptocurrencies, whereas the FATF and the EU are instigating a widening of the 
AML regulatory perimeter to include cryptocurrencies. The regulation recommended 
by the FATF is a first step to addressing the money laundering concerns posed by 
cryptocurrencies, as the regulation of cryptocurrency service providers will only 
regulate the edges of cryptocurrency networks. The EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive mirrors the guidance of the FATF, and therefore mirrors its flaws. Both the 
EU and the FATF should encourage the development of applications which can utilise 
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wealth of data available through publicly available blockchains. In 2015, the FATF has 
suggested “actors in the VC space should seek to develop technology-based solutions 
that will improve compliance”;398 such as application programming interfaces (APIs) to 
provide identification information,399 but this has not led to published results.  
 
The next chapter analyses the money laundering laws of the UK, assessing their 
applicability to cryptocurrencies. The chapter also analyses the existing AML 
measures of the UK and highlights the need for reform to widen the regulatory 
perimeter to cover cryptocurrencies. 
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Chapter 5. United Kingdom 
5.1. Chapter Overview  
This chapter will outline the United Kingdom’s (UK) approach to money laundering. It 
will analyse both the criminal offences and the preventative measures, and 
subsequently, the applicability of the law to cryptocurrencies will be assessed. As well 
as the law, the response to cryptocurrencies in the UK will be considered through the 
reactions of the relevant authorities. The anti-money laundering (AML) approach of 
the UK has similarities to that of the US and Australia, in that the combatting of money 
laundering has two clear elements; criminalisation and preventative measures. The 
preventative measures can further be divided into know your customer, or customer 
due diligence (CDD), and suspicious activity reports (SARs); both of these types of 
measures are intended to increase financial intelligence.  
 
This chapter will first assess the UK money laundering offences, determining whether 
they may be committed using virtual currencies. Sections 327-329 of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) are found to be applicable to cryptocurrencies, and 
cryptocurrencies are identified as capable of being criminal property under s.340. 
Confiscation of cryptocurrencies is not the focus of these thesis, but it presents a 
further complication in money laundering cases and an avenue for future research.1 It 
is clear that cryptocurrencies are capable of being criminal property, and be 
confiscated, but clarity is needed in what the accepted procedure is for dealing with 
                                                     
1 For a detailed analysis of international trends in asset recovery see: C. King, C. Walker and J. 
Gurulé, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, Volume 1 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018) Part III. 
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seized cryptocurrency. Following analysis of the criminal offences, it will be considered 
whether cryptocurrency service providers should be subject to CDD and reporting 
requirements under the AML legislation of the UK. It is argued that the AML regulation 
could, and should, already be applied. Once the legislation has been analysed the 
regulatory agencies will be considered, first the primary authorities and then the 
secondary authorities; their role will be considered in relation to the UK AML approach, 
with particular focus on the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Government. 
Having established the roles of the authorities, then special attention will be given to 
the relevant authorities’ approach to cryptocurrencies, which, to date, has been limited 
to consultations rather than regulation. Lastly, reforms will be considered with regard 
to the applicability of the law to cryptocurrencies, it is recommended that the guidance 
of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is adopted, but that the UK goes further 
than the guidance and seeks to develop novel approaches to the money laundering 
threat posed by cryptocurrencies. Development of technology to automate analysis of 
the blockchain is proposed, to utilise the wealth of transaction data available. 
 
5.2. AML Approach 
The approach to money laundering in the UK has two broad elements, criminalisation 
and preventive measures. Money laundering is criminalised through POCA 2002,2 and 
the Money Laundering Regulations 20173 provide the preventative measures which 
are administered by the supervisory authorities set out in Regulation 7.4 While not the 
only supervisory authority, the analysis of the UK AML approach will focus on the 
                                                     
2 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
3 Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017 (Money Laundering Regulations 2017). 
4 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, reg.7. 
 189 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as it is the authority with the widest responsibility, 
which includes “credit and financial institutions (including money service 
businesses)”,5 and “electronic money institutions”,6 which are the most relevant 
institutions to cryptocurrencies. The UK has relatively long history of creating AML 
legislation, and first criminalised money laundering by virtue of the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986.7 As demonstrated in chapter four, the UK has traditionally kept 
place with international standards, first legislating in the same year as the US, and is 
a founding member of the FATF.8 In 2018 mutual evaluation report, the FATF found 
the UK had “implemented an AML/CFT system that is effective in many respects”,9 but 
that “improvements are needed to strengthen supervision and implementation of 
preventive measures, and ensure that financial intelligence is fully exploited.”10 The 
UK AML approach must be analysed and applied to cryptocurrencies, and the 
concerns of the FATF explored.  
 
5.3. Criminalising Money Laundering 
The UK money laundering offences are found in Part 7 of POCA 2002,11 specifically 
ss.327-333. The three main offences are concealing,12 arrangements,13 and 
                                                     
5 ibid reg.7(a)(i). 
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7 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
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acquisition, use and possession.14 In addition to the money laundering offences there 
are the offences of failing to disclose knowledge of money laundering15 and tipping off 
the suspect.16  
 
5.3.1. Money Laundering Offences – s.327, s.328, and s.329 
Section 327 sets out the concealing offence, which is satisfied if a person conceals,17 
disguises,18 converts,19 transfers,20 or removes21 “criminal property from England and 
Wales or from Scotland or from Northern Ireland.”22 The focus of the offence is upon 
the movement of property, there is no requirement that the movement be of a financial 
nature, which allows a wide gamut of activity to satisfy the offence. The arrangements 
offence is set out in s.328; “a person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes 
concerned in an arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever 
means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of 
another person.”23 The use of the phrase “by whatever means”24 indicates a very wide 
interpretation, which may be applied to any number of varying arrangements. Finally, 
Section 329 sets out the acquisition offence; a person commits an offence if they 
acquire,25 use,26 or possess27 criminal property. Each of the POCA offences is drafted 
widely, allowing a range of activities to satisfy the offence, while the offences are 
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commonly referred to as ‘money laundering offences’ they need not involve any 
recognisable money changing hands, the focus is on property or value being 
transferred. 
 
Money laundering convictions have been obtained where Bitcoin has been used. In 
2018 Bitcoin worth over £1.2million was seized and Sergejs Teresko was sentenced 
to 9 years imprisonment,28 and in April 2019 Thomas White was convicted of a number 
of offences, including money laundering related to £192,000 worth of Bitcoins.29 These 
examples demonstrate that the UK offences are interpreted as being wide enough to 
include cryptocurrency activity. 
 
5.3.2. Criminal Property 
UK money laundering offences exist entirely separately from the offences which the 
criminal property heralds from; an individual will be found guilty of money laundering 
even if they did not commit the crime which produced the criminal property, or benefit 
from the criminal property. Section 340(4) makes it clear that it does not matter “who 
carried out the conduct;”30 “who benefited from it;”31 or “whether the conduct occurred 
before or after the passing of”32 POCA 2002. The stipulation in s.340(4)(c) further 
demonstrates the separation of the offence from the laundering process; it should be 
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made clear that this does not give the Act retrospective effect, but it does mean that 
the money laundering offences are stand-alone offences and do not require a 
conviction for the offence from which the criminal property emanates.  
 
Section 340(3) of POCA focusses on the benefits of the property rather than defining 
what can and cannot constitute property. Criminal property is anything that “constitutes 
a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit”,33 which “the 
alleged offender knows or suspects”34 is such a benefit. The definition recognises that 
the proceeds of crime are often broken up to avoid detection, as such the criminal 
property may represent a benefit “in whole or part”35 and can be direct or indirect.36 
This wide definition of criminal property can therefore encompass the broad array of 
assets which may be used to disguise illegal gains. While no definition of 
cryptocurrency exists in law, the courts have clearly viewed it as property, as 
demonstrated by the convictions of Teresko37 and White.38 The confiscation and 
restraint of Bitcoins is a further demonstration of the courts viewing cryptocurrency as 
property. Hall observes that in the Teresko case Bitcoin was accepted as “realisable 
property”,39 which includes intangible property,40 satisfying s.84(1) of POCA41 and 
                                                     
33 ibid s.340(3)(a). 
34 ibid s.340(3)(b). 
35 ibid s.340(3)(a). 
36 ibid. 
37 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘More than £1.2million of Bitcoin seized from drug dealer’ (19 July 
2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/south-east/news/more-ps12-million-bitcoin-seized-drug-dealer> 
accessed 11 September 2019. 
38 National Crime Agency, ‘Student behind $100m dark web site jailed for 5 years 4 months’ (12 April 
2019) <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/student-behind-100m-dark-web-site-jailed-for-
5-years-4-months?highlight=WyJiaXRjb2luIiwiYml0Y29pbnMiXQ==> accessed 11 September 2019. 
39 J Hall, ‘Restraint orders: R. v Teresko (Sergejs) Kingston Crown Court: HH Judge Lodder QC: 
unreported 11 October 2017’ (2018) 1 CLR 81 at 82. 
40 ibid. 
41 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s.84(1). 
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allowing a s.4142 restraint order to be obtained. Confiscation and restraint can be 
complicated in relation to cryptocurrency as the lack of a centralised authority means 
law enforcement agencies are dependent upon obtaining the login details of the 
offender in order to access their cryptocurrency wallet. When using fiat currency with 
traditional financial institutions, an institution can assist the law enforcement agencies. 
Tracking and obtaining cryptocurrency holdings can be a time-consuming process for 
the police, the recent seizure of Bitcoins from Grant West followed a “lengthy police 
investigation”43 and involved undercover police officers following West onto a train to 
view him logging into his accounts and catching him with “fingers on the keyboard”.44 
The volatility of cryptocurrency values presents a further complication when seizing 
laundered money, as demonstrated by the cases of Teresko and West. Teresko’s 295 
Bitcoins45 were seized in April 2017,46 at the end of April 2017 that quantity of Bitcoins 
was worth £298,649,47 by the time of the court order on 11 October 2017,48 the value 
of the 295 Bitcoins was £1,057,911.49 Reports of the value of Bitcoins seized from 
Teresko vary depending on the date each source took their exchange rate from, a 
further demonstration of the volatility in cryptocurrency values. Likewise, in the case 
of West the value of the Bitcoins at the time of seizure in September 201750 was 
                                                     
42 ibid s.41. 
43 Brett Wilson LLP, ‘Bitcoin seized as ‘realisable assets’ in confiscation proceedings’ (London, 03 
September 2019) <https://www.brettwilson.co.uk/blog/bitcoin-seized-as-realisable-assets-in-
confiscation-proceedings/> accessed 12 September 2019. 
44 M. Busby, ‘Bitcoin worth £900,000 seized from hacker to compensate victims’ The Guardian 
(London, 23 August 2019). 
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46 BBC News, ‘Criminal's Bitcoin seized in Surrey Police first’ (Surry, 21 July 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-surrey-44896665> accessed 12 September 2019. 
47 Based on a value of 1 Bitcoin = £1012.37: XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to GBP’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=GBP&view=5Y> accessed 12 September 2019. 
48 R v Teresko [2018] Crim LR 81 (Unreported). 
49 Based on a value of 1 Bitcoin = £3586.14: XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to GBP’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=GBP&view=5Y> accessed 12 September 2019. 
50 Brett Wilson LLP, ‘Bitcoin seized as ‘realisable assets’ in confiscation proceedings’ (London, 03 
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£3,104.12 per Bitcoin51 and by the time the court order for confiscation was given the 
value has increased to £8,324.81 per Bitcoin,52 which led to £922,978.14 being 
confiscated.53 While the value fluctuations have been beneficial in recent 
confiscations, this will not always be the case and the time between the initial seizure 
and the court order for converting the property into Pounds may lead to substantially 
lower value asset recoveries.  
 
Once the cryptocurrency is confiscated there are currently two options for authorities 
wishing to convert the currency, they can either use a cryptocurrency exchange or sell 
the cryptocurrency at public auction, Hall observes that the US approach is use public 
actions, whereas Dutch authorities use exchanges.54 The UK approach is unclear, in 
the Teresko case an exchange was used,55 but in 2019 a UK police force used the 
public auction method for the first time.56 Confiscation of cryptocurrencies is not the 
focus of these thesis, but it presents a further complication which cryptocurrencies 
present, and an avenue for future research.57 King notes the importance of 
confiscation in the fight against organised crime, using the language used by Tony 
Blair in 1999 while UK Prime Minister, who said that “we want to ensure crime doesn’t 
                                                     
51 Based on a value of 1 Bitcoin = £3104.12: XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to GBP’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=GBP&view=5Y> accessed 12 September 2019. 
52 Based on a value of 1 Bitcoin = £8324.81: XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to GBP’ 
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53 BBC News, ‘Prolific Sheerness hacker ordered to pay back £922k’ (Kent, 23 August 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-49450676> accessed 12 September 2019. 
54 cf Hall (n39) at 82. 
55 ibid. 
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be-auctioned-with-no-reserve/> accessed 30 September 2019 
57 For a detailed analysis of international trends in asset recovery see : C. King, C. Walker and J. 
Gurulé, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, Volume 1 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018) Part III. 
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pay.”58 It is clear that cryptocurrencies are considered criminal property, and can be 




A conviction for an offence under section 327, 328, or 329 is punishable by prison 
sentence of up to 14 years, a fine not exceeding the statutory minimum, or both. The 
Sentencing Council issue guidance for courts in England and Wales, releasing 
updated guidance for money laundering offences in 2016.59 While the maximum 
sentence is 14 years, the guidelines state that this length of sentence should be 
reserved for offenders laundering £10 million or more and with the highest level of 
culpability. Indicators of high culpability may include; taking a leading role in a group 
of offenders or pressuring others to take part, the length of time the offender was 
involved, and whether the money laundering was complex or required significant 
planning. As established earlier in this chapter, laundering money using 
cryptocurrencies can satisfy the relevant criminal offences, it is also clear from the 
sentencing guidelines that the use of cryptocurrencies, and the complexity they add, 
will mean offenders will likely to be held to a high culpability. The average prison 
sentence for money laundering reached an all-time high of 27 months in 2018,60 up 
                                                     
58 C. King, ‘Asset Recovery: An Overview’ in C. King, C. Walker and J. Gurulé, The Palgrave 
Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, Volume 1 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) at p.377. 
59 Sentencing Council, ‘Fraud, bribery and money laundering offences: Definitive guideline’ 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Fraud-bribery-and-money-laundering-
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from 20.5 months in 2008.61 Fines for money laundering are increasingly uncommon, 
in 2013 fines were issued in 15% of money laundering cases, compared to just 7% in 
2018.62 Cases involving cryptocurrencies remain rare, and each of the three cases 
above concern multiple offences in addition to money laundering, so it is difficult to 
generalise in relation to sentence length. White was sentenced to 5 years and 4 
months, for approximately £192,000 laundered in Bitcoins in addition to drug offences 
and trading in child sex images.63 Teresko was jailed for 9 years and 4 months for 
money laundering and drug offences, the assets involved were valued at over 
£1million.64 Finally, West was jailed for 10 years and 8 months, his convictions were 
for fraud, computer misuse, and drug offences, and his cryptocurrency was seized as 
the proceeds of his crime.65 The sentences demonstrate that cryptocurrencies will add 
to the complexity of the money laundering scheme, and raise the level of culpability, 
but factors such as the value of money involved and the severity of the predicate 
offences the offender has been convicted of will also influence the length of the 
sentence.  
 
It is clear from this assessment of the UK money laundering offences that these may 
be committed using cryptocurrencies, and convictions have been obtained. Having 
                                                     
61 F Cameron, ‘Sentences for money laundering getting longer: research’ (Pinsent Masons LLP, OUT-
LAW, 2 September 2019) <https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/sentences-for-money-
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62 ibid. 
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64 BBC News, ‘Criminal's Bitcoin seized in Surrey Police first’ (Surry, 21 July 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-surrey-44896665> accessed 12 September 2019. 
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<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-49450676> accessed 24 September 2019. 
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established that the criminal law is applicable, it must also be considered whether 
transactions involving cryptocurrencies are subject to UK reporting requirements. 
 
5.4. Preventative Measures 
The UK’s money laundering prevention strategy can be split into two main elements; 
these are SARs and CDD requirements. The relevant law is found within the Money 
Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 201766 (Money Laundering Regulations 2017), which were enacted to 
comply with the Fourth Money Laundering Directive;67 the 2017 regulations replace 
the Money Laundering Regulations 2007,68 which were enacted to implement the 
Third Money Laundering Directive.69 The Proceeds of Crime Act also contains an 
offence of failing to reporting suspicious activity when required to.70 As noted by 
Ryder,71 the UK has incorporated preventative measures since the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986,72 and “was one of the first EU members to incorporate preventive 
money laundering measures.”73 The FATF mutual evaluation in 2018 found that with 
regard to “technical compliance, the legal framework is particularly strong”74 but that 
                                                     
66 Money Laundering Regulations 2017. 
67 Directive 2015/849/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
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Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L.141/73. 
68 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
69 Council Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, [2005] OJ L309/15. 
70 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part 2, s.330-332.  
71 N. Ryder Money Laundering - An Endless Cycle?: A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge, London, 2012). 
72 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
73 cf Ryder (n71) at p91. 
74 FATF, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, Fourth 
Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, December 2018) <fatf-
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“major improvements are needed to strengthen supervision and implementation of 
preventive measures, and ensure that financial intelligence is fully exploited.”75 CDD 
requirements and the SARs regime will be outlined and applied to cryptocurrencies. 
Compliance with AML regulation is enforced by the FCA,76 but SARs are submitted to 
the National Crime Agency (NCA), as that is the UK financial intelligence unit (FIU). 
 
5.4.1. Customer Due Diligence 
The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 set out CDD requirements for regulated 
firms, to determine whether cryptocurrency transactions may be subject to reporting 
requirements it will first be necessary to establish what constitutes a regulated 
institution. Regulation 8 sets out the application of the regulations, Reg.8(2) lists the 
regulated institutions of which Reg.8(2)(b) “financial institutions”77 may apply 
cryptocurrency exchanges. The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 definition of a 
financial institution includes “an undertaking, including a money service business, 
when it carries out one or more of the activities listed in points 2 to 12, 14 and 15 of 
Annex 1 to the capital requirements directive.”78 Annex 1 of the Capital Requirements 
Directive outlines the common functions any financial institution may perform, but in 
relation to cryptocurrency exchanges points 4, 5, and 15 may be satisfied. Point 4 
being “payment services,”79 point 5 being “issuing and administering other means of 
                                                     
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 
2019 at para 5. 
75 ibid at para 4. 
76 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Money laundering and terrorist financing’ (03 August 2015) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-crime/money-laundering-terrorist-financing> accessed 17 
September 2019. 
77 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, Regulation 8(2)(b). 
78 ibid Regulation 10(2)(a). 
79 Council Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and 
repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338, Annex I (4). 
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payment … insofar as such activity is not covered by point 4,”80 and point 15 being 
“issuing electronic money.”81 Based on these provisions it is likely that a 
cryptocurrency exchange may be deemed a financial institution. Additionally, money 
services businesses are included as a financial institutions in the Regulations, this 
further strengthens the argument that cryptocurrency exchanges should be subject to 
AML requirements. The definition of a ‘money services business’ under Reg.3 of the 
Money Laundering Regulations82 is an “an undertaking which by way of business 
operates a currency exchange office, transmits money (or any representations of 
monetary value) by any means or cashes cheques which are made payable to 
customers.”83 The phrase “or any representations of monetary value”84 is a very wide 
drafting and while Bitcoin has a particularly high value in fiat currency, but most other 
convertible virtual currencies also have a monetary value in fiat currencies, so may 
satisfy this definition. Based on this analysis; cryptocurrency service providers could 
be subject to CDD requirements, though no evidence of enforcement exists. 
Regulation 4 sets out the limitations, the most relevant of which would be Reg.4(2) 
which states that the regulations do not apply to those engaging in financial activity 
“on an occasional or very limited basis,”85 so it would be unlikely to apply to the users 
of cryptocurrencies, only the operators of exchanges. 
 
The CDD requirements are set out in Part 3 of the Money Laundering Regulations 
2017, Regulation 27 identifies when CDD should take place, and Regulation 28 
                                                     
80 ibid at Annex I (5). 
81 ibid at Annex I (15). 
82 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, Regulation 3. 
83 ibid Regulation 3(1)(d). 
84 ibid Regulation 3(1)(d). 
85 ibid Regulation 4(2). 
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outlines what information is required. CDD measures must be applied when a 
business relationship is first established,86 when an occasional transaction exceeding 
€1,000 takes place,87 where money laundering is suspected,88 or where the “veracity 
or adequacy”89 of the previously obtained information is doubted.90 While the 2007 
Regulations were less prescriptive, requiring the same information from all types of 
customers; the 2017 regulations require differing CDD information from different types 
of customers. The focus of CDD is on identifying the customer, verifying their identity 
and obtaining information on the “purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship or occasional transaction.”91 The requirements are altered if the customer 
is a company; where the identification of the customer requires the name of the 
company, the company number or relevant registration number, and the address of 
the company’s registered office.92 Additionally the regulated entity should “take 
reasonable measures to determine and verify”93 the customer company’s constitution 
and the names of the board of directors.94 As has been identified, the purpose of the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2017 is to meet the requirements of the 4th Money 
Laundering Directive, this can be seen in the focus on the beneficial owner of the 
money or property being transferred. Regulation 28(4) states that where a customer 
company is owned is “beneficially owned by another person”95 then the regulated 
                                                     
86 ibid Regulation 27(1)(a). 
87 ibid Regulation 27(1)(b). 
88 ibid Regulation 27(1)(c). 
89 ibid Regulation 27(1)(d). 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid Regulation 28(2)(c). 
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93 ibid Regulation 28(3)(b). 
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entity must identify that beneficial owner,96 and further efforts must be made to identify 
subsequent beneficial owners if the first beneficial owner is a corporation.97 
 
CDD has inherent weaknesses, money laundering is concerned with making money 
appear legitimate, so it follows that launders will provide information which adheres to 
accepted norms. Chaikin highlights the assumption that customers will be honest and 
that there are no legal requirements for customers to provide full disclosure of the 
names they use or the accounts they have opened,98 there is no reason why a money 
launderer will give truthful information. It has been identified already in this thesis that 
cryptocurrencies provide users with mechanisms to conceal their identity,99 applying 
CDD requirements to cryptocurrency service providers will be more difficult than for 
the traditional financial institutions. Irwin and Dawson note that “cybercriminals are 
likely to be comfortable obtaining fraudulent documents”100 which can defeat CDD, 
and that the high cost of implementing extensive identification processes is not 
proportionate to those making small cryptocurrency payments.101 CDD requirements 
are also vulnerable to professionals who assist in money laundering. Long prior to the 
existence of CDD, individuals have offered services to ‘clean’ money. Rider observes 
that “[s]ince the days of Meyer Lansky there have been individuals who are prepared, 
                                                     
96 ibid Regulation 28(4)(a). 
97 ibid Regulation 28(4)(c). 
98 D. Chaikin, ‘Risk-Based Approaches to Combatting Financial Crime’ (2009) 8(2) Journal of Law and 
Financial Crime 20 at 23. 
99 The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies is addressed by the US Government Accountability 
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for a fee or part of the action, to provide their services to whoever may wish to have 
their money hidden or laundered.”102 Rider goes on to note that the “modern money 
launderer is unlikely to be involved as a member of a criminal organisation”103 instead 
they are likely to be within the financial services industry and “prepared to make his 
services available to whoever is willing to pay.”104 Such individuals will be likely to pass 
CDD checks without drawing attention to themselves, undermining the AML 
measures. 
 
In addition to initial CDD, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 require a regulated 
firm to “conduct ongoing monitoring of a business relationship.”105 This means 
scrutinising transactions to ensure consistency with the customer’s usual behaviour,106 
and ensuring CDD records are kept up-to-date.107 
 
CDD is to be conducted within the risk-based approach. Regulation 28(12) makes 
clear that the “ways in which a relevant person complies with the requirement to take 
CDD measures, and the extent of the measures taken”108 must reflect the “risk 
assessment carried out by the relevant person”109 and an “assessment of the level of 
risk arising in any particular case.”110 It is recognised that the measures “may differ 
                                                     
102 B. Rider, ‘The practical and legal aspects of interdicting the flow of dirty money’ (1996) 3(3) JFC 
234 at 241. 
103 ibid. 
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105 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, Regulation 28(11). 
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110 ibid Regulation 28(12)(a)(ii). 
 203 
from case to case.”111 The higher the money laundering risk attached to the type of 
business being undertaken, the greater the due diligence should be. This policy is 
clear from Regulation 33 of the Money Laundering Regulations,112 which requires 
“enhanced customer due diligence measures and enhanced ongoing monitoring“113 to 
reduce the risk is particular situations. This includes any transaction involving a high-
risk jurisdiction,114 involving politically exposed people,115 and transactions which are 
complex and unusually large.116 In the 2007 regulations, transactions requiring 
enhanced CDD included situations “[w]here the customer has not been physically 
present for identification purposes, a relevant person must take specific and adequate 
measures to compensate for the higher risk.”117 The nature of cryptocurrency means 
that the user may rarely physically meet the regulated entity, therefore a regulated 
cryptocurrency exchange would be required to apply enhance CDD under the 2007 
regulations. Unfortunately, the 2017 regulations are less clear, the “physically 
present”118 has been removed and instead the enhanced measures should be applied 
in “correspondent relationships with a credit institution or a financial institution;”119 but 
the definition of a correspondent relationship is poorly defined in Regulation 34; 
“correspondent relationship” means— 
(i) the provision of banking services by a correspondent to a respondent 
including providing a current or other liability account and related 
services, such as cash management, international funds transfers, 
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cheque clearing, providing customers of the respondent with direct 
access to accounts with the correspondent (and vice versa) and 
providing foreign exchange services; or 
(ii) the relationship between and among credit institutions and financial 
institutions including where similar services are provided by a 
correspondent to a respondent, and including relationships established 
for securities transactions or funds transfers.”120 
 
The term correspondent is not defined which is confusing, but a basic understanding 
of the definition could mean that the term ‘correspondent relationship’ replaces the 
2007 provision in relation to the customer not being physically present and thus 
cryptocurrency transactions would be likely to require enhanced due diligence. 
Regulation 33(5) outlines the enhanced due diligence measures, which include 
seeking independent verification of the customers identity,121 taking further steps to 
understand the “background, ownership and financial situation of the customer”,122 
and placing greater scrutiny on transactions.123  
 
The Money Laundering Regulation 2017 also provides a “simplified due diligence”124 
process under Regulation 37; the effect of this is to remove requirements where there 
is no suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, taking into account the risk 
factors identified in Regulation 37(3) and with regard for the risk assessment which all 
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regulated entities must carry out. The circumstances where Regulation 37 may apply 
are limited and none are likely to apply to cryptocurrencies. CDD information should 
identify the customer and build up intelligence pertaining to their behaviour, this 
information should be used by regulated institutions to help decide when a specific 
transaction is suspicious, and whether a SAR needs to be submitted to the NCA.  
 
5.4.2. Money Laundering Reporting Requirements 
The second element of the UK’s preventative approach is reporting requirements, 
specifically through SARs. As with the US and Australian systems, a SAR is sent to 
the FIU when a transaction, or series of transactions, raises suspicions of money 
laundering or terrorist financing. It is a legal obligation in the UK for those in the 
regulated sector to report suspicious transactions. The legal obligation can be found 
in ss.330-332 of POCA 2002,125 s.330 sets out the criteria of the offence for a person 
in the regulated sector. A person commits an offence if they know or suspect,126 or 
have reasonable grounds to know or suspect,127 that a person is engaged in money 
laundering based on information that came from their course of business,128 and they 
fail to “make the required disclosure as soon as is practicable after the information or 
other matter comes to”129 them. 
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Section 331 concerns a nominated officer, they will commit an offence if the same 
conditions as s.330 are met, the only difference being that “such knowledge or 
suspicion, came to him in consequence of a disclosure made under section 330.”130 
As a nominated officer, they will receive disclosures via s.330 and be required to 
submit a report to the NCA.131  
 
Figure 6. Suspicious Activity Report Volume132 
 
SARs are submitted to the UK FIU, which is the NCA, Figure 6 shows the steady rise 
in the number of SARs submitted annually since 2010, the trend suggests that by 2020 
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the annual volume will be double that of 2010. The rising number of SARs being 
submitted to the NCA could cause difficulties as the FATF identified the “UKFIU suffers 
from a lack of available resources”,133 in terms of both personnel, technology, and 
“analytical capability”.134 The FATF was especially concerned as “similar issues were 
raised over a decade ago in the UK’s previous FATF mutual evaluation.”135 In its 2018 
report on the SARs regime, the Law Commission linked the high numbers of SARs to 
three connected causes, a low threshold for reporting based on suspicion,136 defensive 
reporting due to criminal liability for failing to report,137 and the concept of suspicion 
remaining poorly defined.138 The efficacy of the SARs regime could be impacted if the 
FIU is unable to process reports, this would be exacerbated if AML regulation is 
applied to cryptocurrencies, as it would increase the volume of reports further.  
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The SARs regime in the UK has been criticised by the Court of Appeal, as well as by 
Ryder who points out the increases in defensive reporting,139 which is also identified 
by Leong.140 The Law Commission noted that as the “criminal liability rests with the 
reporter”141 a “culture of defensive reporting”142 has developed. Defensive reporting is 
used to explain the sharp rise in SARs since it became an offence not to submit.143 
This goes against the purpose of the reporting, if the aim is to highlight genuinely 
suspicious transactions then these suspicious transactions will be much harder to 
identify in the sea of reports filled to prevent prosecution. Additional criticism could be 
levied at the use of the word suspicious which is subjective and guidance from the 
courts has not been helpful. The Law Commission found the term suspicious was “ill-
defined, unclear and inconsistently applied”144 by those submitting reports. The term 
has been long been problematic in English law, Lord Devlin stated in Hussien v Chong 
Fook Kam145 that the ordinary meaning of suspicion “is a state of conjecture or surmise 
where proof is lacking”146 which is not definitive enough to be helpful in determining 
whether a SAR should be submitted. Lord Devlin’s definition was provided before it 
was a criminal offence not to report, introduced by a 1993 amendment to the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986.147 Criminal liability for failing to report creates further 
needs for a clear threshold for suspicion, which has not been provided. In R v Da 
                                                     
139 cf Ryder (n71) at p93. 
140 A. Leong, ‘Chasing dirty money: domestic and international measures against money laundering’ 
(2007) 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 140. 
141 Law Commission, Anti-money laundering: the SARs regime (Law Com No 384, 2018) para 5.12. 
142 ibid. 
143 A. Leong, ‘Chasing dirty money: domestic and international measures against money laundering’ 
(2007) 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 140. 
144 Law Commission, Anti-money laundering: the SARs regime (Law Com No 384, 2018) para 5.13. 
145 Shaaban bin Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] 2 WLR 441. 
146 ibid per Lord Devlin at 445. 
147 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s.26B. The offence is now found at s.330 of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002.  
 209 
Silva,148 Longmore LJ held that “it seems to us that the essential element of the word 
suspect and its affiliates, in this context, is that the defendant must think that there is 
a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling 
of unease would not suffice”.149 Da Silva has been upheld, most notably by K Ltd v 
National Westminster Bank plc150 and Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd151 leaving 
the term ‘suspicious’ inadequately defined. The Joint Money Laundering Steering 
Group note that in addition to the subjective test from Da Silva, an objective text is 
clear from the wording of the offences.152 Criminal liability arises for “failing to disclose 
information when reasonable grounds exist for knowing or suspecting that a person is 
engaged in money laundering/terrorist financing.”153 Examples of reasonable grounds 
include factors pertaining to the origin of the transaction, how the relevant funds were 
discovered, the monetary values involved, the destination of the money, and whether 
any apparent links to crime exist.154 The objective text provides limited assistance, as 
the word reasonable also has differing meanings based on the context it is being 
considered. The Law Commission found that the low threshold for suspicion was 
contributing to the large volume of reports being submitted.155 With regards to 
cryptocurrency service providers, if they are deemed to be money services 
businesses, and subject to reporting requirements, then it could be of increased 
difficulty for them to establish what is, and is not, suspicious. This is because they may 
have limited information with which to determine what is normal for their customer if 
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their customer regularly transacts privately within cryptocurrency networks. 
Cryptocurrency service providers would be required to submit SARs based on less 
detailed information that traditional financial institutions and so may report to protect 
themselves from liability, thus adding to the issue of defensive reporting. 
 
5.5. Applicability of Preventative Measures to 
Cryptocurrencies  
At present the FCA does not regulate cryptocurrencies in any capacity, the FCA’s 
approach to cryptocurrencies will be analysed below at 5.7. Despite the lack of 
regulation, it is relatively straightforward to apply AML measures to cryptocurrency 
service providers, but there are potential practical issues in doing this. While regulation 
should be widened to cryptocurrency service providers, as recommended by the 
FATF,156 this will still leave gaps in the regulation of cryptocurrencies, as peer-to-peer 
transactions will continue to go unregulated. It is not possible to apply the SARs regime 
to peer-to-peer transactions in the same way it can be for traditional financial 
transactions, as there is no human interaction at a point where the transaction can be 
held prior to a review, by an FIU. The SARs regime will need to be modified in order 
to apply to cryptocurrency transactions, while transactions cannot be frozen, the 
wealth of information the blockchain provides means that FIUs can monitor the 
blockchain themselves, and could identify money laundering behaviour. The 
pseudonymity provided by cryptocurrencies means that all the FIU would be able to 
obtain is public keys rather than names, but, as demonstrated by Reynolds and Irwin, 
                                                     
156 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019 para 86 at p23. 
 211 
this can be negated by “analysis of transaction history tracing back to an interaction 
with a Bitcoin exchange in which [the money launderer was] required to submit forms 
of identifying information.”157 Despite this potential, it is unlikely that the NCA is going 
to be capable of this, as it requires resources the FATF has identified as lacking in 
availability to the NCA, namely; human resources, IT resources, and analytical 
capability.158 
 
5.6. Authorities  
In this section, the primary and secondary authorities of the UK AML approach will be 
identified, and their responsibilities will be detailed, after this their roles can be 
assessed in relation to cryptocurrencies. As identified by Ryder, primary authorities 
are responsible for creating AML policy and legislation, while secondary authorities 
are tasked with enforcement.159 The primary authorities of the UK are government 
departments, and the principal secondary authorities in the UK are the NCA, as the 
FIU this is the authority that reports are submitted to, and the principle regulator of 
financial institutions, the FCA. The secondary authorities are not part of the 
government, the NCA is an “independent non-ministerial government department”,160 
and the FCA is an “independent public body funded entirely by the firms”161 it 
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regulates. A third category is also recognised by Ryder;162 tertiary agencies, which 
may include “trade associations and professions which are threatened by illegal 
transactions.”163 The UK has one identifiable cryptocurrency trade association in the 
form of CryptoUK.164  
 
5.6.1. Primary 
HM Treasury  
HM Treasury is the principle policy-making authority for UK AML legislation and 
regulation.165 It represents the UK at the FATF166 and is “responsible for the 
implementation of the Money Laundering Directives and the execution of the UN’s 
financial sanctions regime.”167 In this capacity HM Treasury has an instrumental role 
in ensuring the UK financial sector complies with its international obligations, and in 
formulating and enacting AML policy. 168 HM Treasury will regularly assess the money 
laundering threats to the UK, it undertook its first national risk assessment in 2015.169 
The risk assessment found that the UK AML regulators were most knowledgeable 
“about cash-based money laundering, particularly cash collection networks, 
international controllers, and money service businesses, although some gaps in 
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knowledge remain.”170 This was attributed to “the resources that law enforcement 
agencies have invested over a number of years in tackling cash-based money 
laundering and the drugs trade (which largely generates proceeds in the form of 
cash).”171 The risk assessment is an indicator that the UK AML approach needs to 




While HM Treasury is responsible for the financial sector, the Home Office has 
responsibility for “all UK primary legislation concerning money laundering and terrorist 
financing; overall police strategy and targets for money laundering and terrorist 
financing investigations and prosecutions”172 As outlined in this chapter, the UK AML 
legislation can be found within Part 7 of POCA 2002,173 the Terrorism Act 2000,174 and 
the Money Laundering Regulation 2017.175 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a very limited role in UK AML policy, it is 
only concerned with “implementation international Treaties and Conventions”,176 and 
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therefore it will not be considered in detail in relation to cryptocurrencies, as to date 
there are no applicable international treaties. 
 
5.6.2. Secondary  
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
The FCA was established in 2012, it replaced the beleaguered Financial Services 
Authority, which was heavily criticised in the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis.177 
The FCA’s ‘Integrity Objective’ is found at s.1D of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 and requires the FCA to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial 
system.178 This includes reducing the extent to which the financial services industry 
can be used for purposes connected with financial crime.179 Money laundering is 
pursued using a ‘risk-based’ approach; greater AML requirements are placed on those 
firms and individuals who are most susceptible to money laundering. The FCA’s AML 
rules are contained in the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
(known as SYSC), specifically SYSC 6.3. Srivastava notes that the risk-based 
approach in SYSC “is intended to provide more flexibility to firms,”180 and Ryder 
observes that this flexibility “allows them to identify the risks and determine how they 
can best allocate their resources in areas which are most vulnerable.”181 
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The FCA has enforcement powers, these are intended to support its objectives “by 
making it clear there are real and meaningful consequences for firms and individuals 
who don’t follow the rules.”182 Since its creation in 2013, the FCA has imposed 193 
fines,183 amounting to £3,513,743,864, therefore the average fine imposed is 
£18,205,927. These figures are distorted by the extraordinary fines imposed on large 
banks for highly publicised failings in recent years, such as the LIBOR and FOREX 
market manipulation scandals, and the record braking fines of £102million for 
Standard Chartered184 and £163million for Deutsche Bank185 for their AML failings. 
The FCA does not publish statistics for AML compliance enforcement actions, but in 
2019 the 2018/19 Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report it was stated that since 2012, 
18 AML enforcement cases had been concluded by the FCA and its predecessor the 
Financial Services Authority.186 It is clear that while the FCA will take enforcement 
action against non-compliant institutions, its supervision is spread across other 
conduct related areas of financial regulation.  
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National Crime Agency 
Created in 2011, the NCA is a national authority tasked with combatting crime across 
the spectrum, as a result is has a “wide remit”187 to “tackle serious and organised 
crime, strengthen […] borders, fight fraud and cyber crime, and protect children and 
young people from sexual abuse and exploitation.”188 The NCA is the FIU of the UK. 
The NCA is a “Law Enforcement Model”189 FIU when considered against the Egmont 
Group typology. This is because the NCA “implements anti-money laundering 
measures alongside already existing law enforcement systems, supporting the efforts 
of multiple law enforcement or judicial authorities with concurrent or sometimes 
competing jurisdictional authority to investigate money laundering.”190 As the UKFIU, 
all SARs are sent to the NCA; it receives more than 380,000 SARs a year.191 Upon 
receiving SARs, the NCA “identifies the most sensitive SARs and sends them to the 
appropriate organisations for investigation.192  
 
The NCA aims to “provide leadership in these areas through [it’s] organised crime, 
border policing, economic crime and CEOP commands, the National Cyber Crime Unit 
and specialist capability teams.”193 Money laundering is the responsibility of the 
‘Economic Crime Command’, and the Home Office is expected to “ensure a coherent 
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approach to the use of resources focussed on economic crime across the full range of 
agencies deploying them.”194 The Economic Crime Command strategy is based on 4 
principles knows as the “‘4P’ components of the Serious & Organised Crime 
Strategy.”195 The ‘4Ps’ are ‘Prevent’, ‘Pursue’, ‘Protect’, and ‘Prepare’. The Economic 
Crime Command claims to tackle money laundering in three main ways, by “[l]eading 
multi-agency action” against national and international money laundering,196 targeting 
criminals within professions vulnerable to money laundering, such as lawyers, 
accountants and bankers,197 and increasing operational capabilities.198  
 
In December 2014, the NCA placed emphasis on ‘High End Money Laundering’, which 
the NCA defines as the laundering of funds, wittingly or unwittingly, through the UK 
financial sector and related professional services.”199 This definition could be criticised 
as the financial sector is a wide definition, and relatively small amounts of money may 
be laundered through it. The NCA does provide a more helpful distinction as well, 
describing ‘high end money laundering as including; 
“[m]ajor frauds and overseas corruption work, where the raw material of the 
crime is electronic and cash is only used further down the laundering 
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process to disguise audit trails or extract profits. In this respect, it can be 
distinguished from the laundering of street cash generated by the activities 
of organised criminal groups (OCGs).”200 
 
This distinction is notable as the key difference between ‘High End Money Laundering’ 
and more traditional money laundering is that the placement stage may be easier for 
the money launderer to achieve as the funds are already in an electronic format.  
 
It can be seen from the approach of the NCA, via the Economic Crime Command, that 
there is a strong emphasis on inter-agency co-operation. “The NCA works closely with 
partners to deliver operational results,”201 an example of this could be the Joint Money 
Laundering Intelligence Taskforce which has supported over 500 investigations, 
assisting in approximately 130 arrests and confiscating £13m.202 While the NCA is a 
national body it is clearly also an international one, it states that it has “an international 
role to cut serious and organised crime impacting on the UK through our network of 
international liaison officers.”203  
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Similarly to the FCA, the NCA is not solely focused on money laundering, it is 
responsible for tackling all serious and organised crime in the UK.204 Examples of 
recent convictions obtained by the NCA include a 4 years and 6 months jail term and 
an order to repay £7.3m of laundered money,205 eight members of a crime group who 
laundered £1.8m in connection with drug offences received sentences ranging from 7 
years to 18 months,206 and a total of 11 years in prison sentences imposed on 3 men 
for their role in a £1million drug business and money laundering scheme.207 It is difficult 
to analyse the sentences for money laundering in isolation as convictions are for 
multiple offences rather than money laundering alone.  
 
Crown Prosecution Service 
The CPS was established in 1985 through the Prosecution of Offences Act208 and is 
the “principal prosecuting authority for England and Wales, acting independently in 
criminal cases investigated by the police and others.”209 The CPS decides whether to 
prosecute an individual, and the appropriate charges to bring, it prepares cases and 
instructs counsel to present the case at court, and also provides support to victims and 
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witnesses.210 In this capacity, the CPS may prosecute money laundering offences 
under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.211 The CPS will bring the majority of 
individual money laundering cases, where the resources of the larger agencies are not 
required. 
 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
HMRC is a ‘supervisory authority’ under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. 
Simpson and Moffatt state that this means HMRC have “an obligation to ‘monitor firms 
that they supervise and if necessary, to make measures for the purpose of securing 
compliance”212 HMRC is responsible for a wide range of supervision, largely where 
the supervision of the FCA does not extend; it is responsible for high value dealers,213 
and money services businesses or payment services not supervised by the FCA.214 





CryptoUK describe themselves as the “UK’s self-regulatory trade association”215 of the 
cryptocurrency sector. CryptoUK have created a code of conduct which is members 
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should follow,216 but the code is not legally binding. One of the principles of CryptoUK’s 
code is self-regulation, which has been superseded by the FCA taking on the AML 
regulation of cryptocurrency service providers.217 The importance of CryptoUK is 
difficult to measure as it is still in its infancy, it boasts over 30 members218 including 
some prominent market participants such as eToro219 and Coinbase.220 A weakness 
of CryptoUK is that is appears to have limited influence, it has been invited to 
discussions with the FCA which is positive,221 but it does not appear to be in 
discussions with government, as demonstrated by its open letter to the Chancellor in 
July 2019.222 A tertiary authority such as CryptoUK could be well-placed to advise 
regulators on a tailored approach to cryptocurrencies, as their members include 
participants in the cryptocurrencies industry. The NCA and the FCA should implement 
the regulation as national authorities, but as part of the joint up approach recommend 
by Irwin and Turner,223 “information sharing between multiple stakeholders from the 
law enforcement, financial intelligence units, cyber security organisations and fintech 
industry”224 is required. CryptoUK could be a valuable link to the cryptocurrency 
industry. 
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Having outlined the relevant authorities with AML responsibilities, the next section 
assesses the reaction of the UK authorities to the money laundering threat posed by 
cryptocurrencies.  
 
5.7. AML Regulation of Cryptocurrencies  
5.7.1. HM Treasury 
The UK Treasury began addressing cryptocurrencies with a call for information225 to 
gather views on digital currencies and subsequent published responses in March 
2015.226 HM Treasury found that while “[a]lmost all respondents to the call for 
information commented that digital currencies can offer a degree of anonymity to 
users,”227 which might be appealing for money laundering, there were differences of 
opinion in relation to the extent of the anonymity afforded to users. On the issue of the 
level of anonymity, some traditional financial institutions characterised 
cryptocurrencies as “anonymous and untraceable,”228 but the submission from user 
and cryptocurrency service providers argued for the term “‘pseudonymous’ rather than 
anonymous.”229 Using the term ‘pseudonymous’ is consistent with FATF guidance 
when assessing the anonymity offered by cryptocurrencies;230 this term is favoured 
due to the publicly available ledger of transactions created by cryptocurrencies, such 
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as Bitcoin, which documents every transaction. The ledger, known as the 
blockchain;231 will include information such as the users’ public Bitcoin addresses, the 
time of the transaction, and the amount. The view that cryptocurrency transactions are 
traceable is supported by the research of Meiklejohn et al,232 who “were able to identify 
1.9 million public keys with some real-world service or identity, although in many cases 
the identity was not a real name, but rather (for example) a username on a forum”233 
and Juhász et al who were able to identify users’ IP addresses from Bitcoin 
transactions.234  
 
HM Treasury reported respondents concerns that “a number of potential criminal 
activities that could take place involving digital currencies.”235 The Silk Road case236 
was given as an example “where digital currencies have been in evidence as a 
payment vehicle, such as the buying and selling of illicit goods and services via online 
marketplaces”237 While there have been high profile cases such as that of Silk Road 
and Liberty Reserve,238 and “there were a number of other illicit activities mentioned 
where respondents considered there to be potential for digital currencies to be 
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used,”239 the respondents to the consultation paper could not provide any evidence of 
such use, or the extent to which such use could be taking place.240 Furthermore, 
“[s]ubmissions mentioned money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion and 
sanctions evasion as possible or likely activities facilitated by the distinctive features 
of digital currencies.”241 
 
Despite the reported appeal for money launderers, the consultation paper also 
identifies a number of disadvantages; such as price volatility and “the need for some 
technical familiarity or expertise.”242 Other factors which were highlighted were low 
numbers of total transactions, when compared to traditional currency, and the 
“relatively small number of individuals and businesses accepting digital currencies as 
payment for goods and services.”243 These factors may reduce the level of flexibility 
for money launderers as their transactions may appear more suspicious in a smaller 
group of transactions and with a reduced pool of businesses to funnel their proceeds 
through. Due to these issues the consultation paper concluded that “serious organised 
money launderers may favour conventional payment methods instead.”244 
 
On the question of regulation, the consultation found the large majority of respondents 
favoured some form of regulation. The call for information received over 80 
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respondents that “on the whole favoured acting using existing frameworks in the short-
term245” due to the potential costs of a bespoke regime and that it may be premature 
to attempt to create a bespoke regime. The argument against a bespoke regime was 
that cryptocurrencies “are still in a very early stage of development and it is difficult to 
predict what direction the technology might go in.”246 
 
As a result of the consultation, and in respect of the appeal of cryptocurrencies to both 
legitimate and illicit purposes, the “government intends to apply anti-money laundering 
regulation to digital currency exchanges.”247 This approach was decided upon due to 
the nascent state of digital currencies in the UK, and while the risk of digital currencies 
was perceived to be low, consumer protection and potential criminal uses must be 
considered.248 The UK Government failed to follow through on its plan to regulate 
cryptocurrency exchanges, the ongoing fallout from the 2016 EU referendum has 
dominated the political agenda. The average number of Acts of Parliament passed per 
year between 2010 to date is 31, compared to 38 from 2000-2009, and 54 per year in 
the 80s and 90s.249 Although legislation was not passed, in 2018 HM Treasury created 
the ‘Cryptoassets Taskforce’250 which has been tasked with setting out the “UK’s policy 
and regulatory approach to cryptoassets and distributed ledger technology in financial 





249 All figures based on data gathered from: Legisaltion.Gov, ‘Your search for UK Public General Acts 
has returned more than 200 results’ < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga> accessed 20 September 
2019. 
250 HM Treasury, ‘Fintech Sector Strategy: Securing the Future of UK Fintech’ (22 March 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
92874/Fintech_Sector_Strategy_print.pdf> accessed 20 September 2019 at p18. 
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services.”251 The UK has adopted the term ‘cryptoassets’ to describe 
“cryptographically secured digital representations of value or contractual rights that 
use some type of distributed ledger technology.”252 The term cryptoassets is 
interchangeable with the term cryptocurrencies, which is used in this research and 
more commonly worldwide.253 The Cryptoassets Taskforce published their final report 
in October 2018.254 
 
The recommendations of the Cryptoassets Taskforce are similar to that of HM 
Treasury in 2015 in response to their call for information,255 but the plans for regulation 
are more detailed. The Cryptoassets Taskforce outline a ‘regulatory perimeter’ to 
determine which cryptocurrencies and related activities are to be covered by the 
regulation of the FCA.256 It was noted that cryptocurrencies can be used to complete 
cross border transactions, and that the cryptocurrency elements of such transactions 
are not regulated,257 which is a concern. With regards to AML measures and 
cryptocurrencies, the most important conclusion from the Cryptoassets Taskforce is 
that the “government will bring fiat-to-cryptoasset exchange firms and custodian wallet 
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providers within the scope of AML/CTF regulation, as required by [the 5th Money Anti-
Laundering Directive].”258 By implementing the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive259 
the UK will also be compliant with the guidance issued by the FATF.260 
 
5.7.2. Financial Conduct Authority 
The FCA does not currently supervise cryptocurrency service providers, their website 
is explicitly clear on this point:  
Exchange tokens (such as Bitcoin and ‘cryptocurrency’ equivalents) are not 
currently regulated in the UK. This means that the transfer, purchase and sale 
of exchange tokens, including the operation of exchange token exchanges, all 
currently fall outside our regulatory remit.261 
This position is repeated in the FCA’s response to the 2019 Cryptoassets Taskforce 
consultation on the regulation of cryptocurrencies.262 The consultation found that 
almost all respondents agreed that cryptocurrencies were outside of the regulatory 
perimeter,263 but only a third of respondents said that regulation should be imposed.264 
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In March 2019 the FCA published research into UK consumers’ use of 
cryptocurrencies.265 It was not focussed on financial crime, but the findings were 
concerning when viewed from an AML perspective. The headline findings were that 
users were buying cryptocurrencies based on limited information, often influenced by 
a rejection of mainstream media, a fear of missing out on trends, and seeking to ‘get 
rich quick’. 266 The report stated that a “typical journey to purchasing cryptoassets for 
these respondents was based on a suggestion by a single acquaintance, or a 
persuasive online source relaying the large sums of money to be made.”267 This 
creates favourable conditions for fraudsters and those seeking unsuspecting money 
mules. If consumers are poorly informed then they are more likely to make poor 
financial choices, and the numbers of individuals being used as money mules is 
increasing both in young people268 and older people.269 The FCA report found that 
users would be more influenced by online sources rather than mainstream media, 
which means these users will be in areas of the internet completely free from 
regulatory scrutiny, which puts them at risk of being persuaded or duped into assisting 
with money laundering.  
 
The FCA is now the principal regulator of cryptocurrency service providers since the 
implementation of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive,270 it is therefore required 
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to enforce compliance with AML regulation. The guidance provided by the FCA shows 
the UK is going beyond the minimum requirements of the EU directive. The 5th Anti-
Money Laundering Directive requires businesses which exchange between 
cryptocurrency and fiat currency to be regulated, whereas the FCA also includes 
businesses which exchange cryptocurrency for other cryptocurrencies. It is currently 
unclear how the FCA plans implement regulation of cryptocurrency service providers, 
it is yet to determine how regulation will be tailored to apply to such businesses. The 
issue of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has been addressed by the FCA and the 
Cryptoassets Taskforce, the current position is that the UK will continue to implement 
EU Law.271 “Obligations derived from EU law will continue to apply and firms must 
continue with implementation plans for EU legislation”272 while the UK remains a 
member of the EU, and during any transitional period.273 The initial consultation was 
conducted while Theresa May was Prime Minister, but no clear or predictable changes 
have occurred since Boris Johnson became Prime Minister. The response to the 
consultation on the transposition of the Directive was published in January 2020, and 
made clear that while the UK is leaving the EU, it would still apply EU law during the 
implementation period of the UK withdrawal.274 The consultation also states that the 
UK remains committed to implementing the standards of the FATF, which are of an 
equal standard to the EU measures. 
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5.7.3. National Crime Agency 
Based on the NCA’s website it is not clear how it views the money laundering threat 
of cryptocurrencies. However, in the response to the government’s ‘Digital currencies: 
call for information’ the NCA suggested that the “predominant criminal use of such 
currencies was on online marketplaces for the sale and purchase of illicit goods and 
services.”275 The NCA’s initial assessment was that “digital currencies had not been 
widely adopted as a means of payment for goods and services in the broader criminal 
community.”276 Additionally the NCA observed that the “scale of the threat was difficult 
to assess, but said that there was little evidence to indicate use by established money 
laundering specialists or that digital currencies played a role in terrorist financing.”277 
In making this judgement, the NCA considered that the “majority of illicit digital 
currency spends were for low-value transactions.”278 This assessment by the NCA 
could be viewed as a fair at the time it was made, but the value of cryptocurrencies 
has increased since, Bitcoin reached a record high of $19,447 in December 2017.279  
 
The NCA does consider cryptocurrencies as a crime threat, but is does so among its 
cybercrime activities, rather than money laundering.280 The focus of the NCA’s 
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cryptocurrency concerns appear to be focussed on ‘cryptojacking’,281 which refers to 
the practice of using malware to use a victim’s computer to mine cryptocurrency for 
the malware creator.282 
 
Although money laundering through cryptocurrencies is not a publicised priority of the 
NCA, it has recently assisted in the conviction of Thomas White, for running a $100m 
dark web business selling drugs and indecent images of children.283 White was 
convicted of multiple offences, including money laundering, and was sentenced to 5 
year and 4 months. It not possible to infer how the use of cryptocurrency affected 
White’s sentence, but it is in-line with the typical length of sentence the NCA 
investigations have led to. Despite the NCA’s opinion of a minimal threat existing, it is 
worth noting the principles of its approach, which are to pursue, prevent, and prepare 
against serious organised crime in the UK,284 and the conviction of White 
demonstrates that the NCA will not ignore cryptocurrency money laundering. 
Therefore, in relation to protecting and preparing, the NCA should remain watchful of 
cryptocurrencies, especially if they become more widely used, as they may require 
more attention.285  
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5.8. Compliance with Financial Action Task Force Guidance 
In light of the 2019 Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers286 issued by the FATF, the level to which the UK is compliant 
must be assessed. The UK is currently not compliant with the latest guidance from the 
FATF, as it currently does not regulate cryptocurrency service providers, but it is 
partially compliant as it is assessing the risks posed by cryptocurrencies. 
 
The FATF guidance addresses how its members can apply the Recommendations to 
what it describes as ‘virtual assets’ and ‘virtual asset service providers’. Virtual assets 
(VAs) are defined as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or 
transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes.”287 This definition is 
wide and includes cryptocurrencies, the FATF guidance “focuses on VAs that are 
convertible for other funds or value, including both VAs that are convertible to another 
VA and VAs that are convertible to fiat or that intersect with the fiat financial system,”288 
which demonstrates a clear targeting of cryptocurrencies. Virtual asset service 
providers (VASPs) are defined as any natural or legal person providing financial 
services relating to VAs, which includes exchanging between VAs and fiat currencies 
or other forms of VAs, transferring virtual assets or providing mechanisms for the 
storage of VAs, or providing a market for buying and selling VAs.289 
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In relation to Recommendation 1, members should conduct risk assessments of VAs 
and VASPs in their jurisdiction. The UK has been assessing the risks posed by 
cryptocurrencies since 2015 through public consultation,290 and the most recent 
publications from the Cryptoassets Taskforce provide definitions and understanding 
of how the types of “VA products and services function, fit into, and affect all relevant 
regulatory jurisdictions for AML/CFT purposes”.291 This satisfies part of the FATF 
guidance on the implementation of Recommendation 1 in relation to cryptocurrencies 
but there is a lack of clarity to the treatment of VAs, so the UK does not "promote 
similar AML/CFT treatment for similar products and services with similar risk 
profiles.”292 The UK needs to provide clear guidance on the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies in order to fully comply with the FATF guidance. 
 
FATF guidance on Recommendations 3-7 require legislation relating to money 
laundering offences, confiscation and asset freezing to consider “all funds or value-
based terms in the Recommendations, such as “property,” “proceeds,” “funds,” “funds 
or other assets,” and other “corresponding value,” as including VAs.”293 The UK is 
compliant with this guidance, as has been demonstrated through successful 
convictions for money laundering offences,294 and successful conversion of 
cryptocurrency assets295 where confiscation has been possible. From the successful 
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convictions it appears that the UK will not need to legislate in order to comply with 
FATF guidance. 
 
The UK is technically compliant with FATF guidance on the regulation of 
cryptocurrency service providers. “Countries should designate one or more authorities 
that have responsibility for licensing and/or registering VASPs.”296 The UK has 
designated the FCA as this authority, but the FCA are yet to implement any regulation. 
Cryptocurrency exchanges and service providers are required to register with the FCA, 
which is compliant with FATF guidance in relation to applying Recommendation 14 to 
VASPs,297 and in applying Recommendation 15 with regard to new technologies.298 
 
When the FCA does apply AML regulation to cryptocurrency service providers it will 
need to ensure CDD processes are completed by newly regulated entities299 to the 
same standards as the entities that are currently regulated. 300 As well as complying 
with CDD requirements, cryptocurrency service providers should become part of the 
UK’s SARs regime,301 share information with the NCA as the FIU,302 and have 
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adequate risk management systems.303 The FATF recommend that particular 
attention must be paid to the pseudonymous nature of cryptocurrencies, the lack of a 
physical meeting with the customer, and payments from unidentified third parties.304 
The FATF guidance in unclear as to how these issues should be addressed, but it is 
clear that they raise the level of risk associated with such transactions.305 The FATF 
is clear that people who manage cryptocurrency service providers should not be 
criminals, thus should be required to be qualified people.306 
 
The FATF provides guidance as to how the FCA can adapt its supervision for 
cryptocurrency service providers, and such guidance is applicable to all regulated 
institutions. One example of adjustments suggested is employing “both offsite and 
onsite access to all relevant risk and compliance information”,307 but that offsite alone 
is not “appropriate in higher risk situations.”308 Additionally a varied frequency and 
nature of the supervision is suggested, using “periodic reviews and ad hoc AML/CFT 
supervision as issues emerge.”309 Finally, the FATF recommend adjusting the intensity 
of AML supervision to correlate with the level of risk identified with the regulated 
entity.310 The suggestions from the FATF are applicable to all regulated entities, and 
the guidance demonstrates the FATF recommend a proportionate response, in line 
with the risk based approach, and not a one size fits all approach to cryptocurrencies. 
As part of a risk based approach the FATF recommends that supervisors increase 
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their understanding of cryptocurrencies and the related businesses to better inform 
their risk assessments.311 Through the Cryptoassets Taskforce and the research 
published by the FCA,312 the UK is clearly developing its understanding of 
cryptocurrencies, but further development will require investment in training and IT 
capabilities, which have been identified as deficiencies in the UKFIU by the FATF.313  
 
The FATF is also clear that Recommendation 33 is implemented through the 
regulation of cryptocurrencies, requiring record keeping and that statistics are 
maintained.314 This is in keeping with the collection of financial intelligence, meaning 
the FIU will have the appropriate data to be able to better determine what transactions 
are suspicious and require investigation. 
 
In assessing the UK’s compliance with the FATF guidance, it is clear that the UK’s 
criminal offences are compliant with the FATF guidance, as the money laundering 
offences are not avoided by using cryptocurrencies; this is demonstrated by successful 
prosecutions. The UK is becoming compliant in Recommendations relating to 
supervision of VASPs, this will be addressed fully by 2021, as this is the deadline for 
VASPs to register with the FCA under the amended 2017 Money Laundering 
Regulations. Widening the regulatory perimeter is required, and has been promised 
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by both the Cryptoassets Taskforce and the FCA, but as the implementation is not yet 
in effect it cannot be judged. While a welcome step, the widening of the regulatory 
perimeter is limited as it applies existing AML measures to cryptocurrencies, rather 
than developing a tailored approach.  
 
5.9. Summary  
This chapter has identified that UK money laundering offences are future proofed with 
regard to cryptocurrencies, because the drafting of the criminal law is clearly wide 
enough for the offences to be satisfied if criminals use cryptocurrencies. The money 
laundering convictions obtained demonstrate a sentencing policy which is consistent 
with cases not involving cryptocurrencies, but the limited number of cases and multi-
offence nature of the convictions means it is not possible to draw clear conclusions or 
identify any trends. The convictions prove that money laundering using 
cryptocurrencies is taking place, but the extent is unclear. Seizing cryptocurrencies 
presents a further complication to more traditional money laundering techniques, and 
where cryptocurrencies have been successfully seized, the length of time from seizure 
to converting the assets into fiat currencies could lead to law enforcement agencies 
facing a lottery as to what they eventually recover due to fluctuating values. 
 
With regards to the preventative measures, cryptocurrencies are not yet subject to 
AML regulations in the UK. The UK has a developed AML approach, keeping pace 
with international standards since first creating money laundering offences in the 
1980s. The UK has a recognised FIU in the form of the NCA, which receives all SARs, 
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but this authority has been identified as having “a lack of available resources”315 by 
the FATF, in terms of personnel, technology, and “analytical capability”.316 These 
weaknesses are of particular concern given the threat posed by cryptocurrencies, and 
will require investment as identified by the FATF in its 2019 guidance.317 The 
Cryptoassets Taskforce has been charged with addressing the threats posed by 
cryptocurrencies, of which money laundering has been identified as a concern and the 
FCA has been determined as the appropriate authority to regulate cryptocurrency 
service providers. The FCA is the principal regulator of the UK financial services sector 
and is responsible for enforcing compliance with AML legislation, but has repeatedly 
stated that is does not currently regulate cryptocurrencies. The FCA will be required 
to regulate cryptocurrency service providers for AML purposes, in accordance with the 
EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, but it remains to be seen how the FCA will 
implement such regulation. The future regulation of cryptocurrencies in the UK 
remains unclear as the FCA has only published guidance on which businesses need 
to register with it, it is reasonable to predict that cryptocurrency service providers will 
be required to adhere to CDD and reporting requirements, as this is the level of 
regulation required by the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 
 
The next chapters will consider the approach of the United States of America and 
Australia, as cryptocurrency service providers are already subject to AML regulation 
                                                     
315 FATF, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, Fourth 
Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, December 2018) <fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 
2019 at para 6. 
316 ibid. 
317 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019 para 144. 
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in these jurisdictions. This is overseen by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) in the US and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC) in Australia. The responses of the US and Australia will be used to provide 






Chapter 6. United States of America 
6.1. Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, the applicability of the Unites States of America’s (US) money 
laundering offences and preventative measures to cryptocurrencies will be assessed. 
Firstly, the money laundering offences will be outlined, and it will be considered 
whether or not it is possible to commit these offences using cryptocurrencies. It will be 
seen that the criteria of US money laundering offences will still be met where 
cryptocurrencies are used to process the proceeds of crime. Secondly, the preventive 
measures will be assessed; the US anti-money laundering (AML) regime will be 
analysed, and it will be seen whether or not these preventive measures apply to 
cryptocurrency transactions, and cryptocurrency businesses. In light of regulator 
guidance, cryptocurrency users are not required to adhere AML requirements, but 
those operating as a business, especially operating exchanges, are required to meet 
the same standard as ‘money services businesses’.1 After analysing the legislation, 
the various authorities will also be considered, first in terms of their role in the AML 
regime, and then considering how the relevant authorities are addressing 
cryptocurrencies. Having analysed the legislation and authorities, the response of the 
US will be assessed against the guidance of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
issued in 2019. 
 
                                                     
1 FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using 
Virtual Currencies’ <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 
04 September 2019. 
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6.2. AML Approach 
Tomas and Roppolo2 split US AML legislation into two categories; criminal law and the 
implementing of regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act 1970 (BSA). This is a split, 
which is consistent with both the UK and Australia; money laundering is pursued 
through criminalising money laundering and implementing preventative measures 
which regulated entities must comply with.  
 
6.3. Criminalising Money Laundering 
US money laundering offences are codified under Title 18 of the United State Code 
§§1956-1957, which were introduced by the Money Laundering Control Act 1986.3 
Section 1956 contains three offences; money laundering, international money 
laundering, and laundering money activity using money purported to be criminal 
proceeds. The third offence will only apply in government sting operations; such 
operations are also able to secure convictions for international money laundering. 
§1957 contains a further money laundering offence, which criminalises “spending or 
depositing tainted money.”4 
 
                                                     
2 J. P. Thomas and W. V. Roppolo, ‘United States of America’ in A. Srivastava, M. Simpson and N. 
Moffat, International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (Bloomsbury, 2013) at 41.20. 
3 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18. 
4 Federation of American Scientists, ‘Congress Research Service: Money Laundering: An Overview of 
18 USC 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law’ <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33315.pdf> 
accessed 11 December 2015. 
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6.3.1. §1956 - Laundering of monetary instruments 
The actus reus of the money laundering offence is conducting, or attempting to 
conduct, “a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity.”5 The mens rea of the offence is the knowledge and intent of the 
individual; “knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,”6 and intending to promote the “carrying 
on of specified unlawful activity;”7 evade tax;8 avoid reporting requirements;9 or hide 
the ownership of the property.10 In hiding the ownership, the intent must be to “conceal 
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”11 This is a broad drafting of the law, which is 
required so as to encompass the broad nature of money laundering.  
 
A separate offence exists in §1956(a)(2), which is committed if a person moves “a 
monetary instrument or funds”12 either from inside the US to outside the US, or from 
outside the US to inside the US. The mens rea of the international money laundering 
offence has a lower threshold than the §1956(a)(1) offence, as there is no requirement 
to know that the monetary instrument or funds are the proceeds of crime. The intent 
of the transaction is the same as in §1956(a)(1), but with the omission of the tax 
evasion criterion. With regard to the intent of the defendant, emphasis is placed on 
their understanding of the money involved; the money may be legitimate money, which 
                                                     
5 18 USC §1956(a)(1). 
6 ibid. 
7 18 USC §1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 
8 18 USC §1956(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
9 18 USC §1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
10 18 USC §1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 
11 ibid. 
12 18 USC §1956(a)(2). 
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is used in a sting operation. The knowledge of the defendant “may be established by 
proof that a law enforcement officer represented”13 the proceeds of a specified 
unlawful activity, and “the defendant believed such representations to be true.”14 As 
with the §1956(a)(1) offence, the defendant must intend to “conceal or disguise the 
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of” the criminal proceeds.  
 
The third money laundering offence in §1956 is designed to allow for government sting 
operations; it removes the requirement for a ‘specified unlawful activity’ as this would 
not have taken place if the money came from a law enforcement agency. The 
knowledge requirement for this offence is slightly different to that of the first two 
offences; the prosecutor must show that the offender believed the “representation 
made by a law enforcement officer.”15 The financial transaction element of the actus 
reus is the same as §1956(a)(1), therefore, for the offence to be committed using 
cryptocurrencies, the definition of a financial transaction needs to be satisfied. The 
mens rea of the offence, as with §1956(a)(1)-(2), requires the individual to intend to 
“conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of”16 the 
proceeds in question. 
 
The first two offences are very similar, but there are two key distinctions; firstly, 
§1956(a)(1) does not define where the activity must take place, whereas §1956(a)(2) 
states that the offence must involve a transaction passing in or out of the United States. 
                                                     
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 18 USC §1956(a)(3)(C). 
16 18 USC §1956(a)(3)(B). 
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Secondly §1956(a)(2) uses the terms “monetary instrument or funds,”17 which differs 
from the term “financial transaction”18 used in §1956(a)(1). The third offence has the 
same requirements and §1956(a)(1), but the proceeds do not need to be from a 
specified unlawful activity. For cryptocurrencies to be used to satisfy §1956(a)(1) and 
(3), the term “financial transaction”19 needs to be defined, and for §1956(a)(2) to apply, 
“monetary instrument or funds”20 must be defined; cryptocurrencies must satisfy these 
definitions in order for the offences to be committed using cryptocurrencies. If 
cryptocurrencies satisfy the definition, then they must be the proceeds of an ‘unlawful 
activity’. There must be knowledge that the proceeds involved represented such 
proceeds, and intent to “conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, 
or control”21 of the proceeds. 
 
The conviction of Ross Ulbricht confirms that the use of cryptocurrency can satisfy 
§1956. Ulbricht created and operated Silk Road, a website which facilitated the trading 
of illegal items such as drugs,22 and was only accessible using a Tor browser which 
provided anonymity to users.23 Among the offences Ulbricht was found guilty of, §1956 
received special attention from the court, specifically whether transactions in Bitcoin 
satisfied the term financial transaction. The court concluded that the “money 
laundering statute is broad enough to encompass use of Bitcoins in financial 
                                                     
17 18 USC §1956(a)(2). 
18 18 USC §1956(a)(1). 
19 ibid. 
20 18 USC §1956(a)(2). 
21 18 USC §1956(a)(1)-(3). 
22 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York, ‘Ross Ulbricht, A/K/A 
“Dread Pirate Roberts,” Sentenced In Manhattan Federal Court To Life In Prison’ (Manhattan, New 
York, 29 May 2015) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ross-ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-
sentenced-manhattan-federal-court-life-prison> accessed 05 September 2019. 
23 BBC News, ‘Silk Road drug website founder Ross Ulbricht jailed’ (30 May 2015) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32941060> accessed 05 September 2019. 
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transactions.”24 Ulbricht is not the only individual to be convicted for money laundering 
using cryptocurrencies, numerous convictions have been announced through press 
releases from the Department of Justice. Cases vary in complexity and value, just as 
all criminal cases will, from an international gang being investigated for 18 months,25 
to a one-man operation of a much smaller scale.26 The prosecutions for money 
laundering using cryptocurrencies demonstrate that §1956 does not need reform, as 
cryptocurrency transactions clearly satisfy the widely drafted criminal offences. 
 
6.3.2. §1957: Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from 
specified unlawful activity 
A further money laundering offence is contained in 18 USC §1957; this offence 
criminalises “spending or depositing tainted money.”27 The offence requires an 
individual to “engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value 
greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.”28 The wording of 
§1957(a) is similar to §1956(a)(2) in that it requires a “monetary transaction,”29 rather 
than a financial transaction. However, the definition provided in §1957(a)(1) makes it 
clear that this can be satisfied by anything constituting a financial transaction, in 
                                                     
24 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2017) at 570. 
25 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Washington, ‘Multi-State 
International Drug Trafficking Organization Targeted in 18-Month Investigation’ (Washington, United 
States, 6 December 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/multi-state-international-drug-
trafficking-organization-targeted-18-month-investigation> accessed 04 September 2019. 
26 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Central District of California, ‘“Bitcoin Maven” 
Sentenced to One Year in Federal Prison in Bitcoin Money Laundering Case’ 
<https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/bitcoin-maven-sentenced-one-year-federal-prison-bitcoin-
money-laundering-case> accessed 04 September 2019. 
27 Federation of American Scientists, ‘Congress Research Service: Money Laundering: An Overview 
of 18 USC 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law’ <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33315.pdf> 
accessed 11 December 2015. 
28 18 USC §1957(a). 
29 ibid. 
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§1956(a)(1). As with the §1956 offences the offender does not need to know the 
specific origin of the money, but the §1957 offence is easier for the prosecution to 
obtain a conviction, as the prosecution do not need to “prove the defendant knew that 
the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified 
unlawful activity.”30 Case law31 has shown that the prosecution only have to 
demonstrate that the offender knew they were “receiving ‘dirty’ money, regardless of 
whether [they] knew the specific source.”32 The §1957 offence is equally applicable to 
cryptocurrencies as §1956. 
 
6.3.3. Financial Transaction 
A financial transaction has a wide definition in §1956(c)(4), it includes “the movement 
of funds by wire or other means”,33 and can include the transfer of “any real property, 
vehicle, vessel, or aircraft”.34 ‘Transaction’ also has a broad definition in §1956(c)(3), 
including “a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition”.35 
These definitions are wide, so as to allow for the vast array of mechanisms by which 
the proceeds of crime may be moved; as such this is not difficult to satisfy. The 
difficulties that may arise in relation to cryptocurrencies will be whether sending 
cryptocurrencies constitutes a financial transaction, or even a transaction at all. Given 
the already very broad definitions, it is likely that for the purposes of a money 
laundering offence, a cryptocurrency transfer will be considered to satisfy “a 
                                                     
30 18 USC §1957(c). 
31 See USA vs Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 8th Cir.1998. 
32 L. Low et al, ‘Country Report: The US Anti-Money Laundering System’ in M. Pieth and G. Aiolfi, A 
Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, 2004) at p360. 
33 18 USC §1956(c)(4). 
34 ibid. 
35 18 USC §1956(c)(3). 
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transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce […] 
involving the movement of funds by wire or other means.”36 The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) has declared that for taxation purposes, virtual currencies are property, 
not currency;37 but US money laundering law makes it clear that the buying, selling or 
otherwise transferring of property other than currency, can still constitute money 
laundering.38 Therefore, converting illicit funds into cryptocurrency and transferring 
that cryptocurrency will satisfy the transaction requirement of the money laundering 
offence. In USA v Ulbricht39 it was reasoned that there “is no doubt that if a narcotics 
transaction was paid for in cash, which was later exchanged for gold, and then 
converted back to cash, that would constitute a money laundering transaction”,40 and 
by the same virtue, an individual “can money launder using Bitcoin”.41 
 
6.3.4. Specified Unlawful Activity 
Money laundering can only take place with illicit funds, if the funds are legitimate then 
no money laundering can take place. US law states that in order for an offence of 
money laundering to be committed, the funds must be the proceeds of a “specified 
unlawful activity;”42 a list of such activities is found in §1956(c)(7). While the list of 
domestic offences under §1956(c)(7) is very wide as the US will have full jurisdiction 
to declare which of its own criminal offences satisfy US money laundering offences, 
the list of foreign offences is shorter. The foreign, or international, offences are found 
                                                     
36 18 USC §1956(c)(4). 
37 Inland Revenue Service, ‘Notice 2014-21’ <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf> accessed 
17 December 2015. 
38 The §1956 offences refer to ‘property’ rather than currency. 
39 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2017). 
40 ibid at 570. 
41 ibid at 570. 
42 18 USC §1956(a)(1) and 18 USC §1956(a)(2)(A). 
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at §1956(c)(7)(D); as stated, the list is shorter than that of the domestic offences, but 
it is still a broad list. When first enacted the list only contained offences “involving a 
controlled substance abuse, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, destruction of property by 
means of explosive or fire, a crime of violence or bank fraud”43 
 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict, 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 200144 (PATRIOT Act 2001) extends the list 
of foreign offences. The list currently includes destruction of aircraft, bribery, 
smuggling, embezzlement, child pornography, and even copyright.45 Low, et al, have 
observed that where the offences committed are not included on the list, a prosecution 
can still be obtained “by ‘boot-strapping’ them onto domestic”46 specified unlawful 
activities, this is demonstrated by USA v Trapilo.47 Wire fraud is an offence that may 
be used for this, as the money will be part of a domestic offence via the transaction.48 
The requirement for a specified unlawful activity is unaffected by the use of 
cryptocurrencies. 
 
6.3.5. Knowledge that the property involved represented the proceeds of crime 
Knowledge must be present in order for money laundering offences to apply; the 
offender must act know that the property “represents the proceeds of some form of 
unlawful activity.”49 With regard to this, the offender does not need to have knowledge 
                                                     
43 cf Low et al (n32) at p353. 
44 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 
45 18 USC §1956(c)(7)(D). 
46 cf Low et al (n32) at p353. 
47 130 F.3d 547. 2nd Cir. 1997 
48 cf Low et al (n32) at p353. 
49 18 USC §1956(a)(1) and 18 USC §1956(a)(2)(B). 
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of the ‘specified unlawful activity’ the property resulted from. All that is required is that 
the offender knows the relevant property came from an “activity that constitutes a 
felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity 
is specified in paragraph (7).”50 As with the previous elements of the money laundering 
offences, this is drafted relatively widely, the offender does need to know that the 
money came from a ‘specified unlawful activity’, it only matters that it came from some 
form of criminal activity. Low et al, note how this element of the offence has been 
interpreted in the courts, stating that although knowledge is required by legislation, 
examples of ‘wilful blindness’51 have been accepted as satisfying the knowledge 
requirement.52 The move from actual knowledge to wilful blindness is observed by Von 
Kaenel, as being judge led;53 the legislation still requires knowledge, but the threshold 
for this has been lowered through case law, stemming from United States v Jewell54 
in 1976. 
 
The knowledge element of the offence would be no different if the offender was to use 
cryptocurrency; the knowledge requirements are independent of the mechanism by 
which the money is laundered. One potential difference would be that it might be more 
plausible to deny knowledge of origins of the funds if they are being transferred using 
a crypto-currency, as the identity of the parties to a transaction may not be revealed 
to each other. This may be a test of the ‘wilful blindness’ standard; whether a defendant 
be able to successfully argue that they did not know the identity of the person they 
                                                     
50 18 USC §1956(c)(1). 
51 See USA vs Campbell, 997 F.2d 854, 857. 4th Cir 1992. 
52 cf Low et al (n32) at p355. 
53 F. J. Von Kaenel ‘Wilful Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge under the Money 
Laundering Control Act?’ (1993) 71 Wash ULQ 1189 at 1202. 
54 United States v Jewell 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.1976). 
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were dealing with, without attracting questions as to why they would deal with 
someone they do not know. Such considerations are currently speculative, the 
principle may be tested in the courts in the future. 
 
6.3.6. Sentences 
The three money laundering offences in §1956 each carry maximum sentences of 
twenty years; the domestic and international offences may also be punished by a fine, 
this may be up to “$500,000 or twice the value”55 of the funds involved. The §1957 
offence has a lower level fine; $250,000 for an individual,56 or $500,000 for an 
organisation.57 Examples of convictions include a 20 year sentence for drug trafficking 
and money laundering,58 a forfeiture of $1,000,000 and a 5 year probationary sentence 
for structuring transactions to the value of $2.9million,59 and a 30 year sentence for 
leading an international money laundering operation valued at over $250million.60 It 
can be seen that structuring payments alone will be treated less severely than 
instances where drug trafficking is involved, or the complexity of the money laundering 
operation is high, particularly international schemes. Money laundering using 
cryptocurrencies will add complexity to the scheme, but will not immediately lead to a 
long sentence, a small-scale cryptocurrency money laundering operation has been 
                                                     
55 18 USC §1956(a)(1) and (2). 
56 18 USC § 3571(b)(3). 
57 18 USC § 3571(c)(3). 
58 S Parks, ‘Houston Man Sentenced for Federal Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Violations’ 
(DEA, 17 May 2019)<https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2019/05/17/houston-man-sentenced-
federal-drug-trafficking-and-money-laundering> accessed 06 August 2019,  
59 K Korte, ‘Postal Annex Owner Sentenced for Structuring Currency Transactions’ (DEA, 11 
September 2018) <https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2018/09/11/postal-annex-owner-sentenced-
structuring-currency-transactions> accessed 06 August 2019. 
60 S A K Mori ‘Leader of International Drug Money Laundering Organization Sentenced to 30 Years in 
Prison’ (DEA, 14 August 2018) <https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2018/08/14/leader-international-
drug-money-laundering-organization-sentenced-30> accessed 06 August 2019. 
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punished with a one-year sentence.61 However, as shown by the Ulbricht case, much 
longer sentences will be imposed where the money laundering is complex and 
connected to multiple offences.62 The criminal offences in the UK are equally 
applicable to those in the US, as demonstrated by the convictions in recent years,63 
but the prison sentences in UK cases have been shorter than in the US. Given that 
the US criminal offences clearly apply, attention must turn to preventative measures 
to analyse how the money laundering threat posed by cryptocurrencies is being 
combatted.  
 
6.4. Preventative measures  
Preventative measures can be divided into two categories, reporting requirements and 
customer due diligence. The US implements currency transaction reports (CTRs) and 
suspicious activity reports (SARs) as part of its reporting requirements, and customer 
due diligence is covered through know your customer (KYC) protocols. The two broad 
categories of AML measures interrelate, for example, a reporting entity is much better 
informed in deciding whether to submit a SAR if it has effective KYC provisions in 
                                                     
61 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Central District of California, ‘“Bitcoin Maven” 
Sentenced to One Year in Federal Prison in Bitcoin Money Laundering Case’ 
<https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/bitcoin-maven-sentenced-one-year-federal-prison-bitcoin-
money-laundering-case> accessed 04 September 2019. 
62 BBC News, ‘Silk Road drug website founder Ross Ulbricht jailed’ (30 May 2015) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32941060> accessed 05 September 2019. 
63 Example discussed in chapter five at 5.3.1. including: R v Teresko [2018] Crim LR 81, Crown 
Prosecution Service, ‘More than £1.2million of Bitcoin seized from drug dealer’ (19 July 2018) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/south-east/news/more-ps12-million-bitcoin-seized-drug-dealer> accessed 11 
September 2019 and BBC News, ‘Liverpool 'dropout' jailed for Silk Road dark web site’ (12 April 
2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-47913780> accessed 11 September 
2019 and National Crime Agency, ‘Student behind $100m dark web site jailed for 5 years 4 months’ 
(12 April 2019) <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/student-behind-100m-dark-web-site-




place. With regards to cryptocurrencies, the types of service providers that the 
preventative measures apply to will be of particular importance, as anti-money 
laundering regulations are applicable to cryptocurrency exchanges. The Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance in 2013 on the application of 
its rules, making clear that while a regular user will not be subject to FinCEN 
regulation,64 exchanges and administrators would be money services businesses, and 
would need to comply with FinCEN regulation.65  
 
6.4.1. Currency Transaction Reports 
Financial institutions are required to report each transaction of more than $10,000.66 
This requirement applies to single transactions, or to a number of transactions which 
aggregate total is over the value of $10,000.67 Transactions are defined broadly, 
including purchases of “chips, tokens, and other gaming instruments”,68 payments on 
“any form of credit”,69 and currency exchanges.70 A financial institution may be defined 
under the BSA 1970,71 but the reporting requirement is determined based on the 
transaction rather than the institution as determined by FinCEN and the IRS.72 The 
advice of FinCEN and the IRS is that “[e]ach person engaged in a trade or business 
who, in the course of that trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in cash in 
                                                     
64 FinCEN, ‘Guidance - FIN-2013-G001 - Issued: March 18, 2013 - Subject: Application of FinCEN’s 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 06 August 2019 
at p2. 
65 ibid. 
66 31 CFR §103.22(b)(1). 
67 31 CFR §103.22(c). 
68 31 CFR §103.22(b)(1)(i)(A). 
69 31 CFR §103.22(b)(1)(i)(D). 
70 31 CFR §103.22(b)(1)(i)(H). 
71 Codified at 31 U.S. Code § 5312. 
72 IRS, ‘IRS/FinCEN Form 8300’ <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8300.pdf> accessed 15 October 
2019. 
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one transaction or in two or more related transactions”73 must report. Related 
transactions are transaction “conducted in a 24-hour period,”74 but transactions more 
than 24 hours apart may still be deemed related if “the recipient knows, or has reason 
to know, that each transaction is one of a series of connected transactions.”75  
 
A cryptocurrency transaction, like any transaction, will vary in size; freedom to contract 
and the wide range of reasons to transact mean that the values being transferred will 
differ. However, a factor that is particular to cryptocurrencies, is that the value of 
transaction may also vary from day to day due to the fluctuations in the 
cryptocurrency’s value against the US Dollar.76 
 
                                                     
73 ibid at p.3. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid.  
76 Cryptocurrency value changes are discussed in chapter three at 3.3. 
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Figure 7. Bitcoin Value in US Dollars in 201877 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the generally downward trend in Bitcoin’s value over 2018 but at a 
much greater rate than in established fiat currencies. The graph shows values from 
the beginning of each month in 2018, but values also fluctuated wildly in short periods, 
which could present some practical difficulties for submitting CTRs. On 7th January the 
value of bitcoin was $17,102.88,78 so any transaction over 0.59 Bitcoin would need to 
be reported, but by 18th January the value of Bitcoin is $11,169.6479 so transactions 
over 0.90 Bitcoin would need to be reported. The value of Bitcoin dropped over the 
course of 2018 and by 1st January 2019, a CTR would be required for a transaction of 
more 27.12 Bitcoin. While it is simple enough for a business to keep track of the value 
of Bitcoin, it becomes more complicated once other cryptocurrencies are considered, 
                                                     
77 Complied using date from: XE, ‘XE Currency Table: XBT - Bitcoin’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=XBT&date=2019-01-01> accessed 07 August 2019. 
78 XE, ‘USD per 1 XBT’ <https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=USD&view=2Y> 
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of which over 2000 exist.80 The requirement of cryptocurrency businesses to submit 
CTRs to FinCEN presents a practical challenge for the regulated entities in keeping 
track of mandatory reports, but also upon FinCEN in monitoring compliance. 
 
Annual CTR submission statistics are not available, but in 2016 the FATF mutual 
evaluation report stated that the average number of CTRs per year was 15,283,950. 
Requiring cryptocurrency businesses to submit CTRs will obviously lead to an 
increase in CTRs. It is difficult to claim that FinCEN are able to devote adequate 
attention to each and every CTR, and with numbers set to increase it will lead to the 
gathering of ever more data, but not necessarily intelligence. The UK does not 
implement mandatory threshold transaction reporting, and this research does not 
advocate the UK adopting such reporting standards. The FATF has identified that the 
NCA (the UKFIU) is already under resourced with the existing volume of SARs,81 
introducing further reports would not assist the NCA.  
  
6.4.2. Suspicious Activity Reports  
The BSA 1970 introduced SARs in the US, and initially only required banks and money 
services businesses to report.82 §103.18-20 set out the criteria for when a bank or 
relevant business should report a transaction. This has since been widened by the 
PATRIOT Act 2001 to include all Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) registered 
                                                     
80 CoinMarketCap list 2310 currencies on its ‘All Cryptocurrencies’ page: CoinMarketCap, ‘All 
Cryptocurrencies’ < https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/> accessed 08 August 2019. 
81 FATF, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, December 2018) <fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 
2019 at para 6. 
82 31 CFR §§103.18-20 (2002). 
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brokers and dealers.83 It as has also been extended to casinos by FinCEN,84 and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has applied it to futures commission 
merchants, commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators.85 The wording 
of the criteria differs slightly in each of the sections of the BSA 1970, but the meanings 
are the same as those found at §103.18(a)(2).86 A regulated entity must report any 
transaction over $5,000 which is suspected to be from “illegal activities”87 or “assets 
derived from illegal activities”,88 to evade the BSA 1970,89 or has no “apparent lawful 
purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected 
to engage”90 in. 
 
The only material difference in the law regarding the relevant types of entities is that 
money services businesses are required to report a suspicious transaction if it 
“involves or aggregates funds or other assets of at least $2,000.”91 As with the CTRs 
the value of the transaction in cryptocurrency would need to be calculated against the 
$2,000 threshold before the entity reports.  
 
The term ‘suspicious’ is also used by the UK when determining when a report is 
required, where it has caused confusion in determining when a report is necessary, as 
discussed in chapter five, at 5.4.2. Suspicion remains undefined in the US, as 
                                                     
83 Pub. L. No. 107-56, §356(a). 
84 67 Fed. Reg. 60722 (2002). 
85 Pub. L. No. 107-56, §356(b). 
86 31 CFR §103.18(a)(2) codified at 12 CFR §21.11(c)(4). 
87 31 CFR §103.18(a)(2)(i). 
88 ibid. 
89 31 CFR §103.18(a)(2)(ii). 
90 31 CFR §103.18(a)(2)(iii). 
91 31 CFR §103.20(a)(2) codified at 31 CFR § 1022.320(a)(2). 
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observed by the Government Accountability Office; “specific criteria for determining 
whether a transaction is suspicious have never been developed.”92 FinCEN does 
provide some guidance as to when to report, and also some ‘Red Flags’ to be aware 
of which may trigger suspicion, and as such a report, but this guidance is not definitive. 
The first part of the FinCEN guidance simply restates the law, the transaction is 
reportable is it suspected to involve money from criminal activity, evade the BSA 1970, 
or have no apparent legal purpose.93 The guidance provided on ‘Red Flags’ is more 
practical as FinCEN gives examples of ‘Red Flag’ incidents. These include the use of 
fake identification, customers reacting negatively to requests for identification, 
transactions very close to mandatory reporting value, and groups of transactions from 
multiple customers in a short period of time.94 FinCEN’s guidance suggests certain 
factors should be considered upon a ‘Red Flag’, such as whether the transaction is 
“unusually large”,95 whether the transaction is different to the customer’s normal 
pattern of business, or whether the frequency of transactions is unusual.96 These 
considerations demonstrate the inter-related nature of preventative measures as the 
questions may be best answered if the relevant KYC measures have been observed, 
and the reporting entity knows what is ‘usual’ for the customer. Transactions through 
cryptocurrency businesses are more likely to be viewed as suspicious as they take 
place remotely. It is more difficult to verify an individual’s identity over the internet so 
the ‘Red Flag’ incidents relating to identity could be triggered frequently in 
cryptocurrency businesses, adding to the volume of SARs submitted to FinCEN.  
                                                     
92 General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: Needed Improvements for Reporting Suspicious 
Transactions Are Planned (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1995) at p11. 
93 FinCEN, ‘Reporting Suspicious Activity – A Quick Reference Guide for Money Services Businesses’ 






Figure 8. Suspicious Activity Report Volume97 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the annual volume of SARs submitted to FinCEN, which has increased 
year on year since 2012. One reason for the consistent rise in SARs is defensive 
reporting, as identified by Levi in the 1990s,98 by McNeil in the early 2000s,99 and 
Ryder in 2012.100 The increasing size of sanctions imposed on banks, such as the 
$1.256bn settlement with HSBC in 2011,101 and the $1bn sanction imposed on 
                                                     
97 Compiled from the FinCEN Suspicious Activity Report Statistics tool, using the following search 
options; ‘Industry Type’: All, ‘Year & Month’: 2012-2018 respectively, all other selectors were left 
blank, the search tool is available at: FinCEN, ‘Suspicious Activity Report Statistics (SAR Stats)’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats> accessed 21 August 2019. 
98 M. Levi, ‘Evaluating the “New Policing”: Attacking the Money Trail of Organized Crime’ (1997) 30(1) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1 at 9. 
99 C. McNeil, ‘The Australian Anti-Money Laundering Reform in the International Context’ (2007) 22(6) 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 340 at 341. 
100 N. Ryder, Money laundering – an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-money 
laundering policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge, London, 2012) at 5.8. 
101 Department of Justice, ‘HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money 
Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement’ (11 
December 2012) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-
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Standard Chartered in 2019102 for money laundering compliance failings, leads 
regulated institutions to comply so as to avoid receiving such punishments. Defensive 
reporting is where regulated institutions report whenever there is risk of suspicion, 
rather when there is genuine suspicion. This inflates the volume of reports to FinCEN, 
and makes it more difficult to determine which SARs need to be investigated. Given 
the severity of the potential sanctions for non-compliance, it is likely that 
cryptocurrency businesses, will adopt a similar approach to the institutions in the 
traditional financial system. A further risk for cryptocurrency businesses is that their 
ability to absorb a large fine may be dependent on the value of their holdings, which, 
as seen in Figure7, can be volatile. If failings take place while cryptocurrency value 
are high, then the potential money laundering will be of a higher value and the fine 
imposed on the institution will be higher. The expansion of the SARs regime to 
cryptocurrencies is likely to increase the volume of SARs, both due to defensive 
reporting, and simply because the number of regulated institutions has increased.  
 
6.4.3. Know Your Customer 
The second key element of the preventative measures is record keeping and KYC 
protocols. Specific records must be kept in certain circumstances, for example a 
customer verification process must be undertaken in the event of a sale or issuance 
of “bank check or draft, cashier's check, money order or traveller's check for $3,000 or 
more,”103 and any other transaction over $10,000.104 Information required from a new 
                                                     
102 Department of Justice, ‘Standard Chartered Bank Admits to Illegally Processing Transactions in 
Violation of Iranian Sanctions and Agrees to Pay More Than $1 Billion’ (9 April 2019) 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/standard-chartered-bank-admits-illegally-processing-transactions-
violation-iranian-sanctions> accessed 23 August 2019. 
103 31 CFR §1010.415(a). 
104 31 CFR §1010.410. 
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customer includes, but is not limited to; the name and address of the customer; their 
social security number of the purchaser, or identification number; their date of birth; 
the date of purchase; the type(s) of instrument(s) purchased; and the identification 
number of the purchased instrument(s).105 In addition to these details in the event of 
a large transaction, financial institutions should also have customer identification 
programs (CIP) for all of their customers. A bank’s CIP must be “appropriate for its 
size and type of business,”106 but specific information is to be collected by all regulated 
businesses. A customer’s name, date of birth, relevant addresses, and identification 
number are examples of mandatory data to be obtained.107 
 
These requirements are part of a risk-based approach to money laundering which 
allows for differing requirements for different sized institutions. 31 CFR §103.121 sets 
the minimum requirements, but bigger institutions will be expected to do more to 
monitor their customers than smaller institutions. While 31 CFR §103.121 applies to 
banks, money services businesses are covered by 31 CFR §1022.210; which also 
states that the anti-money laundering program should correlate with “the risks posed 
by the location and size of, and the nature and volume of the financial services 
provided by, the money services business.”108 A money services business is any 
business that chases, exchanges, transfers, or transmits money, or similar 
instruments, domestically or internationally,109 whilst not being a depository 
institution.110 The minimum standards for a money services business is to verify their 
                                                     
105 Criteria found in 31 CFR §1010.410 and 31 CFR §1010.415(a). 
106 31 CFR §103.121. 
107 31 CFR §103.121(b)(i)(1)-(5). 
108 31 CFR §1022.210(b). 
109 31 USC §5330(d)(1)(A). 
110 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(1)(C). 
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customers’ identity,111 complete filing reports,112 create and retain records,113 and 
respond to requests for law enforcement.114 A money services business is also 
required to provide education and training,115 and undertake regular reviews of its anti-
money laundering program.116 The money services business should designate an 
individual to ensure compliance with the program.117 
 
By complying with the KYC protocols and having an appropriate CIP it is easier to 
answer the questions which should be triggered by ‘Red Flag’ incidents and make it 
easier for an institution to decide what is, and is not, suspicious. KYC may also provide 
a greater bank of intelligence, and maybe even evidence if an investigation does need 
to take place. The issue with regards to cryptocurrencies is that KYC protocols and 
CIPs may not be possible to implement, or it may be harder to do so compared to 
other institutions. The nature of cryptocurrency businesses means they are unlikely to 
ever meet their customers physically, which in turn means it is not possible to 
confidently identify their customers. Chaikin finds fault with relying on customer data, 
criticising the assumption that customers will be honest and that there are no legal 
requirements for customers to provide full disclosure of the names they use or the 
accounts they have opened.118 Chaikin also criticised the notably Western approach 
to what customer data needs to be collected, as this is ineffective for ethic groups who 
                                                     
111 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(1)(A). 
112 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(1)(B). 
113 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(1)(C). 
114 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(1)(D). 
115 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(3). 
116 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(4) 
117 31 CFR §1022.210(d)(2). 
118 D. Chaikin, ‘Risk-Based Approaches to Combatting Financial Crime’ (2009) 8(2) Journal of Law 
and Financial Crime 20 at 23. 
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use different naming systems.119 It has been identified already in this thesis that 
cryptocurrencies provide users with mechanisms to conceal their identity,120 applying 
KYC requirements to cryptocurrency businesses will be more difficult than for the 
traditional financial institutions.  
 
6.5. Applicability of Preventative Measures to 
Cryptocurrencies  
It has been established at 6.3.3 that cryptocurrencies will satisfy the term ‘financial 
transaction’ and as such money laundering offences are applicable, without a need to 
amend the law. The applicability of AML provisions to cryptocurrency businesses was 
not initially clear, but the FinCEN guidance of 2013 makes it clear that exchanges and 
administrators are viewed as money services businesses, and therefore need to 
comply with AML regulation.121 By applying AML regulation to cryptocurrency 
businesses, the US is compliant with the FATF guidance issued in 2019,122 before the 
guidance was released. The US has been proactive in applying its existing law, but 
simply widening AML regulation to cover cryptocurrency businesses does not show a 
detailed understanding of the issue. KYC protocols are applied to cryptocurrency 
                                                     
119 ibid. 
120 The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies is addressed by the US Government Accountability 
Office in their 2014 report, which described such currencies as pseudonymous, as the although the 
users name is not known, other details are published on the blockchain; such as their Bitcoin address, 
the time of the transaction, and the amount: United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual 
Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019 at p.6. 
121 FinCEN, ‘Guidance - FIN-2013-G001 - Issued: March 18, 2013 - Subject: Application of FinCEN’s 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 06 August 2019 
at p2. 
122 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. 
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businesses as money service businesses, but this approach fails to address the 
peculiarities of cryptocurrencies, and that collecting different data may be required. 
The application of AML to exchanges shows a level of proactivity, but no measures 
appear to be applied to the Bitcoin blockchain itself, or any other distributed ledgers. 
The next section of this chapter will identify the relevant authorities addressing money 
laundering in the US and enforcing the law. 
 
6.6. Authorities  
The US adopts a multi-regulator approach to combatting financial crime and money 
laundering is no different. As identified by Ryder, the various regulatory bodies can be 
categorised into primary and secondary authorities.123 Primary authorities are 
responsible for creating AML policy and legislation, while secondary authorities are 
tasked with enforcement.124 The principal secondary authority is the financial 
intelligence unit (FIU) as this is the authority that reports are submitted to, the FIU of 
the US is FinCEN.  
 
6.6.1. Primary Authorities 
Department of the Treasury (DoT) 
The DoT is the finance department of the US, tasked with maintaining the economy, 
protecting the integrity of the US financial system, and managing the US Government’s 
                                                     
123 cf Ryder (n100) at p.25. 
124 ibid. 
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resources.125 The DoT’s pursuit of financial crime involves safeguarding the US 
financial system and targeting national security threats.126 This is achieved by issuing 
guidance on combatting money laundering; such as the ‘2007 National Money 
Laundering Strategy’127 and ‘National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2015’.128 
The 2007 Strategy document sets out the AML goals of the DoT, which include, 
safeguarding the banking system, enhancing transparency, blocking the flow of bulk 
cash out of the US, and pursuing money laundering both domestically and 
internationally.129 
 
A number of secondary authorities take direction from the DoT, in particular FinCEN, 
which is the FIU, and the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, which has a 
wide range of legal powers through its position within the DoT.130 
 
                                                     
125 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’ 
<https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/role-of-the-treasury> accessed 20 October 
2019. 
126 ibid. 
127 US Department of Justice, ‘2007 National Money Laundering Strategy’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/nmls.pdf> accessed 20 
October 2019. 
128 US Department of the Treasury, ‘National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2015’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%
2006-12-2015.pdf> accessed 20 October 2019. 
129 US Department of Justice, ‘2007 National Money Laundering Strategy’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/nmls.pdf> accessed 20 
October 2019 at page i. 
130 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Resource Centre – Money Laundering’ 
<https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/money-laundering> accessed 16 
October 2019. 
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Department of Justice  
The Department of Justice (DoJ) undertakes investigations into instances of money 
laundering,131 it is the principal government entity responsible for prosecutions at the 
federal level,132 and it fulfils its duties through its 40 departments.133 The most relevant 
departments of the DoJ are secondary authorities, which pursue money laundering; 
namely the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA). While the DoJ is a primary authority it may also take enforcement actions itself, 
in this role the DoJ can bring prosecution cases and impose sanctions.134 
 
Department of State 
The Department of State (DoS) is primarily concerned with international cooperation 
in combatting money laundering;135 in this role it will liaise with the DoT and DoJ, as 
well as the governments and authorities of other jurisdictions to improve international 
money laundering standards. The DoS operates in a similar way to the DoT and DoJ 
in that is has many departments, offices and bureaus, which may be tasked with the 
various roles that the department fulfils. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
                                                     
131 cf Ryder (n100). 
132 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combatting the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf> accessed 03 September 2019. 
133 US Department of Justice, ‘Agencies’ <http://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart#OAG> accessed 03 
December 2018.  
134 Examples of enforcement actions can be seen in DoJ press releases: Department of Justice, 
‘Justice News’ <https://www.justice.gov/news> accessed 29 August 2019. One example involved 
breaches of sanctions against Iran: Department of Justice, ‘Iranian Businessman Pleads Guilty to 
Conspiracy to Violate U.S. Sanctions by Exporting Carbon Fiber From the United States to Iran’ (New 
York, 29 August 2019) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-businessman-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-
violate-us-sanctions-exporting-carbon-fiber> accessed 29 August 2019. 
135 The Department of State is the department of the Secretary of State whom “Under the 
Constitution, the President of the United States determines U.S. foreign policy. The Secretary of 
State, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is the President’s chief 
foreign affairs adviser. The Secretary carries out the President’s foreign policies through the State 
Department and the Foreign Service of the United States”: US Department of State, ‘Duties of the 
Secretary of State’ <http://www.state.gov/secretary/115194.htm> accessed 18 October 2019. 
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Enforcement Affairs is once such office and every year “U.S. officials from agencies 
with AML responsibilities assess the money laundering situations in approximately 200 
jurisdictions.”136 
 
6.6.2. Secondary Authorities 
As stated above, the US adopts a multi-regulator approach, this is most prevalent in 
its secondary authorities, within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
alone there are 9 other organisations listed within its organisational chart. The sheer 
volume of authorities makes it impractical to list them all in this chapter, therefore only 
the most relevant authorities will be outlined here. The focus of this section is on the 
principal secondary authorities addressing money laundering, namely the Office of 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, FinCEN and the Securities Exchange 
Commission. 
 
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) is an office within the DoT; as 
the name suggest the TFI combats both terrorist financing and financial crime. The 
focus of this thesis is money laundering, which, as argued in chapter four, is distinct 
from terrorist financing and should be treated as such.137 In the TFI’s AML role it 
“develops and implements the National Money Laundering Strategy as well as other 
                                                     
136 US Department of State, ‘2015 INCSR: Money Laundering/Financial Crimes Countries’ 
<https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/222471.htm> accessed 23 October 2019. 
137 See chapter four at 4.10. 
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policies and programs to fight financial crimes.”138 The TFI has a very wide capacity, 
covering intelligence across the financial system relating “combating rogue nations, 
terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators, money 
launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats.”139  
 
Figure 9. Organisation of the TFI140 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the hierarchy of the authorities under the TFI. Each of the 4 offices is 
accountable to the TFI and a clear division of priorities can be seen. The most relevant 
division of the TFI for the purposes of AML is FinCEN as it is the FIU of the US and 
responsible for implementing the BSA 1970.141 
                                                     
138 US Department of the Treasury, ‘About>Terrorism and Financial Intelligence’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-
Financial-Intelligence.aspx> accessed 16 October 2019. 
139 ibid. 
140 Image taken from: Department of the Treasury, ‘Organizational Structure » Offices » Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence’ <https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-
of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx> accessed 30 August 2019. 
141 FinCEN, ‘What We Do’ <http://fin-cenus.com/what-we-do.html> accessed 03 October 2019. 
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Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
FinCEN aims to “safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money 
laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.”142 It is 
the FIU of the US, as identified by the FATF.143 FinCEN is responsible for enforcing 
the BSA 1970.144 FinCEN is accountable to the DoT, and FinCEN’s director reports to 
the Under Secretary of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. FinCEN 
works in cooperation with the IRS,145 which is indicative of the interconnectedness of 
US regulatory authorities. As the FIU, FinCEN is the recipient of both SARs and CTRs, 
and is responsible for deciding whether to take such reports further. As a secondary 
authority FinCEN is also responsible for enforcing compliance of AML regulations.146 
FinCEN’s money laundering enforcement actions should be distinguished from 
broader money laundering prosecutions, as FinCEN will sanction regulated institutions 
for non-compliance rather than that the institution itself has committed money 
laundering.  
 
                                                     
142 ibid. 
143 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Third Mutual Evalulation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combatting the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019. 
144 FinCEN, ‘What We Do’ <http://fin-cenus.com/what-we-do.html> accessed 03 October 2019. 
145 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Third Mutual Evalulation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combatting the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019 at 
p.16. 
146 FinCEN, ‘Law Enforcement Overview’ <https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement-
overview> accessed 30 August 2019. 
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Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The SEC is an independent industry regulator, created by the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934,147 in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929. Due to the nature of its capacity 
as a regulator, the SEC, like FinCEN, is primarily concerned with ensuring regulated 
firms comply with AML measures, rather than convictions for money laundering 
offences. The SEC sets out its mission as being “to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”148 The SEC issues 
guidance on AML regulations149 and contributes to debates on money laundering 
issues.150 
 
Each of the authorities identified has a role in implementing the US AML regime. The 
DoJ and the many state and district Attorney Generals’ offices are concerned with 
obtaining money laundering convictions, and they have utilised the existing law to 
obtain convictions for money laundering involving cryptocurrencies. The preventative 
measures are implemented by a number of authorities, but the focus of this chapter 
will be on FinCEN as the FIU of the USA, and the agency which is responsible for 
supervising money services business.151 The next section analyses the AML 
regulation of cryptocurrencies, it is noted that there has been a widening of the 
regulatory perimeter to include cryptocurrencies, and that FinCEN has instigated this 
                                                     
147 Securities Exchange Act 1934, Sec.4.  
148 US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘About the SEC’ 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml> accessed 28 October 2019. 
149 US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘Spotlight on Anti-Money laundering Rulemaking’ 
<https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/moneylaundering.htm> accessed 27 October 2019. 
150 US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘SPEECH - Anti-Money Laundering: An Often-Overlooked 
Cornerstone of Effective Compliance’ <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/anti-money-laundering-an-
often-overlooked-cornerstone.html> accessed 27 October 2019. 
151 FinCEN, ‘Reporting Suspicious Activity – A Quick Reference Guide for Money Services 
Businesses’ <https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/msbsar_quickrefguide.pdf> 
accessed 27 October 2019. 
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expansion, therefore the US has adopted a regulator led widening of the regulatory 
perimeter.  
 
6.7. AML Regulation of Cryptocurrencies  
In May 2014 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report,152 which 
assessed the risks posed by virtual currencies. This report identified the federal 
agencies that may be affected by the continued development of cryptocurrencies. The 
GAO only considered the implications of convertible virtual currencies as these 
currencies “interact with the real economy because depository institutions (for 
example, banks and credit unions) may have business relationships with companies 
that exchange virtual currencies for government-issued currencies.”153 To this end the 
GAO identified FinCEN, prudential banking regulators, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, the SEC, the CFTC, and the Department of Homeland Security 
and Justice as having potential responsibilities for regulating virtual currencies. The 
GAO report was not solely concerned with money laundering risks, this section will 
focus on the relevant identified authorities which have responsibilities for tackling 
money laundering.  
 
                                                     
152 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> 
accessed 04 September 2019. 
153 ibid at p.5. 
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6.7.1. FinCEN 
The GAO identified FinCEN as the agency with the biggest relationship with 
cryptocurrencies, due to its role as the chief implementing agency of the BSA 1970.154 
In this capacity, where entities engage in “virtual currency transactions with U.S. 
customers or become customers of a U.S. financial institution”155 FinCEN is 
responsible for ensuring that such entities comply with AML regulations.156 FinCEN 
has identified cryptocurrency exchanges as money services businesses157 and takes 
responsibility for regulating such exchanges, ensuring they have adequate AML 
procedures.158 FinCEN only regulates convertible virtual currencies, which have value 
in real currency or may act as a substitute for real currency,159 as a result FinCEN’s 
regulatory remit includes cryptocurrencies, as defined in chapter three.160 FinCEN has 
issued enforcement actions against cryptocurrency businesses which it considered to 
be money services business, these actions were against Ripple Labs,161 BTC-e and 
                                                     
154 31 CFR §1010.810(a). 
155 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> 
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160 See chapter three at 3.7. 
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Currency Exchanger’ (Washington, 5 May 2015) 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2016-08-02/20150505.pdf> accessed 
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Alexander Vinnik,162 and Eric Powers.163 The first FinCEN enforcement action against 
a cryptocurrency exchange business was in 2015, when Ripple Labs Inc were required 
to pay $700,000 for breaching BSA 1970 requirements.164 Ripple Labs were found to 
have acted as a money services business and traded a virtual currency without 
registering with FinCEN.165 The case came two years after FinCEN had stated it would 
regulate cryptocurrency exchanges, and in addition to receiving a financial penalty, 
Ripple Labs agreed to "conduct a three-year “look-back” to [review] suspicious activity 
reporting for prior suspicious transactions.”166 The ‘look-back’ demonstrates the 
commitment of FinCEN to ensuring AML regulations are adhered to, and that as the 
FIU, any potentially intelligence is still gathered. A contrasting enforcement action can 
be seen in July 2017, when a penalty of $110,003,314 was imposed on BTC-e, and a 
penalty of $12,000,000 was imposed on Alexander Vinnik, the operator of the 
exchange.167 In this case the fines imposed were much larger, as the value of 
cryptocurrency being transferred was larger than in the Ripple Labs case; BTC-e 
transferred over $296,000,000 in Bitcoin transactions,168 as well as a considerable 
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value in transactions in other cryptocurrencies.169 The value of the transactions was 
not the only aggravating factor, BTC-e handled over 300,000 Bitcoins which were 
stolen in the from the hacking of Mt. Gox exchange170 in which 744,408 Bitcoins were 
stolen,171 and while Ripple Labs agreed to a ‘look-back’, no such agreement appears 
in the BTC-e enforcement notice. The BTC-e and Vinnik case demonstrates that the 
punishments for not complying with FinCEN regulation can be severe, and financial 
penalties will increase if criminal activity is also discovered. The most recent FinCEN 
enforcement action against a cryptocurrency exchange is the $35,350 fine imposed 
on Eric Powers.172 The sanction imposed on Powers was for breaches of the BSA 
1970, as was the case for Ripple Labs and the BTC-e and Vinnik cases, but the value 
of the transactions completed by Powers were much lower. Powers failed to “(a) 
register as an MSB with FinCEN; (b) establish and implement an effective written anti-
money laundering (AML) program; (c) detect and adequately report suspicious 
transactions; and (d) report currency transactions.”173 While the list of charges are 
similar to previous enforcement action by FinCEN, Powers conducted over 1,700 
transactions,174 and his most prevalent suspicious customer’s transactions equated to 
$86,000.175 Powers was not directly implicated in any known crimes, which contrasts 
with BTC-e and Vinnik where the Mt. Gox connection existed.  
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From the enforcement actions FinCEN has taken so far, it is appears that a reasonable 
approach has been taken. Fines are being imposed, and the size of the fines imposed 
are clearly influenced by mitigating or aggravating factors. Where the values of 
transferred currency is lower, a lower fine will be imposed, compared to high value 
cases which received larger sanctions. Additional criminal behaviour will be an 
aggravating factor, but attempts to retrospectively comply with FinCEN regulation will 
be considered, as shown by the Ripple Labs case. Deterrence is not mentioned in any 
of the enforcement notices, but as noted by Ryder,176 one of FinCEN’s objectives is 
the deterrence of financial crime,177 therefore a consideration in determining a fine will 
be deterring others from the same activity. In the UK, the comparable agencies are 
the NCA as the FIU and the FCA as the principal regulator. The FCA has failed to take 
the bold approach that FinCEN has taken. The FCA could have interpreted the 
definition of a ‘money services business’ in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing 
and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017178 to include 
cryptocurrency service providers, and thus apply its regulation, but it has not. The UK 
will adopt a legislator led widening of the regulatory perimeter, in contrast to the much 
faster regulator led widening demonstrated by FinCEN. 
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6.7.2. Securities Exchange Commission  
The GAO identified that the SEC will need to regulate “if a broker-dealer were to accept 
payments in”179 cryptocurrencies and there were money laundering concerns, or if a 
broker-dealer holds cryptocurrencies either for themselves or on behalf of a 
customer.180 The mission of the SEC is “to protect investors, [and] maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets;”181 therefore the SEC will act in cases where virtual 
currencies are used to commit offences against investors and markets. An example of 
such action can be seen in SEC v. Shavers;182 which concerned a Ponzi scheme 
where the victims invested with Bitcoin. As well as bringing prosecutions the SEC also 
issues alerts and guidance to market participants; two notable alerts were issued in 
2014,183 as well as two other alerts which related to a mining scheme which used a 
virtual currency called ‘Gemcoins’184 and another warning relating to ‘fantasy stocks’ 
which may also use virtual currencies.185 A further responsibility for the SEC will be to 
review the registration of companies wishing to offer cryptocurrency related securities, 
a prominent example being the Gemini Bitcoin exchange, which was recently opened 
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in New York and founded by the Winklevoss twins.186 These examples show that the 
SEC will address issues involving cryptocurrencies when there is an impact on the 
areas it has responsibility for, but the SEC is not the principal regulator for AML 
compliance, which is FinCEN. In the UK it is the responsibility of the FCA to set AML 
rules for all financial institutions.187 
  
6.7.3. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
The GAO found that the responsibilities of the CFTC “depend partly on whether bitcoin 
or other virtual currencies meet the definition of a commodity under the Commodity 
Exchange Act.”188 In 2015 the CFTC submitted their position to the GAO, “CFTC 
officials said the agency would not make a formal determination [on whether their 
enforcement of the BSA 1970 included virtual currencies] until market circumstances 
require one.”189 Since 2017 the CFTC has issued a number of advisory notices on the 
issue of cryptocurrencies,190 which has focussed on increasing the awareness of 
investors to the risks of fraud in cryptocurrency investments. The focus of the CFTC 
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is on “open, transparent, competitive, and financially sound markets,”191 therefore its 
focus is not primarily to address money laundering. The aims of the CFTC are to 
“protect market users and their funds, consumers, and the public from fraud, 
manipulation, and abusive practices related to derivatives and other products”192 which 
means their enforcement actions will relate to those issues. Recent enforcement 
actions by the CFTC concern failure to supervise employees,193 unauthorised 
trading,194 false claims of certification,195 and other instances of fraud.196 Where the 
CFTC has acted against cryptocurrency related businesses, it has been for fraudulent 
activity in conjunction with cryptocurrencies, rather than money laundering, as 
demonstrated by the recent action against Diamonds Trading Investment House and 
First Options Trading,197 where the defendants impersonated a CFTC officer and sent 
forged documents purportedly from the CFTC.198 As identified by the GAO the CFTC 
will act in relation to the trading of commodities, and federal courts have ruled that 
cryptocurrencies can be commodities, such as in CFTC v Patrick McDonnell and 
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others,199 but the CFTC have not acted in money laundering cases, this remains the 
responsibility of FinCEN. The CFTC issues AML guidance to the institutions it 
regulates, but this guidance takes its lead from the guidance of FinCEN.200 In the UK, 
the FCA would still be the equivalent regulator, but has resisted applying regulation, it 
is the designated regulator of cryptocurrency services providers since January 
2020.201  
 
6.7.4. Department of Homeland Security and Justice  
As with fiat currencies, cryptocurrencies can be used to commit crime in a number of 
ways, therefore law enforcement agencies may have to deal with cases involving 
cryptocurrencies. The DoJ advised the GAO that there are two areas of interest for 
such agencies. Firstly, where cryptocurrencies have been used to launder money and 
a prosecution is sought against and individual,202 and secondly where cryptocurrency 
businesses have committed money laundering offences.203 Based on this approach it 
would appear that these law enforcement agencies will continue in much the same 
way as they have in the past, their involvement with cryptocurrencies will naturally 
occur when crimes involve cryptocurrencies. Examples of money laundering 
convictions which involve cryptocurrencies can be found through press releases by 
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the DoJ; the search terms ‘Bitcoin money laundering’ returns over 270 results.204 
Example cases vary in complexity and value, just as all criminal cases will, from an 
international gang being investigated for 18 months,205 to a one-man operation of a 
much smaller scale.206 The prosecutions for money laundering using cryptocurrencies 
demonstrate that the offences do not need reform to as cryptocurrency transactions 
clearly satisfy the widely drafted criminal offences within Title 18 of the United States 
Code.207 As identified in chapter five,208 UK law enforcement agencies have also 
obtained prosecutions for money laundering using cryptocurrencies,209 demonstrating 
that the criminal offences are applicable to cryptocurrencies.  
 
6.7.5. Perceived Threats of Cryptocurrencies and Gaps in Regulation 
Aside from the applicability of the law to cryptocurrencies, there are a number of more 
general concerns that the GAO has raised over the use of cryptocurrencies. These 
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threats include volatility,210 anonymity,211 lack of bank involvement,212 and the 
international nature of cryptocurrencies.213 The issue of volatility is in relation to the 
value of the cryptocurrencies, against fiat currency. This issue is addressed in chapter 
three where cryptocurrencies are compared to fiat currencies and traditional money; 
the volatile value may be seen a bar against cryptocurrencies being considered 
money. 
 
The increased anonymity of cryptocurrencies is clearly a concern from an anti-money 
laundering perspective; if the parties to a transaction cannot be identified then any 
reporting of that transaction is of minimal use. The anonymity attached to 
cryptocurrencies is addressed by the GAO in their 2014 report, which described such 
currencies as pseudonymous,214 as although the users name is not known, other 
details are published on the blockchain;215 such as their Bitcoin address, the time of 
the transaction, and the amount. Furthermore, the GAO claim that data analysis 
techniques may reveal the identity of a user, and that investigators may obtain 
identifying information through exchanges of Bitcoin for Dollars or vice versa. Finally 
the report points to research by Meiklejohn et al,216 who “we were able to identify 1.9 
million public keys with some real-world service or identity,”217 however, Meiklejohn et 
al found “in many cases the identity was not a real name, but rather (for example) a 
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username on a forum.”218 The anonymity of cryptocurrencies may be eroded by the 
aforementioned techniques, but the fact such extra measures need to be taken in 
order to pursue users of cryptocurrencies will always present an extra level of difficulty, 
and complexity, to cases involving cryptocurrencies. A further example of investigative 
techniques being developed to combat cryptocurrency anonymity is demonstrated by 
Juhász et al who identified 22,363 users 1,797 associated IP addresses.219 Juhász et 
al argue their “method is cheap in terms of resources,”220 and their “algorithms are 
relatively easy to implement and can be combined with other Bitcoin-transaction 
related information.”221 The research of Meiklejohn et al and Juhász et al demonstrates 
that investigative tools can be developed to combat the anonymity of cryptocurrencies. 
 
The lack of bank involvement is identified as an issue as there will be a far reduced 
level of protection to the users of cryptocurrencies, compared to those using fiat 
currencies and traditional financial institutions. The inclusion of cryptocurrency 
exchanges in the regulatory regime will go some way to protect consumers, but the 
decentralised nature of some cryptocurrencies means there is no central organisation 
acting as an administrator for the currency, so there is no way to insure the holdings 
of consumers in the way that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation operates for 
banks.  
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Lastly the international nature of virtual currencies will always be a concern for 
individual jurisdictions; virtual currencies are either operated by private companies, or 
in the case of cryptocurrencies, operated by algorithms. Cryptocurrencies do not 
recognise borders, so it is difficult for one jurisdiction to regulate. The GAO report 
accepts that regulations imposed by the US will mean “federal financial regulatory and 
law enforcement agencies face challenges in enforcing these requirements and 
investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes that may involve virtual 
currencies.”222 The GAO encourage co-operation with international counterparts but 
fears that some individuals may choose to “operate out of countries that have weak 
legal and regulatory regimes or that are less willing to cooperate with U.S. law 
enforcement  
 
At the present time there are no specific reforms planned for the US AML approach, 
or for the treatment of cryptocurrencies. The current practice of each agency releasing 
its own guidance looks set to continue, though the GAO have recommended that 
potential consumer protection should addressed through the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau and that interagency assistance should be given.223 
 
6.8. Compliance with Financial Action Task Force guidance  
The most recent FATF mutual evaluation report of the USA, in 2016, predates the 
2019 FATF guidance on virtual assets, and given how recently the FATF guidance 
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has been released, it is not reasonable to expect full compliance. However, as 
identified in chapter four,224 the US has frequently implemented AML measures before 
they become international standards. Therefore, it is reasonable to assess the level to 
which the US is already compliant with the FATF guidance. The terminology used by 
FATF differs to that if the US. The FATF use the term ‘virtual asset’ (VA), which is 
defined as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred 
and can be used for payment or investment purposes.”225 The agencies of the US 
predominantly use the term virtual currencies,226 but the use of this term is the 
equivalent of the FATF term ‘virtual asset’. The FATF guidance also uses the term 
‘Virtual Asset Service Provider’ (VASP)227 to describe businesses providing services 
for cryptocurrency users. The approach of FinCEN has been to recognise 
cryptocurrency businesses as ‘money services businesses.228 The use of different 
term by the FATF and the US is immaterial, as the definitions of the terms are similar, 
and the US definitions will be compliant with the FATF guidance. The FATF guidance 
addresses the majority of the 40 Recommendations, stating that “[a]lmost all of the 
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FATF Recommendations are directly relevant”229 to addressing the money laundering 
risks posed.  
 
Recommendation 1 requires countries to undertake a risk assessment and apply the 
risk-based approach,230 which the 2019 guidance states should now include VAs and 
VASPs. As identified by the GAO report, and the recognition of cryptocurrencies by 
FinCEN, the US is clearly assessing the risks posed, including those relating to money 
laundering. The risk assessment should identify the relevant authorities that should 
regulate VAs and VASPs, and the treatment of these products and services should be 
consistent.231 The inclusion of cryptocurrency exchanges in FinCEN regulation 
demonstrates compliance with this, FinCEN is the FIU of the US, and the treatment of 
VASPs is consistent with other money service businesses. 
 
FATF Recommendations advise that all “funds or value-based terms in the 
Recommendations, such as “property,” “proceeds,” “funds,” “funds or other assets,” 
and other “corresponding value,” 232 should be interpreted to include VAs.233 The US 
has not amended its criminal offences to explicitly include VAs, but the existing 
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legislation is drafted so widely that the law will apply to VAs. §1956234 and §1957235 
refer to transactions, which does not preclude cryptocurrency satisfying the offences. 
The applicability of offences has been proven by the successful money laundering 
convictions obtained by various DoJ District Attorneys, as discussed at 6.7.4. The 
example cases vary from an international gang being investigated for 18 months,236 to 
smaller scale offences such as one-man operations.237 The prosecutions for money 
laundering using cryptocurrencies demonstrate that the offences do not need reform, 
as cryptocurrency transactions clearly satisfy the widely drafted money laundering 
offences. The US is clearly compliant with FATF Recommendations 3, 4, and 5 
pertaining to the criminalisation of money laundering,238 confiscation of criminal 
proceeds,239 and terrorist financing.240 The US is also compliant with the guidance on 
Recommendation 6 which concerns asset freezing,241 although this is usually 
impossible for cryptocurrencies, and Recommendation 7 which relates to sanctions,242 
which again would be difficult to enforce in relation to cryptocurrencies. 
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States, 6 December 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/multi-state-international-drug-
trafficking-organization-targeted-18-month-investigation> accessed 04 September 2019. 
237 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Central District of California, ‘“Bitcoin Maven” 
Sentenced to One Year in Federal Prison in Bitcoin Money Laundering Case’ 
<https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/bitcoin-maven-sentenced-one-year-federal-prison-bitcoin-
money-laundering-case> accessed 04 September 2019. 
238 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019 para 66 at p21. 
239 ibid at para 67 at p21. 
240 ibid at para 69 at p21. 
241 ibid at para 70 at p21. 
242 ibid at para 71 at p21. 
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As well as ensuring applicable criminalisation of money laundering through 
cryptocurrencies, the 2019 guidance addresses AML regulation as well. The FATF 
guidance requires preventative measures to apply to VASPs.243 In determining that 
cryptocurrency exchanges are treated as money services businesses,244 FinCEN has 
extended the BSA 1970 to cover VASPs in line with the FATF guidance, which satisfies 
Recommendation 15.245 FinCEN’s remit and regulatory powers satisfy 
Recommendations 26 and 27, so by FinCEN adopting the regulation of VASPs, it is 
compliant with 2019 FATF guidance in this respect.246 FinCEN regulates compliance 
with BSA 1970 requirements, so, under FinCEN regulation, VASPs are required to 
complete CDD processes, complying with Recommendation 10 in line with the 2019 
guidance.247 FinCEN provide guidance to money services businesses to aide with 
compliance, the requirements are condensed into factsheets for quick reference.248 
The factsheets from FinCEN cover the general requirements of a money service 
business, including having an AML compliance program, record keeping, and 
submitting CTRs and SARs,249 specifically when a report is required.250 As identified 
at 6.7.1, FinCEN has taken enforcement action against non-compliant VASPs on 3 
occasions,251 demonstrating its commitment to ensuring VASPs adhere to AML 
                                                     
243 ibid at para 86 at p23. 
244 FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using 
Virtual Currencies’ <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 
04 September 2019. 
245 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019 para 91 at p23. 
246 ibid. 
247 ibid. 
248 FinCEN, ‘A Quick Reference Guide for Money Services Businesses’ (Washington, United States, 
September 2007) <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/bsa_quickrefguide.pdf> accessed 
04 September 2019. 
249 ibid at p.1. 
250 ibid at p.2. 
251 FinCEN, ‘FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual 
Currency Exchanger’ (Washington, 5 May 2015) 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2016-08-02/20150505.pdf> accessed 
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regulation. The enforcement actions of FinCEN have included punishments for not 
registering with FinCEN, a requirement which satisfies FATF expectation that VASPs 
are required to register with a designated authority.252 
 
In summary, the US can be seen to be ahead of international best practice, recognising 
cryptocurrency businesses in 2013 and applying AML regulation. By applying 
regulation to cryptocurrency exchanges, the US is already compliant with the FATF 
guidance of 2019. 
 
6.9. Recommendations for the United Kingdom 
Both the UK and the US have money laundering offences which can be committed 
using cryptocurrencies. The focus of the wording if the offences are different, in the 
UK offence focuses on the movement of property, and criminal property is defined in 
wide terms. Criminal property in the UK is anything that “constitutes a person’s benefit 
from criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit”,253 which “the alleged offender 
knows or suspects”254 is such a benefit. The definition recognises that the proceeds of 
crime is often broken up to avoid detection, as such the criminal property may 
                                                     
02 September 2019, FinCEN, ‘In the Matter of BTC-E a/k/a Canton Business Corporation and 
Alexander Vinnik’ (Vienna, United States, 07 June) 
<2017https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2017-07-
27/Assessment%20for%20BTCeVinnik%20FINAL2.pdf> accessed 02 September 2019, and FinCEN, 
‘In the Matter of Eric Powers’ (Vienna, United States, 18 April 2019) 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2019-04-
18/Assessment%20Eric%20Powers%20Final%20for%20Posting%2004.18.19_1.pdf> accessed 02 
September 2019. 
252 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019 para 78 at p22. 
253 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part 7, s.340(3)(a). 
254 ibid s.340(3)(b). 
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represent a benefit “in whole or part”255 and can be direct or indirect.256 This wide 
definition of criminal property can therefore encompass the broad array of assets 
which may be used to disguise illegal gains. The US offences instead focus on 
transactions. The UK offences are simpler than in the US where the money laundering 
offences require a ‘specified unlawful activity’257 to have taken place, as listed in 
§1956(c)(7).258 The successful convictions in both the UK and the US demonstrate the 
offences are applicable to cryptocurrencies, and there are no reasons for the UK to 
reform the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002259 to adopt the US money laundering offences. 
 
The UK requires regulated institutions to adhere to similar AML regulation as the US, 
with the exception of CTRs, the UK does not enforce compulsory reporting and instead 
focuses on SARs. The differences with regard to cryptocurrency service providers are 
stark, the UK does not currently impose AML regulation on cryptocurrency service 
providers, whereas the US does, through FinCEN. The US response to the AML 
threats posed by cryptocurrencies was implemented soon after cryptocurrencies grew 
in prominence and was achieved without the need for legislative reform. This was 
achieved by FinCEN in 2013, when it determined that cryptocurrency exchanges and 
administrators were too be viewed as money services businesses, and therefore need 
to comply with AML regulation.260 A similar approach could be implemented in the UK 
                                                     
255 ibid s.340(3)(a). 
256 ibid. 
257 18 USC §1956(a)(1). 
258 18 USC §1956(c)(7). 
259 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
260 FinCEN, ‘Guidance - FIN-2013-G001 - Issued: March 18, 2013 - Subject: Application of FinCEN’s 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 06 August 2019 
at p2. 
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if Regulation 3 of the Money Laundering Regulations261 were to be interpreted 
differently. A money services business is an “an undertaking which by way of business 
operates a currency exchange office, transmits money (or any representations of 
monetary value) by any means or cashes cheques which are made payable to 
customers.”262 Were the FCA to take the approach of FinCEN, and determine that 
cryptocurrency service providers satisfy this definition, then AML regulation could be 
implemented in a similar way to in the US. The UK sought opinions on the US 
approach to regulating cryptocurrencies, as part of the 2015 public consultation. 
Respondents were “positive, reporting that regulation has increased the legitimacy of 
digital currency firms, helped firms establish banking partnerships and investment, and 
deterred criminals.”263 Criticisms of the US approach were made in relation to a 
perceived “lack of clarity about which categories of business activity are captured by 
the FinCEN requirements, and some said that the process of registering in multiple 
American states has been burdensome and has forced smaller firms to exit the 
market.”264 The issue of state regulation is not relevant to a UK transposition of the US 
approach, but lack of clarity regarding what businesses are covered could be 
problematic. The guidance of the FATF should be followed, by considering the 
definition of a cryptocurrency service provider as the same as that of the term ‘VASP’ 
in the FATF guidance,265 confusion over regulated businesses should be avoided. 
 
                                                     
261 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, Regulation 3. 
262 ibid Regulation 3(1)(d). 
263 GOV.UK, ‘Digital currencies: response to the call for information’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414040/digital_curren
cies_response_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019 at p.19. 
264 ibid. 
265 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 September 2019 at para 33(c). 
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Although compliant with FATF guidance, the US regulation of cryptocurrencies is 
missing the majority of cryptocurrency transactions, which take place on a peer-to-
peer format within individual cryptocurrency networks. The quality of the financial 
intelligence gained through regulating cryptocurrency service providers should be 
supported by monitoring the blockchain. Cryptocurrencies offer a level of anonymity, 
but as argued by the GAO in the US; data analysis techniques may reveal the identity 
of a user, and investigators may obtain identifying information through exchanges of 
Bitcoin for Dollars, or vice versa.266 Traditional AML measures cannot be applied to 
blockchain transactions, as there is no human involvement, except for the two 
transacting parties, but a plethora of blockchain APIs are available to enable 
automated analysis of the blockchain.267 At present it is not clear if the financial 
intelligence available through the blockchain is being utilised for AML purposes, but it 
is a valuable resource that the UK and the US should benefit from. 
 
It is recommended that the UK retains its current money laundering offences as they 
are as effective as the US offences. The FCA should consider widening its 
interpretation of a ‘money services business’ so as to include cryptocurrency service 
providers and bring these entities into the regulatory perimeter of the FCA. It is 
recommended that the UK go further than the US and monitor the blockchains of 
cryptocurrencies, so as to avoid a significant number of transactions taking place 
outside of the financial system, with no regulatory scrutiny. 
                                                     
266 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, 
Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> 
accessed 04 September 2019 at p.6. 
267 Examples can be found at Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Bitcoin Developer APIs’ 




This chapter establishes that US money laundering offences can be committed using 
cryptocurrencies, which is confirmed by the successful prosecutions which have been 
obtained. Money laundering through cryptocurrencies is criminalised in the same way 
as other forms of money laundering, with no need for the law to be amended, or new 
offences to be created. The convictions in the US prove that money laundering it taking 
place using cryptocurrencies, but the exact extent is difficult to determine.  
 
The current position of the US is to try and balance the advantages of cryptocurrencies 
with the risks posed. There is concern over the lack of bank involvement, the potential 
volatility of the value of cryptocurrency, and the issues with anonymity. However, there 
are potential benefits such as reduced costs, faster transactions, increased privacy 
and the potential to incorporate the blockchain technology as an innovation in 
ledgering.  
 
With regards to preventative measures, cryptocurrencies are subject to AML 
regulations in the US. Individual users are not subject to FinCEN regulation, just as 
individual users of the traditional financial system are not regulated. AML regulation is 
applied to cryptocurrency businesses, which are deemed to be money services 
businesses, as outlined by FinCEN,268 therefore such businesses must adhere to 
CTR, SAR, and KYC requirements. The approach of the US towards money 
                                                     
268 FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using 
Virtual Currencies’ <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 
04 September 2019. 
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laundering is a risk-based one, as such the size and complexity of a company’s AML 
program must be adequate in relation to the size and nature of the business being 
operated. If the risks associated with cryptocurrencies rise, then users and exchanges 
may receive more attention. The application of CTRs to cryptocurrencies is 
problematic for two reasons, firstly such reports are of limited value in terms of financial 
intelligence, CTRs just add to the mass of data being collected by FIUs and adding a 
further source of CTR reports will provide FinCEN with even more reports to process. 
Secondly, and more specific to cryptocurrencies, is that the volatility of cryptocurrency 
values will complicate CTR submissions as the $10,000 threshold may be breached 
one day but not the next. Despite the difficulties it is not unreasonable to apply CTRs 
to cryptocurrency businesses if they remain vigilant to transaction values compared to 
the US Dollar. Different problems exist in complying suspicious activity reporting, as 
regulated entities are likely to adopt a defensive reporting approach to avoid sanctions, 
which diminishes the quality of the SARs submitted. The implementation of the SARs 
regime should be aided by complying with KYC protocols, but cryptocurrencies provide 
users with mechanisms to conceal their identity,269 so applying KYC requirements to 
cryptocurrency businesses will be more difficult than for traditional financial 
institutions. The difficulties in obtaining accurate customer information mean it is more 
difficult for a cryptocurrency business to determine whether a transaction is suspicious, 
therefore they may over report to protect themselves from enforcement action from 
FinCEN, and the resulting financial penalties. 
                                                     
269 The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies is addressed by the US Government Accountability 
Office in their 2014 report, which described such currencies as pseudonymous, as the although the 
users name is not known, other details are published on the blockchain; such as their Bitcoin address, 
the time of the transaction, and the amount: United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual 
Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019 at p.6. 
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FinCEN is responsible for implementing AML regulation, and as the FIU, it receives 
CTRs and SARs. FinCEN has taken a proactive approach to the threat posed by 
cryptocurrencies, by determining cryptocurrency businesses as money services 
businesses, this brought some cryptocurrency transactions within the remit of its 
regulation. In doing so regulated businesses have had to comply with BSA 1970 
requirements, and FinCEN has taken enforcement action on non-complicit institutions. 
The approach of FinCEN is commendable, but it has not utilised the public ledger 
technology in order to further widen its intelligence gathering ability, by only applying 
regulation to cryptocurrency businesses. FinCEN still ignores transactions that take 
place within cryptocurrency networks, as these transactions are peer-to-peer and do 
not go through regulated institutions. In order to better utilise reports from 
cryptocurrency businesses, FinCEN needs to analyse the public ledgers of 
cryptocurrencies. The next chapter will consider the response of Australia to the 





Chapter 7. Australia 
7.1. Overview 
In this chapter, the applicability of Australia’s money laundering offences and 
preventative measures to cryptocurrencies are assessed. Firstly, the money 
laundering offences are outlined, and it is determined that it is possible to commit these 
offences using cryptocurrencies. After applying the offences, the preventive measures 
are then be assessed; Australia’s anti-money laundering (AML) regime is analysed, 
and the AML regulation of cryptocurrency transactions and cryptocurrency service 
providers is assessed. As part of the assessment of the AML regime, the relevant 
authorities are also considered, first in terms of their role in the AML regime, and then 
considering how the relevant authorities are addressing cryptocurrencies. The chapter 
illustrates that Australia has addressed money laundering in accordance with 
international best practice, it is compliant with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
guidance, and in line with world leaders such as the United States (US). Australia has 
adopted a legislator led widening of the AML regulatory perimeter, which is a contrast 
to the regulator led approach in the US. The recent AML reforms are analysed, 
particularly the regulation of cryptocurrency service providers and Australia’s 
compliance with the guidance of FATF on applying a risk-based approach to 
cryptocurrencies.1 While Australia’s reforms are commended, it is also noted that the 
weaknesses of international guidance are transferred to Australia, and the potential 
intelligence available through publicly available blockchains is not utilised, as pre-
existing AML measures are applied to cryptocurrencies, rather than a tailored 
                                                     
1 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. 
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approach. The conclusions of this chapter are similar to those of chapter six in relation 
to the US. It is recommended that the United Kingdom (UK) bring its AML regulation 
up to the same standard as Australia, but that it then goes further to benefit from the 
wealth of financial intelligence available on publicly available blockchains. 
 
7.2. AML Approach 
The approach to money laundering in Australia is similar to the UK and the US;2 there 
are a number of money laundering offences which criminalise the activity, and there 
are preventative measures centred around know your customer requirements and 
suspicious activity reports. Australia began addressing money laundering in 1984, 
within a year of the US.3 The key differences between the Australian approach and 
that of the US and UK are the structure of the legislation, and the way in which 
penalties are formulated. Despite these differences, the applicability of the offences is 
similar, and Australia is largely compliant with the FATF Recommendations. 
 
7.3. Criminalising Money Laundering  
Australia has 19 money laundering offences, contained in subdivisions 400.3-9 of the 
criminal code;4 subdivision 400.9 is a single offence, and subdivisions 400.3-8 each 
contain three offences.5 This may appear to be a large number of offences, but it is a 
result of the Criminal Code categorising money laundering offences by the amounts 
                                                     
2 See chapter six. 
3 N. Ryder, Money laundering – an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-money 
laundering policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge, London, 2012) at 5.1. 
4 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3-9. 
5 ibid. 
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of money involved. Money laundering offences in Australia are arranged very 
differently to the UK and the US. The UK and the US have a small number of offences, 
and sentencing provisions allow for the appropriate sentence to be imposed, whereas 
in Australia the same three offences are repeated 6 times to prescribe sentencing 
guidelines depending on the value of money or property involved. As stated, under 
each subdivision there are three offences. Taking Subdivision 400.3 as an example, 
the first relates to the knowledge of the offender; a person is guilty of an offence if they 
deal with “money or other property”6 and they either believe it to be the “proceeds of 
crime”,7 or intends it to “become an instrument of crime.”8 In this offence the knowledge 
of the offender is the most important factor; they must believe the money, or property, 
to be the proceeds of crime. The FATF observe that money laundering penalties in 
Australia are dependant in the level of fault,9 as such the high level of knowledge 
required for this offence means it carries the highest penalty. The grading of the 
offences can be seen when the second and third offences are considered. The second 
offence requires less knowledge than the first, instead the offender must be “reckless 
as to the fact that the money or property is the proceeds of crime.”10 The third offence 
has the lowest knowledge threshold, a person will be guilty if they are “negligent as to 
the fact that the money or property is proceeds of crime”11 The lower the required level 
of knowledge required for the offence, the lesser the sentence, as can be seen in 
Figure 10 below. 
                                                     
6 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3 (1)(a). 
7 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3 (1)(b)(i). 
8 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3 (1)(b)(ii). 
9 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures - 
Australia, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 
23 July 2019 at a.3.9. 
10 Criminal Code Act 1995 Division 400.3 (2)(c). 
11 Criminal Code Act 1995 Division 400.3 (3)(c). 
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With regard to committing money laundering offences using cryptocurrencies, it must 
be determined whether cryptocurrencies satisfy the definition of either “money or other 
property.”12 As has already been discussed in this thesis, it is difficult for 
cryptocurrencies to be defined as money due to their changing value, which restricts 
their ability to satisfy the unit of account and store of value functions of money.13 
Therefore cryptocurrencies must satisfy the definition of property. The Criminal Code 
defines property as: “real or personal property of every description, whether situated 
in Australia or elsewhere and whether tangible or intangible, and includes an interest 
in any such real or personal property.”14 This definition is very broad and it is difficult 
to envisage anything failing to satisfy it; cryptocurrencies are intangible and impossible 
to possess, but the inclusion of “interest in”15 means that anything of value may be 
included. Once cryptocurrencies are established as “money or other property”16 there 
are no other limits to money laundering offences being satisfied using 
cryptocurrencies.  
 
This format, of three offences requiring decreasing levels of knowledge, is mirrored in 
Subdivisions 400.4-8, as the amounts of involved decreases so do the penalties; the 
maximum penalties for each offence in each subdivision can be seen in Figure 10 
below. 
                                                     
12 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3 (1). 
13 Functions of money are discussed in detail in chapter three at 3.5.1. 




Figure 10. Maximum Penalties for Money Laundering Offences17 
Subdivision and Value 
of money or property 
involved.  
Offence 1 Offence 2 Offence 3 
400.3 - $1,000,000 or 
more 
25 years or 1500 
penalty units, or 
both 
12 years or 720 
penalty units, or 
both 
5 years or 300 
penalty units, or 
both 
400.4 - $100,000 or 
more  
20 years or 1200 
penalty units, or 
both 
10 years or 600 
penalty units, or 
both 
4 years or 240 
penalty units, or 
both 
400.5 - $50,000 or more 15 years or 900 
penalty units, or 
both 
7 years or 420 
penalty units, or 
both 
3 years or 180 
penalty units, or 
both 
400.6 - $10,000 or more 10 years or 600 
penalty units, or 
both 
5 years or 300 
penalty units, or 
both 
2 years or 120 
penalty units, or 
both 
400.7 - $1,000 or more 5 years or 300 
penalty units, or 
both 
2 years or 120 
penalty units, or 
both 
12 months or 60 
penalty units, or 
both 
400.8 - any value 12 months or 60 
penalty units, or 
both 
6 months or 30 
penalty units, or 
both 
10 penalty units  
 
                                                     
17 Compiled using Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3-8. 
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The severity of the punishment depends on the level of knowledge and the value of 
the assets involved; the maximum prison sentence decreases by five years per 
Subdivision down the scale, or 300 penalty units. In each Subdivision offence 1 is the 
most serious, offence 2 is less serious and punishable with half the severity of offence 
1, and lastly offence three is the least severe and punishable to 20% of the offence 1 
maximum. There is a further money laundering offence at 400.9 which has no 
knowledge threshold for the offender, instead this offence is committed if “it is 
reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime.”18 If a person 
deals with property of “$100,000 or more”19 and is convicted, then they may be 
sentenced to three years imprisonment, or 180 penalty units, or both. If the property 
is worth less than £100,000 then the punishment is two years imprisonment, or 120 
penalty units, or both.20 If charged with an offence under 400.9, the burden of proof is 
reversed, it is for the defendant to prove that they had "no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the money or property was derived or realised, directly or indirectly, 
from some form of unlawful activity.”21 
 
Penalty units are used by the majority of territories in Australia as a method of issuing 
fines, with the exception of South Australia. Under the penalty unit system, a fine is 
calculated by multiplying the value of 1 penalty unit by the number of units imposed; 
this allows fines to be gradually increased in line with inflation. This was implemented 
following the recommendation of Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law 1991, which 
found that “the erosion of the value of money sooner or later causes the amount 
                                                     
18 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.9(1)(b). 
19 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.9(1)(c). 
20 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.9(1A)(c). 
21 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.9(5). 
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specified [in specific legislation] to be unrealistic.”22 Each state, or jurisdiction, may set 
the value of 1 penalty point, and Figure 11 sets out the value of 1 penalty unit in each 
jurisdiction:  
                                                     
22 H. Gibbs, R. Watson and A Menzies, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law: Fifth Interim Report 
(Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, 1991). 
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Figure 11. Value of Penalty Units across Australia23 
Jurisdiction Value of 1 Penalty Unit  
Australian Capital Territory $150 (Individual) $750 (Corporation)24 
Commonwealth25 $21026 
New South Wales $11027 
Norther Territory $15528 
Queensland Unless legislation states otherwise: £110 (State 
Offences) $75 (Local Law Infringements) 29 
South Australia N/A30 
Tasmania $16831 
Victoria $ 165.2232 
Western Australia Varies depending on the legislation in question.33 
                                                     
23 Correct as of 22 July 2019. 
24 Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s.133(2). 
25 The Commonwealth jurisdiction is the federal jurisdiction of Australia, it has national effect and the 
Federal Court has jurisdiction for offences contained in Commonwealth legislation: Federal Court of 
Australia, The Court’s Jurisdiction’ <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/jurisdiction> accessed 12 
August 2015. 
26 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.4AA(1). This will move to being calculated based on a price index from 1 
July 2020: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.4AA(3). 
27 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 17. 
28 2018/2019 value at the top of the table: Northern Territory Government: Department of Attorney 
General and Justice, ‘Penalty Units’ <https://nt.gov.au/employ/money-and-taxes/taxes,-royalties-and-
grants/territory-revenue-office/penalty-units> accessed 22 July 2019. 
29 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), ss.5-5A. 
30 South Australia does not use the penalty unit system; instead maximum prison sentences have 
corresponding maximum fines set out in: Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), s.28A. 
31 Penalty units increase yearly based on the formula B x (C D) where B is $154; C is the value of the 
CPI figure for Hobart for the December quarter immediately preceding the financial year in which the 
value of the penalty unit is to apply; and D is the value of the CPI figure for Hobart for the December 
quarter 2014: Penalty Units and Other Penalties Act 1987 (Tas), s4A(2). 
32 Monetary Units Act (Vic), s.6(a). Up to date Penalty Unit Values are published by the Victoria State 
Government: Victoria State Government: Treasury and Finance, ‘Indexation of Fees and Penalties’ 
<https://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/financial-management-government/indexation-fees-and-penalties> 
accessed 22 July 2019. 
33 No fixed value for a penalty unit exists in Western Australia. Some legislation sets its own value for 
a penalty unit such as: Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA), s.6(2). Other legislation pegs its 
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The money laundering offences are contained in the Criminal Code, which is 
Commonwealth legislation. Commonwealth legislation applies across all Australian 
jurisdictions, it is federal law,34 and the current value of 1 penalty unit is $170; 
therefore, the maximum fine for money laundering is calculated as follows: 1500 x 
£170 = $255,000. This is much lower than the fines which may be imposed in the US; 
where each of the three money laundering offences in §195635 carry maximum fines 
of “US$500,000 or twice the value”36 of the funds involved, which equates to 
approximately AU$700,000.37 However, the maximum sentence is higher than both 
the UK and the US. In the UK the maximum sentence is 14 years,38 and sentences in 
the US are up to twenty years. However, in the US numerous counts may be 
sentenced concurrently, meaning that actual sentences are often much longer. 
 
The 2015 FATF mutual evaluation report concluded that Australia was compliant with 
Recommendation 3,39 which requires members to criminalise money laundering.40 
However, the FATF criticised the effectiveness and implementation of the offences at 
                                                     
penalty unit value to that of the Commonwealth jurisdiction, such as: Australian Crime Commission 
(Western Australia) Act 2004 (WU), s.3(6). 
34 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Clause 5. 
35 18 USC §1956. 
36 18 USC §1956(a)(1) and (2). 
37 Equating to 709,773.06 AUD: XE, ‘500,000 USD to AUD = 709,773.06 Australian Dollars’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=500%2C000&From=USD&To=AUD> 
accessed 22 July 2019. 
38 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part 7, s.334. 
39 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures - 
Australia, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 
23 July 2019 at a.3.12. 
40 Financial Action Task Force, ‘The FATF Recommendations’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> 
accessed 03 September 2019, Recommendation 3 at p.10. 
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“the State and Territory level”,41 and that while Australia has utilised Division 400 
offences against natural legal persons, these offences were not being used to pursue 
corporations.42 With regards to sentencing, the FATF found that sentences were often 
“combined with sentences for predicate offences”43 and therefore difficult to assess 
the sanctions. The FATF praised the structure of Australian money laundering 
offences, noting that the varying levels of fault allows for “proportionate sanctions to 
be applied.”44 The Australian criminalisation of money laundering is compliant with 
both the FATF recommendations and UN Conventions.45 The focus of prosecutors in 
Australia was on asset seizures, and the FATF has previously observed money 
laundering being treated as a “subsidiary crime”.46 This suggests that prosecutions for 
money laundering using cryptocurrencies will take similar form, and will be attached 
to prosecutions for predicate offences. As Chaikin notes, the conviction rate improved 
between the 2005 and 2015 FATF evaluations,47 but the total number of convictions 
was still low, with 149 custodial sentences.48 The low number of convictions can be 
balanced against the relative importance of gaining prosecutions for the predicate 
offences, Chaikin questions the bias of the FATF, suggesting that it is immaterial which 
offence a criminal is prosecuted for between the original criminal behaviour and the 
management of the proceeds of crime.49 The argument that any conviction is better 
                                                     
41 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures - 
Australia, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 
23 July 2019 at a.3.1. 
42 ibid at 3.52. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 cf Ryder (n3) at 5.6. 
46 ibid. 
47 D. Chaikin, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures with 
Reference to Australia’ in C. King, C, Walker and J. Gurulé, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and 
Terrorism Financing Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) at p308.  
48 ibid. 
49 ibid at p309. 
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than no conviction is a valid one, but only where the offender has committed the 
predicate offence, it is less applicable in organised crime where the money laundering 
operation is separated from the predicate offences. As identified in chapter five at 
5.4.1, Rider observes that money laundering by professional accomplices has been 
occurring for decades.50 The importance of pursuing money laundering alone is 
important as the “modern money launderer is unlikely to be involved as a member of 
a criminal organisation”51 instead they are likely to be within the financial services 
industry and “prepared to make his services available to whoever is willing to pay.”52 
Australia has criminalised money laundering in line with the FATF guidelines, and the 
offences are drafted widely enough so that using cryptocurrencies to disguise 
proceeds of crime will satisfy the money laundering offences. As identified in chapter 
five, the UK offences are also applicable to cryptocurrencies, and while the Australian 
approach to criminalising money laundering is structurally different to the UK, 
ultimately the same effect is achieved. Given that it is possible to launder money 
through cryptocurrencies, focus will now turn to the preventative measures designed 
to prevent and detect money laundering in Australia. 
 
7.4. Preventative Measures 
Australia’s preventative measures are contained within the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter Terrorist Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act 2006).53 As in the UK and 
the US, the key preventive measures are customer identification procedures and 
                                                     
50 B. Rider, ‘The practical and legal aspects of interdicting the flow of dirty money’ (1996) 3(3) JFC 
234 at 241. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006. 
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reporting obligations. Customer due diligence (CDD), also known as know your 
customer, is identified by Chaikin a one of the “pillars of the anti-money laundering 
regime”54 and observes that the concept pre-dates recognised AML law.55 Likewise, 
Demetriades states that CDD is "vital for the prevention of money laundering.”56 The 
reporting obligation in Australia take two forms, suspicious matter reports, and 
threshold transactions, as in the US, threshold transactions are imposed as obligatory 
reporting regardless of suspicion.  
 
7.4.1. Threshold Transactions  
Australia, like the US, makes reporting certain transactions compulsory through 
Threshold Transaction Report (TTRs). Section 43 of the AML/CTF Act 2006 stipulates 
that if a reporting entity “provides, a designated service,”57 which “involves a threshold 
transaction”58 it “must, within 10 business days after the day on which the transaction 
takes place, give the AUSTRAC CEO a report of the transaction.”59 The threshold is 
set at $10,000 for either physical currency or an electronic transfer,60 which is the 
same threshold used in the US, however the exchange rate means the threshold in 
Australia is lower in real terms, at approximately 7,000 USD.61 The threshold for 
reporting one-off transactions is lower than the one recommended by the FATF, who 
                                                     
54 D. Chaikin, ‘Risk-Based Approaches to Combatting Financial Crime’ (2009) 8(2) Journal of Law and 
Financial Crime 20 at 22. 
55 ibid. 
56 G. Demetriades, ‘”Is the person who he claims to be?” old fashion due diligence may give the 
correct answer!’ (2016) 19(1) JMLC 79. 
57 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Part 3 s.43(1)(a). 
58 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Part 3 s.43(1)(b). 
59 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Part 3 s.43(2). 
60 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act 2006 Part 1 s.5: Definitions. 
61 Based on an exchange rate of 1 AUD = 0.7007376: XE, ‘1 AUD to USD = 0.700376 US Dollars’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=AUD&To=USD> accessed 23 
July 2019. 
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recommend threshold reporting where the transactions exceed USD/EUR 15,000.62 
Australia has set a threshold which is approximately 33% of the value in the FATF 
guidance. Each country is the best placed to set a threshold for their jurisdiction, based 
on their application of a risk-based approach, but by setting the threshold lower, more 
reports will be made to the financial intelligence unit (FIU). Australia’s FIU is the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). Despite the low 
threshold, TTR volumes have been steadily reducing, as Figure 12 shows. The 
number of reports was notably higher in 2010/11, which could be related to the 
transition from reporting under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1988,63 to the 
AML/CTF Act 2006.64 The UK does not implement threshold reporting, and given the 
resourcing limitations identified in the UKFIU, it is not advisable for the UK to adopt 
this measure. It is not clear how threshold reports will assist the UK in combatting the 
money laundering threat posed by cryptocurrencies.  
 
                                                     
62 US$15,000 equates to approximately AU$21,500: Based on an exchange rate of 1 AUD = 
0.7007376 USD: XE, ‘1 AUD to USD = 0.700376 US Dollars’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=AUD&To=USD> accessed 23 
July 2019. €15,000 equates to approximately AU$23,900: Based on an exchange rate of 1 AUD = 
0.628131 EUR: XE, ‘1 AUD to EUR = 0.628131 Euros’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=EUR&To=AUD> accessed 23 
July 2019. 
63 Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1988. 
64 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006. 
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Figure 12. Annual Threshold Transaction Report Volume65 
 
7.4.2. Reports of Suspicious Matters  
Australia requires regulated institutions to report matter which are suspicious, this is 
the consistent with the UK and the US. Where the UK and the US have specific 
provisions for reporting suspected money laundering, the Australian AML/CTF Act 
2006 includes a widely drafted reporting requirement, which not only requires reporting 
entities to report if they suspect money laundering, but also if they suspect terrorist 
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financing, fraud, and tax evasion. A reporting entity must submit a suspicious matter 
report (SMR) within “3 business days after the day on which the reporting entity forms 
the relevant suspicion.”66  
 
No legal definition exists for suspicion, but AUSTRAC provides an extensive list of 
potential situations in which require a SMR to be submitted.67 The behaviours listed 
focus on customers acting unusually68 or out of character,69 undertaking transactions 
which are either illogical70 or lacking business rationale,71 and transacting in high 
volume72 or high value,73 or making a number of transactions just below the TTR 
threshold,74 which is referred to as smurfing.75 While examples are helpful, this still 
falls short of a definition of suspicion, which is a common problem for AML regimes, 
and a problem shared with the UK and US.76 In the US, a similar approach is taken to 
Australia, with ‘Red Flag’ incidents highlighted by the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN)77 which address similar instances as provided by AUSTRAC.78 The 
                                                     
66 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Part 3 s.41(2)(a). 
67 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Typologies and Case Studies Report 2014’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-07/typologies-report-2014.pdf> accessed 24 July 
2019 Appendix A. 
68 Examples 1 and 17 refer to unusual transactions: AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Typologies and Case 
Studies Report 2014’ <https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-07/typologies-report-
2014.pdf> accessed 24 July 2019 Appendix A. 
69 ibid, examples 15 refers to sudden changes in a customer’s gambling. 
70 ibid, examples 6 and 16 refer to actions lacking logical reasoning. 
71 ibid, examples 7 and 18 refer to transaction slacking business rationale. 
72 ibid, example 9 refers to frequency, example 6 refers to volume, examples 10 refers to multiple 
transfers, and example 12 refers to regular or multiple transactions. 
73 ibid, example 6 refers to high-value transfers. 
74 ibid, examples 10 and 13 refer to transactions being just below £10,000. 
75 M. Goldby, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Requirements Imposed by English Law: Measuring 
Effectiveness and Gauging the Need for Reform’ (2013) 4 Journal of Business Law 367 at 394. 
76 Goldby discussed the problematic term suspicious in: M. Goldby, ‘Anti-Money Laundering 
Reporting Requirements Imposed by English Law: Measuring Effectiveness and Gauging the Need 
for Reform’ (2013) 4 Journal of Business Law 367 at 368-373. 
77 FinCEN, ‘Reporting Suspicious Activity – A Quick Reference Guide for Money Services Businesses’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/msbsar_quickrefguide.pdf> accessed 14 
December 2015. 
78 See chapter six at 6.4.2 for examples of FinCEN Red Flags. 
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UK also struggles with the concept of suspicion, which inflates the volume of reports 
submitted to the FIU.79 The Law Commission identify the low threshold for suspicion, 
80 the criminal liability for failure to report, 81 and the lack of a clear definition82 as the 
factors causing over reporting. The volume of reports in Australia is considerably lower 
than in the UK, as can be seen in Figure 13 below. 
 
Figure 13. Suspicious Matter Report Volume83 
 
                                                     
79 See chapter five at 5.4.2 for discussion of the UK interpretation of suspicion. 
80 Law Commission, Anti-money laundering: the SARs regime (Law Com No 384, 2018) para 5.11. 
81 ibid at para 5.12. 
82 ibid at para 5.13. 
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It can be seen in Figure 13 above, that the volume of reports has been consistent, 
approximately 75,000 SMRs per year between 2014-2017, having risen from an 
average of around 45,000 during 2010-2013, however, there has been a dramatic rise 
in SMRs 2017/18. Even with the recent rise in numbers, these volumes are far lower 
than the in the UK where over 400,000 suspicious activity reports are filed each year.84 
Australian SMRs figures for 2018/19 are not available at the time of writing, and it is 
not possible to ascertain whether the 2017/18 volume is a sign of a new norm; it could 
be a reaction to the high-profile enforcement action from AUSTRAC. In November 
2017 Tabcorp was fined $45million,85 and in June 2018 Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia was fined $700million,86 in what were viewed as landmark rulings.87 
Tabcorp’s failings included not having a compliant AML program for over three years88 
and failing to submit SMRs either “on time or at all on 105 occasions.”89 Similarly, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s failings included, but were not limited to, three 
years of failing to monitor 778,370 accounts,90 continuing business with customers it 
was aware were suspected of money laundering,91 and failing to submit SMRs 
                                                     
increase of approximately 7% in SMRs from 2014-15 to 2015-16 reported in AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC 
Annual Report 2015-16’ <https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-
05/AUSTRAC_annual_report_2015-16.pdf> accessed 24 July 2019 at p.76, AUSTRAC Annual 
Report 2014-15 in unavailable. 
84 See Figure 6 in chapter five at 5.4.2 for annul SARs volumes in the UK. 
85 Chief Executive Officer of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v TAB Limited (No 3) 
[2017] FCA 1296. 
86 Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited [2018] FCA 930. 
87 P Durkin, ‘70pc jump in suspicious money laundering transactions: AUSTRAC’ Financial Review 
(Melbourne, 18 October 2018) <https://www.afr.com/business/banking-and-finance/70pc-jump-in-
suspicious-money-laundering-transactions-austrac-20181018-h16szs> accessed 24 July 2019. 
88 AUSTRAC, ‘Record $45 million civil penalty ordered against Tabcorp’ (16 September 2019) 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/record-45-million-civil-penalty-ordered-against-tabcorp> accessed 22 
October 2019. 
89 ibid. 
90 AUSTARC, ‘AUSTRAC and CBA agree $700m penalty’ (4 June 2018) 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/austrac-and-cba-agree-700m-penalty> accessed 22 October 2019. 
91 ibid. 
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involving transactions totalling over $10million.92 These sanctions could prove to be a 
spur for other regulated entities to adhere to reporting requirements, as suggested by 
a 70% increase in SMRs in 2018,93 but it could also be that reporting entities are 
adopting a defensive reporting strategy, rather than engaging with the AML provisions. 
It is not possible for this thesis to prove defensive reporting is taking place, but 
Australia has a history of over-reporting. Jensen observed in 2005 that AUSTRAC 
received a “very high volume of data compared to other FIUs around the world”94 which 
was in part down to TTRs, as these are mandatory regardless of suspicion. As 
identified in chapters five and six in relation to the UK and US, the issue of defensive 
reporting has been identified by Levi in the 1990s,95 by McNeil in the early 2000s,96 
and Ryder in 2012.97 Given the severity of the potential sanctions for non-compliance, 
it is likely that cryptocurrency businesses which are regulated by AUSTRAC, will adopt 
a similar approach to the institutions in the traditional financial system. The effects of 
applying the SMR regime to cryptocurrencies cannot be assessed yet due to the 
limited timeframe, and lack of published data, but it demonstrates an attempt to apply 
AML regulation to cryptocurrency activity, and the UK could follow Australia’s lead. 
 
                                                     
92 ibid. 
93 P Durkin, ‘70pc jump in suspicious money laundering transactions: AUSTRAC’ Financial Review 
(Melbourne, 18 October 2018) <https://www.afr.com/business/banking-and-finance/70pc-jump-in-
suspicious-money-laundering-transactions-austrac-20181018-h16szs> accessed 24 July 2019. 
94 N. Jensen, ‘Technology and Intelligence’ (2005) 8(3) JMLC 227 at 236. 
95 M. Levi, ‘Evaluating the “New Policing”: Attacking the Money Trail of Organized Crime’ (1997) 30(1) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1 at 9. 
96 C. McNeil, ‘The Australian Anti-Money Laundering Reform in the International Context’ (2007) 22(6) 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 340 at 341. 
97 cf Ryder (n3) at 5.8. 
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7.4.3. Customer Due Diligence  
The AML/CTF Act 2006 requires reporting entities to comply with CDD requirements, 
as does the AML legislation of the UK and the US. Australia is different from the other 
two jurisdictions in that it requires all reporting entities to complete a written risk 
assessment. Under s.165 of the AML/CTF Act 2006, a civil penalty may be imposed if 
a written risk assessment is not submitted.98 The risk assessment should seek to 
identify,99 mitigate,100 and manage101 the potential risks of money laundering affecting 
the reporting entity’s business. 
 
Reporting entities are also expected to gather specific information from their 
customers in order to identify them; s.27 of Part 2 of the AML/CTF Act 2006102 requires 
regulated entities to verify the identity of their customers, and complete ongoing due 
diligence.103 As identified in chapter four, Chaikin finds fault with CDD, particularly for 
its Western approach, arguing that this is ineffective for ethic groups who use different 
naming systems.104 Additionally the assumption that customers will be honest can be 
questioned; there are no legal requirements for customers to provide full disclosure of 
the names they use or the accounts they have opened.105 As identified in chapter 
five,106 Irwin and Dawson highlight that “cybercriminals are likely to be comfortable 
                                                     
98 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Part 13 Division 8 s.165 
99 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Part 13 Division 8 
s.165(6)(b)(i). 
100 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Part 13 Division 8 
s.165(6)(b)(ii). 
101 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Part 13 Division 8 
s.165(6)(b)(iii). 
102 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Part 2. 
103 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, Part 2, s.27. 
104 cf Chaikin (n54) at 23. 
105 ibid. 
106 See chapter five at 5.4.1. 
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obtaining fraudulent documents”107 which can defeat CDD, and that the high cost of 
implementing extensive identification processes is not proportionate to those making 
small cryptocurrency payments.108 CDD requirements are also vulnerable to 
professional money launders, long prior to the existence of CDD individuals have 
offered services to ‘clean’ money, as observed by Rider.109 Such individuals will be 
likely to pass CDD checks without drawing attention to themselves, undermining the 
AML measures. Cryptocurrencies provide a further tool to money launderers who do 
not commit the predicate offences. It has been identified already in this thesis that 
cryptocurrencies provide users with mechanisms to conceal their identity,110 therefore 
applying CDD requirements to cryptocurrency businesses will be more difficult than 
for the traditional financial institutions. Irwin and Turner recommend a more joined up 
approach for cryptocurrencies, calling for “information sharing between multiple 
stakeholders from the law enforcement, financial intelligence units, cyber security 
organisations and fintech industry.”111 Improved CDD data will aid in determining when 
a SMR is required, but there are currently no signs such an approach is forthcoming. 
 
The Australian approach is risk-based, so the level of information required from each 
customer will depend on the risks involved; however, a minimum level of information 
                                                     
107 A. S. M. Irwin, and C. Dawson, ‘Following the cyber money trail: Global challenges when 
investigating ransomware attacks and how regulation can help’ (2019) 22(1) JMLC 110 at 125. 
108 ibid. 
109 cf Rider (n50) at 241. 
110 The anonymity attached to cryptocurrencies is addressed by the US Government Accountability 
Office in their 2014 report, which described such currencies as pseudonymous, as the although the 
users name is not known, other details are published on the blockchain; such as their Bitcoin address, 
the time of the transaction, and the amount: United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual 
Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 16 December 2015 at p.6. 
111 A. S. M. Irwin and A. B. Tuner, ‘Illicit Bitcoin transactions: challenges in getting to the who, what, 
when and where’ (2018) 21(3) JMLC 297 at 310. 
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is required from all customers. The minimum information includes the customer’s 
name,112 date of birth,113 and address.114 In addition to the minimum information, each 
reporting entity must utilise its risk assessment to determine when additional CDD 
information is required.115 The risk-based approach is also employed in both the UK 
and the US, and it is recommended by the FATF and the EU. The level of risk 
associated with cryptocurrencies is difficult to quantify. The applicability of these 
measures to cryptocurrencies needs to be considered to determine whether there are 
gaps in the law that may be exploited for money laundering purposes.  
 
7.5. Applicability of Preventative Measures to 
Cryptocurrencies  
For the purpose of the money laundering offences in Australia, cryptocurrencies will 
satisfy the requirement for dealings “with money or other property,”116 and the offences 
are applicable This was not the case for AML measures, as cryptocurrencies service 
providers fell outside of the list of designated services of the Anti‑Money Laundering 
and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006.117 This was highlighted in the 2016 
statutory review of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 
                                                     
112 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No. 1) Para 
4.2.3.(1). 
113 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No. 1) Para 
4.2.3.(2). 
114 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No. 1) Para 
4.2.3.(3). 
115 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No. 1) Para 
4.2.5. 
116 Criminal Code Act 1995 Subdivision 400.3(1)(a). 
117 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.6. 
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2006.118 It was noted that the only possible way for cryptocurrencies to be regulated 
was through the definition of ‘e-currency’ in s.6,119 which did not cover “decentralised 
crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin, because crypto-currencies are backed by an 
algorithm rather than a physical thing.”120 This gap was also highlighted by the 
Attorney General’s Department report on the statutory review. 121 The statutory review 
recommended that the definition of an e-currency should be expanded to include 
convertible digital currencies, specifically to cover cryptocurrencies.122 The 2016 
statutory review led to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Amendment Bill 2017,123 which became the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2017.124 The 2017 amendment inserted “digital 
currency”125 into the definitions section, and the definition of a digital currency follows 
that of the FATF. A digital currency performs the functions of money,126 while not 
issued by a government or authority,127 and it is interchangeable with money.128 
Importantly, to distinguish from shop vouchers or local currencies, the definition also 
requires the currency to be available to the public without restriction on its use as 
consideration.129 The 2017 amendment also inserted the terms “registered digital 
                                                     
118 Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, ‘Report on The Statutory Review of The Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 And Associated Rules and 
Regulations’ <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/how-to-engage-us-subsite/files/report-on-the-statutory-
review-of-the-anti-money-laundering.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019. 
119 ibid at p.45. 
120 ibid. 
121 ibid at p.46. 
122 ibid at p.49. 
123 Parliament of Australia, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 
2017’ 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/billsdgs/5592699/upload_binary/5592699.pd
f;fileType=application/pdf> accessed 16 July 2019. 
124 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2017. 
125 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
126 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5, Digital Currency (a)(i). 
127 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5, Digital Currency (a)(ii). 
128 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5, Digital Currency (a)(iii). 
129 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5, Digital Currency (a)(iv). 
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currency exchange provider”130 and “registrable digital currency exchange service”131 
which recognise the existence of cryptocurrency service providers. 
In addition to providing statutory definitions for the purposes of money laundering 
legislation, the 2017 amendment adds digital currency exchange services to the list of 
designated services, which are regulated by the Act.132 The 2017 reforms mean that 
Australia is compliant with the FATF guidance issued in 2019,133 long before the 
guidance was released. This demonstrates that Australia is proactive in seeking to 
understand cryptocurrencies, the risks they pose, and how to regulate them. 
Legislators in Australia are also utilising guidance from consultation papers and 
international organisations. The UK should look to the approach taken in Australia as 
an example of good practice to follow. Australia’s AML regulation of cryptocurrencies 
is not complete, but by adhering to FATF guidance, a clear, and welcome, starting 
point has been established, from which it can build more tailored regulation. As has 
been identified throughout this thesis, combatting money laundering, and any crime 
for that matter, has two clear requirements, appropriate laws, and appropriate 
enforcement. Having considered the applicability of Australian legislation, attention 
now must turn to the relevant authorities that are responsible for enforcing the law. 
 
                                                     
130 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
131 ibid. 
132 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.6(2) Item 50A. 
133 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. 
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7.6. Authorities 
In this section, the relevant authorities which make up Australia’s AML approach will 
be identified. After that the relevant authorities’ responses to cryptocurrencies will be 
analysed. Regulatory bodies can be categorised into primary and secondary 
authorities; primary authorities set AML policy, and secondary authorities are 
enforcement agencies, regulatory agencies and financial intelligence units. A third 
category, tertiary authorities, is also recognised by Ryder;134 tertiary agencies may 
include “trade associations and professions which are threatened by illegal 
transactions.”135 Cryptocurrencies are in their infancy compared to industries and 
professions within the traditional financial system, but the Australian Digital Commerce 
Association (ADCA) is identified here as a tertiary body. While an array of authorities 
have responsibilities for tackling money laundering in Australia, this section will identify 
the relevant authorities with regards to cryptocurrencies and money laundering.  
 
7.6.1. Primary 
Attorney General’s Department 
Australia only has one primary agency, as recognised by the FATF’s mutual evaluation 
report in 2015;136 the Attorney General’s Department (AGD), which manages AML 
policy and makes recommendations, as identified by Ryder.137 The FATF identify the 
                                                     
134 cf Ryder (n3) at p.25. 
135 ibid. 
136 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Australia – Mutual Evaluation Report – April 2015’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 
05 September 2019 at p.36. 
137 cf Ryder (n3) at p.110. 
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AGD as having “policy responsibility for AML/CTF”138 as well as being “Australia’s 
central authority for extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.”139 The 
AGD states that it “delivers programs and policies to maintain and improve Australia's 
law and justice framework,”140 in this capacity, similarly to HM Treasury in the UK, 
AGD will conduct public consultations, and make recommendations based on these 
consultations. The AGD’s most recent review of the AML/CTF regime was published 
in April 2016,141 and recommends simplifying reporting procedures and strengthening 
enforcement measures.142 The report also identified money laundering risks posed by 
cryptocurrencies,143 which is discussed at 7.7.3 below.  
 
7.6.2. Secondary 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
AUSTRAC is “Australia's financial intelligence unit (FIU) with regulatory responsibility 
for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing.”144 As the FIU, all TTRs 
and SAR’s are sent to AUSTRAC, and AUSTRAC then attempts to “join the dots to 
provide a complete financial intelligence picture,”145 and the “resulting financial 
                                                     
138 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Australia – Mutual Evaluation Report – April 2015’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 
05 September 2019 at p.36. 
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intelligence is provided to partner agencies.”146 As has been seen in relation the UK 
and the US, the numbers of transaction reports sent to the FIU are very high; in 2014-
2015 AUSTRAC received 96,369,657 transaction reports,147 91,423,681 of which are 
International Funds Transfer Instruction (IFTI) reports, which are obligatory if “a 
reporting entity sends or receives an instruction to or from a foreign country, to transfer 
money or property.”148 Similarly to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK, 
and FinCEN in the US, AUSTRAC makes rules which regulated entities must follow, 
this power is vested in the CEO of AUSTRAC, but all rule changes are developed with 
relevant stakeholders.149 The FATF describe AUSTRAC as a “well-functioning”150 FIU, 
praising the volume of transaction data AUSTRAC holds and the integration with other 
authorities, particularly with regards to data sharing.151 A criticism levelled by the FATF 
is that the information AUSTRAC maintains is not utilised frequently enough by law 
enforcement.152 AUSTRAC has powers of enforcement, through the AML/CFT Act 
2006,153 which it utilised in November 2017 when Tabcorp was fined $45million,154 
and in June 2018 when the Commonwealth Bank of Australia was fined $700million.155 
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However, the large fines in recent years are viewed in the press as landmark rulings,156 
and the list of AUSTRAC enforcement actions is short, particularly when compared to 
FinCEN in the US157 and the FCA in the UK.158 As outlined in below at 7.7.4. 
AUSTRAC is responsible for the AML regulation of cryptocurrency service providers 
and the FCA may look to the experiences of AUSTRAC in executing its own regulation 
from 2021.159 
 
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC)  
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) is the national criminal 
intelligence agency of Australia.160 The purpose of the ACIC is to “collect intelligence 
to improve the national ability to respond to crime impacting Australia”,161 it operates 
on a national level and with international counterparts.162 The ACIC is comparable to 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) in the UK, specialising in organised crime and being 
the “conduit for sharing criminal information and intelligence between all state, territory 
and Commonwealth law enforcement agencies.”163 As the ACIC identify, “[m]oney 
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laundering is the common element in almost all serious and organised crime”164 
therefore it is of paramount concern to the ACIC. The ACIC is a law enforcement 
authority, it will investigate cryptocurrencies with regard to organised crime, but does 
not have a supervisory role over any regulated entities.  
 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
Policing is principally undertaken at a state level, especially if the crime concerned is 
wholly committed in one state; the role of the AFP is to enforce “Commonwealth 
criminal law [and] contribute to combating organised crime.”165 The AFP is also 
“Australia's international law enforcement and policing representative.”166 The AFP is 
the head of the Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce (CACT), which pursues criminal 
assets and seeks to seize these assets; it successfully seized $62.5 million in 2012-
2013.167 In its role as Australia’s international law enforcement and policing 
representative, the AFP is Australia’s Terrorism Financing Investigations Unit 
(TFIU).168 As with the ACIC, the AFP is not a supervisory authority, but will take part 
in money laundering investigations. UK police have achieved successes in pursuing 
money laundering where cryptocurrencies have been used, and examples of best 
practice should be shared between international counterparts. 
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Australian Digital Commerce Association (ADCA) 
A recognisable tertiary body representing cryptocurrencies in Australia is the ADCA,169 
which describes itself as the “industry body that represents Australian businesses and 
other organisations participating in the digital economy through blockchain 
technology.”170 The ADCA promotes the use of blockchain in both private and public 
sectors in Australia,171 and published a code of conduct172 in February 2016,173 which 
it updated in November 2016. The code of conduct addresses money laundering, and 
its provisions are in line with the guidance from the FATF. It is clearly a positive step 
that such a code of conduct exists, and is endorsed by a national industry association, 
but the code is a voluntary one,174 and as such does not carry any force. The ADCA 
occupies a similar position to Crypto UK, which is the “self-regulatory trade 
association”175 for the crypto currency sector in the UK. 
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7.7. AML Regulation of Cryptocurrencies  
As is the case in the UK and the US, policy makers and legislators have considered 
the development of cryptocurrencies in Australia,176 particularly the tax treatment of 
Bitcoin. However, Australia has gone further than the UK and the US, and has 
addressed cryptocurrencies through legislation. Reforms to the AML/CTF Act 2006177 
have widened the scope of AML regulation in Australia to cover cryptocurrency service 
providers; the approach of the relevant authorities will be considered in this section. In 
chapter five is was seen that the US application of AML regulation to cryptocurrencies 
was regulator led, this section analyses the Australian response, which has been 
legislator led. The UK should consider the response of Australia as a useful example 
when legislating with regard to cryptocurrencies, as the UK will be required to legislate 
in order to implement the EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which widens the 
AML regulatory perimeter to include cryptocurrency service providers.  
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7.7.1. Australian Taxation Office  
The ATO initially issued guidance on the “tax treatment of crypto-currencies in 
Australia – specifically Bitcoin”178 in 2014, and found such cryptocurrencies not to be 
money.  
“The ATO’s view is that Bitcoin is neither money nor a foreign currency, and the 
supply of bitcoin is not a financial supply for goods and services tax (GST) 
purposes. Bitcoin is, however, an asset for capital gains tax (CGT) 
purposes.”179 
 
GST is a 10% tax rate, and this ruling by the ATO had a number of implications for the 
use of cryptocurrencies in the course of a business. Firstly, when receiving Bitcoins in 
payment for goods and services “a business may be charged GST on that Bitcoin.”180 
Additionally a business would incur tax liability when paying for good and services 
using Bitcoin. As the 2014 ruling stated that “GST is payable on the supply of bitcoin 
made in the course or furtherance of your enterprise,”181 GST would be payable for 
any cryptocurrency exchange services provided. It is not unreasonable to expect all 
businesses to pay tax where appropriate; the issue for cryptocurrency service 
providers is that the 2014 ruling led to them be being taxed twice. The ATO has since 
changed its position in relation to cryptocurrencies and GST, from 1st July 2017 sales 
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and purchases of cryptocurrencies are not subject to GST.182 This removes the issue 
of double taxation and shows an adaptable approach from the Australian authorities. 
The tax treatment of Bitcoin, and the negative feedback it received, was a factor in 
instigating Australia’s legislative reform, and the 2014 ruling was highlighted to 
parliament during the consultations on reform.183  
 
7.7.2. Australian Parliament  
Criticisms of the 2014 ATO ruling were made clear to a parliament committee when 
the issue of regulating cryptocurrencies was considered; the Bitcoin Foundation and 
Bitcoin Association of Australia184 submitted their concerns to the Senate Economics 
References Committee in 2015,185 arguing that “GST would be applied to the goods 
or services being provided, in addition to the 'supply' of the digital currency used as 
payment.”186 It was argued by Bitcoin supporters that double taxation of 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, effected the competitiveness of Australian based 
companies dealing in cryptocurrencies; “CoinJar, an Australian digital finance start-
up, noted that the ATO's GST ruling had rendered it 'uncompetitive against non-
Australian rivals'.”187 In light of these arguments, and other submissions from 
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cryptocurrency service providers and academics,188 the committee recommended 
“digital currency should be treated as money for the purposes of the goods and 
services tax.”189 The committee recommend that this should be achieved by 
“amending the definition of money in the A New Tax System (Goods and Services 
Tax) Act 1999 and including digital currency in the definition of financial supply in A 
New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999.”190 In light of the 
recommendations from the committee report, the Government response stated that 
the double taxation issue would be addressed,191 as the withdrawing of the ATO 2014 
ruling demonstrates this. The approach of the Australian Government has been 
reactive and flexible to cryptocurrencies, shown through its use of recommendations 
from the committee report.  
 
The committee reviewed a wide range of issues pertaining to cryptocurrencies, both 
risks and benefits. In relation to the benefits of cryptocurrencies, the committee found 
little benefit to the speed and cost savings that cryptocurrencies offer; the committee 
considered that although “digital currencies offer numerous advantages, their benefits 
are not as significant in the Australian context.”192 The Australian Payments Clearing 
Association (APCA) argued “Australia's payment system is already overwhelmingly 
digital in nature, with only about 18 per cent of Australian currency existing in physical 
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form.” The committee report also cites the already low cost of transactions in Australia, 
claiming that there “is little room for digital currencies to improve on domestic point-of-
sale purchases, which account for around 40 per cent of all transactions by value.”193 
The committee did see benefits from cryptocurrencies, particularly the distributed 
public ledger introduced by Bitcoin,194 and the APCA advice to the committee was that 
this was “worth exploring and understanding the implications of.”195 The committee 
identified a number of risks relating to cryptocurrencies, not dissimilar to the concerns 
of the US, the key risks identified were: tax evasion,196 financial stability,197 price 
volatility,198 pseudo-anonymity,199 and criminal activity.200 
 
The committee found that the taxation issues were similar to that of cash as it may go 
unreported,201 this is clearly a money laundering concern as transactions within 
blockchains will not be reported. By including cryptocurrency service providers in the 
regulatory remit of AUSTRAC, a proportion of transactions will be reported, but the 
majority of transactions within cryptocurrency networks will remain unregulated and 
outside of the AML regime. This is because transactions within cryptocurrency 
networks are entirely automated, and there is no opportunity for the transaction to be 
reported before it is completed. 
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The committee considered the issue of financial stability but this was largely dismissed 
due to the size of cryptocurrency holdings, and transactions, in relation to fiat currency, 
being relatively small compared to fiat currency.202 Additionally, the price volatility 
argument was discussed; the committee received numerous submissions that 
“referred to the price instability of Bitcoin,”203 which may mean cryptocurrencies are 
“not be suited for direct consumer interaction.”204 A counter argument was also 
submitted, arguing that the increased use of cryptocurrencies worldwide means that 
the “volatility is reducing.”205 The committee stopped short of describing 
cryptocurrencies as anonymous, instead a similar term as in the US was used; 
pseudo-anonymous.206 This is because “[d]igital currencies such as Bitcoin do not 
provide complete anonymity for users,”207 but the use of a public key, rather than the 
users identity, does act as a layer of disguise to the users. As a result, the committee 
was informed that the AFP is “concerned that pseudo-anonymity and the ability to 
conduct digital currency transactions outside the regulated financial framework would 
make it difficult to determine the true owners of digital currencies.”208 The AFP also 
submitted advice in relation to the criminal risks posed by cryptocurrencies, identifying 
four main types of crimes being investigated, which were; theft of Bitcoin via hacking; 
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the payment for the importation of illicit narcotics using Bitcoin via major online black 
marketplaces such as Silk Road; Bitcoin being used as payment in domestic supply 
and trafficking of narcotics; and money laundering and dealing with the proceeds of 
crime via Bitcoin.209 It is clear that the Australian authorities are concerned about the 
potential to launder money through cryptocurrencies, but the committee heard from 
the AFP that despite the risks “digital currencies were not currently a significant 
operational issue,”210 but if “digital currencies become more widely used, it could 
become an issue in the future.”211 The committee gave a cautious conclusion, 
acknowledging both the benefits and the risks of cryptocurrencies. The committee 
supported the application of AML regulation to cryptocurrencies; it recommended a 
“statutory review considers applying AML/CTF regulations to digital currency 
exchanges.”212  
 
The advice of the committee was adopted, a statutory review in 2016 ultimately led to 
an amendment of the AML/CTF Act 2006 in 2017.213 The 2017 amendment inserted 
“digital currency”214 into the definitions section, and the definition of a digital currency 
follows that of the FATF, focussing on the functions of money being performed, but 
without a government or authority backing the currency.215 The terms “registered 
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digital currency exchange provider”216 and “registrable digital currency exchange 
service”217 were also added to the 2006 Act, which recognise the existence of service 
based cryptocurrency service providers. The list of designated services which are 
regulated by the AML/CTF Act 2006 now covers cryptocurrency exchange services.218 
The 2017 reforms mean that Australia is compliant with the FATF guidance issued in 
2019,219 before the guidance was released. The UK has undertaken consultations on 
broader issue of cryptocurrencies,220 and the more specific issue of AML regulation of 
cryptocurrencies.221 The responses in the UK consultations were similar to that of the 
Australian consultation process, cryptocurrencies were identified as having potentially 
criminal uses,222 and found to pose money laundering risks due to the levels of 
anonymity.223 However, despite the UK consulting at a similar time to Australia, it did 
not go on to enact reforms to address cryptocurrency money laundering concerns until 
it was required to by the EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The reforms to the 
AML/CTF Act 2006 demonstrate proactivity from the Australian law makers, in 
commissioning reviews and being ahead of international best practice, compared the 
lacklustre reaction in the UK. The Australian reforms are limited, as the effect of the 
updated legislation is to simply apply existing AML regulation to cryptocurrency service 
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providers, which indicates a lack of understanding of cryptocurrencies. The UK should 
follow the start that Australia has made in applying AML regulation to cryptocurrencies, 
which it is required to do by the EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 224 
 
7.7.3. Attorney General’s Department  
The Attorney General’s Department (AGD) undertook a statutory review of the 
AML/CTF Act 2006 in 2016,225 the subsequent report identified similar money 
laundering risks posed by cryptocurrencies, as those identified by the Senate 
Economics References Committee,226 particularly that the AML/CTF Act 2006 did not 
regulate cryptocurrencies.227 In light of the money laundering risks of cryptocurrencies, 
the AGD recommended that AUSTRAC monitored the risks posed by new payment 
methods, that the AML/CTF Act 2006 be amended to cover digital wallets and digital 
currencies not backed by a physical thing. The AGD also said that the Act should also 
be amended so as to include activities relating to digital currencies in the list of 
designated services.228 The AGD made it clear that cryptocurrencies should be 
brought under the AML/CTF regime, but did differ from the Senate report on one detail, 
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amending the definition of money. The AGD made no mention of the Senate 
Economics References Committee’s recommendation to amend the definition of 
money, which would have caused cryptocurrencies to become one of the designated 
services of the AML/CTF Act 2006.229 The AGD instead proposed an amendment of 
the definition of ‘e-currency’ in order to make AML measures applicable to 
cryptocurrency service providers. It can be seen from the 2017 amendments to the 
AML/CTF Act 2006, that instead of taking the AGD’s suggestion, the term “digital 
currency”230 has been inserted into the definitions section, which addresses the 
recommendation that digital currencies should be covered by the Act. The AGDs 
recommendation in relation to the inclusion of digital currency services being included 
on the list of designated services was followed, so digital currencies are now regulated 
by the Act. The AGD’s role does not involve directly enforcing the law, its 
recommendations for reform have been implemented and it is AUSTRACs 
responsibility to regulate and enforce the AML/CTF 2006. 
 
7.7.4. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
AUSTRAC made submissions to the Senate Economics References Committee, 
providing advice on the risk they pose and the potential ways in which they may be 
regulated. AUSTRAC recognised the risks posed by digital currencies, but did not see 
digital currencies as such a threat that would see AUSTRAC demanding to 
government that "[i]t is imperative that you give us sight over this.”231 Similarly to the 
                                                     
229 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act 2006 Part 1 s.6, Table 1. 
230 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
231 Parliament of Australia, ‘Digital Currency – Game Changer or bit player’ (August 2015) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Digital_currency/~/
 334 
AGD, AUSTRAC also told the committee that regulating cryptocurrencies would 
require legislative change, and that more was required than just changes to the 
regulations that AUSTRAC administer.232 In light of the amendments to the AML/CTF 
Act 2006, cryptocurrency services are now the responsibility of AUSTRAC for AML 
regulation. AUSTRAC provide guidance to digital currency exchange businesses,233 
which is similar to the advice that is given to other regulated entities. Requirements 
include completing a risk assessment, training employees, complying with CDD 
requirements, and appointing an AML/CTF compliance officer who will be responsible 
for submitting SMRs and TTRs to AUSTRAC.234 The 70% increase in SMRs sent to 
AUSTRAC are not attributable to including digital currency exchanges, as the changes 
were only implemented on 3rd April 2018, which would be less than half of the period 
covered by the 2017/18 report.235 The strong enforcement actions by AUSTRAC 
against Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Tabcorp236 may indicate a change in 
enforcement approach by AUSTRAC which could lead to larger fines in the future. In 
the UK the FCA has taken on the equivalent role to AUSTRAC from January 2020,237 
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235 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Annual Report 2017-18’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-05/AUSTRAC_annual_report_2017-18.pdf> 
accessed 24 July 2019. 
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and could observe the approach taken by AUSTRAC, and assist newly regulated 
entities in a similar way to the guidance issued by AUSTRAC.238 AUSTRAC has been 
praised by the FATF for its management of intelligence,239 and based on the 
recommendation of Irwin and Turner, AUSTRAC should lead a more joined up 
approach for cryptocurrencies, as it is best placed to implement “information sharing 
between multiple stakeholders from the law enforcement, financial intelligence units, 
cyber security organisations and fintech industry.”240  
 
7.7.5. Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission 
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) is a not a recognised member 
of the Australian Intelligence Community, but it is the national criminal intelligence 
agency of Australia.241 In ACIC has a number of projects, which are investigating and 
gathering information on cryptocurrencies, but the issue is not being addressed by a 
dedicated body. In its 2017-18 Annual Report, the ACIC reported that it had made 
presentations on cryptocurrencies as part of ‘Project Longstrike’,242 claimed to have 
improved intelligence and understanding of cryptocurrencies as part of ‘Project 
Whitebeam’,243 and produced “intelligence products”244 on the “use of bitcoin as an 
                                                     
238 AUSTRAC, ‘A guide to preparing and implementing an AML/CTF program for your digital currency 
exchange business’ <https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-
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240 cf Irwin and Tuner (n111) at 310. 
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accessed 29 July 2019. 
242 Australian Crime Intelligence Commission, ‘Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Annual 
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alternative to traditional money laundering” as part of ‘Project Cryogenic’.245 Reporting 
from ACIC is too vague to draw conclusions from; the intelligence the ACIC gather is 
sensitive, so unlikely to be shared. The role of the ACIC is to work with “state and 
territory, national and international partners on investigations and to collect intelligence 
to improve the national ability to respond to crime impacting Australia.”246 The role of 
the ACIC is comparable to the NCA in the UK, which has had some successes in 
pursuing money launderers who use cryptocurrencies.247 Also comparable to the NCA, 
the broad nature of the ACIC’s role means their focus and resources are not targeted 
solely towards cryptocurrencies and money laundering. 
 
7.8. Compliance with Financial Action Task Force guidance  
Australia’s most recent mutual evaluation from the FATF predates the 2019 FATF 
guidance on virtual assets. It would not be appropriate to expect full compliance with 
FATF guidance so soon after the publication of the guidance, but it is helpful to 
consider to what degree Australia is already compliant. The FATF uses different 
terminology to Australia. The FATF use the term ‘virtual asset’ (VA), which is defined 
as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred and can 
be used for payment or investment purposes.”248 Australia uses the term “digital 
currency”,249 but the definition in the AML/CTF Act 2006 would satisfy the FATF term 
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‘virtual asset’. The FATF guidance also uses the term ‘Virtual Asset Service Provider’ 
(VASP),250 to describe businesses providing services for cryptocurrency users. 
Australia uses the terms “registered digital currency exchange provider”251 and 
“registrable digital currency exchange service”252 to describe cryptocurrency service 
providers. While the FATF and Australia use different terms, the definitions of the 
terms are similar, and the Australian definitions will be compliant with the FATF 
guidance. The FATF guidance addresses the majority of the 40 Recommendations, 
stating that “[a]lmost all of the FATF Recommendations are directly relevant”253 to 
addressing the money laundering risks posed.  
 
Recommendation 1 concerns countries undertaking a risk assessment and applying 
the risk-based approach.254 The 2019 guidance states that money laundering risk 
assessments should now include VAs and VASPs. The assessment should identify 
the relevant authorities that should regulate VAs and VASPs, and the treatment of 
these products and services should be consistent.255 Australia has been including VAs 
and VASPs in a number of annual reports, the ACIC have included comments on VAs 
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in both of its annual reports,256 and AUSTRAC have included VAs and VASPs in their 
annual report of 2017-18.257 
 
The FATF Recommendations advise that countries should consider all “funds or value-
based terms in the Recommendations, such as “property,” “proceeds,” “funds,” “funds 
or other assets,” and other “corresponding value,” as including VAs.”258 Australia has 
not amended its criminal offences to explicitly include VAs, but the existing legislation 
is drafted so widely that the law will apply to VAs. As discussed at 7.3, the Criminal 
Code defines property as: “real or personal property of every description, whether 
situated in Australia or elsewhere and whether tangible or intangible, and includes an 
interest in any such real or personal property.”259 This definition is very broad and it is 
difficult to envisage anything failing to satisfy it; cryptocurrencies are intangible and 
impossible to possess but the inclusion of “interest in”260 means that anything of value 
may be included. The wide definition means that Australia would be compliant with 
FATF Recommendations 3, 4, and 5, pertaining to criminalisation of money 
laundering,261 confiscation of criminal proceeds,262 and terrorist financing.263 Australia 
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would also be compliant for Recommendation 6 which concerns asset freezing,264 but 
this is usually impossible for cryptocurrencies, and Recommendation 7 which relates 
to sanctions,265 which again are difficult to enforce in relation to cryptocurrencies.  
 
The 2019 FATF guidance also recommends that VASPs are covered by AML 
regulation, which Australia has already achieved as the term ‘digital currency’ has 
been added the definitions in the AML/CTF Act 2006.266 Additionally, the terms 
“registered digital currency exchange provider”267 and “registrable digital currency 
exchange service” have been added to the Act.268 The 2017 amendments brings VAs 
and VASPs into the regulatory remit of AUSTRAC, making Australia compliant with 
Recommendations 26 and 27, in accordance with the 2019 FATF guidance.269 By 
being subject to AUSTRAC supervision, VASPs are required to complete CDD 
processes, so Recommendation 10 is adopted in line with the 2019 guidance,270 and 
AUSTRAC provide advice to newly regulated businesses on how to comply with their 
obligations.271 VASPs being regulated entities means such businesses are required to 
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have risk management systems in place,272 comply with reporting requirements,273 
and share information with AUSTRAC as the FIU of Australia.274 
 
As identified at 7.6.2, AUSTRAC is the FIU of Australia, and it is responsible for the 
enforcement of the AML/CTF Act 2006, which, in light of the 2017 amendments, 
includes cryptocurrency service providers. AUSTRAC publish annual reports detailing 
the number of reports they receive, and these reports now include those from digital 
currency service providers, this makes Australia compliant with the 2019 FATF 
guidance on implementing Recommendation 33. In summary, Australia can be seen 
to be ahead of international best practice, legislating in 2017 and already being 
compliant with the FATF guidance of 2019.  
 
7.9. Recommendations for the United Kingdom 
Australia has taken a different approach to criminalising money laundering compared 
to the UK, but the contrasting approaches achieve similar effects. There are no plans 
for the UK to reform its money laundering offences, and therefore it is not likely that 
the UK will adopt the scaling model used in Australia. A fundamental difference 
between the UK and Australia is seen in the way penalties are imposed, the penalty 
point system is something which is peculiar to Australia, and there is nothing to indicate 
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that the UK would seek to adopt this. The penalty point system is implemented across 
criminal law in the majority of Australian territories, and it would require extensive 
reform for the UK to adopt. The differing values of a penalty unit across Australia raises 
concerns in relation to fairness, which are not the focus of this thesis. 
 
The AML regulation in Australia, much like the AML regulation of the US, is similar to 
that of the UK, with the exception of threshold reporting, which the UK does not 
enforce, instead the UK focuses on suspicious activity reporting. Also like the 
comparison between the UK and the US, the differences with regard to cryptocurrency 
service providers are stark, as the UK does not currently impose AML regulation on 
cryptocurrency service providers, whereas Australia does, this will change once the 
deadline for cryptocurrency service providers to register with the FCA passes in 
January 2021. 
 
Australia enforces similar AML regulation to the US with regards to cryptocurrency 
service providers, and both jurisdictions are compliant with the latest FATF guidance, 
but the routes taken to regulate cryptocurrency service providers were different. While 
the approach of FinCEN in the US negated the need for legislative reform, by declaring 
that cryptocurrency exchanges and administrators were too be viewed as money 
services businesses and needed to comply with AML regulation,275 the Australian 
approach has been to legislate. Australia has been efficient in its legislative reform, by 
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amending of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Amendment Act 2006 in 2017.276 The 2017 amendment inserted “digital currency”,277 
“registered digital currency exchange provider”,278 and “registrable digital currency 
exchange service”279 to the 2006 Act. The list of designated services which are 
regulated by the 2006 Act now covers cryptocurrency exchange services,280 and 
AUSTRAC is responsible for enforcing AML regulation. The UK has not created or 
amended its own legislation to cover cryptocurrencies, as observed in chapter five. 
The UK Parliament has passed comparably few Acts in the past decade and has been 
distracted by the withdrawal from the EU. While UK legislators have been idle, the EU 
has passed the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive,281 which addresses 
cryptocurrencies and requires Member States to apply AML regulation to 
cryptocurrency service providers. Other than making the FCA responsible for the AML 
regulation of cryptocurrency businesses, it is unclear how the UK intends to implement 
the Directive, but by regulating cryptocurrency service providers, the UK will have 
taken a similar approach to Australia and bring the UK in line with international best 
practice as set out by the 2019 FATF guidance.282 
 
                                                     
276 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2017. 
277 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
278 ibid. 
279 ibid. 
280 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.6(2) Item 50A. 
281 Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] 
OJ L 156/43. 
282 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for A Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> 
accessed 01 August 2016. 
 343 
As with the US, although Australia is compliant with FATF guidance, the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies is not covering peer-to-peer transactions within individual 
cryptocurrency networks, which is where the majority of cryptocurrency transactions 
take place. The quality of the financial intelligence gained through regulating 
cryptocurrency service providers should be supported by monitoring the blockchain. 
Traditional AML measures cannot be applied to blockchain transactions, as there is 
no human involvement, except for the two transacting parties, but by utilising 
blockchain APIs, automated analysis of the blockchain could be implemented.283 At 
present it is not clear if the financial intelligence available through the blockchain is 
being used for AML purposes, but it is a valuable resource that all jurisdictions should 
utilise  
 
It is recommended that the UK retains its current money laundering offences as the 
UK criminal law is not compatible with the format adopted by Australia. The UK 
Parliament and the FCA should make it clear how the 5th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive will be implemented, but meeting the current international standards alone is 
not enough. It is recommended that the UK goes further than the Australia, and 
monitors the blockchains of cryptocurrencies, so as to avoid a significant number of 
transactions taking place outside of the financial system, without regulatory scrutiny. 
 
                                                     
283 Examples can be found at Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Bitcoin Developer APIs’ 
<https://www.blockchain.com/api> accessed 26 September 2019. 
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7.10. Chapter Summary 
Australia has addressed money laundering in accordance with international best 
practice, it is compliant with core Recommendations of the FATF by criminalising 
money laundering and implementing preventative measures. When compared to the 
approach of the US, Australia’s offences take a notably different form, but achieve the 
same effect. Laundering money using cryptocurrencies will satisfy the money 
laundering offences without the need for reform, no new gap in the law has been 
created with regards to the criminal offences. A further difference noted between 
Australia and the US is that while the US prescribes maximum fines in US$, Australia 
has instead developed a penalty points system. The use of penalty points appears 
more complicated than simply designating fines, but it is clear that this system better 
future proofs money laundering offences as fines can be raised in accordance with 
inflation by raising the value of a penalty point, rather than having to amend each law. 
 
With regard to preventative measures, again, Australia is in line with international 
standards, the FATF Recommendations are followed, and similarities are seen 
between the Australian approach and the US one. As in the US, Australia requires 
regulated entities to submit reports on both suspicious activity and transactions over 
a specified threshold. It is noted that the number of SARs submitted in Australia has 
risen sharply in 2018, potentially due to strong enforcement action from Australian 
regulators. Australia adopts a single regulator approach to AML, with AUSTRAC being 
responsible for enforcing the AML/CTF Act 2006, this is a much simpler approach 
compared to the US which adopts a multi-regulator approach. Despite the recent high-
profile fines of Common Wealth Bank of Australia and Tabcorp, the fines imposed by 
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the US dwarf those figures, such as the fine of over US$1bn against Standard 
Chartered in April 2019.284  
 
Australia has been proactive in reforming its AML/CTF legislation to cover the 
emergence of cryptocurrency service providers. The 2017 amendments have widened 
the scope of the AML/CTF Act 2006 to cover cryptocurrency services providers, this 
has been achieved in a succinct manner by inserting new definitions and followed a 
clear consultation period. The weaknesses of the amendments are that the coverage 
remains at the fringes of cryptocurrency networks. While the legislation is in line with 
the guidance of the FATF, it shows a limitation in the understanding of 
cryptocurrencies, as observed in chapter four.285 The public ledgers which 
cryptocurrencies produce should be utilised to be able to dovetail with the intelligence 
being gathered through regulated entities. As recommended by Irwin and Turner, a 
more joined up approach is required for cryptocurrencies,286 with “information sharing 
between multiple stakeholders from the law enforcement, financial intelligence units, 
cyber security organisations and fintech industry.”287 AUSTRAC are the best placed 
authority to implement such an approach in Australia. 
 
It has been noted that Australia has seen an upsurge in SMRs, which will more likely 
rise further as the regulation is applied to a new sector. Given the existing concerns 
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over defensive reporting, it is not unforeseeable that regulated cryptocurrency 
exchanges will produce a high volume of reports due to their services satisfying the 
characteristics of being high-risk under the risk-based approach, and due to the fear 
of high fines for compliance failings. By expanding the AML measures to 
cryptocurrency service providers, CDD is now required, which is potentially 
problematic as the majority of customers will be using services remotely. The 
weaknesses of CDD have been highlighted, particularly that it is relatively easy for 
service users to give false details; this becomes even easier in remote transactions 
and with the pseudonymous nature of cryptocurrencies.  
 
In conclusion, Australia has reacted to the development of cryptocurrencies in line with 
international best practice and has taken proactive steps to regulate this developing 
area. AUSTRAC provides a good comparison to the UK Financial Conduct Authority, 
as both are the sole enforcers of AML in their jurisdictions. The UK can learn from the 
Australian approach, both in its strengths in the succinct reform of the law, and in its 




Chapter 8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The question this thesis seeks to answer is:  
How can the UK learn from international guidance and the approaches of the 
United States and Australia to address the money laundering risks posed by 
cryptocurrencies?  
 
The aim of this research is to analyse cryptocurrencies, specifically the legal 
understanding of cryptocurrencies, and to assess how the money laundering risks 
should be addressed. This thesis argues that a tailored approach is needed towards 
the regulation, and monitoring of cryptocurrencies, and that simply transposing 
existing regulations onto cryptocurrencies will not be effective. 
 
This chapter sets out the findings from this research, cryptocurrencies are identified, 
and it is recommended that the United Kingdom (UK) adopts the term 
cryptocurrencies, instead of cryptoassets. It is observed that the United Nations (UN) 
has been overtaken by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the European 
Union (EU) in the setting of model anti-money laundering (AML) legislation, this 
change in international leadership took place in the 1990s and 2000s as the FATF and 
EU became more prescriptive and the UN focussed on its wider aims. It is 
recommended that the UK implements the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, 
and in the process adheres to FATF guidance, but it is suggested that the UK goes 
further than the current international best practice as peer-to-peer transactions remain 
unregulated. The UK could adopt either a regulator led, or legislator led widening of 
the regulatory perimeter, but it is unlikely the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) will 
take the same proactive steps that the Financial Crime Enforcement Network 
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(FinCEN) has in the US. Therefore, the UK will take a legislator led approach, such as 
the approach of Australia, to widening the regulatory perimeter to cover 
cryptocurrencies, as it implements the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive.  
 
The UK has been lacklustre in its response to cryptocurrencies, but it is advised that 
it goes further than its contemporaries and addresses the regulatory gaps present in 
existing regulation of cryptocurrencies. The wealth of data available from the 
blockchain is being ignored, so developing technology and utilising application 




8.1. Defining cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies are best identified by the FATF as part of their typology of virtual 
currencies. Cryptocurrencies are decentralised convertible virtual currencies, and in 
order for them to be decentralised, they operate based on the Bitcoin model of a 
distributed ledger. Figure 14 demonstrates that all virtual currencies can be placed 
within a grid of 4 squares, where the columns are a choice between centralised or 
decentralised and the rows denote the convertibility of the virtual currency. Fiat 
currencies are not included in the grid as they are not solely virtual, but if they were to 
be included they would be centralised convertible currencies as they are administrated 
by a central bank. 
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Figure 14. FATF Categories of Virtual Currency1 
 Centralised Decentralised 
Convertible Linden Dollars (used in Second 
Life) are an example of a 
convertible virtual world currency; 
users may exchange their 
currency for US Dollars. The 
currency is centralised, Linden 
Labs (the developer of Second 
Life) act as administrators.  
 
Examples of decentralised 
currencies include Bitcoin and 
Dogecoin. These are convertible 
for fiat currency but not controlled 




World of Warcraft (WoW) gold is 
non-convertible virtual world 
currency; users may not convert 
this into a fiat currency. WoW gold 




8.1.1. Cryptocurrencies Distinguished from Money 
Money is not a fixed concept, as it develops over time, and its form has changed from 
physical to electronic. Moss v Hancock3 clearly seeks to define money by its functions, 
of which the law is primarily concerned with the medium of exchange function. Socio-
                                                     
1 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th November 2014. 
2 ibid. 
3 [1899] 2 QB III. 
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economics recognises medium of exchange as the main function, but also considers 
money as a store of value and a unit by which value is determined. The function-based 
approach adopted by the law allows it to be flexible, and the law does not prescribe 
what money is, and as such cryptocurrencies may have the potential to become 
money. However, at present the fluctuations in the value of cryptocurrencies, and their 
treatment by users as an investment vehicle rather than as a medium of exchange, 
means that cryptocurrencies are not currently viewed as money in the same way as 
fiat money.  
 
As cryptocurrencies do not satisfy all of the functions of money, it is difficult to conclude 
that they are money in same way as fiat money is money. Cryptocurrencies can be 
placed on Bell’s hierarchy of money.4 Instead of cryptocurrencies being viewed as 
highly as ‘State Money’, it is more likely that by satisfying some of the functions of 
money, cryptocurrencies sit lower on the hierarchy, as shown in Figure 15. 
                                                     
4 See chapter three at 3.4.3 for a discussion of Bell’s hierarchy. 
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Figure 15. Placing Cryptocurrency on Bell’s Hierarchy of Money5 
 
 
Cryptocurrencies have no state to act as the driver of the money, and there are no 
state debts to pay with cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies are best placed as either 
company money or bank money. Cryptocurrencies could be considered a company 
money of relatively high liquidity, or a bank money with comparably low liquidity; with 
the potential to become as usable as other bank money if acceptability increases. It is 
helpful to determine the nature of cryptocurrencies against existing concepts, but the 
most important issue for this thesis is how they are treated by regulators. In order for 
regulation to be consistent, the terminology used should be harmonized to ensure 
each regulator is clear in what they are referring to. 
 
                                                     
5 Produced based on: S. Bell, ‘The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money’ (2001) 25 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 149. 
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Confusion exists as to the accepted terminology to use when referring to 
cryptocurrencies, with a number of different terms being used by international and 
supranational organisations, such as the FATF and the EU, and nationally by the UK, 
the US, and Australia. This thesis recommends the term ‘cryptocurrencies’ as this term 
specifically refers to exclusively digital virtual currencies, which operate based on 
cryptography as a decentralised network using a distributed ledger. The term ‘virtual 
assets’, used by the FATF, is too broad as the term could also include virtual 
currencies which are centralised, and can be regulated through regulation of that 
central authority. Cryptocurrencies are a specific subset of virtual currencies, which 
require unique AML measures due to their decentralised nature, level of anonymity, 
and monetary value. The EU uses the term ‘virtual currencies’ and Australia uses the 
term ‘digital currency’,6 both of which suffer from the same shortcomings of the FATF 
term, as they do not sufficiently define cryptocurrencies. The agencies of the US also 
predominantly use the term ‘virtual currencies’,7 but the terminology used by the 
various authorities in the US is not consistent. 
 
8.1.3. Recommendations for the UK 
The lack of consistency in the terminology used to refer to cryptocurrencies is 
unhelpful as it can lead to confusion as to exactly what each term covers. The UK uses 
                                                     
6 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
7 As demonstrated throughout the GAO report on in 2014: United States Government Accountability 
Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. The term is also used by 
FinCEN: FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving 
Convertible Virtual Currencies’ (9 May 2019) <https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. The CFTC 
refer to Bitcoin directly, but also use the term: CFTC, ‘Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies’ 
https://www.cftc.gov/Bitcoin/index.htm> accessed 04 September 2019. 
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the term ‘cryptoassets’,8 yet another variation on the terms used by the FATF, the EU, 
the US, and Australia, and potentially adds to the confusion. The term ‘assets’ appears 
deliberate as the FCA does not accept cryptocurrencies as currency or money.9 The 
term ‘cryptocurrencies’ is the best term to use, as this specifically refers to 
decentralised convertible virtual currencies, which is the class of virtual currencies 
which pose a money laundering risk, as accepted by all of the organisations and 
jurisdictions considered in this thesis. 
 
8.2. International Anti-Money Laundering Landscape  
An analysis of the history and development of AML measures reveals a change in 
leadership with regard to international best practice. From the 1960s until the late 
1980s the UN was the leading international body tackling money laundering and 
setting accepted minimum standards for legislation. The efforts of the UN were 
intertwined with its attempts to curtail the international drugs trade.10 Since the creation 
of the FATF in 1989, the UN has taken a much less prominent role in combatting 
money laundering, as the FATF has assumed the role of leading international best 
practice. The FATF has a clearer AML focus than the UN, the FATF was created “in 
response to mounting concern over money laundering”11 among the G7,12 and was 
solely concerned with the money laundering “threat posed to the banking system and 
to financial institutions.”13 The FATF and its Recommendations demonstrate a shift 
                                                     
8 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets – Consultation Paper’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf> accessed 19 March 2019 at 2.3. 
9 ibid at 2.7. 
10 See chapter four and 4.7. and N. Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century: Law and Policy 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011) at p.15. 
11 Financial Action Task Force, ‘History of the FATF’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> 




away from the drugs trade, and towards treating money laundering as a standalone 
issue. The FATF has taken on counter terrorist financing as part of its mission, but it 
remains more focussed on money laundering than the UN, which has much broader 
aims.  
 
The FATF is not alone in setting AML best practice, it is joined by the EU which, in its 
various forms, has been developing its AML standards since the 1970s.14 The EU’s 
recommendations in 1980 were ahead of their time, but, unfortunately, were not 
utilised.15 Despite this, the EU has promoted the harmonisation of AML regulation 
across Member States, the latest example of this is the 5th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive which came into force in January 2020. The EU is a prominent international 
organisation developing AML standards, and is able to enforce compliance with its 
AML legislation across Member States. The FATF does not have sanctioning powers, 
but it has utilised blacklisting to promote compliance with its Recommendations. While 
the UN began the global AML fight, it is clear that the EU and the FATF have been the 
leading forces in developing international best practice and enforcing standards in 
recent decades. 
 
8.2.1. Recommendations for the UK 
The UK has ratified all of the relevant UN conventions relating to money laundering, it 
is also compliant with the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive and largely compliant 
                                                     
14 N. Ryder, Money laundering – an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-money 
laundering policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge, London, 2012) at p.18. 
15 W. Gilmore, Dirty Money – The Evaluation of International Measures to Counter Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Council of Europe, Brussels, 2004) at p161. 
 355 
with the FATF Recommendations, as identified in the most recent mutual evaluation 
report.16 The UK has implemented the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, and once 
the reforms come into force, it will be compliant with the latest guidance from the FATF. 
It is recommended that the UK continues to keep pace with international standards, 
but that the UK does not simply meet the minimum regulation of cryptocurrencies 
required by the FATF and the EU. Instead, the UK should seek to address the gaps 
left by the model legislation of the FATF and the EU. The UK should harness the 
wealth of data within the distributed ledgers of cryptocurrencies and use this to assist 
its FIU in detecting money laundering. There are promising developments in this area 
as in January 2020 the Regulatory Policy Committee approved the UK transposition 
of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive as fit for purpose, and noted that the UK 
was going beyond the minimum requirements.17 The FCA will regulate businesses 
which conduct cryptocurrency-to-cryptocurrency exchanges, as well as 
cryptocurrency-to-fiat currency exchanges. While promising, enforcement remains to 
be seen; the deadline for relevant businesses to register with the FCA is January 2021. 
 
 
8.3. Money Laundering Offences 
Cryptocurrencies present a problem for the application of existing AML measures, but 
the criminalisation of money laundering in the UK, the US and Australia effectively 
                                                     
16 FATF, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, December 2018) <fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 
2019. 
17 Regulatory Policy Committee, ‘Transposition of the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive HM 
Treasury’ (London, 16 January 2020) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8
63735/2020-01-16-RPC-HMT-4432_1_-Transposition_of_the_Fifth_Anti-
Money_Laundering_Directive.pdf> accessed 28 July 2020. 
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covers the use of cryptocurrencies. Definitions of cryptocurrencies vary against 
existing assets, property, and money, but the offences in each jurisdiction are drafted 
broadly to apply to all proceeds of crime. Although the applicability of money 
laundering offences is clear, how to process confiscated cryptocurrencies presents 
three clear issues; accessing the cryptocurrencies in a criminal’s wallet, determining 
how to covert the cryptocurrency into fiat currency, and the changes in the value of the 
cryptocurrency in the length of time from confiscation to conversion. Successful 
confiscation has largely been due to circumstantial luck, such as freezing the 
cryptocurrency assets of an individual having caught them with their “fingers on the 
keyboard”18 in the case of West. A likely method of seizing illicit cryptocurrency, which 
was also used against West, is to use a court order requiring the convicted individual 
to give up the cryptocurrency or face further jail time.19 Once the cryptocurrency is 
confiscated there are currently two options for authorities wishing to convert the 
currency, they can either use a cryptocurrency exchange or sell the cryptocurrency at 
public auction. Hall observes that the US approach is to use public actions, whereas 
Dutch authorities use exchanges.20 The third issue is more pertinent due to the 
volatility in the value of cryptocurrencies, it is seen in chapter five at 5.3.2 that the UK 
experience in this has been positive, but the fluctuations in value mean that it would 
be highly likely that future seizures of cryptocurrency could be worth far less at the 
time of conversion than at the time of seizure. 
 
                                                     
18 Mattha Busby, ‘Bitcoin worth £900,000 seized from hacker to compensate victims’ The Guardian 
(London, 23 August 2019). 
19 ibid. 
20 J Hall, ‘Restraint orders: R. v Teresko (Sergejs) Kingston Crown Court: HH Judge Lodder QC: 
unreported 11 October 2017’ (2018) 1 CLR 81 at 82. 
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8.3.1. Recommendations for the UK 
The UK money laundering offences do not require reform for the purpose of applying 
to cryptocurrencies, the drafting of the offences is wide enough to obtain convictions, 
as demonstrated by the prosecutions of Teresko,21 White,22 and West.23 The UK 
approach with regards to converting confiscated cryptocurrency is inconsistent; in the 
Teresko case an exchange was used,24 but in 2019 a UK police force used the public 
auction method for the first time.25 It is recommended that the UK processes 
cryptocurrency seizures faster so as to be able to realise the value of the confiscated 
goods at the correct value, however it is currently unclear which method of conversion 
is preferred. 
 
8.4. Applying Anti-Money Laundering Regulation to 
Cryptocurrencies 
Australia and the US demonstrate that regulation of cryptocurrency service providers 
is possible, and adapting an AML approach to include cryptocurrency service 
providers can be achieved in a timely fashion. Both jurisdictions have widened their 
AML regulation to require cryptocurrency service providers to adhere to customer due 
diligence and reporting requirements, and shown that cryptocurrency service 
                                                     
21 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘More than £1.2million of Bitcoin seized from drug dealer’ (19 July 
2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/south-east/news/more-ps12-million-bitcoin-seized-drug-dealer> 
accessed 11 September 2019. 
22 BBC News, ‘Liverpool 'dropout' jailed for Silk Road dark web site’ (12 April 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-47913780> accessed 11 September 2019 and 
National Crime Agency, ‘Student behind $100m dark web site jailed for 5 years 4 months’ (12 April 
2019) <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/student-behind-100m-dark-web-site-jailed-for-
5-years-4-months?highlight=WyJiaXRjb2luIiwiYml0Y29pbnMiXQ==> accessed 11 September 2019. 
23 BBC News, ‘Prolific Sheerness hacker ordered to pay back £922k’ (23 August 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-49450676> accessed 24 September 2019. 
24 cf Hall (n20) at 82. 
25 Wilsons Auctions, ‘£500k of bitcoin seized from UK criminal to be auctioned, with no reserve!’ (19 
September 2019) <https://www.wilsonsauctions.com/news/500k-of-bitcoin-seized-from-uk-criminal-to-
be-auctioned-with-no-reserve/> accessed 30 September 2019. 
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providers can be regulated in the same way as traditional financial institutions. Though 
the end result has been the same in both jurisdictions, they have each taken a different 
method to developing their AML regulation. In the US, FinCEN has taken the lead in 
a regulatory led widening of the regulatory perimeter, compared to Australia where 
Parliament has delivered a legislator led widening of the regulatory perimeter.  
 
8.4.1. Regulator Led Widening of the Regulatory Perimeter 
A regulator can widen its regulatory perimeter by the way it chooses to interpret 
definitions in existing legislation. FinCEN did this in 2013, as it determined that 
cryptocurrency exchanges and administrators were to be viewed as money services 
businesses, and therefore need to comply with AML regulation.26 The FinCEN 
guidance was clear that while a regular user will not be subject to FinCEN regulation,27 
exchanges and administrators would need to comply with FinCEN regulation.28 A 
similar approach could be implemented in the UK if Regulation 3 of the Money 
Laundering Regulations29 were to be interpreted differently by the FCA. Under the 
Money Laundering Regulation 2017 a ‘money services business’ is an “an undertaking 
which by way of business operates a currency exchange office, transmits money (or 
any representations of monetary value) by any means or cashes cheques which are 
made payable to customers.”30 Were the FCA to take the approach of FinCEN, and 
determine that cryptocurrency service providers satisfy this definition, then AML 
                                                     
26 FinCEN, ‘Guidance - FIN-2013-G001 - Issued: March 18, 2013 - Subject: Application of FinCEN’s 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ 




29 Money Laundering Regulations 2017, Regulation 3. 
30 ibid, Regulation 3(1)(d). 
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regulation could, and should, have been implemented in a similar way to the regulation 
in the US. The UK has considered the US approach in 2015 as part of a public 
consultation, in which respondents were positive about the increased legitimacy 
regulation brings and the deterrence of crime.31  
 
Criticisms of the US approach, and with it the regulator led approach, were made in 
relation to a perceived “lack of clarity about which categories of business activity are 
captured by the FinCEN requirements, and some said that the process of registering 
in multiple American states has been burdensome and has forced smaller firms to exit 
the market.”32 The issue of state regulation is not applicable to the UK, but the 
concerns over clarity are relevant, and indicate an issue with the ad hoc nature of 
regulator led regulatory changes. A regulator is likely to be reactive, and the changes 
may be piecemeal rather than planned and formalised. It is clear that a cryptocurrency 
exchange is a money services business, but wallets are more complicated, and 
Bitcoins can be stored privately offline. It is also unclear when an individual is no longer 
an individual, and becomes a business; thresholds are not set. The guidance of the 
FATF should be followed; by considering the definition of a cryptocurrency service 
provider as the same as that of the term ‘VASP’ in the FATF guidance,33 the confusion 
will be addressed as the activities which are considered to satisfy the term VASP are 
clearly defined. 
 
                                                     
31 GOV.UK, ‘Digital currencies: response to the call for information’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414040/digital_curren
cies_response_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf> accessed 11 March 2016 at p.19. 
32 ibid. 
33 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 September 2019 at para 33(c). 
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The principal benefit of regulator led changes to regulation is the speed at which the 
regulatory gap can be covered, the US was able to implement AML regulation upon 
cryptocurrency service providers much faster than Australia. The US response to the 
AML threats posed by cryptocurrencies was implemented soon after cryptocurrencies 
grew in prominence, and was achieved without the need for legislative reform. 
However, the Australian approach has been much clearer by adding new legal 
definitions to its AML legislation. 
 
8.4.2. Legislator Led Widening of the Regulatory Perimeter 
The alternative to regulator led changes to regulation is legislative reform, an approach 
which was taken by Australia. Australia has been efficient in its legislative reform, by 
amending the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment 
Act 2006.34 The 2017 amendment inserted “digital currency”,35 “registered digital 
currency exchange provider”,36 and “registrable digital currency exchange service”37 
to the 2006 Act. The list of designated services which are regulated by the 2006 Act 
now covers cryptocurrency exchange services,38 and AUSTRAC is responsible for 
enforcing the AML regulation. The advantages of legislative reform are that the 
resulting law should be clear, and fully address the gaps in the law. The legislative 
process will vary by jurisdiction, but common characteristics are readings in 
Parliaments and Senates, and advice from select committees. This allows for time and 
care to be taken to achieve the correct wording to the reform, and consider any 
                                                     
34 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2017. 
35 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.5. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006, s.6(2) Item 50A. 
 361 
consequences of the reform. The 2017 amendments to Australian law were the result 
of a statutory review by the Attorney General’s Department39 and a public consultation 
by the Parliament.40 Subsequently a Bill was produced which proceeded through the 
normal scrutiny prior to enactment. Such a detailed process demonstrates a 
commitment by the relevant authorities in Australia to providing the correct response 
to the development of cryptocurrencies. The resultant reform meant that Australia was 
compliant with FATF guidance on cryptocurrencies before the detailed 2019 guidance 
was published. The definitions are clear, and in line with international standards. The 
UK has not created its own legislation to cover cryptocurrencies, but it has 
implemented the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. As observed in chapter five, the 
UK Parliament has passed comparably few Acts in the past decade, partly due to the 
ongoing issue of leaving the EU.  
 
The EU has also instigated a legislator led widening of the regulatory perimeter 
through the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The Directive adds “virtual currency 
exchange platforms as well as custodian wallet providers to the list of obliged entities 
within the scope of the [4th] Directive;”41 which mirrors the guidance of the FATF with 
regards to bringing points of intersection between virtual currencies and the traditional 
financial system under the scope of EU AML regulations. The UK has implemented 
                                                     
39 Attorney General’s Department, ‘Report on The Statutory Review of The Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 And Associated Rules and Regulations’ (April 2016) 
<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/how-to-engage-us-subsite/files/report-on-the-statutory-review-of-the-
anti-money-laundering.pdf>accessed 28 October 2019. 
40 Parliament of Australia, ‘Digital Currency – Game Changer or bit player’ (August 2015) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Digital_currency/~/
media/Committees/economics_ctte/Digital_currency/report.pdf> accessed 21 October 2019 
41 EUROPA, ‘Revision of the Fourth Anti-Money-Laundering Directive’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607260/EPRS_BRI%282017%29607260
_EN.pdf> accessed 10 September 2019. 
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the 5th Directive through an amendment to the 2017 Money Laundering Regulations, 
but it is unclear how the UK intends to implement the Directive in practice. By 
regulating cryptocurrency service providers, the UK will take a similar approach to 
Australia and bring the UK up to international best practice as set out by the 2019 
FATF guidance.42 
 
8.4.3. Recommendations for the UK 
Based on the UK’s previous behaviour observed in chapter four,43 it is anticipated that 
the UK will keep pace with international AML standards. The FCA has failed to take 
the initiative in the way FinCEN has in the US, instead the approach of the FCA has 
been to take a hands-off approach. The FCA indicated that it does not regulate 
cryptocurrencies, and individuals use them at their own risk.44 The FCA could have 
interpreted the definition of a ‘money services business’ more proactively to address 
a regulatory gap, but it did not. The UK has also had ample time to adopt a legislator 
led approach to cryptocurrencies, as has been implemented in Australia. It is accepted 
that there have been a number of elections in short succession in the UK in the past 
decade, hampering the enacting of legislation. However, Australia has had 4 elections 
in the last 10 years and not produced a majority government, yet it still managed to 
pass legislation regulating cryptocurrencies. While UK legislators have been inactive, 
                                                     
42 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for A Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> 
accessed 01 August 2016. 
43 See chapter 4, specifically ‘History of Anti-Money Laundering Law at 4.7. 
44 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets: Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3’ 
(London, July 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf> accessed 23 September 
2019 at 2.19-29. 
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the EU has passed the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive,45 which addresses 
cryptocurrencies and requires Member States to apply AML regulation to 
cryptocurrency service providers. The UK is following the legislator led model, but via 
the supranational legislation of the EU, as the UK has amended legislation in order to 
implement the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The exact nature of the UK’s 
departure from the EU is unclear, but the UK has a history of implementing EU 
directives and following international best practice as demonstrated in chapter four at 
4.7, so it is anticipated that the UK will continue to keep pace with EU AML law through 
complying with FATF standards.  
 
While EU has taken a positive step, it presents the same short comings as identified 
in relation to the FATF guidance, the measures would apply to exchanges for fiat 
currency, and leave a large proportion of the cryptocurrency network outside of AML 
regulation. It is recommended that the UK goes further than simply implementing the 
5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, instead it needs to consider the remaining gaps 
in regulation, and address the blockchain. It is not possible to simply transpose existing 
AML regulation to distributed ledgers, as there is a lack of human involvement due to 
automated transactions. The blockchain presents regulatory challenges, but also 
opportunities for developments in AML supervision and detection. 
 
                                                     
45 Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] 
OJ L 156/43. 
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8.5. Analysing the Blockchain using APIs 
The wealth of data available through public ledgers is being ignored by the current 
approach to regulating cryptocurrencies. The focus of regulatory reform has been 
placed on the intersections between fiat currency and cryptocurrency, but this will only 
gather financial intelligence from a proportion of cryptocurrency transactions. As 
defined by Lilly money laundering is “the process whereby the identity of dirty money 
that is the proceeds of crime and the real ownership of these assets is transformed so 
that the proceeds appear to originate from a legitimate source.”46 This process is 
clearly going to be aided by a plethora of unmonitored networks by which criminals 
can undertake numerous transactions without human involvement. It is not possible to 
apply existing AML regulation to cryptocurrency transactions, because the users 
transact directly rather than through a financial intermediary, therefore there is no 
institution to apply customer due diligence or file a suspicious activity report. A different 
approach is required, which will not be able to directly intercept or freeze a transaction, 
but will utilise the data the publicly available distributed ledger provides.  
 
The current FATF guidance only applies to cryptocurrency service providers, but the 
FATF is aware that more can be done to “develop technology-based solutions that will 
improve compliance”47 such as application programming interfaces (APIs) to digest 
and analyse the available information.48 The FATF appears to be aware of the key 
weakness to its guidance, yet despite being aware of this in 2015, it has not fully 
                                                     
46 P. Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering (London, 
Kogan Page, 2006). 
47 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-
VASPs.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019 para 51 at p14. 
48 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for A Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fat2/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> 
accessed 01 August 2016, para 51 at p14. 
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addressed this. This weakness was partly addressed in the 2019 guidance, 
recognising that VASPs providing cryptocurrency exchange services will convert 
between cryptocurrencies, as well as from fiat to cryptocurrency. Recognising 
transactions exchanging between cryptocurrencies is helpful in widening the 
regulatory perimeter, but it does not address the blockchain.  
 
An API can interact with a programme, it can download and process data from that 
programme. Bitcoin’s blockchain can be viewed freely online,49 and there are 
numerous blockchain APIs available to enable automated analysis of the blockchain.50 
It is not clear if the financial intelligence available through the blockchain is currently 
being analysed for AML purposes, but it is a valuable resource that needs to be 
utilised.  
 
At present a money laundering investigation will only begin when suspicion is aroused, 
but by automating analysis of the blockchain, money laundering investigations could 
get a head start, and patterns of transactions could be identified. Blockchain analysis 
should be the responsibility of the FIU as financial intelligence will be produced, 
therefore in the UK this will be the NCA.  
 
8.5.1. Recommendations for the UK 
The UK should utilise the data available through the blockchain to monitor money 
laundering and aid investigations. The wealth of transaction data available in a digital 
                                                     
49 Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Block Explorer’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer> accessed 30 
September 2019. 
50 Examples can be found at Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Bitcoin Developer APIs’ 
<https://www.blockchain.com/api> accessed 26 September 2019. 
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format, paired with the traditional AML measures applied to cryptocurrency service 
providers, will begin to address the currently unregulated realm of cryptocurrencies. 
To do this the UK must address the resourcing issues afflicting the NCA. The FATF 
have repeatedly found it to be lacking in terms personnel, technology, and “analytical 
capability”,51 which are crucial in order to remain among world leaders tackling money 
laundering.  
 
At present money laundering investigations are behind the curve, by the time an 
investigation is launched, the money could be long gone. Analysing the blockchain will 
allow the NCA to follow cryptocurrencies as the transactions are openly published, a 
transaction could be reviewed within seconds of the block being created. It is not 
possible to identify individuals using the blockchain alone, but techniques are being 
developed to identify users through their public keys.52 
 
8.6. Recommendations for further research 
More research is required in order to develop APIs and software tools specifically for 
analysing the distributed ledgers for money laundering purposes, such software needs 
to include functionality for identifying patterns of transactions which are consistent with 
money laundering. Further research is also required into techniques which allow users 
to be identified. There are opportunities for artificial intelligence to be developed, when 
a body of successful investigations exists, machine learning could help identify money 
                                                     
51 FATF, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom, 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, December 2018) <fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 
2019 at para 6. 
52 Sarah Meiklejohn, et al, “A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No 
Names,” (2013) 38(6) ;Login: 10. 
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Cryptocurrencies do not satisfy definitions of money, but their characteristics warrant 
regulatory attention. The FATF and the EU lead the international approach to 
regulating cryptocurrencies, but their guidance is focussed on the intersections 
between cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies, which leaves the majority of 
cryptocurrency transactions unregulated. The UK must go further than the FATF and 
EU measures, and should monitor the blockchain so as to avoid missing important 
financial intelligence. It is unlikely the FCA will take the initiative in the same way 
FinCEN has in the US, instead the UK will take a legislator led approach to widening 
the regulatory perimeter through implementing the 5th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive and enacting further legislation. The NCA currently lacks the required 
resources to be able to address cryptocurrencies and follow the recommendations of 
this research. Therefore, while unlikely, resources should be provided to the NCA to 
allow them to develop technology which automates analysis of the distributed ledgers 









Convention against Corruption (adopted 21 October 2003, entered into force 14 
December 2005) 43 ILM 37. 
 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(adopted 20 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990) UNTS 1582. 
 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, 
entered into force 29 September 2003) UNTS 2225. 
 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (adopted 21 February 1971, entered into 
force 16 August 1976) 520 UNTS 1019. 
 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (adopted 30 March 1961, entered into force 13 
December 1964) 520 UNTS 151 (Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs). 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 (UNTS) 331. 
 
EU Treaties 
Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On The European Union [2012] OJ C326/25. 
 
Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union 
[2012] OJ C326/156. 
 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime (adopted 08 August 1990, entered into force 01 September 
1993) ETS 141. 
 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 16 May 2005, 





Council Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering [2001] OJ L.344/76. 
 
 370 
Council Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, [2005] 
OJ L309/15. 
 
Council Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338. 
 
 
Council Directive 2015/849/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC 
[2015] OJ L.141/73. 
 
Council Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 
2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] OJ L 156/43. 
 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the 





EU Case Law 
Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95. 
 
Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corf v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
 
 
United Kingdom National Legislation 
Bribery Act 2010. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. 
 
Criminal Finances Act 2017. 
 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
 
Criminal Justice Act 1993. 
 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
 
 371 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. 
 
Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
 
Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the 
Payer) Regulations 2017. 
 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1987. 
 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. 
 




Australia National Legislation  
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006. 
 
Criminal Code Act 1995. 
 
Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1988. 
 




Australia State Legislation 
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA). 
 
Australian Crime Commission (Western Australia) Act 2004 (WU). 
 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
 
Monetary Units Act (Vic). 
 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). 
 
Penalty Units and Other Penalties Act 1987 (Tas). 
 





United States of America National Legislation  
Annunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act 1992. 
 
Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91–508. 
 
Code of Federal Regulations Title 31 - Money and Finance: Treasury. 
 
Money Laundering Control Act Pub. L. 99-570. 
 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict, 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56. 
 
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18. 
 
Securities Exchange Act 1934. 
 
US Code Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure. 
 
US Code Title 31 - Money and Finance. 
 




United Kingdom Case Law  
K Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc (Revenue and Customs Commissioners and 
another intervening) [2006] EWCA Civ 1039. 
 
Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB III. 
 
R v Cuthbertson [1981] A.C. 470 HL. 
 
R v Da Silva [2007] 1 WLR 303. 
 
R v Teresko [2018] Crim LR 81 (Unreported). 
 
R v Terry (Westminster Magistrates, 13 July 2012). 
 
Shaaban bin Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] 2 WLR 441. 
 




Australia Case Law 
Chief Executive Officer of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v TAB 
Limited (No 3) [2017] FCA 1296. 
 
 373 
Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v 




United States of America Case Law 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Patrick K. McDonnell, and Cabbagetech, 
Corp. D/B/A Coin Drop Markets, Case No 1 18-CV-361 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018). 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Trendon T. Shavers and Bitcoin Savings 
and Trust, Civil Action No. 4:13-CV-416. 
 
United States v $ 4,255,625.39, 551(Suppl. 314) (1982) 23. 
 
United States v. Campbell, 997 F.2d 854, 857. 4th Cir 1992. 
 
United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 8th Cir.1998. 
  
United States v Jewell 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.1976). 
 
United States v Sadighi and Rayhani Unreported (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
United States v Santos 128, S. Ct. 2020, 2025, 2031 (2008) affirming 461 F. 3d 886 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
 
United States v Stewart 185 F.3d 112 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 
United States v. Trapilo 130 F.3d 547. 2nd Cir. 1997. 
 




Books and Chapters in Edited Collections 
Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Ch.9. 
 
Castronova E, Virtual Worlds: A First Hand Account of Market and Society of the 
Cyberian Frontier (SSRN, 2001). 
 
Chaikin D, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures with Reference to Australia’ in C. King, C, Walker and J. Gurulé, The 
Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018). 
 
Chambers Jones C, and Hillman H, Financial Crime and Gambling in a Virtual World: 
A new Frontier in Cybercrime (Edward Elgar, 2014). 
 
Cotterrell R, Law’s Community (OUP 1995). 
 374 
 
Craig P and de Búrca G, EU Law: Text Cases and Materials (6th edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
 
Dadomo C and Quénivet N, European Union Law (Hall & Stott Publishing, 2015). 
 
De Sanctis FM, Football, gambling, and money laundering: a global criminal justice 
perspective (Springer, New York 2014). 
 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. Britannica Book of the Year (2015) (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2015). 
 
Foley D, ‘Money in Economic Activity’ in M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds) The New 
Palgrave: Money (W.W. Norton, 1987). 
 
Fox D, Property Rights in Money (OUP, 2008). 
 
Freidman L, Crime and Punishment in American History (Basic Books 1934). 
 
General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: Needed Improvements for Reporting 
Suspicious Transactions Are Planned (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 
1995). 
 
Gibbs H, Watson R and Menzies A, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law: Fifth 
Interim Report (Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, 1991). 
 
Gilmore WC, Dirty Money – The Evaluation of International Measures to Counter 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Council of Europe, Brussels, 
2004). 
 
Gilmore WC, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures 
(Strasbourg, Council of Europe Press, 1995). 
 
 
Hudson A, The Law of Finance (Sweet and Maxwell, 2013). 
 
Huizinga J, Homo Ludens: A Story of the Play-Element in Culture (Beacon Press, 
1938). 
 
Hunter E, ‘Australia’, in M Simpson, N Smith and A Srivastava (eds), International 
Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2010). 
 
Hurst JW, A Legal History of Money in the United States 1774-1970 (University of 
Nebraska Press, 1973). 
 
Karha J, ‘How to Make Comparable Things: Legal Engineering at the Service of 
Comparative Law’ in Hoecke Mv, Epistemology and methodology of Comparative 
Law (Hart Publishing 2004). 
 
 375 
Keynes JM, A Treatise on Money (Harancourt Brace, 1930). 
 
King C, ‘Asset Recovery: An Overview’ in King C, Walker C and Gurulé J, The 
Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, Volume 1 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018). 
 
Kiyotaki N and Wright R, ‘Acceptability, Means of Payment and Media of Exchange’ 
in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds) The New Palgrave: Money (W.W. 
Norton, 1987). 
 
Knapp GF, The State Theory of Money (Macmillan, 1924). 
 
Lastowka G, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (Yale University Press, 
2010). 
 
Levi M, Naylor and P. Williams, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money 
Laundering (New York, 1998). 
 
Low L et al, ‘Country Report: The US Anti-Money Laundering System’ in M. Pieth 
and G. Aiolfi, A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, 2004). 
 
Madinger J, Money Laundering: A Guide for Criminal Investigators: Third Edition 
(CRC Press, 2016). 
 
Mann T (ed), Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press 2010). 
 
Margossian A, Bagnall M, Mitra R and Halforty I, ‘Australia’ in M. S. Sackheim and N. 
A. Howell (eds), The Virtual Currency Regulation Review (London, Law Business 
Research Ltd, 2018). 
 
Marx K, Capital: Vol 1 (London, Penguin, 1976). 
 
Mason M and Mason J, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson 2007). 
 
Mclellan D, Karl Marx (London, Harper Collins, 1975). 
 
Minsky HP, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (Yale University Press, 1986). 
 
North DC, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
 
Lilley P, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering (London, 
Kogan Page, 2006). 
 
Pearce D, Campbell E and Harding D (‘Pearce Committee’), Australian Law Schools: 
A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987). 
 
 376 
Proctor C (ed), Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money (7th Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
 
Robinson J, The Laundrymen (London, Pocket Books, 1995). 
 
Ryder N, Financial Crime in the 21st Century: Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2011). 
 
Ryder N, Money laundering – an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-
money laundering policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Canada (Routledge, London, 2012). 
 
Simpson M, Smith N and Srivastava A (eds), International Guide to Money 
Laundering Law and Practice (Haywards Heath, Bloomsbury Professional, 2010). 
 
Smith A, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (The 
Cannon Edition, New York, The Modern Library, 1937). 
 
Stewart DG, Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking (Canberra, Australia 
Government Printing Services, 1983). 
 
Thomas JP and Roppolo WV, ‘United States of America’ in A. Srivastava, M. 
Simpson and N. Moffat, International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice 
(Bloomsbury, 2013). 
 
Unger B and Linde D vd, Research Handbook On Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2013). 
 
Unger B, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2007). 
 
Wray LR, Money and Credit in Capitalist Economics: The Endogenous Money 
Approach (Edward Elgar, 1990). 
 
Zagaris B, International White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials (New York: 




Alexander K, ‘The International Anti-Money-Laundering Regime: The Role of the 
Financial Action Task Force’ (2001) 4(3) JMLC 231. 
 
Alexander R, ‘How to Regulate Bitcoin – the Debate Continues’ (2018) 39(3) Comp 
Law 65. 
 
Alexander R, Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the EU: Law and Regulation 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
 
 377 
Alford D, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on Financial Institutions’ 
(1994) 19(3) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 
437. 
 
Bell MW, ‘Toward a Definition of “Virtual Worlds”’ (2008) 1(1) Journal of Virtual 
Worlds Research 1. 
 
Bell S, ‘The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money’ (2001) 25 Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 149. 
 
Blau CW Et Al., Investigation and Prosecution of Illegal Money Laundering: A Guide 
to the Bank Secrecy Act, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (1983). 
 
Bradshaw A, Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal 
Research Methods’ in P Thomas (ed) Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot, Ashgate-
Dartmouth, 1997). 
 
Brendan James Gilbert, ‘Getting to Conscionable: Negotiating Virtual Worlds’ End 
User License Agreements without Getting Externally Regulated’ (2009) 4(4) JICLT 
238. 
 
Brenner S, ‘Fantasy Crime’ (2008) 11(1) V and J Ent & Tech L 1. 
 
Buchanan B, ‘Money laundering – a global obstacle’ (2004), 18(1) Research in 
International Business and Finance 115. 
 
Carr I, ‘Fighting corruption through the United Nations Convention on Corruption 
2003: a global solution to a global problem?’ (2005) 11(1) Int. T.L.R. 24. 
 
Cassella SD, ‘Reverse money laundering (2003) 7(1) Journal of Money Laundering 
92. 
 
Castronova E, ‘The Right to Play’ (2004) 49 NYL Sch L Rev 185. 
 
Chaikin D, ‘Risk-Based Approaches to Combatting Financial Crime’ (2009) 8(2) 
Journal of Law and Financial Crime 20. 
 
Chaum, D, ‘Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms’ 
[1981] 24(2) Communications of the ACM 84. 
 
Chaum.D, ‘Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments’ in Chaum. D, Rivest. RL, 
Sherman, AT (ed), ‘Advances in Cryptology’ (Session III, Springer US, 1982). 
 
Demetriades G, ‘”Is the person who he claims to be?” old fashion due diligence may 
give the correct answer!’ (2016) 19(1) JMLC 79. 
 
Doyle T, ‘Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactic 




Feldman AM, ‘Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwdse Optimality and Pareto 
Optimality’ (1973) 40(4) Review of Economic Studies 463. 
 
Fortson R, ‘Intensifying anti-money laundering laws - the last 30 years’ (2016) 4 Arch 
Rev 6. 
 
Gallant MM, ‘Money Laundering Consequences: Recovering Wealth, Piercing 
Secrecy, Disrupting Tax Havens And Distorting International Law’ (2014) 17(3) 
JMLC 296. 
 
Geva B, ‘Disintermediating Electronic Payments: Digital Cash and Virtual Currencies’ 
(2016) 31(12) JIBLR 661. 
 
Goldby M, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Requirements Imposed by English 
Law: Measuring Effectiveness and Gauging the Need for Reform’ (2013) 4 Journal of 
Business Law 367. 
 
Goodhart CAE, ‘What is the essence of money?’ 2005 29 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 817. 
 
Graham G, ‘Seychelles 'haven for money laundering'’ Financial Times (London 2 
February 1996) 3. 
 
Hall J, ‘Restraint orders: R. v Teresko (Sergejs) Kingston Crown Court: HH Judge 
Lodder QC: unreported 11 October 2017’ (2018) 1 CLR 81. 
 
Houben R, ‘Cryptocurrencies from a money laundering and tax evasion perspective’ 
(2019) 30(5) International Company and Commercial Law Review 261. 
 
Innes AM, ‘What is Money’ (1913) 30 Banking LJ 377. 
 
Irwin ASM and Tuner AB, ‘Illicit Bitcoin transactions: challenges in getting to the who, 
what, when and where’ (2018) 21(3) JMLC 297. 
 
Irwin ASM, and Dawson C, ‘Following the cyber money trail: Global challenges when 
investigating ransomware attacks and how regulation can help’ (2019) 22(1) JMLC 
110. 
 
Irwin ASM, Kim-Kwang RC, and Liu L, ‘An analysis of money laundering and 
terrorism financing typologies’ (2012) 15(1) JMLC 85. 
 
Irwin ASM, Slay J, Kim-Kwang RC, Lui L, ‘Money laundering and terrorism financing 
in virtual environments: a feasibility study’ (2014) 17(1) JMLC 50. 
 
Jacobs R, ‘European Union: Virtual Currencies – Warning’ (2018) 33(3) JIBLR 29. 
 
Jensen N, ‘Technology and Intelligence’ (2005) 8(3) JMLC 227. 
 
Jones RA, ‘The Origin and Development of Media of Exchange’ (1976) 84 (4, Part 1) 
August Journal of Political Economy 757. 
 379 
Juhász PL, Stéger J, Kondor D and Vattay G, ‘A Bayesian approach to identify 
Bitcoin users’ (2018) 13(12) PLoS ONE 1 
 
Kennedy A, ‘Dead Fish across the Trail: Illustrations of Money Laundering Methods’ 
(2005) 8(4) JMLC 305. 
 
Kennedy R, ‘Law in Virtual Worlds’ (2009) 12(10) Journal of Internet Law 3. 
 
Kerr OS, ‘Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds’ [2008] Chi Legal F 415. 
 
Kluczyński M, ‘Prevention of Money Laundering in the Fight Against Human 
Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants’ (2013) 5(2) Internal Security 83.  
 
Lane J, ‘Bitcoin, Silk Road and the Need for a New Approach to Virtual Currency 
Regulation’ (2013-2014) 8 Charleston Law Review 511. 
 
Lastowka G and Hunter D, ‘Virtual Crimes’ (2004) 49 NYL Sch Rev 294. 
 
 
Leong A, ‘Chasing dirty money: domestic and international measures against money 
laundering’ (2007) 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 140. 
 
Levi M, ‘Evaluating the “New Policing”: Attacking the Money Trail of Organized 
Crime’ (1997) 30(1) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1. 
 
McDowell J and Novis G, ‘The Consequences Of Money Laundering And Financial 
Crime’ (2001) 6(2) Economic Perspectives 6. 
 
McNeil C, ‘The Australian Anti-Money Laundering Reform in the International 
Context’ (2007) 22(6) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 340. 
 
Meiklejohn S, et al, “A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with 
No Names,” (2013) 38(6) ;Login: 10. 
 
Menger K, ‘On Origins of Money’ (1892) 2(6) Economic Journal 293. 
 
Mitsilegas V and Gilmore B, ‘The EU legislative framework against money laundering 
and terrorist finance: a critical analysis in light of evolving global standards’ (2007) 
56(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 119 at 120 
 
Morris-Cotterill N, ‘The International Effect of Money Laundering Laws’ (1996) 4(1) 
Journal of Financial Regulation & Compliance 67. 
 
Ping He, ‘A Typological Study on Money Laundering’ (2010) 13(1) JMLC 15. 
 




Reuter P and Greenfield VA, ‘Measuring Global Drug Markets: How Good Are the 
Numbers and Why Should We Care about Them?’ (2001) 2(159) World Economics 
73. 
 
Reynolds P and Irwin ASM, ‘Tracking digital footprints: anonymity within the bitcoin 
system’ (2017) 20(2) JMLC 172. 
 
Rider B, ‘The practical and legal aspects of interdicting the flow of dirty money’ 
(1996) 3(3) JFC 234. 
 
Roberge I, ‘Misguided Policies in the War on Terror? The Case for Disentangling 
Terrorist Financing from Money Laundering’ (2007) 27(3) Political Studies 
Associations 196. 
 
Ryder N, ‘The Financial Services Authority and Money Laundering: A Game of Cat 
and Mouse’ (2008) 67(3) Cambridge LJ 635. 
 
Ryder N, ‘To Confiscate or not to Confiscate? A Comparative Analysis of the 
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Legislation in the United States and the 
United Kingdom’ [2013] 8 JBL 767. 
 
Simser J, ‘Money laundering: emerging threats and trends’ (2013) 16(1) JMLC 41. 
 
Southall. E and Taylor. M, ‘Bitcoins’ [2013] 19(6) Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review 177. 
 
Sproule DW, and St-Denis P, ‘The UN Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step’ 
(1989) 27 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 263. 
 
Stessens G, ‘The FATF ‘Black List’ of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories’ 
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 199. 
 
Stewart DP, ‘Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances’ (1990) 18 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 387. 
 
Stokes R, ‘Virtual Money Laundering: The Case of Bitcoin and the Linden Dollar’ 
(2012) 21(3) Information and Communications Technology Law 221. 
 
Thomas J, ‘Quantifying the Black Economy: ‘Measurement Without Theory’ Yet 
Again?’ (1999) 109(456) The Economic Journal 381. 
 
Tromans R, ‘The World is not Enough: Law for a Virtual Universe’ (2007) 70 Euro 
Law 21. 
 
Tseng YS, ‘Governing Virtual Worlds: Iteration 2.0’ (2011) 35 J Law & Policy 547. 
 




van Dunné J, ‘On a clear day, you can see the continent - the shrouded acceptance 
of good faith as a general rule of contract law on the British Isles’ (2015) 31(1) Const. 
L.J. 3. 
 
van Hoecke M, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) What Kind of Discipline?’ in M. van 
Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research (Bloomsbury, 2011). 
 
Von Kaenel FJ, ‘Willful Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge 
under the Money Laundering Control Act?’ (1993) 71 Wash ULQ 1189. 
 
Walker J and Unger B, ‘Estimating Money Laundering: The Walker Gravity Model’ 
(2009) 5(821) Review of Law and Economics 53. 
 
Weber B, ‘Bitcoin and the legitimacy crisis of money’ (2016) 41 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 17. 
 
Welling SN, ‘Smurfs, Money Laundering, and The Federal Criminal Law: The Crime 
Of Structuring Transactions’ (1989) 41 Florida Law Review 287. 
 





Attorney General’s Department, ‘Report on The Statutory Review of The Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 And Associated Rules and 
Regulations’ (April 2016) <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/how-to-engage-us-
subsite/files/report-on-the-statutory-review-of-the-anti-money-laundering.pdf> 
accessed 28 October 2019. 
 




orts%20and%20Analysis%20Centre%20report%20for%202013%22> accessed 24 
July 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Annual Report 2015-16’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-
05/AUSTRAC_annual_report_2015-16.pdf> accessed 24 July 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Annual Report 2016-17’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-
05/AUSTRAC_annual_report_2016-17.pdf> accessed 24 July 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Annual Report 2017-18’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-




AUSTRAC, ‘Annual Report 2017/18’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-
05/AUSTRAC_annual_report_2017-18.pdf> accessed 29 July 2019. 
 
Australia, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-
2015.pdf> accessed 23 July 2019. 
 
Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, ‘Report on The Statutory 
Review of The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
And Associated Rules and Regulations’ <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/how-to-
engage-us-subsite/files/report-on-the-statutory-review-of-the-anti-money-
laundering.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019. 
 
ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> 
accessed 02 June 2019. 
 
ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis’ 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf> accessed 
29 March 2019. 
 
HM Government ‘Economic Crime Plan’ (12 July 2019) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/816215/2019-22_Economic_Crime_Plan.pdf> accessed 23 October 
2019. 
 
HM Treasury, ‘Cryptoassets Taskforce: final report’ (29 October 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/752070/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_web.pdf> accessed 
20 September 2019. 
 
HM Treasury, ‘Fintech Sector Strategy: Securing the Future of UK Fintech’ (22 
March 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/692874/Fintech_Sector_Strategy_print.pdf> accessed 20 September 
2019. 
 
HM Treasury, ‘UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist 
financing’ (October 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4682
10/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019. 
 
Law Commission, Anti-money laundering: the SARs regime (Law Com No 384, 
2018). 
 





accessed 21 October 2019. 
 
Parliament of Australia, ‘Government Response to the Inquiry into Digital currency’ 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Dig
ital_currency/~/media/Committees/economics_ctte/Digital_currency/report.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2019. 
 






Busby M, ‘Bitcoin worth £900,000 seized from hacker to compensate victims’ The 
Guardian (London, 23 August 2019). 
 
Durkin P, ‘70pc jump in suspicious money laundering transactions: AUSTRAC’ 
Financial Review (Melbourne, 18 October 2018) 
<https://www.afr.com/business/banking-and-finance/70pc-jump-in-suspicious-
money-laundering-transactions-austrac-20181018-h16szs> accessed 24 July 2019. 
 
The Guardian, ‘Australian election 2019: live results’ (18 May 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2019/may/18/live-
results-for-the-2019-australian-election-track-the-votes> accessed 09 October 2019. 
 
The Guardian, ‘Energy cost of 'mining' bitcoin more than twice that of copper or gold’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/05/energy-cost-of-mining-
bitcoin-more-than-twice-that-of-copper-or-gold> accessed 05 March 2019. 
 
 
The Guardian, ‘Nine Bitcoin alternatives for future currency investments’ 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/28/bitcoin-alternatives-future-
currency-investments> accessed 17 June 2015. 
 
Treanor J, The Guardian, ‘London still world's top financial centre despite Brexit, 
says survey’ <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/11/london-financial-
centre-brexit-frankfurt-dublin-new-york-donald-trump> accessed 20 July 2018. 
 
Washington Post, ‘5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats' Office’ 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html> accessed 06 September 
2019. 
 
Washington Post, ‘Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds’ 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bug-suspect-got-campaign-








Attorney General’s Department, ‘About Us’ 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/About/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 10 July 2015. 
 
AUSTARC, ‘AUSTRAC and CBA agree $700m penalty’ (4 June 2018) 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/austrac-and-cba-agree-700m-penalty> accessed 22 
October 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘A guide to preparing and implementing an AML/CTF program for your 
digital currency exchange business’ <https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-
comply-guidance-and-resources/guidance-resources/guide-preparing-and-
implementing-amlctf-program-your-digital-currency-exchange-business> accessed 
26 July 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘About AUSTRAC’ <http://www.austrac.gov.au/about-us/austrac> 
accessed 14 September 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘AML/CTF Rules overview’ (27 September 2019) 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/legislation/amlctf-rules/amlctf-rules-overview> 
accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Typologies and Case Studies Report 2014’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-07/typologies-report-2014.pdf> 
accessed 24 July 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘Introduction to Money Laundering’ 
<https://michaelsmithnews.typepad.com/files/money-laundering.pdf> accessed 5 
September 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘New Australian laws to regulate cryptocurrency providers’ 
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/media/media-releases/new-australian-laws-regulate-
cryptocurrency-providers> accessed 23 July 2018. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘Record $45 million civil penalty ordered against Tabcorp’ (16 March 
2017) <https://www.austrac.gov.au/record-45-million-civil-penalty-ordered-against-
tabcorp> accessed 22 October 2019. 
 
AUSTRAC, ‘Strategic analysis brief: Money laundering through real estate’ 
<https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-
resources/guidance-resources/strategic-analysis-brief-money-laundering-through-
real-estate# > accessed 07 September. 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Federal Election 2016’ 




Australian Crime Intelligence Commission, ‘About Us’ (17 May 2019) 
<https://www.acic.gov.au/about-us> accessed 29 July 2019. 
 
Australian Crime Intelligence Commission, ‘Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Commission Annual Report 2016-17’ 
<https://acic.govcms.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1491/f/acic_2016-
17_annual_report.pdf?v=1508387578> accessed 29 July 2019. 
 
Australian Crime Intelligence Commission, ‘Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Commission Annual Report 2017-18’ 
<https://acic.govcms.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3726/f/acic_2017-
18_ar_digital.pdf?v=1539748074> accessed 29 July 2019. 
 
Australian Crime Intelligence Commission, ‘Money laundering’ (27 February 2019) 
<https://www.acic.gov.au/about-crime/organised-crime-groups/money-laundering> 
accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
Australian Digital Commerce Association, ‘About’ <https://adca.asn.au/about/> 
accessed 19 July 2019. 
 
Australian Digital Commerce Association, ‘Australian Digital Currency Industry Code 
of Conduct’ <https://adca.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Australian-Digital-
Currency-Industry-Code-of-Conduct-Board-Approved-Text-30-Nov-2016.pdf> 
accessed 19 July 2019. 
 
Australian Federal Police, ‘Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce’ 
<https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/PDF/criminal-assets-confiscation-
taskforce-brochure.pdf> accessed 14 September 2019. 
 
Australian Federal Police, ‘Our Organisation’ <https://www.afp.gov.au/about-us/our-
organisation> accessed 14 September 2019. 
 
Australian Tax Office, ‘GST and Digital Currency’ 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/business/gst/in-detail/your-industry/financial-services-and-
insurance/gst-and-digital-currency> accessed 17 September 2019. 
 
Australian Tax Office, ‘Tax Treatment of Crypto-Currencies in Australia – Specifically 
Bitcoin’ <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Gen/Tax-treatment-of-crypto-currencies-in-
Australia---specifically-bitcoin/> accessed 17 September 2019. 
 
Bambrough B, ‘A Bitcoin Halvening Is Two Years Away - Here's What'll Happen To 
The Bitcoin Price’ (Forbes, 29 May 2018) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/05/29/a-bitcoin-halvening-is-two-
years-away-heres-whatll-happen-to-the-bitcoin-price/#4bffecd05286> accessed 19 
March 2019. 
 
Bank of England, ‘What are cryptoassets (cryptocurrencies)?’ 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/what-are-cryptocurrencies> 
accessed 14 October 2019. 
 386 
 
Bank of England, ‘What is Money?’ (19 February 2019) 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/what-is-money> accessed 07 
October 2019. 
 
Barclays, ‘Where’s Britain spending? The Barclaycard Consumer Spending Report 
Q3 2014’ 
http://www.barclaycard.com/content/dam/bcardpublic/FinalContent/NewsandViews/2
014/q3spendreport/Barclaycard_Spend_Report_Q3_2014.pdf> accessed 17 June 
2015. 
 
BBC, ‘The League of Nations and the United Nations’ (17 February 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/league_nations_01.shtml> 
accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Bitcoin Currency Hits New Record High’ 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42135963> accessed 19 March 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Bitcoin explained: How do crypto-currencies work?’ (12 February 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/technology-43026143/bitcoin-explained-how-do-
crypto-currencies-work> accessed 20 July 2018. 
 
BBC News, ‘Bitcoin’ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/c734j90em14t/bitcoin> 
accessed 05 March 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Brexit: Boris Johnson's second attempt to trigger election fails’ (10 
September 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49630094> accessed 09 
October 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Business: The Company File: Beenz means business’ 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/297133.stm> accessed 12 June 2015. 
 
BBC News, ‘Criminal's Bitcoin seized in Surrey Police first’ (Surry, 21 July 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-surrey-44896665> accessed 12 
September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Criminals hide 'billions' in crypto-cash – Europol’ (12 February 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43025787> accessed 08 October 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Election 2015’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results> 
accessed 27 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Election 2017’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results> 
accessed 27 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Liberty Reserve digital money service forced offline’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22680297> accessed 17 June 2015. 
 
 387 
BBC News, ‘Liverpool 'dropout' jailed for Silk Road dark web site’ (12 April 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-47913780> accessed 11 
September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘'Money mules': Rising numbers are in middle age’ (18 June 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48671542> accessed 23 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘MtGox bitcoin exchange files for bankruptcy’ (28 February 2014) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25233230> accessed 07 October 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘NHS cyber-attack: GPs and hospitals hit by ransomware’ (13 May 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-39899646> accessed 097 October 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘One million adults 'do not have a bank account' 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10277151> accessed 29 May 2015. 
 
BBC News, ‘Prolific Sheerness hacker ordered to pay back £922k’ (23 August 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-49450676> accessed 24 September 
2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Rise in teenage money mules prompts warnings’ (16 September 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49717288> accessed 23 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Silk Road drug website founder Ross Ulbricht jailed’ (30 May 2015) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32941060> accessed 05 September 
2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Theresa May and the DUP deal: What you need to know’ (26 June 
2017) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40245514> accessed 09 October 
2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Top Bitcoin exchange MtGox goes offline’ 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26333661> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘US Election 2016’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/us2016/results> 
accessed 27 September 2019. 
 
BBC News, ‘Video Games Embrace China’s Freemium Model to Beat Piracy’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20899165> accessed 17 June 2015. 
 
Bitcoin Charts, ‘Markets’ <http://bitcoincharts.com/markets/> accessed 18 June 
2015. 
 
Bitcoin, ‘Getting started with Bitcoin’ <https://bitcoin.org/en/getting-started> accessed 
14 October 2019. 
 
Bitcoin, ‘How it Works’ <https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works> accessed 13 October  
2019.  
 
Bitcoin Wiki, ‘Research’ <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015. 
 388 
 
Bitcoin.org, ‘How Does Bitcoin Work?’ <http://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works> accessed 
19 January 2014. 
 
Blizzard, ‘Games and Subscriptions’ <http://eu.battle.net/wow/en/shop/> accessed 
11 June 2015. 
 
Blizzard, ‘World of Warcraft: Game Guide’ <http://eu.battle.net/wow/en/game/> 
accessed 11 June 2015. 
 
Blockchain Australia, ‘Home’ <https://blockchainaustralia.org/> accessed 19 July 
2019. 
 
Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Bitcoin Developer APIs’ <https://www.blockchain.com/api> 
accessed 26 September 2019. 
 
Blockchain Luxembourg, ‘Block Explorer’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer> 
accessed 30 September 2019. 
 
Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Bitcoin Cash’ 
<https://www.blockchain.com/explorer?currency=BCH> accessed 13 October 2019. 
 
Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Bitcoin’ <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer> 
accessed 13 October 2019 
 
Blockchain, ‘Block Explorer: Ethereum’ 
<https://www.blockchain.com/explorer?currency=ETH> accessed 13 October 2019 
 
Brett Wilson LLP, ‘Bitcoin seized as ‘realisable assets’ in confiscation proceedings’ 
(London, 03 September 2019) <https://www.brettwilson.co.uk/blog/bitcoin-seized-as-
realisable-assets-in-confiscation-proceedings/> accessed 12 September 2019. 
 
British Bankers Association, ‘Response to Cutting Red Tape Review, The 




pbWUucGRmIiwibmVlZGxvZ2luIjpmYWxzZSwidXNlciI6ZmFsc2V9> accessed 28 
June 2019. 
 
Business Insider, ‘Second Life Has Devolved into a Post-Apocalyptic Virtual World, 
And The Weirdest Thing Is How Many People Still Use It’ 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/second-life-today-2014-7?op=1&IR=T> accessed 
11 June 2015. 
 
Cameron F, ‘Sentences for money laundering getting longer: research’ (Pinsent 
Masons LLP, OUT-LAW, 2 September 2019) <https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-




Carrefour, ‘Carrefour stores worldwide’ <http://www.carrefour.com/content/carrefour-
stores-worldwide> accessed 05 March 2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies’ https://www.cftc.gov/Bitcoin/index.htm> 
accessed 04 September 2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘CFTC Issues Order Finding that Korea Exchange, Inc. Made a False and 
Misleading Certification to the CFTC’ (Washington, United States, 12 July 2019) 
<https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7971-19> accessed 03 September 
2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘CFTC Orders Dean Katzelis and Shahin Maleki d/b/a Essex Futures to Pay a 
$500,000 Penalty to Settle Charges of Unauthorized Options Trading, Failure to 
Supervise, and Other Violations’ (Washington, United States, 12 July 2019) 
<https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7972-19> accessed 03 September 
2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘CFTC Orders Vision Financial Markets LLC to Pay a $200,000 Penalty to 
Settle Charges that It Failed to Supervise Its Employees’ (Washington, United 
States, 12 July 2019) <https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7973-19> 
accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘Commodity Pool and its President Ordered to Pay $1.2 Million, Banned from 
Markets for Futures Fraud’ (Washington, United States, 12 July 2019) 
<https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7948-19> accessed 03 September 
2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘Federal Court Permanently Enjoins Defendants and Orders Them to Pay 
Penalties and Restitution for Bitcoin Solicitation Fraud, Impersonating a CFTC 
Investigator, and Sending Forged CFTC Documents’ (Washington, United States, 10 
July 2019) <https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7965-19> accessed 03 
September 2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘Learn and Protect > Bitcoin > Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.cftc.gov/Bitcoin/index.htm> accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
CFTC, ‘Mission and Responsibilities’ 
<https://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm> accessed 03 
September 2019. 
 
CNet, ‘E-currency Site Flooz Goes Offline’ <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-
271385.html> accessed 12 June 2015. 
 
Coin Desk, ‘What is Bitcoin’ <http://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-bitcoin/> 
accessed 23 June 2015. 
 
Coin Map ‘World View’ <https://coinmap.org> accessed 05 March 2019. 
 
Coinbase, ‘Coinbase’ <https://www.coinbase.com/> accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
 390 
CoinMarketCap list 2310 currencies on its ‘All Cryptocurrencies’ page: 
CoinMarketCap, ‘All Cryptocurrencies’ < https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/> 
accessed 08 August 2019. 
 
Commerce Times, ‘Beenz.com Closes Internet Currency Business’ 
<http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/12892.html> accessed 12 June 2015. 
 
Consilium, ‘The presidency of the Council of the EU’ 




Council of Europe ‘Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. 
R (80) 10’ <https://rm.coe.int/16804f6231> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
Council of Europe, ‘Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 198’ 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/198/signatures?p_auth=7ynMkkvx> accessed 28 September 
2019. 
 
Council of Europe, ‘Details of Treaty No.141’ 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/141> accessed 
27 September 2019. 
 
Council of Europe, ‘European Committee on Crime Problems’ 
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/cdpc> accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
Council of Europe, ‘Resolutions and recommendations elaborated under the 
authority of the CDPC’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cdpc/resolutions-
recommendations > accessed 25 September 2019. 
 
Crown Prosecution Service, ‘More than £1.2million of Bitcoin seized from drug 
dealer’ (19 July 2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/south-east/news/more-ps12-million-
bitcoin-seized-drug-dealer> accessed 11 September 2019. 
 
Crown Prosecution Service, ‘What We Do’ <http://www.cps.gov.uk/about/> accessed 
02 March 2016. 
 
Cryptorunner, ‘How to Get Started with Bitcoin’ <https://cryptorunner.com/get-
started-with-bitcoin/> accessed 14 October 2019. 
 
CryptoUK, ‘About Us’ <https://cryptouk.io/about/> accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
CryptoUK, ‘Code of Conduct’ <https://cryptouk.io/codeofconduct/> accessed 23 
October 2019. 
 
CryptoUK, ‘CryptoUK hosts 5MLD roundtable at the FCA’ (24 July 2019) 
https://cryptouk.io/2019/07/24/cryptouk-hosts-5mld-roundtable-at-the-fca/> accessed 
23 October 2019. 
 
 391 
CryptoUK, ‘CryptoUK Members’ <https://cryptouk.io/members/> accessed 23 
October 2019. 
 
CryptoUK, ‘Open Letter to Chancellor Sajid Javid from CryptoUK’ (25 July 2019) 
<https://cryptouk.io/2019/07/25/open-letter-to-chancellor-sajid-javid-from-cryptouk/> 
accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
Dai W, ‘b-money’ (1998) <http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt> accessed 13 October 
2019. 
 
Department of Justice, ‘HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to 
Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement’ (11 December 2012) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-
holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-
violations> accessed 23 August 2019. 
 
Department of Justice, ‘Justice News’ <https://www.justice.gov/news> accessed 29 
August 2019.  
 
Department of Justice, ‘Iranian Businessman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Violate 
U.S. Sanctions by Exporting Carbon Fiber From the United States to Iran’ (New 
York, 29 August 2019) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-businessman-pleads-
guilty-conspiracy-violate-us-sanctions-exporting-carbon-fiber> accessed 29 August 
2019. 
 
Department of Justice, ‘Search: Query= bitcoin + money + laundering’ 
<https://search.justice.gov/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&affiliate=justice&sort_by=&qu
ery=bitcoin+money+laundering> accessed 19 October 2019. 
 
Department of Justice, ‘Standard Chartered Bank Admits to Illegally Processing 
Transactions in Violation of Iranian Sanctions and Agrees to Pay More Than $1 
Billion’ (9 April 2019) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/standard-chartered-bank-
admits-illegally-processing-transactions-violation-iranian-sanctions> accessed 23 
August 2019. 
 
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Central District of California, ‘“Bitcoin 
Maven” Sentenced to One Year in Federal Prison in Bitcoin Money Laundering 
Case’ <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/bitcoin-maven-sentenced-one-year-
federal-prison-bitcoin-money-laundering-case> accessed 04 September 2019. 
 
 
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York, ‘Ross 
Ulbricht, A/K/A “Dread Pirate Roberts,” Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court To 
Life In Prison’ (Manhattan, New York, 29 May 2015) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/ross-ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-sentenced-manhattan-federal-court-
life-prison> accessed 05 September 2019. 
 
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Washington, ‘Multi-
State International Drug Trafficking Organization Targeted in 18-Month Investigation’ 
(Washington, United States, 6 December 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-
 392 
wdwa/pr/multi-state-international-drug-trafficking-organization-targeted-18-month-
investigation> accessed 04 September 2019. 
 
Department of the Treasury, ‘Organizational Structure » Offices » Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence’ <https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
 
Dogecoin, ‘Dogecoin’ <https://dogecoin.com/> accessed 13 October 2019. 
 
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘About’ 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/about> accessed 27 September 2019 
 
Egmont Group, ‘Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)’ 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/financial-intelligence-units-fius> accessed 11 
March 2016. 
 
Ethereum, ‘Learn about Ethereum’ <https://www.ethereum.org/learn/> accessed 13 
October 2019. 
 
eToro, ‘eToro’ <https://www.etoro.com/> accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
EU2017.EE, ‘Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union’ 
<https://www.eu2017.ee/> accessed 30 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘Countries’ <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries_en#28members> accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’ 
<https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en> 
accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘Donald Tusk re-elected president of the European Council’ 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/09-european-
council-president-election/> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Commission > About the European Union > Organisational 
Structure > Locations’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-
union/organisational-structure/locations_en#country> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Commission > Political Leadership’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-union/organisational-structure/political-
leadership_en#composition-of-the-college> accessed 25 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Commission > The Commissioners > President (2014-2019)’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/president_en> 
accessed 27 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Commission’ <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission_en> accessed 27 September 2019. 
 393 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Council/Council of the European Union: Home > Contact’ 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/contact/> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Council: President’ 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/> accessed 01 
September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Parliament: The President’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/> accessed 29 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘European Parliament’ <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-parliament_en> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘Regulations, Directives and Other Acts’ <https://europa.eu/european-
union/eu-law/legal-acts_en> accessed 08 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘Revision of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AML). Countering 
Terrorist Financing’ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-of-
justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-revision-of-the-anti-money-laundering-directive-
(aml)> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘Revision of the Fourth Anti-Money-Laundering Directive’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607260/EPRS_BRI%28
2017%29607260_EN.pdf> accessed 10 September 2019. 
 
EUROPA, ‘The Institution > Contact Us’ 
<https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7022/en/> accessed 02 September 2019. 
Europa, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-
eu_en> accessed 29 September 2019. 
 
European Commission, ‘Strengthened EU rules to prevent money laundering and 
terrorism financing’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=48935> 
accessed 05 September 2018  
 
European Commission, ‘The euro as legal tender’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/euro/use-euro/euro-
legal-tender_en> accessed 10 October 2019. 
 
European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers: Anti-money Laundering Directive’ 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2381_en.htm> accessed 16 
September 2019. 
 
European Parliament, ‘Supranational decision-making procedures’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.4.1.ht
ml> accessed 05 September 2019. 
 
 394 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf> accessed 04 
September 2019. 
 
Facebook, ‘Facebook Game Payments’ 
<https://www.facebook.com/help/354773291362154> accessed 02 June 2015. 
 
FBI, ‘Ross Ulbricht, aka Dread Pirate Roberts, Sentenced in Manhattan Federal 
Court to Life in Prison’ <https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2015/ross-
ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-to-life-in-
prison> accessed 11 March 2016. 
 
FCA, ‘2019 Fines’ (11 October 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-
stories/2019-fines> accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
Federal Court of Australia, The Court’s Jurisdiction’ 
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/jurisdiction> accessed 12 August 2015. 
 
Federation of American Scientists, ‘Congress Research Service: Money Laundering: 
An Overview of 18 USC 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law’ 
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33315.pdf> accessed 11 December 2015. 
 
Financial Action Task Force ‘Who We Are’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/> 
accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential 
AML/CFT Risks’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-
currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th November 
2014. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘About Us’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whatwedo> accessed 09 June 2015. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Annual Report 1995-1996’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1995%201996%20ENG.pdf> accessed 03 
September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
measures - Australia, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-
2015.pdf> accessed 23 July 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
measures – United Kingdom, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’ (Paris, 
December 2018) <fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-
Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 11 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Australia – Mutual Evaluation Report – April 2015’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-
Report-Australia-2015.pdf> accessed 05 September 2019. 
 395 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘FATF IX Special Recommendations’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-
%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf> accessed 02 
September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘FATF Recommendations – 2003’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%
202003.pdf> accessed 28 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: 
Report’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1990%20ENG.pdf> 
accessed 27 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach – Virtual 
Currencies’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-
Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 04 March 2016. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets 
and Virtual Asset Service Providers’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-VASPs.pdf> accessed 07 
October 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#high-risk> accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘History of the FATF’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 14 October 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going 
Process - 23 June 2017’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-june-2017.html> accessed 04 
September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘IX Special Recommendations’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-
%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf> accessed 28 
September 2019. 
 
Financial action Task Force, ‘Ministers renew the mandate of the Financial Action 
Task Force until 2020’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/ministersrenewthemandateofthefinancial
actiontaskforceuntil2020.html> accessed 04 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Mutual evaluation of United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland’ <http://www.fatf-




Financial Action Task Force, ‘Public Statement - 23 June 2017’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-
statement-june-2017.html> accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Publication Search: Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/?hf=10&b=0&q=virtual+currencies&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> 
accessed 25 June 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘The FATF Recommendations’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%
202012.pdf> accessed 24 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering 1990’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%
201990.pdf> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf> 
accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Topic: Mutual Evaluations’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> 
accessed 04 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘United Kingdom’ <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/#United%20Kingdom> accessed 11 September 2019. 
 
Financial Action Task Force, ‘Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential 
AML/CFT Risks’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-
currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 27th November 
2014. 
 
Financial Action Taskforce, ‘FATF Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF-
Report-G20-FM-CBG-July-2018.pdf> accessed 23 July 2018. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘About the FCA’ (24 April 2016) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca> accessed 17 September 2019. 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report 2012/13’ 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/anti-money-laundering-report.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2015. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Anti-money laundering Annual report 2018/19’ (09 July 
2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/annual-report-2018-19-anti-
money-laundering.pdf> accessed 18 September 2018. 
 
 397 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Cryptoassets: Our Work’ (23 January 2019) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/cryptoassets> accessed 20 September 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Cryptoassets’ (07 March 2019) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/cryptoassets> accessed 23 September 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Enforcement’ (22 April 2016) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement> accessed 18 September 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA fines Deutsche Bank £163 million for serious anti-
money laundering controls failings’ (31 January 2017) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-deutsche-bank-163-million-
anti-money-laundering-controls-failure> accessed 18 September 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA fines Standard Chartered Bank £102.2 million for 
poor AML controls’ 09 April 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-
fines-standard-chartered-bank-102-2-million-poor-aml-controls> accessed 18 
September 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA publishes Feedback Statement on Distributed 
Ledger Technology’ (15 December 2017) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-
releases/fca-publishes-feedback-statement-distributed-ledger-technology> accessed 
13 October 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets – Consultation Paper’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf> accessed 19 March 
2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets: Feedback and Final 
Guidance to CP 19/3’ (London, July 2019) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf> accessed 23 September 
2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘How and why consumers buy cryptoassets: A report for 
the FCA’ (07 March 2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/how-and-
why-consumers-buy-cryptoassets.pdf> accessed 23 September 2019. 
 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Money laundering and terrorist financing’ (03 August 
2015) <https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-crime/money-laundering-terrorist-
financing> accessed 17 September 2019. 
 
Financial Times, ‘Length of UK prison terms for money launderers hits record high’ 
(1 September 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/846c0e5c-c9a4-11e9-af46-
b09e8bfe60c0> accessed 12 September 2019. 
 
Financial Times, ‘Lexicon: Definition of a Currency Swap’ 
<http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=currency-swap> accessed 17 June 2015. 
 
 398 
Financial Times, ‘Lexicon: Definition of Disposable Income’ 
<http://markets.ft.com/research/Lexicon/Term?term=disposable-income> accessed 
18 June 2015. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Annual Report 2010’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/annual_report_fy2010.pdf> accessed 22 
September 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving 
Convertible Virtual Currencies’ (9 May 2019) 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf> accessed 04 September 
2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘A Quick Reference Guide for Money Services Businesses’ (Washington, 
United States, September 2007) 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/bsa_quickrefguide.pdf> accessed 
04 September 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Enforcement Actions’ (18 April 2019) <https://www.fincen.gov/news-
room/enforcement-actions> accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a 
Virtual Currency Exchanger’ (Washington, 5 May 2015) 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2016-08-
02/20150505.pdf> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘FinCEN’s Strategic Plan’ <https://www.fincen.gov/about/fincens-strategic-
plan> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Guidance - FIN-2013-G001 - Issued: March 18, 2013 - Subject: Application 
of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual 
Currencies’ <https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf> accessed 06 August 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘In the Matter of BTC-E a/k/a Canton Business Corporation and Alexander 
Vinnik’ (Vienna, United States, 07 June) 
<2017https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2017-07-
27/Assessment%20for%20BTCeVinnik%20FINAL2.pdf> accessed 02 September 
2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘In the Matter of Eric Powers’ (Vienna, United States, 18 April 2019) 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2019-04-
18/Assessment%20Eric%20Powers%20Final%20for%20Posting%2004.18.19_1.pdf
> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Law Enforcement Overview’ <https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-
enforcement-overview> accessed 30 August 2019. 
 
 399 
FinCEN, ‘Mission’ <https://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/mission.html> 
accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Reporting Suspicious Activity – A Quick Reference Guide for Money 
Services Businesses’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/msbsar_quickrefguide.pdf> 
accessed 14 December 2015. 
 
FinCEN, ‘Suspicious Activity Report Statistics (SAR Stats)’ 
<https://www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats> accessed 21 August 2019. 
FinCEN, ‘What We Do’ <https://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/index.html> 
accessed 03 December 2015. 
 
Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2014/11/19/world-of-warcraft-tops-10-
million-subscribers-following-warlords-of-draenor-expansion/> accessed 11 June 
2015. 
 
Gemini, ‘What is Gemini?’ <https://gemini24.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/204732945-What-is-Gemini-> accessed 18 December 2015. 
 
GOV.UK, ‘Cryptoassets Taskforce: final report’ (30 July 2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cryptoassets-taskforce> accessed 20 
September 2019. 
 
GOV.UK, ‘Digital currencies: call for information’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-currencies-call-for-
information/digital-currencies-call-for-information> accessed 11 March 2016. 
 
GOV.UK, ‘Digital currencies: response to the call for information’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4140
40/digital_currencies_response_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf> 
accessed 11 March 2016. 
 
GOV.UK, ‘Digital currencies: response to the call for information’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4140
40/digital_currencies_response_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf> 
accessed 24 September 2019. 
 
GOV.UK, ‘The National Crime Agency A plan for the creation of a national crime-
fighting capability’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97826/
nca-creation-plan.pdf> accessed 02 March 2016. 
 
Hannah Murphy, ‘Europol meets cryptocurrency exchanges to thwart criminals’ 
Financial Time (London, 19 June 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/9430a3b0-73d4-
11e8-b6ad-3823e4384287> accessed 14 October 2019. 
 
Henderson H, ‘application programming interface (API)’ in Harry Henderson (ed) 




e_api/0> accessed 20 October 2019. 
 
IGN, ‘IGN Presents the History of World of Warcraft’ 
<http://uk.ign.com/articles/2009/08/18/ign-presents-the-history-of-warcraft> accessed 
11 June 2015. 
 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Money Laundering: the Importance of International 
Countermeasures’ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm> 
accessed 15 June 2015. 
 
Inland Revenue Service, ‘IRS/FinCen Form 8300’ <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8300.pdf> accessed 15 December 2015. 
 
Inland Revenue Service, ‘Notice 2014-21’ <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-
21.pdf> accessed 17 December 2015. 
 
 
Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, ‘Prevention of money laundering/combating 
terrorist financing: Part I, 2017 REVISED VERSION’ (13 December 2017) 
<http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/download/10005> accessed 21 October 2019. 
 
Korte K, ‘Postal Annex Owner Sentenced for Structuring Currency Transactions’ 
(DEA, 11 September 2018) <https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2018/09/11/postal-
annex-owner-sentenced-structuring-currency-transactions> accessed 06 August 
2019. 
 
Legisaltion.Gov, ‘Your search for UK Public General Acts has returned more than 
200 results’ < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga> accessed 20 September 2019. 
 
Linden Labs, ‘Become a Second Life Premium Member’ 
<https://secondlife.com/my/account/membership.php> accessed 11 June 2015. 
 
Linden Labs, ‘LindeX™ Exchange’ <https://secondlife.com/my/lindex/#> accessed 
28 August 2018.  
 
Linden Labs, ‘Second Life Market Place’ 
<https://marketplace.secondlife.com/?lang=en-US> accessed 11 June 2015. 
 
Linden Labs, ‘What is Second Life’ <http://secondlife.com/whatis/> accessed 11 
June 2015. 
 
LiteCoin, ‘LiteCoin’ <https://litecoin.org/> accessed 13 October 2019. 
 
Makuck E, Gamespot (3 November 2015) 
<https://www.gamespot.com/articles/blizzard-will-no-longer-report-world-of-warcraft-
s/1100-6431943/> accessed 29 March 2019. 
 
 401 
Maltego, ‘Visualising the Bitcoin Blockchain in Maltego’ (12 April 2016) 
<http://maltego.blogspot.com/2016/04/visualization-bitcoin-blockchain-in.html> 
accessed 07 October 2019. 
 
'Money Laundering, n.' (OED Online, OUP June 2016) 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/121171?redirectedFrom=money+laundering+#eid3
6244231> accessed 06 September 2019. 
 
 
Mori SAK, ‘Leader of International Drug Money Laundering Organization Sentenced 
to 30 Years in Prison’ (DEA, 14 August 2018) <https://www.dea.gov/press-
releases/2018/08/14/leader-international-drug-money-laundering-organization-
sentenced-30> accessed 06 August 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘RAF sergeant and pensioner jailed for involvement in £1m 




Jtb25leSBsYXVuZGVyaW5nIl0=> accessed 19 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Cyber Crime’ 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/cyber-
crime?highlight=WyJiaXRjb2luIiwiYml0Y29pbnMiXQ==> accessed 20 September 
2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Economic Crime Command’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime> 
accessed 02 March 2016. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Economic Crime Command’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime> 
accessed September 2019.  
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Ex-Goldman Sachs investment banker ordered to pay back 
£7.3 million’ (06 September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/ex-goldman-sachs-investment-
banker-ordered-to-pay-back-7-3-million> accessed 19 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Governance and transparency’ 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/governance-and-
transparency> accessed 17 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘High End Money Laundering: Strategy and Action Plan’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/625-high-end-money-
laundering-strategy/file> accessed 02 March 2016. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘National Crime Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2015–




accessed 15 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘National Crime Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2016–
17’ (London, 20 July 2017) <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-
are/publications/25-nca-annual-report-2016-17/file> accessed 15 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘National Crime Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2017–
18’ (London, 19 July 2018) <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-
are/publications/177-nca-annual-report-accounts-2017-18/file> accessed 15 
September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘National Economic Crime Centre’ 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/national-economic-crime-
centre> accessed 19 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised 
Crime 2017’ <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/807-national-
strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime-2017/file> accessed 05 
September 2018. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Our Mission’ 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/our-mission> accessed 19 
September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Seventy years for multi-million pound drugs and money 
laundering group’ (26 July 2019) 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/seventy-years-for-multi-million-
pound-drugs-and-money-laundering-group> accessed 19 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Student behind $100m dark web site jailed for 5 years 4 
months’ (12 April 2019) <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/student-
behind-100m-dark-web-site-jailed-for-5-years-4-
months?highlight=WyJiaXRjb2luIiwiYml0Y29pbnMiXQ==> accessed 11 September 
2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2014’ 
(London, 24 March 2015) 
<http://www.octf.gov.uk/OCTF/media/OCTF/images/publications/SARS-Annual-
Report-2014.pdf?ext=.pdf> accessed 15 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2015’ 
(London, 18 May 2017) <https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-
are/publications/2-sars-annual-report-2015/file> accessed 15 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2018’ 
(London, 15 March 2019) <https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-
are/publications/256-2018-sars-annual-report/file> accessed 15 September 2019. 
 
 403 
National Crime Agency, ‘The cyber threat to UK business 2017/18’ (10 April 2018) 
<https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/178-the-cyber-
threat-to-uk-business-2017-18/file> accessed 20 September 2019. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘UK Financial Intelligence Unit’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-
crime/ukfiu> accessed 04 March 2016. 
 
National Crime Agency, ‘What We Do’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do> accessed 02 March 
2016. 
 
Northern Territory Government: Department of Attorney General and Justice, 
‘Penalty Units’ <https://nt.gov.au/employ/money-and-taxes/taxes,-royalties-and-
grants/territory-revenue-office/penalty-units> accessed 22 July 2019. 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Gross Domestic 
Product’ <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1163> accessed 15 June 
2015. 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Harmful Tax 
Competition; An Emerging Global Issue’ 
<http://www.OECD.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf> accesse17 June 2015. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Analysis’ 




Oxford English Dictionary, ‘pacta sunt servanda’ 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/135875?redirectedFrom=pacta+sunt+servanda#eid
> accessed 08 September 2019. 
 
Parks S, ‘Houston Man Sentenced for Federal Drug Trafficking and Money 
Laundering Violations’ (DEA, 17 May 2019)<https://www.dea.gov/press-
releases/2019/05/17/houston-man-sentenced-federal-drug-trafficking-and-money-
laundering> accessed 06 August 2019. 
 
Parliament of Australia, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Amendment Bill 2017’ 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/billsdgs/5592699/upload_bi
nary/5592699.pdf;fileType=application/pdf> accessed 16 July 2019. 
 
PayPal, ‘About Paypal’ <https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/about> accessed 
17 June 2015. 
 
Sentencing Council, ‘Fraud, bribery and money laundering offences: Definitive 
guideline’ <https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Fraud-bribery-




Serious Organised Crime Agency, ‘Suspicious Activity Reports Regime: Annual 
Report 2010’ (London, 26 November 2010) 
<https://www.octf.gov.uk/OCTF/media/OCTF/images/publications/SARS%20Annual
%20Report/SARs-Annual-Report-2010.pdf?ext=.pdf> accessed 15 September 2019. 
 
The European Union, ‘The EU in Brief’ <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/eu-in-brief_en> accessed 26 August 2016. 
 
Thompson Reuters, ‘Liberty Reserve founder must face $6 bln laundering case in 
U.S.’ <http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-cybersecurity-liberty-reserve-
idUSL1N11T2G420150923> accessed 11 March 2016. 
 
Transparency International-Bond Anti-Corruption Group, ‘Report on the UK’s 
Compliance with the UN Convention Against Corruption’ 
<https://www.transparency.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/download-
attachments/includes/download.php?id=901> accessed 10 June 2019. 
 
Treasury and Finance, ‘Indexation of Fees and Penalties’ 
<https://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/financial-management-government/indexation-fees-and-
penalties> accessed 22 July 2019. 
 
United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Reports: 2018 
Statistical Update’ (14 December 2018) <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update> 
accessed 14 October 2019. 
 
United Nations Office of Drug Control, ‘Basic Manual on the Detection and 
Investigation of the Laundering of Crime Proceeds Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<https://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/FULL10-UNODCVirtualCurrencies_final.pdf> 
accessed 10 June 2019. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘About the UNODC’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop> accessed 
02 September 2019. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Basic Manual on the Detection and 
Investigation of the Laundering of Crime Proceeds Using Virtual Currencies’ 
<http://www.imolin.org/pdf/UNODC_VirtualCurrencies_final_EN_Print.pdf> accessed 
01 September 2019. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Illicit Money: How Much is Out There?’ 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-
out-there.html> accessed 15 June 2015. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Political Declaration and Plan of Action 
on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to 
Counter the World Drug Problem’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/V0984963-English.pdf> accessed 
05 September 2019. 
 
 405 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘UNODC on Money Laundering and 
Countering the Financing of Terrorism’ <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-
laundering/index.html?ref=menuside> accessed 03 September 2019. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs Crime, ‘Signature and Ratification Status’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html> accessed 10 
June 2019. 
 
United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1617 (2005)’ 
<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1617> accessed 10 June 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘About Us’ <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/about-us> accessed 02 
September 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘Fifty First General Assembly Session: Agenda item 168, Renewing 
the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’ 
<https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/51/950> accessed 07 June 
2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘Functions and powers of the General Assembly’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘History of the United Nations’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html> accessed 
01 September 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘International Court of Justice’ <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘Secretariat’ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-
un/secretariat/index.html> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘Trusteeship Council’ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-
un/trusteeship-council/index.html> accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
United Nations, ‘What is the Security Council’ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/> 
accessed 02 September 2019. 
 
United Nations, Overview’ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-
un/overview/index.html> accessed 01 September 2019. 
 
United States Department of Justice, ‘Standard Chartered Bank Admits to Illegally 
Processing Transactions in Violation of Iranian Sanctions and Agrees to Pay More 
Than $1 Billion’ <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/standard-chartered-bank-admits-
illegally-processing-transactions-violation-iranian-sanctions> accessed 05 August 
2019. 
 
United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Virtual Currencies: Emerging 
Regulatory, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges’ 
<http://gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. 
 406 
 
United States Treasury, ‘National Money Laundering Risk Assessment’ 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%2
0%E2%80%93%2006-12-2015.pdf> accessed 5 September 2019. 
 
US Department of State, ‘2015 INCSR: Money Laundering/Financial Crimes 
Countries’ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/222471.htm> 
accessed 23 October 2019. 
 
US Department of State, ‘Duties of the Secretary of State’ 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/115194.htm> accessed 18 October 2019. 
 
US Department of the Treasury, ‘About>Terrorism and Financial Intelligence’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-
Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx> accessed 16 October 2019 
 
US Department of the Treasury, ‘Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’ <https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/role-of-the-treasury> 
accessed 20 October 2019. 
 
US Department of the Treasury, ‘National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2015’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%2
0%E2%80%93%2006-12-2015.pdf> accessed 20 November 2015. 
 
US Department of the Treasury, ‘Resource Centre – Money Laundering’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/Money-
Laundering.aspx> accessed 16 November 2015. 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘About the SEC’ 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml> accessed 04 December 2015. 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘Investor Alert: Beware of Fantasy Stock 
Trading Websites Offering Real Returns’ <https://www.investor.gov/news-
alerts/investor-alerts/investor-alert-beware-fantasy-stock-trading-websites> accessed 
18 December 2015. 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual 
Currency-Related Investments’ <http://www.investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-
alerts/investor-alert-bitcoin-other-virtual-currency-related-investments> accessed 18 
December 2015. 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘Investor Alert: Ponzi Schemes Using Virtual 
Currencies’ <https://www.investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-alerts/investor-alert-
ponzi-schemes-using-virtual-currencies> accessed 18 December 2015 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Halts $32 Million Scheme That 
Promised Riches from Amber Mining’ <https://www.investor.gov/news-alerts/press-
 407 
releases/sec-halts-32-million-scheme-promised-riches-amber-mining> accessed 18 
December 2015. 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘SPEECH - Anti-Money Laundering: An Often-
Overlooked Cornerstone of Effective Compliance’ 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/anti-money-laundering-an-often-overlooked-
cornerstone.html> accessed 04 December 2015. 
 
US Securities Exchange Commission, ‘Spotlight on Anti-Money laundering 
Rulemaking’ <https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/moneylaundering.htm> accessed 04 
December 2015. 
 
US Senate, ‘HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, 
Terrorist Financing Risks’ 
<https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-
us-finacial-system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks> accessed 05 
August 2016. 
 
US Department of Justice, ‘2007 National Money Laundering Strategy’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/nmls.pdf> accessed 20 November 2015. 
 
US Department of Justice, ‘Agencies’ <http://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart#OAG> 
accessed 03 December 2015. 
 
White & Chase, ‘New UK AML Action Plan – The Increased Role of the Private 
Sector’ (London, April 2016) 
<https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/new-
uk-aml-action-plan-the-increased-role-of-the-private-sector.pdf> accessed 15 
September 2019. 
 
Wilsons Auctions, ‘£500k of bitcoin seized from UK criminal to be auctioned, with no 
reserve!’ (19 September 2019) <https://www.wilsonsauctions.com/news/500k-of-
bitcoin-seized-from-uk-criminal-to-be-auctioned-with-no-reserve/> accessed 30 
September 2019. 
 
Wolfsberg Group, ‘Mission’ <https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/about/mission> 
accessed 14 October 2019. 
 
XE, ‘1 AUD to EUR = 0.628131 Euros’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=EUR&To=AUD> 
accessed 23 July 2019. 
 
XE, ‘1 AUD to USD = 0.700376 US Dollars’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=AUD&To=USD> 
accessed 23 July 2019. 
 
XE, ‘500,000 USD to AUD = 709,773.06 Australian Dollars’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=500%2C000&From=USD
&To=AUD> accessed 22 July 2019. 
 408 
 
XE, ‘EUR to USD Chart’ 
<http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=EUR&to=USD&view=5Y> accessed 24 
September 2019. 
 
XE, ‘USD per 1 GBP’ 
<http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=GBP&to=USD&view=5Y> accessed 23 
September 2019. 
 
XE, ‘USD per 1 XBT’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=USD&view=2Y> accessed 07 
August 2019. 
 
XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to GBP’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=GBP&view=5Y> accessed 12 
September 2019. 
 
XE, ‘XE Currency Charts: XBT to USD’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=XBT&to=USD&view=10Y> accessed 07 
October 2019. 
 
XE, ‘XE Currency Table: XBT - Bitcoin’ 
<https://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=XBT&date=2019-01-01> accessed 07 
August 2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
